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The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LX DECEMBER, 1966 NO. 4

POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE*

GABRIEL A. ALMOND
Stanford University

Like Rachel, Jacob's beloved but still childless bride, who asked herself and the Lord each morning, "Am I?," or "Can I?," so presidents of this Association on these annual occasions intermittently ask, "Are we a science?," or "Can we become one?" My predecessor, David Truman, raised this question last September applying some of the notions of Thomas Kuhn in his recent book on scientific revolutions.[1] I shall be following in Truman's footsteps, repeating much that he said but viewing the development of the profession from a somewhat different perspective and intellectual history. My comments will be organized around three assertions.

First, there was a coherent theoretical formulation in the American political theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Second, the development of professional political science in the United States from the turn of the century until well into the 1950's was carried on largely in terms of this paradigm, to use Kuhn's term. The most significant and characteristic theoretical speculation and research during these decades produced anomalous findings which cumulatively shook its validity.

Third, in the last decade or two the elements of a new, more surely scientific paradigm seem to be manifesting themselves rapidly. The core concept of this new approach is that of the political system.

Let me first develop my theme by the back door, so to speak, through some comments on the sociology of political science, arguing that we are becoming a science by inference from changes in the magnitude, structure, age distribution, and intellectual environment of the political science profession. Up to the time of the founding of the American Political Science Association, and going all the way back more than two millennia to Plato, the total number of political philosophers and theorists who had contributed to systematic speculation about and study of politics did not exceed a few hundred. In 1903 the fledgling American Political Science Association numbered a little over 200 members. In 1934 there were 1,800 members of the Association; in 1944, 3,200; in 1954, 6,000; and in 1966, 15,000. The expectation is that the membership will exceed 20,000 in the 1970's. Our Washington office assures us that we are the most rapidly growing discipline in the social sciences.

This extraordinary rate of growth is associated with the rate of growth of American higher education; the expansion of faculties, and the increasing division of labor which is resulting in separate departments of political science in existing universities and colleges or in new departments in newly founded institutions. This growth of the political science profession is primarily an American phenomenon. England has a few hundred members in its Political Studies Association. Japan has a few hundred political scientists. There are a few hundred more on the European continent and in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But nine out of every ten political scientists in the world today are American, and probably two out of every three political scientists who have ever lived are alive and practicing today. Though American preponderance is very great indeed, growth is occurring outside the United States as well. In Europe and elsewhere there is a noticeable shift from the single chair in the theory of the state, or political philosophy, to the American plan with a departmental division of labor similar to ours.

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* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 8, 1966.

[1] David B. Truman, "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 865–873; Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

These figures on the rate of growth of the profession make it clear that the professional accent is on youth Thus the eight or nine thousand new members who joined the Association between 1954 and 1966 must have created quite a bulge of young men in their thirties; and the anticipated growth in the profession in the next decade will probably increase this proportion of young men. I have been given to understand that a similar bulge in the proportion of young men in the population as a whole has some connection with the increased crime rate. It should not surprise us that this increased proportion of younger men should be associated with departure from norm and tradition in political science.

Furthermore, the growth of departments of political science at a rate exceeding the capacity of our graduate schools to produce Ph.D.'s means that these young men are scarce, are in a seller's market, and are being promoted rapidly, and becoming department chairmen and otherwise influential in the affairs of the profession. There are two aspects of this changing age distribution which call for comment.

First, young men are intellectually and professionally more innovative than older men. And second, younger men are more likely to have been trained in the newer approaches to political science and more effectively exposed to the intellectual currents of the times.

This brings me to my third point regarding the growth of the field. It is taking place in the age of the scientific revolution—indeed, it is an integral part of this revolution. There is hardly a major center of graduate training in the United States where scientific methods have not been accepted, or are in process of being accepted, and where the components of the scientific approach are not acknowledged to be important parts of graduate training. The use of quantitative methods, the use of the new research technology, sample surveys, rigorous logical methods, sociological, psychological, and anthropological theory, large-scale research undertakings, research grants, team research, surely are here to stay. An increasing proportion of the newer generation of political scientists has this kind of training, and this proportion will continue to grow. Indeed, we might argue the case that while political philosophy and political analysis are ancient fields of inquiry—primarily Mediterranean and European in their origins—political science as a profession, with specialization of interests, substantial research support, emphasis on systematic field research, and rigorous logical methods, is relatively new, and at the present time is almost entirely American.

If it is at the present time a predominantly American discipline, then we must particularly concern ourselves with political theory in America on the eve of the development of political science as a specialized discipline. The paradigm of American political theory in the nineteenth century consisted of the doctrines of separation of power, checks and balances, and the mixed constitution—theories of diverse origins, which had been combined in American political and constitutional thought into a coherent and relatively explicit empirical and normative theory of politics.

Let me briefly recount the historical background of this theory. Or better, let me present a swift sketch of these developments in the hope that my mistakes and oversimplifications may challenge more competent political theorists to do this essential job of relating contemporary notions to earlier concepts and formulations. From Plato and Aristotle, through Polybius and Cicero, Aquinas and others, there had been developed a partly differentiated theory or categorization of political activities or functions. Thus in his discussions of the *Laws* and in his references to historic political systems, Plato refers to different ways in which political activities such as choosing magistrates and legislators, proposing and ratifying laws, administering laws and justice may be assigned to particular institutions such as a popular assembly, a council, and a magistracy.[2] Aristotle deals with the consequences of differing patterns of distribution of activities among agencies for the form of the polity, and for its normative qualities. But neither Plato nor Aristotle systematically separates structure from function. Aristotle proposed a threefold categorization of powers of government—the deliberative, magistrative, and judicial. But it is obvious that in Aristotle these functions are not analytically separated from structures. It is true that he defines the *deliberative power* by its activities, assigning to it sovereignty on the issues of war, peace, and alliances, sovereignty in the enactment of laws, the control of the death penalty, and the appointment of magistrates. But he speaks of the *magistrative power* as consisting of the elected officials of the state and of the *judicial power* as being expressed in the system of law courts.[3]

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[2] Plato, *The Laws*, trans. B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), Book VI.

Actually, classical political theory is more a political sociology and psychology and a normative political theory than it is a theory of the political process. What goes on inside the black box of the political system and its consequences are inferred from the ways in which the social structure is represented in it. The Platonic, Aristotelian and later Roman classifications of types of political systems are far more explicit on the consequences of varieties of social stratification and their representation in political systems for their forms and their performance, than they are regarding the varieties of political decision-making processes. The bases of political classification are sociological rather than political, depending on whether a monarchy, an aristocracy, or the people predominate, or some combination of these three elements, or two of them. (This tendency is most marked in Aristotle who distinguishes four types of oligarchy and five types of democracy associated with different socio-economic stratification patterns.)[4] These three socio-political types are again divided normatively according to whether they govern in the interests of the ruling group or of the whole. The Greek and Roman theory of political development is a social-psychological theory, treating the pure forms of rule as inherently unstable because of their susceptibility to corruption stemming from sociological and psychological processes. Hence, the Greek and Roman theorists are advocates of the "mixed constitution" which, while lacking the structural simplicity of "lawful" monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, has the virtue of optimizing the values of stability, virtue, and liberty.

Greek and Roman political theory stressed the interrelations of social stratification with the political system as the basis of political classification and political change, leaving the internal operations of the political process in a relatively unelaborated form. The British political theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries focussed more sharply on the political system itself, emphasizing the internal division of functions and powers. The classical concepts of mixed constitution (*i.e.*, mixing of social status groups in the political system) and checks and balances (*i.e.*, the checking and balancing of the powers of social classes in the political system) were assimilated into a specifically political theory of separation of powers and checks and balances.

This development of political theory was brought about by British constitutional experience as interpreted by such theorists as Harrington, Lilburne, and Locke[5] and later by Montesquieu, who introduced the familiar threefold separation-of-powers conception. Struggle for an independent judiciary and over the legislative power of Parliament in the period from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth suggested such a functional, analytical, treatment of the political process. It was justified on grounds of efficiency, government in the common interest, the rule of law, and stability. In Montesquieu[6] separation of powers rather than the representation of status groups in the political system becomes the basis of political classification. Though he does not reject the Platonic and Aristotelian monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic categories, he introduces a new classification based on different ways of organizing the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Monarchies are differentiated from despotisms through the separation of judicial power from the legislative and the executive. And republics are separated from monarchies and despotisms by the separation of legislative from executive power.

Montesquieu does not reject the political sociology of the Greek and Roman theorists. The notions of mixed constitution and checks and balances are used in his partly erroneous treatment of the British constitution, where a social status system consisting of a royal family, an aristocracy, and a commons have special access to governmental powers and means of protecting this access from invasion by other social groupings. Nevertheless, the seventeenth and eighteenth century theorists moved toward a more analytically sophisticated theory in two respects. They came closer to making an analytical separation between social structure and political process, and in their theory of the political process they came closer to separating structure from function.

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[3] Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). See Book IV: Chapter XIV on the deliberative power; Chapter XV on magistrates; Chapter XVI on the judicial power.

[4] Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Book IV: Chapter IV on democracy; Chapter V on oligarchy.

[5] James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) (New York: G. Routledge & Sons, 1887); see John Lilburne and the Levellers in *The Leveller Tracts*, edited by William Haller and Godfrey Davies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government in Social Contract* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), especially chapters XI–XIV.

[6] Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949). Book XI, also II, V, VI.

The writers of *The Federalist Papers* go farther in analytical sophistication. The British theorists and Montesquieu, reflecting British constitutional experience with the separation of a judicial function and a legislative function from the powers of the crown and the feudal magnates, tend to treat the executive function residually. Hamilton and Madison, on the other hand, viewing these concepts from the perspective of American political and constitutional experience, and particularly from the point of view of the experiments in the state constitutions under the Articles of Confederation with powerful legislative bodies and weak executives, were forced to think more explicitly about the relations between the legislative and the executive functions. Thus, the theory of separation of powers as formulated in the *Federalist* is more of a systemic-equilibrium concept than that elaborated in Locke and Montesquieu. If we think of some of our contemporary, behaviorally oriented systems theorists as arrogant, it is instructive to read once again the remarks of the thirty-year-old Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 1.

> It has frequently been remarked, that, it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, to decide by their conduct and example, the important question, whether Societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions on accident and force. . . .

And in *Federalist* No. 9 he observes,

> The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. . . . The regular distribution of power into distinct departments, the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election; these are either wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times.[7]

This confidence was in part the product of general "Enlightenment optimism" and in part the special consequence of the fact that the writers of the *Federalist Papers* could benefit from a period of experimentation in constitution-making and from the informed and often analytically elegant debates of the Constitutional Convention. The explanatory power of their theories was an intoxicating experience. Perhaps I go too far when I suggest that the contemporary renascence of creative political theory is again associated with a period of experimentation in constitution-making and nation building, this time on a world scale in the explosions into nationhood of the last decades. And again, we have a generation of political theorists searching for an explanatory, predictive, and manipulative political theory. But I shall return to this theme at a later point.

It is in the formulation of the *Federalist Papers*, then, and in the early commentaries on the American Constitution, that we first get a clear-cut and explicit functional theory of separation of powers. Each power is positively defined, as generic aspects of political systems. Varieties of political systems are classified according to the ways in which these functions are allocated among political institutions. Tyrannies combine the legislative, executive, and judicial functions in a single institution or structure. The early political systems of the states are treated as unstable republican systems because they fail to separate the three functions effectively. The legislative function is inherently dominant; and true balance and separation can only be maintained by checks and balances, by some mixture of functions among the structures, by according some legislative power to the executive and courts, some executive power to the legislative, and so forth. A political system with separation of power, duly checked and balanced to maintain the separation, is in a state of internal equilibrium, and is in a state of equilibrium with the other components of the general society, the individual, the family, the community, religious groups, and the economy. Separation of powers with checks and balances maintains a stable social order, combining justice with liberty and equality.[8]

Mixed-constitution doctrine still appears in an attenuated form in the *Federalist Papers*. But it must be remembered that for most of the earlier theorists the mixed constitution doctrine implied a balancing of *estates*—monarchy, aristocracy and clerical hierarchy, and commons. The early American republic had no estates. It had holders of different amounts and forms of property and the propertyless. Separation of powers and checks and balances provided for access for these economic interest groups to the various functions in the political process. An indirectly elected executive and senate, a popular legislative assembly, an appointive judiciary, different electorates for different agencies, connected the specifically political theory of separation of powers with the less differentiated political-sociological theory of the classical writers.[9]

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[7] *The Federalist*, Beloff edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), No. 1, and No. 9.

[8] *Ibid.* See Nos. 9–10 on factions, No. 47 on separation of powers, No. 51 on checks and balances.

These propositions became the dominant American political theory of the first half of the nineteenth century. There was of course a political-constitutional polemic. But the early American Jacobins, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians challenged the specifics; they did not themselves propose alternative general theories of politics. The validity of the threefold scheme is taken for granted, and the virtues of some version of separation and checks are acknowledged.

But in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as professional university-based political science began to develop, almost with its first breath so to speak, questions were raised as to the validity of the theory in its whole and in its parts. Woodrow Wilson,[10] A. Lawrence Lowell,[11] Frank Goodnow,[12] among others, pressed for a sharper analytic distinction between structure and function, striving to free empirical political science from the earlier assumptions of necessary relations between them. Wilson and Goodnow explicitly rejected the threefold distinction in favor of a twofold one between politics and administration.[13] A. Lawrence Lowell tried to find a legitimate place for the bargaining function of the party politician in the theory of the political process,[14] while Arthur Bentley rejected structural-functional theory in favor of an interest-group theory of the political process.[15] All of them rejected formalism, whether legal or ideological, in favor of a study of the facts—real operations, performance, behavior.

Thus, on the eve of the emergence of American political science as a large-scale, empirically oriented discipline there was considerable theoretical ferment. But while the separation-of-powers theory was under attack, the two more elaborate efforts at proposing alternative general theories of the political process—those of Goodnow and Bentley—had surprisingly little resonance at the level of general theory. There was no general theoretical polemic at this time, but rather a strong anti-theoretical, empirical movement which gathered momentum after World War I, questioning in an ad hoc way the whole separation-of-powers scheme—the threefold division of functions, the association of particular functions with particular structures, and the assumptions of the normative consequences of separation of powers.

Several scholarly generations of empiricists and "middle range" theorists followed in the wake of these "turn of the century" theorists, pointing to a division of functions among governmental agencies quite different from the classic conception of separation of powers. The judiciary was shown to be a significant lawmaker; executives were demonstrated to be the primary legislative agencies; administrative agencies were represented as being legislators and adjudicators; and legislative bodies were pictured as modifiers, legitimators, aggregators, and not as legislators at all. And yet while they rejected separation-of-powers concepts, they were still prisoners of the theory, reflected by efforts to reconcile these anomalies at least with the nomenclature of separation of powers. Thus the legislative and adjudicative powers of administrative agencies were referred to as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial.

Similarly other scholars in the period roughly from World War I on into the present challenged separation-of-powers theory as an inadequate categorization of the political process. Thus the students of political parties, following Lowell's insight, developed a theory of the party and the politician as a system of brokerage, bargaining, aggregation. But there is no place in separation of powers theory for a brokerage or bargaining function. It was reconciled as a function which could impart coherence to a separation-of-powers, checks-

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[9] *Ibid.* See Nos. 52–53 on the House of Representatives, Nos. 62–63 on the Senate, Nos. 67–77 on the Executive, Nos. 78–83 on the Judiciary.

[10] Woodrow Wilson, *The State* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1898), Chapter III.

[11] A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Physiology of Politics," this REVIEW, 4 (February, 1910), 1–15.

[12] Frank J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900), Chapter I.

[13] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, 2 (June, 1887), 197–222; Frank J. Goodnow, *op. cit.*, Chapter I.

[14] A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York: David McKay Company, 1914), pp. 61–64.

[15] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

and-balances, and federal system.[16] Students of pressure groups and the lobby in their search for theoretical legitimation spoke of the lobby and pressure groups as a "third chamber of the legislature."[17] And finally students of the media of communication, in similar efforts to fit these institutions into the political process resorted to such strained analogies as "America's House of Lords," or "the fourth branch of government."[18]

The ethical justification of separation-of-powers theory also came in for attack. The assumption that separation of powers was not only a natural and efficient organization of the political process, but a sure guarantor of the preservation of order and liberty, was challenged by those who questioned the identification of liberty with a governmental system with limited powers to legislate for mass welfare, a governmental system that provided institutionally for oligarchic interests. A groping began here to make a sharper analytic separation between empirical and normative propositions and to subject assertions about the ethical consequences of structural-functional arrangements to empirical examination. But even in this area there was no principled effort to replace separation of powers with another general theory. While there were populistic political theorists who favored direct legislation and simple majority rule, and other political theorists who were influenced by Marx, Michels, and Pareto, they founded no schools of political theory in America. There was a certain uneasiness, even guilt feeling, among these empirical iconoclasts. Students of Merriam will recall that he brooded now and then about the unwritten *Allgemeine Staatslehre* which he had in his bones. And an earlier generation of students of public administration will recall the search for "principles."[19]

There was indeed a certain uneasiness about this atheoretic orientation. It was in part the consequence of a cumulative sense of the inadequacy of the theory of separation of powers as a scheme for dealing with political reality and in part a nostalgia for the great tradition of political theory which dealt with first principles. What general theory we had was attenuating, and to all intents and purposes creative political theorizing as a discipline had ceased to exist on any significant scale. And this condition could continue as long as one component of the original theory survived. This was the Enlightenment faith in the irreversibility of the relation between the spread of knowledge and education and the diffusion of the rule of law, popular participation in the political process, and government by intelligent deliberation—in other words, some version of the separation-of-powers system. This was the final anomaly, the final disconfirmation, the disproof of prediction at the hands of history which turned us back to theory again.

Half a century or more ago the universe of political systems as seen by Anglo-American political philosophers and theorists had a hierarchic structure. At the peak were the Anglo-American systems representing man's highest attainment of the Enlightenment ideals of reason, liberty, justice, and equality. Other systems were viewed according to their distance from or proximity to these morally and historically leading systems. These systems were the primary objects of study, since the historical process was moving in these directions. The relationship between the Enlightenment faith and the empirical iconoclastic approach is beautifully illustrated in the work of Charles Merriam, who perhaps more than any other American political scientist of his generation shook the validity of various elements of separation-of-powers theory. With an Enlightenment faith as strong as his one could break idol after idol of the separation-of-powers scheme and still get along without an alternative general theory of politics. This became increasingly difficult for his students who not only saw a new world of political reality coming, but had to inhabit it, make some intellectual order and meaning out of it. It became difficult to believe simply in the idea of progress in a world in which fascism could capture strongholds in Western culture. It became painfully difficult to think of communism as a historical digression, as it seized power in Russia, moved into Eastern Europe and China, and threatened Western Europe. It became intellectually impossible to accept either a separation-of-powers approach or a predominantly empirical approach in the analysis of the unstable phenomena of the new nations of the post-World War II period.

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[16] See inter al. E. Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1940); E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942). See also Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York: Henry Holt, 1949), Chapters VI and VII for a critique of separation-of-powers theory in terms to those developed here.

[17] E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation before Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 18; Harwood L. Childs, *Labor and Capital in National Politics* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930); Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, *American Politics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), p. 753.

[18] See inter al. Harold L. Ickes, *America's House of Lords: An Inquiry into the Freedom of the Press* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939); Douglas Cater, *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959). For an analytical discussion of the function of the press in the process of policy making and citations of the literature see Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 31 ff.

[19] L. D. White, *Introduction to Public Administration* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926); see particularly the third edition (1948) for a discussion of principles of public administration.

Thus far we have described a sequence much like that presented by Thomas Kuhn in his theory of scientific revolutions.[20] If it does not quite fit his model, then we must remember that the social sciences may have a dialectic somewhat different from the physical and biological sciences. At any rate, we begin with a dominant paradigm, a formulation of the subject matter of political analysis, specifying variables, parameters, their relations and consequences. Political science as normal science, as a professional discipline in America, begins with problems suggested by this theory, turning up anomalous finding after anomalous finding which are reconciled with strained formulations such as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, third chambers, fourth estates, or fourth branches of government. The final anomaly—the disproof of Enlightenment-historical predictions—breaks the back of the traditional conceptual scheme and an era of theoretical speculation, of new candidates for paradigms begins.

I cannot escape a certain uneasiness about Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. I have the impression that in the interest of making his point about the discontinuous aspect of scientific growth, he understates the element of continuity, of cumulativeness. Normal science is treated as somewhat more orthodox than may often be the case. And the discontinuities may be treated as more innovative. At any rate in the development of political science in America, the generation of empirical researchers who turned up the anomalies, had been preceded by more speculative theorists who argued that the anomalies would be there if we looked. And the empirical students of legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, of parties, pressure groups, and communication, were operating with process and functional concepts which were the direct ancestors of contemporary system and functional concepts. The relationship is quite clear. The concept of process, as Easton points out, preceded that of system. The one may be said to have led to the other.[21]

The introduction of the system concept represents a genuinely important step in the direction of science. It is a step comparable in significance to the ones taken in Enlightenment political theory over the earlier classic formulations, comparable in significance to the analytical-empirical achievements of the political process movement in American political science in the first half of the twentieth century. Taking place in the era of the scientific revolution it represents a surer thrust into the culture of modern science. This may be a premature account of its intellectual origins, but surely Merriam's prophetic *New Aspects of Politics*,[22] Lasswell's brilliant early analysis of "the state as a manifold of events,"[23] and the generalization of the concept of process and of interaction in the work of Herring, Schattschneider, Odegard, and Key in their studies of the interrelations of interest groups, political parties, bureaucracy, and executives illuminated a new horizon in political science. If these scholars spied out the land, then we might say that men such as Truman, Easton, Dahl, Deutsch,[24] and others have been moving across the Jordan to possess it.

A new paradigm is surely developing in political science. Its first formulations are crude, partial, and often pretentious. But theory formulation will undoubtedly go forward with the rapid growth of the profession and with the high capabilities and research opportunities of an increasing proportion of its members. What are some of the principal features of this emerging approach?

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[20] Thomas Kuhn, *op. cit.*, Chapters III–VII.

[21] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), pp. 96 ff. and 160 ff.

[22] Charles E. Merriam, *New Aspects of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925).

[23] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), Chapter XIII.

[24] See David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951); David Easton, *op. cit.* and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) and *Modern Political Analysis* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55. (September, 1961), 493–514; V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th. ed. (New York: Crowell and Company, 1964).

1) The first is a statistical approach to the universe of political systems. We no longer focus simply on the "great powers," but are concerned with sampling the total universe of man's experiments with politics, contemporary and historical, national, sub-national, and international. Increasingly, we select our cases for study in order to test hypotheses about the relations between variables—environmental influences on politics, political influences on the environment, and the interaction of political variables with each other. The comparative method is used more rigorously, in a self-conscious search for control, not only in cross-national comparisons, but in sub-national comparisons and international system comparisons as well.[25]

2) A second significant characteristic of this emerging paradigm of political science is the differentiation and specification of variables and the assumptions of probability and reflexivity in their relations. Thus, in our efforts to establish the properties of political systems, compare them with each other, and classify them into types, we explicitly separate structure from function, structure from culture, social systems from political systems, empirical properties from their normative implications. We tend to view the individual political system as a universe of interactions and make case studies of its operations according to some sampling strategy. The result is a movement away from black-and-white typecasting, toward classification based on statements of probability of process and performance patterns which enable us to compare, explain, and evaluate more precisely.[26]

3) The emerging analytical framework in contemporary political theory is the concept of system whether it is employed at the level of sub-national, regional, or structural units such as communities, legislative bodies or committees, at the level of national political units, or at the level of the international political system. The principal advantage of the system concept is that it analytically differentiates the object of study from its environment, directs attention to the interaction of the system with other systems in its environment, to its own conversion characteristics, and to its maintenance and adaptive properties. In the development of the political system concept, Lasswell's seven functional categories of the decision process and Easton's demand-support-output model represent post-separation-of-powers efforts at postulating sets of categories which are logically distinct and universally applicable. The scientific approach to categorization is the modest approach of the coder, rather than that of the philosopher. There is constant revision of the code as it is used to organize data. The ease with which we can get and analyze data these days gives us a secular attitude toward our categories. They have a short and instrumental life, and we avoid becoming their prisoners as we once were of separation-of-powers concepts.

In this search for an adequate system of functional categories, one thing seems to be clear. Our analytical framework has to enable us to relate three aspects of the functioning of political systems. We need functional categories in order to describe and compare political systems at the level of their performance—as systems interacting with other systems in their domestic and international environments. We need functional categories which will enable us to describe and compare political systems according to their internal conversion processes. And finally we need functional categories in order to describe and compare political systems according to their maintenance and adaptive characteristics. Modern political theory will consist in good part of a logic which will enable us to relate changes in the performance of political systems to changes in internal process and conversion patterns and to changes in recruitment and socialization patterns. Another part of it will consist of a logic which will enable us to move from empirical relationships to normative judgments.

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[25] Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), Conclusion; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960); Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government, op. cit.* and "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *op. cit.*, Bruce Russett, et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1963); Heinz Eulau, "Comparative Political Analysis: A Methodological Analysis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (November, 1962), 397–407.

[26] In this connection see Robert Dahl, *op. cit.;* Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1965); and Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *op cit.*, Chapter I.

4) The Enlightenment theory of progress toward democracy and the rule of law is giving way to a multi-linear theory of political development leading us to break through the historical and cultural parochialism of the field. Enlightenment theory began with the leviathan state and postulated as the legitimate problem of political theory that of bringing the leviathan under control through institutional and legal checks and balances, and through popular processes. Modern political theory has to ask how the leviathan itself comes into existence, in order to cope with the intellectual problems of understanding the political prospects and processes of the new nations. We are beginning to break through the historical barrier of the French Revolution and the ethnic barrier of Western Europe, reaching into historical and anthropological data for knowledge of the variety of political development patterns. And we are on the eve of a search for rational choice theories of political growth—an approach which may make political theory more relevant to public policy. Like the authors of the *Federalist Papers*, contemporary political theorists are inescapably confronted with the problem of how resources may be economically allocated to affect political change in preferred directions. The justification for this quest for an allocation-of-resources theory of political development is not only its relevance to central concerns of public policy, but its uses as a test of the validity and power of our theories. It forces us to place our bets, set the odds, and confront straightforwardly the issue of the kind of prediction which is possible in political science.

These developments are not matters of the remote future; they are already to be observed in the thrust of the various sub-fields of political science. Thus, American political studies are moving out of their parochial orientation in the search for the illumination and increased rigor which can be gained through cross-national and sub-national comparison.[27] We are discovering that the American political system, no matter how much we love it, is still a political system comparable to other systems and that we can perhaps love it better as we acquire the perspective and illumination which systematic and rigorous comparison make possible. Some of the subdisciplines of political science—political parties, interest groups, public opinion and communication, bureaucracy—previously based almost entirely on American experience, are increasingly treated in system terms and in a cross-national, comparative context. As the mood of the cold war changes from obsession to concern, Soviet and Communism studies are becoming more systemic and comparative. The newest developments in international relations theory reflect the impact of system concepts and comparative methods. Political theory begins to show signs of claiming its role as the systematizer, codifier, hypothesis formulator, and ethical evaluator of the field as a whole.

It has been the great privilege of the subdiscipline of comparative politics to have acted as a catalyst in this process of professional development. Because of the existing division of labor, comparative politics dealt with European, Asian, African, and Latin American political systems. Leaving out as it did the American and Communist political systems in an empirical, though not in a theoretical sense, it could avoid the pressures of ethnocentrism and the distortions of the Cold War. And, confronted by the exotic and unstable phenomena of the new and modernizing nations, it was uniquely challenged by the problems of comparison, classification, and change, and led in the search for analytical frameworks and categories suitable for coping with these intellectual problems. It is not accidental that it fell to comparative politics to be particularly active in reestablishing the relationship between the analysis of individual political systems and their classes and varieties with general political theory, and that it dramatized the necessity of reforging the links between historical political theory, empirical political theory, and normative political theory.

A future historian of political science may find it suggestive to compare the fate of comparative politics with that of the Liberal Party of Britain which, having accustomed the Tories to competition and accommodation and having socialized the elites of the working classes into a common bargaining culture, found that it had put itself out of political business, so to speak. So the field of comparative politics pressing into strange lands and experimenting with exotic concepts may really have been leading political science back to the thread of continuity in the field and putting itself out of business as a distinctive subdiscipline. For comparison, whether it be in the experiment, in the analysis of the results of quantitative surveys, or in the observation of process and behavior in different contexts in the real world, is the very essence of the scientific method. It makes no sense to speak of a comparative politics in political science, since if it is a science, it goes without saying that it is comparative in its approach. And in time the significant message of comparative politics will be assimilated on the one hand into political theory and on the other into the analytical frameworks and methodologies of the empirical studies we make whether they be in American urban areas or legislative bodies, in Sub-Saharan Africa or in the international arena. This is no small mortal span, and it is not yet complete.

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[27] Robert Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); John C. Wahlke, et al., *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); Robert E. Agger, et al., *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

These trends toward rigor and scope, systematic exploration of the consequences for politics of social and psychological variables, and the formulation of general analytical frameworks represent a significant step into the modern world of science. And the rate of growth and professionalization of political science give promise that the intellectual rate of growth will be correspondingly rapid. It may very well be that there is no word of counsel, of caution, which the older Turks can give to the young ones, no unexplored area or neglected problem in the field which this numerous, talented, and highly skilled generation has not already anticipated or soon will encounter and solve more effectively than those who preceded them.

It may, however, be appropriate to point out that the persisting bipolar conflict in the field between humanists and behavioralists conceals a lively polemic within both camps and perhaps particularly among the so-called behavioralists. Among the modernists neologisms burst like roman candles in the sky, and wars of epistemological legitimacy are fought. The devotees of rigor and theories of the middle range reject more speculative general theory as non-knowledge; and the devotees of general theory attack those with more limited scope as technicians, as answerers in search of questions.

In my comments this evening I have tried to relate contemporary general theory to the great tradition. Or better, I have presented a plea to our political theorists to do this job of forging the links between past, present, and future more effectively than I possibly can. I attach special importance to this task since confusion, even loss, of identity is inevitably associated with professional growth. And when quantitative and qualitative growth occur at such extraordinary rates, the confusion and conflict may be multiplied. If Dahl was correct when he wrote the epitaph for a monument to a successful protest, then it may be that the battle of science has been won, and this may be an appropriate moment for the victors to take a look back at their intellectual origins.

If we consider the tradition of political science and the place of political science in the university curriculum, it becomes quite clear that, while drawing heavily upon other disciplines, political science is not science in general and not social science. However we define it, we have a limited and special responsibility for the political aspects of the social process. Our past imposes this structural restraint upon us; and the existence of anthropology, sociology, law, history, philosophy, statistics, economics, and mathematics within the community of the university confronts us with an inescapable problem of intellectual and institutional boundaries. We are not the best judges of psychological, sociological, mathematical, and statistical competence, though we are or should be the best judges of the appropriateness and usefulness of the application of these disciplines to the special field in which we have or should have the highest competence.

Whatever political science may become, one of its peculiarly important ingredients will be what it has been. And here let me argue that we have no cause for shame in this past. Surely the dominant element in this tradition is our special relation to the problem of violence and coercion in human affairs. This mission becomes peculiarly central in the political theory of the Enlightenment when the secular optimism of the Age of Reason led men to the conviction that this ethically dangerous—even normally wicked—instrumentality might be tamed and put to humane and constructive work. This is no small tradition, and it is peculiarly ours. The Enlightenment theorists were not only convinced that this was their mission, but that it was in sure process of being accomplished. We are less sure of the outcome of this confrontation of knowledge and violence.

My friends will recall that I have never been able to resist the temptation of quoting Scripture, even when another book would do. I ask them to indulge me once again as I return to the childless Rachel seeking to remind the Lord of the role he had assigned her in his plan for man's redemption. She resorts to a desperate strategem. She gives Jacob her handmaiden Bilhah as a concubine, and then acts as midwife receiving the two boys, Dan and Naphtali on her knees. It would take the compassionate and ironic fantasy of Thomas Mann to interpret this strategem of Rachel. The good book in its powerful and compact way simply tells the tale, and then moves on to the eventual birth of Rachel's Joseph, Jacob's favorite son and the instrument of Israel's salvation. My own theory is that there was no magic here, but simply a primitive form of suggestion therapy as Rachel sought to overcome her own sterility by sharing her simple handmaiden's fertility. But the point of the tale for my purposes this evening is that never, not even in the extremity of her childless grief, did Rachel confuse Bilhah's progeny with her own unborn Joseph. Her mission was still before her; her labor still undone.

Yet I sometimes have the impression that for many of us in the camp of the behavioralists, the intoxication of new research technologies, and the explanatory power of insights from other disciplines has obscured this mission—our own unborn Joseph—which is passed on to us inescapably by our past and imposed on us by our present division of labor. If this is true, or rather let me put it this way, to the extent that this is true, we are in danger of becoming alienated from our special professional culture and from the powerful motivation which comes from having a significant part in the solution of the ultimate problem of man's enlightenment.

TRANSACTION FLOWS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM*

STEVEN J. BRAMS
Institute for Defense Analyses

When we speak of an *international system,* we start with the presumption that there is something habitual and regular about the behavior of the nations that constitute it. Unfortunately, the concept of an international system has had a singularly hollow ring in the works of many scholars who have employed the term. It is frequently compared to an incredibly complicated watch or thermostat, or alternatively it is defined so abstractly that it would appear to have no specific empirical referents—and therefore practically everything in one way or another would qualify as a "system."[1]

The abstract and shadowy significance of the concept in international relations studies has retarded its usefulness for exploring the regularities that underlie the interactions of nations. More than ever before, however, the actions of nations have multiple reverberations on each other and can be ascribed meaning only within the context of the relations of many nations with each other. Because the configuration of inter-nation relations has become increasingly complex, it has become more and more difficult to trace out these relations and determine what structure, if any, there is in the "system."

We shall see later that any definition of a system is arbitrary to the extent that its inclusion and exclusion rules are arbitrary. If we can specify the simplifying assumptions which create this arbitrariness, however, then the problematic cases included or excluded in a system or component subsystems can usually be identified and explained. This approach seems preferable to positing systems criteria that are either ambiguous or non-operational, enriching the vocabulary but not the analysis. Our first task, then, is to describe systems concretely; only after having done this will we be able to assess their theoretical significance.

I. THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH

To analyze the relations of nations in the *international* system seems to me to be qualitatively different from comparing characteristics of nations or aspects of *national* behavior. The systemic approach deals specifically with the relations of nations: their substance and significance, the form they take vis-à-vis other nations, and the effect of this form on national behavior. By comparison, the cross-national approach asks about a nation's behavior: what it is, how it compares with other nations, and how it affects a nations's relations. At the level of explanation in international relations, the relations of nations are used to explain aspects of national behavior in the systemic approach while aspects of national behavior are used to explain the relations of nations in the cross-national approach.[2]

This conceptual distinction between questions of relations-affecting-behavior (the systemic approach) and behavior-affecting-relations (the cross-national approach) should not be confused with J. David Singer's dichotomization of different *levels* of analysis into systemic and subsystemic. In pointing out that each level of analysis carries certain theoretical assets and liabilities, Singer does not postulate any explanatory direction from relations to nations or vice-versa.[3] It is our purpose, how-

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[1] For a critical review of work in "general systems theory," see Rolo Handy and Paul Kurtz, "A Current Appraisal of the Behavioral Sciences," *American Behavioral Scientist,* 7 (March, 1964, supplement), 137–141.

[2] The most complete treatment of the question of causation in international relations can be found in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). See also Jay S. Goodman, "The Concept of 'System' in International Relations Theory," *Background,* 8 (February 1965), 257–268.

[3] "Though the systemic model does not necessarily preclude comparison and contrast among the national subsystems, it usually eventuates in rather gross comparisons based on relatively crude dimensions and characteristics": J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics,* 14 (October 1961), p. 83. The subsystemic model, though also comparative, "permits significant differentiation among our actors in the international system": *ibid.*, p. 82.

ever, to clarify the directions in which explanation may proceed by differentiating two *units* of analysis—nations and relations—at Singer's systemic or "big-picture" level of analysis. This distinction between units alerts us to the differences between the characteristics of the points that make up the picture (nations) and the lines (relations) that connect the points. Roughly speaking, the substance of the points is subordinated in the systemic approach in order to highlight the relations of nations; the substance of the lines is subordinated in the cross-national approach in order to highlight the behavior of nations. Ultimately, both approaches (at the systemic level of analysis) seek to explain *international* behavior—that is, the behavior of nations in the international system—in contradistinction to the behavior of nations qua nations.

While both approaches seem necessary for the development and enrichment of international relations theory, the recent balance in empirical research weighs heavily in favor of the cross-national approach.[4] Partially to offset this imbalance and partially to demonstrate the utility of the systemic approach, I shall attempt to show how the juxtaposition of different formal definitions of subsystems can shed light on the structure and functioning of the international system. The use of the concept of system in internationa relations necessarily implies specifying the relations of its members, and this I shall do through the analysis of different kinds of transactions which nations have with each other. My main interest will not be to describe the individual transactions of nations with each other, however, but to amplify higher-order relationships that bring out what coherence there is in the *totality* of their transactions. As Ernst B. Haas has pointed out,

> The system is not made up of specific trade between Canada and Mexico, war between Cambodia and Thailand, emigration from Greece to Argentina, American-directed subversion in Russia or Russian-directed subversion in America, or any of the other myriad transactions and relationships that have made up international relations. Instead, the system consists of the relationships among the *patterns* of trade, war, migration, and subversion as . . . [interpreted] by outside observers. . . . Systems may stress or slight the empirical world; what matters is that the empirical world need not be aware of the system.[5]

The system must take cognizance of the empirical world, however, and assumptions about behavior within the system must be grounded in fact wherever possible.

The different kinds of transaction flows selected for analysis are diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGO's).[6] While each of these flows may involve the exchange between countries of either people, goods, or services—or some combination of all three—all minimally involve the transfer of some information from one country to another. Diplomats, trade dollars, and colleagues in IGO's are all stocks (in the economist's usage) at a particular point in time, but each contributes over time to the *flow* of messages between countries.

It is from this flow of messages that decision-makers fashion images of other countries. Their perceptions of everything that happens in the world are conditioned by these images and the international transaction flows which reinforce or cast doubt upon them. The attitudes and behavior of decision-makers toward foreign affairs are also determined by cultural and ideological factors, as well as personality traits and role expectations, but the effect of information from the environment on the behavior of a nation's decision-makers would appear to be substantial in most cases.[7] The three kinds of transaction flows which we shall analyze are certainly primary sources of this information, though we shall not attempt here to assess their relative influence on national decision-making processes.[8]

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[4] Recent substantial contributions to the compilation and analysis of aggregate cross-national data include Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Bruce M. Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964); and Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). Cross-national comparisons of data presented later in this article are given in Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics* forthcoming.

[5] Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 53, italics in original.

[6] Diplomatic exchanges refer to the number of career-level diplomats each country received from all other countries in 1963–64, as reported in lists of diplomats in 104 national capitals published by the host countries. Trade data are for 112 countries in 1962 and were taken from the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Direction of Trade, Annual 1958–62* (Washington, D. C., 1964). The number of memberships in 161 IGO's which each country shared in 1963 with every one of 117 other countries was computer-calculated from the country-IGO table given in the *Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations: United Nations* (New York: Worldmark Press, 1963), pp. 258–265.

Before proceeding to an analysis of the transaction-flow data, it is necessary to indicate what we mean when we say that two countries are related to each other in the international system. Our intuitive notion is that two countries are somehow related or salient to each other when they are not indifferent to each other's behavior. We assume that for two countries to pass above a threshold of indifference and be salient to each other, a certain level of communication must exist between them. In order to determine this level and define operationally the concept of salience, we have used the transaction-flow model, which we shall first describe in terms of the diplomatic-exchange data and then indicate how it can be applied to the analysis of the other kinds of transaction-flow data.

II. THE TRANSACTION-FLOW MODEL

Accepting provisionally the correspondence between the size of a diplomatic mission and the magnitude of its message traffic with its foreign office,[9] we postulate that the number of diplomats which country A sends to country B is an indicator of the salience of B to A's decision-makers. If B were a large country, we would expect A to send to B a higher proportion of its diplomats than if B were a small country. The transaction-flow model enables us to translate these proportions into actual estimates of the number of diplomats which each country exchanges, under the assumption that A will allocate to B approximately the same percentage of its diplomats as that percentage of the world's diplomats which B receives from all countries combined. If B receives one percent of the world's diplomats, for example, the model predicts that A (as well as all other countries) will send approximately one percent of its diplomatic corps to B.[10] In other words, the country of origin (A) of a diplomat has no effect on his country of destination (B); we assume only that, if T is the total number of diplomats in the world and b is the total number of diplomats received by B, A (and all other countries) sends b/T of its diplomats to B. Origin-destination independence, the fundamental assumption of the model, thus implies that diplomats are perfectly mobile and are distributed only on the basis of the total number of diplomats which each country sends to and receives from all other countries.[11] Because the model is indifferent to all other factors in the system, it is sometimes referred to as an indifference, or null, model.

The preceding description applies to the transaction-flow model as it was originally developed by I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, where only a country's transactions with itself are excluded from the movement of transaction flows.[12] The unrestricted movement of diplomats to all other countries is quite an unrealistic assumption, however, since the average country exchanges missions with less than one-quarter of all other countries in the world.[13] It makes sense, therefore, to apply the origin-destination assumption only to the prediction of exchanges for those countries that actually exchange diplomats with each other and not to predict levels for the non-existent exchanges.[14] This is precisely the modification that Leo A. Goodman has made in the Savage-Deutsch model, and his modified transaction-flow model was the one used in this analysis.[15]

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[7] The effect appears to be greatest when information from the environment is rich and differentiated. See Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics*, 14 (October 1961), p. 100.

[8] For a discussion of the political significance of each of these transaction flows, see Steven J. Brams, *Flow and Form in the International System* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966), pp. 29–37.

[9] For limited empirical evidence of this correspondence, see *ibid.*, pp. 70–71.

[10] Actually, the model predicts that A will send slightly more than one percent of its corps to B, since A is not allowed by the model to send diplomats to itself. Those diplomats which this "no self-exchange" restriction disallows are, in effect, spread around to other countries.

[11] Predictions might also be based on the population or national income of a country. Such a procedure is suggested by Georgio Mortara for measuring the relative intensity of trade flows. See his "Indices of the Intensity of Trade between Two Countries," *PROD Translations* [*American Behavioral Scientist*], 3 (February 1960), 14–20. For a "polarization" index of trade flows, see Paul Smoker, "Trade, Defence and the Richardson Theory of Arms Races: A Seven Nation Study," *Journal of Peace Research*, 2 (1965), 161–176.

[12] I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 28 (July 1960), 551–572. For a computer program of this model, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Behavioral Science*, 7 (October 1962), 498–499.

[13] Alger and Brams, *op. cit.*

Even excluding predictions for the non-existent exchanges, we know that diplomatic exchanges are not indifferent to all variables but the sending and receiving totals of countries. It is convenient to take this size factor into account at the outset, however, by measuring the deviations of actual exchanges from those predicted by the indifference model. In this way, the predicted (or expected) diplomatic exchanges can serve as a *baseline* against which to compare the actual exchanges in order to determine those cases where there is a greater-than-expected exchange of diplomatic personnel and, presumably, a heightened awareness of a country's decision-makers for the affairs of another country. Expressing the deviation in relative terms, the relative acceptance (RA) of country j for country i's diplomats—that is, the *salience* of j to i—is the difference between the actual (A) and expected (E) exchanges, divided by the expected exchange:

$$RA_{ij} = \frac{A_{ij} - E_{ij}}{E_{ij}} \quad \text{where} \quad -1 < RA_{ij} < \infty.$$

The two RA's for each pair of countries i and j give us a first approximation of their mutual "political awareness" or, conversely, the effective "political distance" which separates them.[16] The distance vectors for all pairs of countries could be considered a weighted average of such component factors as geographical proximity, ideological compatibility, and cultural homogeneity, whose relative effects might be tested for in a regression analysis.

The *awareness* of a nation's decision-makers for the affairs of a foreign country could be operationalized in terms of the proportion of time they devote to following its affairs. This concept is one step removed from salience, which we have related directly to the message flows generated by diplomats. Since we do not have any way of correlating the schedules of decision-makers with message flows, we shall assume that the salience of a country to a nation's decision-makers, and their awareness of its affairs, exhibit a one-to-one correspondence. For the purpose of drawing out some of the implications of the transaction-flow model in the discussion that follows, we shall further assume that receiving country j is *salient* to sending country i if RA_{ij} is greater than a specified amount.

Because the indifference model allocates both positive and negative RA's to every nation, large nations with envoys in many countries will, of course, ordinarily have more salient (as well as non-salient) exchanges than small nations with envoys in only a few countries. In this sense large nations will be more involved in the world arena, but only because they have envoys in many countries, not because of the magnitude of their exchanges. These two senses of size—the total number of exchanges of a nation, and the size of the missions which are exchanged—may be related not only to each other but also to a third size variable, the total number of diplomats in the capitals of the countries to which a nation sends its diplomats.

In the model which we have used, the number of salient diplomatic exchanges of nation i—that is, the number of its RA_{ij}'s that exceed some predetermined level, k—is a function of all three of these size variables. While it is readily apparent that the number of salient RA's of nation i will depend on the number of countries j with which it has exchanges (size variable one), as well as the actual sizes (A_{ij}'s) of these exchanges (size variable two), the connection between the number of nation i's salient RA's and the size of the diplomatic communities (A_{ij}'s) in host countries j (size variable three) is slightly less obvious.

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[14] If the predictions for the non-existent exchanges in the Savage-Deutsch model did not affect the other predictions, they could simply be ignored. Since there are a fixed number of diplomats to be distributed in the system, however, allocations made by the Savage-Deutsch model to predictions for the non-existent exchanges lower the values of the predictions for the actual exchanges. The Goodman model, by disallowing non-existent exchanges as well as self-exchanges, distributes all diplomats in the system to fewer pairs of countries (only those that exchange diplomats with each other) and thereby raises the values of the predictions for the exchanges that actually occur.

[15] Leo A. Goodman, "Statistical Methods for the Preliminary Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 31 (January–April 1963), 197–208; and "A Short Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science*, 9 (April 1964), 176–186. The mathematical model for a computer program, but not an actual computer program, is given in the latter article; for a program of the model written for the CDC 3400 computer, see my "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (October 1965), 487–488. A write-up and listing of this program are available from the Vogelback Computing Center, Northwestern University.

[16] On this point, see Karl W. Deutsch and Walter Isard, "A Note on a Generalized Concept of Effective Distance," *Behavioral Science*, 6 (October 1961), 308–311. Criteria for measuring the political distance between countries are suggested by Quincy Wright in *A Study of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, pp. 1250–1252. See *ibid.*, pp. 1466–1471, for actual judgments which Wright made of the political and other "distances" separating the seven great powers prior to World War II.

This more invidious third relationship follows from the fact that the absolute deviation, $D=A-E$, is divided by the expected value, E, in the RA index. The larger E is, the less sensitive the RA index is to changes in the absolute deviation, D. This means that it takes a greater number of a nation's diplomats, above the expected level, to make an RA index salient with a large receiving country (i.e., one which receives a large number of diplomats and has high E's with its exchange partners) than with a small receiving country. For nation i, the differential in diplomats between an expected exchange ($RA_{ij}=0$) and a salient exchange ($RA_{ij}>k$) with a large receiving country j could very well put its expected exchanges with several small receiving countries above the threshold of salience.

This is an obvious bias against large nations. The RA index presumes that the marginal importance of adding an extra man to a large mission, above the expected level, is less than adding him to a small mission. If each man can add the same increment to the communication traffic no matter where he is assigned, then the absolute deviation, D, would appear to be a better index of above-normal message flows than the relative acceptance index, $RA=D/E$. Since we have postulated a relationship between message flows and the expenditure of attention by decision-makers, then it would seem more satisfactory as a measure of above-normal attention, too.

To say that there is an above-normal information-carrying capacity between two countries, however, is not to say that the *relative* capacity to transmit information is significantly greater than expected. If a nation's information-processing and decision-making capabilities are greater for large foreign countries than for small, then an above-normal load of messages from a large country would not become a severe overload as rapidly as from a small country, because an increased burden of messages from a large country could be distributed among, and processed by, more personnel. Assigning more personnel to alleviate a burden on the channel capacity of a large country would consequently have a less significant relief effect on the *individuals* handling that country's affairs than the same assignment of personnel to a small country. The RA index reflects the presumption that a particular assignment of personnel above the expected level to a small country would count for more than to a large country, even though the channel capacity of the small and large countries might be increased by the same amount.

The RA index also takes account of the obvious fact that small countries may attract the attention of large countries.[17] If the absolute deviation, D, were our sole criterion of salience, then small countries, like the Congo or Cuba, would probably never be highly salient to large countries, because an above-normal consignment of diplomats which a small country might receive from a large country would probably not be very much greater than expected in absolute terms. Whereas the RA index exhibits an insensitivity to the above-normal exchanges of large countries, the D index displays an insensitivity to the above-normal exchanges of small countries.

We conclude that both indices are useful for different, but related, purposes: the RA index stresses the *relative* salience of two countries for each other, the D index the *absolute* salience. Accordingly, we have used both indices to determine salience in our analysis, defining a *lower* threshold of salience at $RA_{ij} \geq .25$ and $D_{ij} \geq 1.0$, and a *higher* threshold of salience at $RA_{ij} \geq .50$ and $D_{ij} \geq 2.0$. We also insist that in order for two countries, i and j, to be considered salient to each other, both their RA's (RA_{ij} and RA_{ji}) and both their D's (D_{ij} and D_{ji}) meet the threshold criteria. This means, in the case of diplomats, that two countries will be considered salient at the lower level if and only if each sends to the other at least 25 percent more diplomats than the indifference model would predict their exchanges to be; and, in addition, that this 25 percent greater-than-expected consignment of diplomats from each country to the other involve in each case at least one more diplomat than predicted by the model.

To illustrate these criteria, if the expected size of country i's mission in country j were 5 diplomats, but country i actually sent 6, its D_{ij} would be equal to 1.0 but its RA_{ij} would be equal to only .20—not enough to qualify at the first salience level. On the other hand, if country i's expected mission size in country j were 1.5, but country i actually sent 2 diplomats to country j, its RA_{ij} would be equal to .33 but its D_{ij} would be equal to only 0.5—again, not enough to qualify at the first salience level. And even if one country's mission did meet the threshold criteria at the first level, the two countries still would not be considered salient to each other unless the other country's mission also met the criteria.[18]

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[17] For evidence on this point, see Annette B. Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

Our indices of salience are directly applicable to the trade and IGO shared-membership data. In the case of trade, the threshold criteria for the D indices are one and two million dollars for the lower and higher levels of salience; for shared memberships, one and two shared memberships.[19] Although we define two RA and two D indices for each dyad according to which country is the sending country and which is the receiving country, the reader should bear in mind that this distinction is irrelevant to the shared-membership data; the index will be the same whichever country in a shared-membership dyad is considered the sender or receiver.

While it seems reasonable to demand that a salient relationship at the lower level exceed expected values by at least one diplomat, one million dollars, or one shared membership for each of the different transaction flows, our RA threshold criteria for the two levels of salience are quite arbitrary.[20] The test of their reliability is the degree to which the choice of one level over another does not affect the results of our analysis. We shall later appraise these results and also assess the validity of the analysis.

The application of the transaction-flow model to trade requires some technical assumptions about the independence and size of consignments that are treated by Savage and Deutsch.[21] Their reasoning could also be applied to the flow of messages generated by diplomats, instead of employing the perfect-mobility assumption about the movement of diplomats which we used in the preceding analysis.

The application of the model to the IGO shared-membership data appears at first glance to rest on less substantial ground than its applications to the diplomatic-exchange and trade data. The assumption that shared memberships, like diplomats, are relatively homogeneous, and each capable of contributing a more or less equal amount to the message traffic between two countries, is extremely tenuous. Instead of relying upon such a message-flow assumption, it seems preferable to think of shared memberships as stocks, each chosen at random from a large population and then classified in a cross-classification table according to the two countries that each shared membership links. (The cross-classification table would really be a square matrix with countries along the rows and columns.) It seems reasonable to assume that the less the frequency of two countries' links can be predicted by the independence of their row and column classifications—that is, the less the choice of one half of a shared membership is independent of the choice of the other half—the more probable the countries are salient to each other. To say that two countries are statistically associated in this way does not, of course, imply that any particular IGO's will put them above the threshold of salience—the-straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back argument—but rather that a particular percentage (and number) above some expected level will. As we shall see later, the fit of the indifference model to the shared-membership data compares favorably with its fit to the diplomatic-exchange data and is far closer than its fit to the trade data.

Two different congruence statistics have been used to measure the correspondence of the indifference model to the different kinds of transaction-flow data. If N is the number of countries, and L is the number of pairs of countries which have non-zero transaction flows, the goodness-of-fit statistic,

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} D_{ij} RA_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \frac{(A_{ij} - E_{ij})^2}{E_{ij}},$$

summed over all cells in the transaction-flow matrix with non-zero entries, has a chi-square distribution with L−2N+1 degrees of freedom.[22] If χ^2 is sufficiently small that the deviations of the observed values from the predicted values could have occurred by chance, then we would accept the hypothesis that the transaction-flow model "explains" the data. Because the χ^2 statistic has more than thirty degrees of freedom for our transaction-flow matrices, however, it is convenient to use the expression,

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[18] Although the salience criteria we have used are symmetrical—that is, they apply to flows in both directions for each pair of countries—I have elsewhere suggested an index to measure the asymmetry, or imbalance, of transaction flows between two countries. See my "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *op. cit.*, p. 488.

[19] That is, the total number of IGO affiliations two nations have in common must exceed the predicted number by either one or two memberships.

[20] Although Savage and Deutsch suggest statistical procedures for determining significant RA's, these involve assuming a common consignment size for the flows between all pairs of countries which seems a no less arbitrary procedure than that used here to determine salience. See Savage and Deutsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 567–571.

[21] *Ibid., passim.*

[22] Leo A. Goodman, "On the Statistical Analysis of Mobility Tables," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (March 1965), p. 578.

$$Z = \sqrt{2\chi^2} - \sqrt{2L - 4N + 1},$$

as a normal deviate with unit variance to measure the fit of the model to the data.

As a second measure of the congruence of the model to the transaction-flow data, we have computed the percentage of transactions that would have to be moved from one cell of the transaction-flow matrices into another in order to make the model fit the data perfectly. If

$$T = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} A_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} E_{ij},$$

this percentage,

$$P = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \frac{50\,|D_{ij}|}{T},$$

is in effect a measure of the over-all magnitude of the discrepancies between the observed and predicted proportions for all cells with non-zero entries.[23]

III. DISCREPANCIES IN THE SYSTEM

The normal deviate (Z) and percentage discrepancy (P) congruence statistics for the three different kinds of transaction flows are shown in Table 1. Because virtually any relationship between the cell values and the marginal values will show up as a statistically significant result for matrices with many degrees of freedom,[24] it is not surprising to find that the actual distributions of transaction flows in all cases fall many standard deviations from those predicted by the indifference model (see the normal deviate statistics in Table 1).

More intuitively interesting than these deviations from the theoretical distributions, however, are the percentages of transactions that would have to be rerouted in an international system which impersonally allocated to each pair of countries a share of transactions proportionate to the total traffic of each of its members. Thus, the percentage discrepancy statistics in Table 1 reveal that trade "discrepancies" are by far the largest in the system: nearly 42 percent of the total volume of trade went to the "wrong" countries (in 1962), as against 19 percent of all diplomatic exchanges (in 1963–64) and 21 percent of all IGO shared memberships (in 1963); that is to say, these percentages are "misclassified" *according to the assumptions of the indifference model.* Using this model as an ideal, the percentages are an indicator of the "lopsidedness" of relations—diplomatic, economic, and organizational—between nations today. They show a rough correspondence to the values of the normal deviate of the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic, but there is no one-to-one correspondence between these two measures. In the comparative analysis of transaction flows, the percentage-discrepancy statistic seems more appealing as a descriptive statistic because of its clear substantive relationship to the data.

TABLE 1. CONGRUENCE STATISTICS FOR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES (1963–64), TRADE (1962), AND IGO SHARED MEMBERSHIPS (1963)

Congruence Statistics	Diplomatic Exchanges	Trade	IGO Shared Memberships
Normal Deviate (Z)	28.7	574.3	65.0
% Discrepancy (P)	19.1	41.5	20.7

Many factors tend to restrict the flow of transactions, and in the case of trade transportation costs certainly loom large. These costs affect diplomatic and IGO contacts to a much smaller degree, because what is usually involved in these contacts is the physical transfer of human beings, not commodities. Once these contacts have been established, information is then the primary commodity exchanged, and its cost over long distances is trivial compared to the cost of transporting goods, too.

If all the discrepancies in transaction flows were caused only by ecological factors, we could look forward to a world progressively more united as communication and transportation barriers disappear between nations. Unfortunately, the world is riven by a host of political, economic, social, and cultural cleavages between nations, and each produces seepages and blockages in channels that confound any idealized description of transaction flows.[25]

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 573. Although not computed here, this statistic can also be calculated for individual countries. See Brams, "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *loc. cit.*

[24] See William L. Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 613.

[25] Besides the cleavages that exist *between* nations, the viability of "linkage groups" connecting a nation's domestic community with the international environment must also be taken into account in evaluating the permeability of national boundaries. See Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in

Trade is probably more susceptible to private likes and dislikes, and a better barometer of changing political relations between two countries, than either of the other kinds of transaction flows. A country will rarely sever diplomatic relations with another, or pull out of an IGO, except under conditions of extreme provocation, but deteriorating political relations between two countries will usually dry up their trade in a hurry. Our congruence statistics reflect the fact that trade saliencies tend to be the most "all or nothing" of the three kinds of transaction flows; departures from expectation of shared-membership ties are much less extreme, and diplomatic exchanges show even less pronounced deviations. These cross-sectional relationships suggest a longitudinal model in which diplomatic exchanges come out as the most tradition-bound and non-fluctuating of the transaction flows, shared memberships somewhat less steady, and trade the most erratic.

It should be recalled that the model we have employed makes no predictions about the magnitude of flows between nations which have no recorded transactions with each other. Because the congruence statistics measure divergencies from the indifference model for only those pairs of nations connected by *some* flow of transactions, they do not reflect those "discrepancies" caused by pairs of nations which have no transactions with each other. These pairs necessarily produce divergencies from the expected values in the Savage-Deutsch model, since this model predicts non-zero values for *all* pairs of countries, whether or not they actually have transactions with each other. The application of this model to the transaction-flow data would thus inflate slightly the percentage-discrepancy statistics, but it would not significantly affect the relative sizes of the percentages.

IV. MAPPING THE TRANSACTION FLOWS

So far the transaction-flow model has provided us with a tool for defining the salience of transaction flows between nations. It has also provided us with a summary measure of the discrepancy of flows in the international system that we have been able to compare against an idealized pattern for the entire system. It is now necessary for us to go beyond comparisons with this idealized pattern and ask how the actual distribution of flows structures the international system.

It is legitimate to ask how we even know that there *is* "structure" in the system. It is fine to talk about a "systemic approach" that tries to coax out the superordinate patterns that inhere in international relations, but might this not be just a futile search for something that does not exist? Are we really justified in sullying analyses of international relations with the presumption of an underlying order?[26]

I think this presumption can be tested. We know that there are definite limitations on the perceptual apparatus of all nations, and we further know that within these limitations nations focus their attention very differently on each other. To the decision-makers in every nation, some images are bright and some hazy, but in all images there seems to be a lack of any kind of equal-time rule applied to international politics.[27]

The absence of such a rule implies that discrimination exists. If it were random in character, there *would be* a rule to predict how favoritisms (or saliencies) are distributed in the system.[28] We know that the probability is infinitesimal, however, that the patterns formed by any one of the transaction flows could have occurred by chance.

This knowledge is not very helpful when it comes to finding out what coherence *does* exist in the system. Some political analysts are clearly more perspicacious than most of us and

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R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 5–26.

[26] It is interesting to note that the search by theorists for a structural order in international relations has a parallel in the history of modern art, where the desire to render an objective representation of reality (in contrast to the subjectivism of impressionistic painting) first took shape in the work of the great French painter, Paul Cézanne. See Herbert Read, *A Concise History of Modern Painting* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 13–21.

[27] Deutsch and Singer have shown that a nation's allocation of unequal amounts of attention to other nations may critically affect the likelihood of its initiating international conflict. See Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, 16 (April 1964), 390–406.

[28] Problems of "disorganized complexity," characteristic of the physical sciences, are amenable to this approach, but the problems of "organized complexity" that are characteristic of the social sciences are generally not soluble in this way. See Warren Weaver, "A Quarter Century in the Natural Sciences," *Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1958* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1959), pp. 7–15; and John G. Kemeny, *A Philosopher Looks at Science* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), p. 249.

can see in the interplay of nations in the world arena patterns we cannot see. Yet even the most astute observer is limited in the number of interactions he can comprehend and draw patterns from—and so must be any theory that uses these patterns as a springboard for hypotheses. How can we discover the essential features of organization in the enormously complex interactions of nations?[29] In particular, is it possible to sort out some overarching order from the staggering number of salient linkages of more than 100 nations with each other?

Fortunately, several computer programs are now available that make tractable the analysis of large transaction-flow matrices. Employing different definitions of what a "subsystem" is, the programs extract the most tightly-linked clusters of units from a matrix of all pairwise interactions between them. Each computer program operates on a binary matrix of ones and zeros, a one indicating a link between two units and a zero indicating no link. The program which we have used in the initial analysis of the transaction-flow data is described below.[30]

Starting with a group of, say, 100 nations and a matrix specification of their salient relationships, the program breaks this large group down into two approximately equal subgroups, splits each of these subgroups in turn into two smaller subgroups, and continues this biparous splintering operation until it reaches subgroups of eight or less nations, or subgroups of more than eight nations in which each nation is connected to every other nation and there is thus no possible way of performing a further subdivision. In this manner, the program strings out the original 100 nations in a hierarchical configuration of subgroups governed by the linkages between the nations. The "tree" thus generated is the output of the program and is illustrated in Figure 1.

At each level of the hierarchy, the program searches among the salient linkages (ones in the matrix) for the most independent subgroups of nations, carving out those subgroups which minimize information flow—determined by a link between two nations—*between* subgroups. Thus, the linkages cutting across successive partitions are as sparse as possible, and, within the statistical limitations of the sampling procedure employed by the program, nations are tacked to the subgroups to which they have the most links. The subgroups of nations with the highest density of links are those at the bottom of the tree, with the cohesiveness among the nations of a subgroup diminishing as we proceed up the hierarchy to the larger clusters.

By factoring out the most independent subgroups and blueprinting the way in which they tend to coalesce, the program is able to draw, in effect, a transactional map of the international system for the different kinds of transaction flows. Each hierarchical level of the tree can be interpreted as representing a different scale on the map, from the very gross two-way split at the top level of the hierarchy to the many more refined partitions at the bottom.[31]

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[29] The interactions of people and the analogous problem of schematically summarizing the group structures which they form is treated in sociometry. For a review of various approaches, see James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 14–16, 430–468; and Terrance A. Nosanchuk, "A Comparison of Several Sociometric Partitioning Techniques," *Sociometry,* 26 (March 1963), 112–125. Factor analysis has been used in recent studies by political scientists to group together nations that behave in similar ways across a set of variables. Applied to the D or RA transaction-flow matrices in this study, however, factor analysis would not necessarily produce groups of nations that have a high density of internal linkages, since nations would be grouped together on the basis of the similarity of their patterns of transaction flows with nations *not necessarily in their factor groups*—not according to whether the nations in each group had high flows with each other. See Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in J. David Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, forthcoming); Bruce M. Russett, "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," this REVIEW, 60 (June 1966), 327–339; and Arthur S. Banks and Philip M. Gregg, "Grouping Political Systems: Q-Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey,*" *American Behavioral Scientist,* 9 (November 1965), 3–6.

[30] Christopher Alexander and Marvin L. Manheim, *HIDECS 2: A Computer Program for the Hierarchical Decomposition of a Set with an Associated Linear Graph* (Cambridge, Mass.: Civil Engineering Systems Laboratory, M.I.T., 1962). The mathematical model on which HIDECS 2 is based is given in Christopher Alexander, *Notes on the Synthesis of Form* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp 174–191. This model serves as the basis for a fascinating theory of design presented in *ibid.*

[31] The importance of maps to the study of international politics has long been recognized. While cognizant of their misuses in the past, Harold and Marqaret Sprout assert that "one can scarcely hope to understand the foreign policies and interactions of states without the aid of maps . . . ": "Geography and International Poli-

V. HIERARCHIES IN THE SYSTEM

The code abbreviations for the 119 nations included in this study are given in Table 2; and in Figures 2, 3, and 4 we have illustrated the decompositions of all the salient linkages at the lower level for the three kinds of transaction flows. Although not presented here, the maps are quite similar at the higher level of salience, with thirteen additional nations having no salient linkages in the case of the diplomatic exchanges, nine in the case of the IGO shared memberships, and two in the case of trade.

Geographical proximity seems to be the dominant influence in the structuring of most of the subgroups. On all three maps, for example, the Latin American nations show up as one major branch on the trees, though in the case of the diplomatic exchanges the presence of Portugal and Spain suggests a lingering Iberian influence in this region. The ties of the United States with her southern neighbors firmly anchor her position in the Americas on all but the diplomatic map, where her attachment with several Asian nations is apparently very strong.

Britain's position is not clear-cut on any of the maps. She is not securely attached to the European nations on the shared-membership map, she carries Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda with her to the next-to-last rung on the trade map, and she is associated mostly, but not exclusively, with her former colonies on the diplomatic map. The colonial associations of France, too, are conspicuous on the diplomatic and trade maps.

The Communist nations form quite private subgroups on all the maps, but comparisons across the maps are revealing. Except for Yugoslavia, which is over in Western Europe, the Asian and European Communist nations form two exclusive subgroups on the shared-membership map. On the trade map, Cuba, Syria, and the UAR join Rumania, while on the diplomatic map the Soviet Union is actually disassociated at the final level from her satellites, and Austria and Switzerland take her place. If we exclude the anomalous case of Yugoslavia, it appears that diplomatic and economic penetration of the Communist world are more easily achieved than penetration through institutionalized arrangements.

In a few instances on the maps a small subgroup of nations is separated from a larger subgroup, but the ties that bind the smaller subgroup seem hard to understand. For example, the association of Jamaica with Cyprus and Malta on the trade map, and Taiwan with Iran and Yemen on the shared-membership map, appear quite remote.

Indeed they are; their grouping simply means that these nations each have fewer links with the nations in the subgroups from which they are split than any others, but not that they are necessarily linked to each other. Unless each nation is linked to all other nations in a subgroup with more than eight members, the program partitions the subgroup in such a way that the one or more members with the fewest links are separated from it. When only one nation, with fewer links to a subgroup than any others, is split off—like Israel from the Arab-African nations and Cuba from the Latin American nations on the shared-membership map—this causes no problem of interpretation. However, in the few and rather obvious cases where several nations have equally weak links to a larger subgroup, and are split off, the reader should interpret these nations to be the most marginal members of the subgroup from which they are separated; they may or may not be linked to each other.

The over-all patterns of the maps are interesting to compare. There are nineteen bottom-level subgroups on the trade map, sixteen on the shared-membership map, and fifteen on the diplomatic map, though there are more unlinked nations on the latter map than on either of the others. The shared-membership map is most sharply distinguished from the other two by its very large subgroups of regionally-related nations all linked to one another. Neither diplomatic exchanges nor trade show such a clear organizing principle, with colonial ties in several instances tending to upset some of the regional patterns on these maps.

The comparison of individual maps represents one approach to establishing the correspondence of salience patterns across all the transaction flows. The convergence of subsystem boundaries can be more directly appraised, however, by drawing maps based on the *intersection* of the salient linkages for all the transaction flows. The three-fold bonds defined by the coincidence of salient linkages across all the transaction flows are surely more indicative of a convergence of interests and obligations of nations than are diplomatic, economic, or organizational ties alone. In this sense they delineate the "critical boundaries" of subsys-

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tics in an Era of Revolutionary Change," in W. A. Douglas Jackson (ed.), *Politics and Geographic Relationships* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 38. On the value of graphical methods of data reduction, see John W. Tukey's "Statistical and Quantitative Methodology," in Donald P. Ray (ed.), *Trends in Social Science* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), pp. 121–122, 128; and his "The Future of Data Analysis," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 33 (March 1962), pp. 60–61.



FIG. 1. Hypothetical decomposition of 100 nations by HIDECS 2.

TABLE 2. CODE ABBREVIATIONS OF THE 119 NATIONS IN THE STUDY

Nation	Abbreviation	Nation	Abbreviation	Nation	Abbreviation
1 Afghanistan	AFG	40 Ghana	GHA	80 Niger	NIR
2 Albania	ALB	41 Greece	GRC	81 Nigeria	NIG
3 Algeria	ALG	42 Guatemala	GUA	82 Norway	NOR
4 Argentina	ARG	43 Guinea	GUI	83 Pakistan	PAK
5 Australia	AUL	44 Haiti	HAI	84 Panama	PAN
6 Austria	AUS	45 Honduras	HON	85 Paraguay	PAR
7 Belgium	BEL	46 Hungary	HUN	86 Peru	PER
Belgium-Luxembourg[a]	B-L	47 Iceland	ICE	87 Philippines	PHI
8 Bolivia	BOL	48 India	IND	88 Poland	POL
9 Brazil	BRA	49 Indonesia	INS	89 Portugal	POR
10 Bulgaria	BUL	50 Iran	IRN	90 Rumania	RUM
11 Burma	BUR	51 Iraq	IRQ	91 Rwanda	RWA
12 Burundi	BUU	52 Irish R.	IRE	92 Saudi Arabia	SAU
13 Cambodia	CAM	53 Israel	ISR	93 Senegal	SEN
14 Cameroun	CAO	54 Italy	ITA	94 Sierra Leone	SIE
15 Canada	CAN	55 Ivory Coast	IVO	95 Somali R.	SOM
16 Central African R.	CEN	56 Jamaica	JAM	96 Spain	SPN
17 Ceylon	CEY	57 Japan	JAP	97 Sudan	SUD
18 Chad	CHA	58 Jordan	JOR	98 Sweden	SWD
19 Chile	CHL	59 Kenya	KEN	99 Switzerland	SWZ
20 China (People's R.)	CHN	60 Korea (Dem. R.)	KON	100 Syrian Arab R.	SYR
21 China (R.)	CHT	61 Korea (R.)	KOS	101 Tanganyika	TAN
22 Colombia	COL	62 Kuwait	KUW	102 Thailand	TAI
23 Congo (Braz.)	CON	63 Laos	LAO	103 Togo	TOG
24 Congo (Leop.)	COP	64 Lebanon	LEB	104 Trinidad & Tobago	TRI
25 Costa Rica	COS	65 Liberia	LBR	105 Tunisia	TUN
26 Cuba	CUB	66 Libya	LBY	106 Turkey	TUR
27 Cyprus	CYP	67 Luxembourg	LUX	107 Uganda	UGA
28 Czechoslovakia	CZE	68 Malagasy R.	MAD	108 Union of S. Africa	UNS
29 Dahomey	DAH	69 Malaya[a]/Malayasia	MAL	109 U.S.S.R.	USR
30 Denmark	DEN	70 Mali	MLI	110 United Arab R.	UAR
31 Dominican R.	DOM	71 Malta	MLT	111 United Kingdom	UNK
32 Ecuador	ECU	72 Mauritania	MAU	112 United States	USA
33 El Salvador	ELS	73 Mexico	MEX	113 Upper Volta	UPP
34 Ethiopia	ETH	74 Mongolia	MON	114 Uruguay	URU
35 Finland	FIN	75 Morocco	MOR	115 Venezuela	VEN
36 France	FRN	76 Nepal	NEP	116 Vietnam (Dem. R.)	VTN
37 Gabon	GAB	77 Netherlands	NTH	117 Vietnam (R.)	VTS
38 Germany (Dem. R.)	GME	78 New Zealand	NEW	118 Yemen	YEM
39 Germany (Fed. R.)	GMW	79 Nicaragua	NIC	119 Yugoslavia	YUG

[a] Used only for trade data.


1–119
COS ELS GUA HON MEX NIC
COL HAI VEN
CUB PAN POR
BRA CHL ECU PAR PER SPN URU
DEN FIN GMW NOR SWD USR
AUS BUL CZE GME HUN POL RUM SWZ
CYP GRC ISR ITA TUR YUG
IRQ LBY SAU SOM SUD UAR
ALG CAM FRN JOR KUW MOR SYR
BEL CAO CEN COP LUX
GHA GUI LEB LBR NIG SEN SIE
CHT KOS LAO PHI TAI USA VTS
AUL INS JAP MAL NEW
AFG BUR IND IRN NEP PAK
CAN CEY JAM NTH UNS UNK
Unlinked
ALB, *ARG*, *BOL*, *BUU*, CHA, *CHN*, CON, *DAH*, *DOM*, ETH, GAB, ICE, IRE, *IVO*, KEN, *KON*, MAD, MLT, MAU, *MON*, *NIR*, *RWA*, TAN, TOG, TRI, *TUN*, UGA, *UPP*, *VTN*, *YEM*

FIG. 2. Decomposition of salient ($RA \geq .25$, $D \geq 1.0$) linkages for diplomatic exchanges (1963–64) by HIDECS 2[a]

[a] Since there were sending but no receiving diplomatic-exchange data for the fifteen nations underscored in the unlinked group, none of their linkages is salient by definition.


1–112
ARG BRA CHL HAI PAR PER
MEX PAN
CAN COS ELS GUA HON NIO USA VEN
COL DOM ECU
CHT KOS
GAB GHA IRQ JOR LEB MAD SEN UPP
ETH LBR
CYP JAM MLT
NIG SIE UGA
DEN FIN GMW ICE IRE NOR SWD UNK
B-L COP KEN LBY NTH UNS
AUL INS JAP KUW MAL NEW PHI TAI
BUR CEY IND IRN PAK SAU TAN
CAO CON IVO MLI TOG
ALG FRN GUI MOR POR SPN TUN VTS
CEY CHN SUD
CUB RUM SYR UAR
ALB BUL CZE GME HUN POL USR YUG
AFG AUS GRC ISR ITA SOM SWZ TUR
Unlinked
BOL, CEN, CHA, DAH, LAO, MAU, NIR, TRI, URU, YEM

FIG. 3. Decomposition of salient (RA$\geq$.25, D$\geq$1.0) linkages for trade (1962) by HIDECS 2[a].

[a] Trade data were not available for BUU, KON, MON, NEP, RWA, and VTN.


1–118
FIN POR SPN YUG
UNK
CYP
AUS, BEL DEN, FRN GMW, GRC ICE, IRE ITA, LUX NTH, NOR SWD, SWZ TUR
CHT IRN YEM
ALG, IRQ JOR, KUW LEB, LBY MOR, SAU SUD, SYR TUN, UAR
ISR
CHN KON MON VTN
ALB BUL CZE GME HUN POL RUM USR
TRI
ARG, BOL BRA, CHL COL, COS DOM, ECU ELS, GUA HAI, HON MEX, NIC PAN, PAR PER, USA URU, VEN
CUB
AFG CAN UNS
AUL, BUR CAN, CEY IND, INS JAP, KOS LAO, MAI NEP, NEW PAK, PHI TAI, VTS
CAO, CEN CHA, CON DAH, ETH GAB, IVO LBR, MAD MLI, MAU NIR, NIG SEN, SIE SOM, TAN UGA, UPP
BUU GHA GUI KEN RWA TOG
Unlinked
JAM

FIG. 4. Decomposition of salient (RA ≥ .25, D ≥ 1.0) linkages for shared memberships (1963) by HIDECS 2[a].

[a] Shared-membership data were not available for MLT.


1–119
BRA CHL COS ELS GUA HON MEX NIC PAN
BEL DEN GMW NTH NOR SWD USA
GRC ITA TUR YUG
BUL CZE FIN GME HUN POL USR
AUS POR SPN SWZ
BUR CEY IND IRN PAK SUD UAR
AUL CYP NEW NIG UNK
CHT INS KOS MAL PHI TAI
Unlinked
AFG, ALB, ALG, ARG, BOL, BUU, CAM, CAO, CAN, CEN, CHA, CHN
COL, CON, COP, CUB, DAH, DOM, ECU, ETH, FRN, GAB, GUI, HAI
ICE, IRQ, IRE, ISR, IVO, JAM, JOR, KEN, KON, KUW, LAO, LEB
LBR, LBY, LUX, MAD, MLI, MLT, MAU, MOR, MON, NEP, NIR, PAR
PER, RUM, RWA, SAU, SEN, SIE, SOM, SYR, TAN, TOG, TRI, TUN
UGA, UNS, UPP, URU, VTN, VTS, VEN, YEM

FIG. 5. Decomposition of coincidentally salient (RA ≥ .25, D ≥ 1.0) linkages for diplomatic exchanges (1963–64), trade (1962), and shared memberships (1963) by HIDECS 2.

tems, because a violation of these boundaries would have the highest probability of touching values shared by nations along a number of dimensions.[32] For this reason their study seems important.

The decomposition of the coincidentally salient linkages shows up the interplay of geographical and colonial forces evident on the diplomatic and trade maps (see Figure 5). In particular, the concentration of several British Commonwealth nations at three different levels in the tree dilutes some of the geographical unity which most of the subgroups exhibit. We emphasize that all nations in the subgroups are not linked to each other, since the partitioning is terminated when a subgroup has eight or less members. Reference to a complete listing of all salient linkages (not given here) reveals, for example, that Austria is linked to Switzerland and Portugal to Spain, but these two pairs have no ties with each other. To iron out these and other idiosyncrasies of the HIDECS 2 decompositions, we shall now explore alternative ways of demarcating the boundaries of subsystems.

VI. ROUNDING OUT THE PICTURE

Although there are good reasons for believing that most complex systems, including political systems, are hierarchically structured,[33] at times a hierarchical representation of a system may do violence to the boundaries of its most *natural* subsystems: to wit, the sequential two-way partitioning criterion of HIDECS 2 tends not to preserve the holistic nature of a system which a multiple-partitioning criterion may better describe. To attenuate this possible bias, we have also used the program BLDUP, which compares two-way, three-way, and more complicated partitions with one another simultaneously, to decompose the matrix of coincidentally salient linkages (see Figure 6).[34]

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[32] On the concept of "critical boundary," see Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 265–266; and Andrew M. Scott, "Internal Violence as an Instrument of Cold Warfare," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 160.

[33] See Herbert A. Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 106 (December 12, 1962), 467–482. For a very persuasive argument that this i not true of "natural" cities, see Christopher Alexander, "A City Is Not a Tree," *Architectural Forum*, 122 (2 pts.; April, May 1965), 58–62, 58–61.

The seventeen disjoint subsets produced by BLDUP emphasize the fact that the system defined by the coincidentally salient linkages is a good deal more fragmented than suggested by HIDECS 2. The East European nations form the largest cohesive subgroup, with Russia, notable by her absence from this subgroup, linked to Finland. The majority of the subgroups have only two members, including the subgroups of Austria-Switzerland and Portugal-Spain, formerly arbitrarily grouped together by HIDECS 2.

The five nations in Figure 6 that have coincidentally salient linkages, but are not grouped, are a consequence of the fact that the formation of the subgroups that best satisfy the BLDUP partitioning criterion automatically eliminates those nations with linkages only to nations in these subgroups but not to each other. Thus, Costa Rica and Nicaragua are both linked only to El Salvador, but El Salvador's very presence in the subgroup with Guatemala and Honduras (all mutually linked and thus the strongest Latin American subgroup) means that there is no way to represent the association of Costa Rica and Nicaragua with El Salvador on the BLDUP map.

This kind of mapping problem is not insurmountable. We can inscribe more of the detail of systemic relationships on our maps if we drop the requirement that each nation be a member of one, and only one, subgroup, and instead take account of the *overlapping* memberships of nations in two or more subgroups. In the analysis which follows, each of the three programs that we have used—SIMPX, EQCLA, and HYPAP—decomposes a binary matrix into subsystems which are not necessarily disjoint.

SIMPX tests each element of the graph defined by the nations and their linkages until it finds one which belongs to just one complete subgraph (i.e., all elements connected to each other) with three or more vertices (i.e., a triangle, tetrahedron, etc.). It removes this element from the graph, printing out the unique subgraph which it defines. The program then applies this criterion again to the reduced graph, picking off complete subgraphs which satisfy the condition of having one unique element. If no element is in just one complete subgraph, the entire graph is split into two subgraph-disjoint sets and the criterion is applied to each of these sets in turn.

There are no completely-linked subgroups consisting of more than three members for the coincidentally salient linkages (see Figure 7), but the distribution of the twenty-four nations in the twelve triangular subgroups given by SIMPX is revealing. Five of these twelve subgroups consist only of Eastern European nations, with Poland straddling four of them—more than any other nation—and Czechoslovakia, tied for second place with Britain, three. It would appear that these nations are more involved than any others in the affairs of nations on the map, yet the subsystems spanned by Poland and Czechoslovakia consist only of Communist nations, while the three subsystems which Britain spans contain only Commonwealth nations in Asia-Australasia. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has only two overlapping memberships, but it clearly acts as a broker nation because of its foot in both the Communist (Hungary and Poland) and non-Communist (Greece and Italy) worlds.

EQCLA uses a less restrictive criterion than SIMPX in generating subsystems. Instead of pairing off only completely-linked subgroups, it groups all nations that are linked to each other by a sequence of triangles (or tetrahedra), each overlapping the next in sequence by two (or three) vertices.[35] Using a hypergeometric probability function, HYPAP generates those

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[34] BLDUP and all but one of the other decomposition programs employed in the subsequent analysis are described in Christopher Alexander, *HIDECS 3: Four Computer Programs for the Hierarchical Decomposition of Systems Which Have an Associated Linear Graph* (Cambridge, Mass.: Civil Engineering Systems Laboratory, M.I.T., 1963). For a description of HYPAP, not given in *HIDECS 3* see Gary T. Moore, "Computer Program—The Hierarchical Decomposition of a System with an Associated Linear Graph" (Department of Architecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1965, ditto).

[35] In the simplest representation of such overlap, nations A and B are triangle-connected if their flows are related thus:



they are tetrahedron-connected if their flows are related not only through C and D but also through a third nation (not pictured here), E. All of the EQCLA subgroups in Figure 7 are triangle-connected, but none meet the more stringent criterion of tetrahedron-connectedness.


1–119
BUL CZE GME HUN POI
DEN GMW NOR SWD
AUL NEW NIG UNK
INS JAP PHI
GRC ITA YUG
BUR CEY IND
ELS GUA HON
BRA CHL USA
MEX PAN
POR SPN
AUS SWZ
BEL NTH
FIN USR
SUD UAR
IRN PAK
CHT KOS
MAL TAI
Linked, but not grouped
COS, CYP, GHA, NIC, TUR
Unlinked
AFG, ALB, ALG, ARG, BOL, BUU, CAM, CAO, CAN, CEN, CHA, CHN
COL, CON, COP, CUB, DAH, DOM, ECU, ETH, FRN, GAB, GUI, HAI
ICE, IRQ, IRE, ISR, IVO, JAM, JOR, KEN, KON, KUW, LAO, LEB
LBR, LBY, LUX, MAD, MLI, MLT, MAU, MOR, MON, NEP, NIR, PAR
PER, RUM, RWA, SAU, SEN, SIE, SOM, SYR, TAN, TOG, TRI, TUN
UGA, UNS, UPP, URU, VTN, VTS, VEN, YEM

FIG. 6. Decomposition of coincidentally salient (RA ≥ .25, D ≥ 1.0) linkages for diplomatic exchanges (1963–64), trade (1962), and shared memberships (1963) by BLDUP.


SIMPX
1–119
CHT JAP TAI
IND PAK UNK
AUL NEW UNK
CEY IND UNK
GRC ITA YUG
HUN POL YUG
CZE HUN POL
ELS GUA HON
GMW NOR SWD
DEN NOR SWD
CZE GME POL
BUL CZE POL
EQCLA[a]
1–119
BUL CZE GME HUN POL YUG
CEY IND PAK UNK
DEN GMW NOR SWZ
HPAP
1–119
AUS, BEL BUL, CZE DEN, FIN GME, GMW GRC, HUN ITA, NTH NOR, POL SWD, SWZ TUR, USR YUG
AUL, BUR CEY, CHT CYP, GHA IND, INS IRN, JAP KOS, MAL NEW, NIG PAK, PHI TAI, UNK
COS ELS GUA HON NIC
BRA CHL USA
SUD UAR
POR SPN
MEX PAN

Number of Overlapping Subgroups to Which Each Nation Belongs

1. POL-4
2. CZE-3
3. UNK-3
4. HUN-2
5. IND-2
6. NOR-2
7. SWD-2
8. YUG-2
9. AUL-1
10. BUL-1
11. CEY-1
12. CHT-1
13. DEN-1
14. ELS-1
15. GME-1
16. GMW-1
17. GRC-1
18. GUA-1
19. HON-1
20. ITA-1
21. JAP-1
22. NEW-1
23. PAK-1
24. TAI-1

All Subgroups
Are Disjoint

All Subgroups
Are Disjoint

FIG. 7. Decomposition of coincidentally salient (RA ≥ .25, D ≥ 1.0) linkages for diplomatic exchanges (1963–64), trade (1962), and shared memberships (1963) by SIMPX, EQCLA and HYPAP, with nations ranked according to the number of overlapping subgroups to which they belong[b].

[a] The three EQCLA subgroups are triangle-connected. See text for explanation of this term.
[b] Those nations which are not listed are either unlinked, or, if linked, not grouped.

subsystems of nations which have the smallest probabilities, assuming a random distribution of links between all nations, of containing the number of links which they do.

The fact that neither EQCLA nor HYPAP produced any overlapping subgroups is an indication that the "connectedness" of the coincidentally salient subsystems is small. The EQCLA (and SIMPX) subgroups may be thought of as the most cohesive "kernels" embedded in the diffuse HYPAP subgroups. With the exception of some Commonwealth nations, the two largest HYPAP subgroups separate Europe from most of Africa and Asia.

The general conclusion that may be drawn from the analysis of the coincidentally salient linkages is that their tapestry is very "knotty" and contains no strands of significant length. What threads there are point to geographical proximity as being the most compelling force of attraction in the international system. Ideological compatibility undoubtedly reinforces an association between propinquant nations, but colonial ties, rather than just similarities in political orientation, seem to be the factor most likely to tear away nations from their geographical neighbors.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this article I have attempted to show that the relations of nations can be meaningfully conceptualized as flows of transactions between nations and subjected to systematic empirical analysis. I did this by first outlining a systemic or relational approach to the study of international relations phenomena and then showing how the concepts of system and subsystem could be operationalized and applied to the analysis of international transaction flows.

The transaction-flow model provided us with criteria for defining the salience of two nations for each other's transactions. In addition, it offered a useful yardstick with which to measure the deviation of each of the different kinds of transaction flows of all nations from an ideal type. A comparison of the discrepancy values for each of the flows suggested that trade relations tend to be much more erratic—and thus probably reflective of changes or disturbances in the international system—than do diplomatic or organizational relations between nations.

To reduce the multitude of salient linkages to forms which could more readily be comprehended, I applied a battery of decomposition programs, each employing a different definition of a subsystem, to the salient and coincidentally salient linkage matrices for diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships. The holistic synthesis of data captured in the decomposition maps revealed that most groupings of nations could be explained by either the geographical proximity or the colonial associations of their members.

In concert the maps mitigated the formalism of any particular definition of a subsystem and thereby enhanced the richness and reduced the arbitrariness of a single description of systemic relationships. They allowed us to "see" what lies behind an ensemble of relationships which correlational techniques and tests of association only summarize for many nations at once: how the relationships structure a group of nations into the most tightly knit subgroups, the memberships of these subgroups, and how these subgroups relate to one another. Although we illustrated our results at only the lower salience level, this level seemed to provide a reliable picture of the architecture of salient linkages: the populations of linked nations were reduced at the higher salience level—drastically for the coincidentally-linked nations[36]—but the higher salience criteria did not alter the boundaries of the subsystems markedly.

Our mappings of the subsystems indicate that it is possible to describe inductively the major flow patterns that underlie the myriad transactions of a group of nations. But more than just vividly describing the main outlines of the international system, the maps provide important clues about the conditions associated with membership in its subsystems and the strains impinging upon nations which deviate from the overall membership patterns. As memberships change over time, future analyses can not only reveal changes in membership patterns but also can provide insight into the dynamic nature of the transformations through which the international system is passing, and the influence of these transformations on international behavior.[37]

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[36] Only 28 of the 51 nations with coincidentally salient linkages at the first level met the threshold criteria at the second level.

[37] For an example of a longitudinal analysis of flows using the techniques set forth in this article, see my "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System (paper delivered at the Third European Peace Research Conference, Peace Research Society (International), Vienna, Austria, September 2–4, 1966).

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF MOBILITY IN CHINA'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT*

JOHN W. LEWIS
Cornell University

I. EARLY CHARACTERISTICS OF MOBILITY

Traditionally, Chinese urbanism was as much "a way of life" as in present-day America or Europe though its style, scope and effect on general social change differed markedly from its Western counterparts. The pre-modern Chinese city, predominantly an administrative-military center, extended and enforced imperial authority and proved to be a hostile environment to entrepreneurship.[1] Typically, the mark of officialdom was stamped on the Chinese city, and urban life and elite status were often equated. Moreover, the appeal of urban living remained sufficiently strong through the years to attract large numbers of non-official local elites or "gentry" as well as officials, particularly during periods of relative social instability and peasant unrest. Since the perquisites of status surrounded the lives of city dwellers in many areas of China, the young peasant aspirant to the elite also considered movement to the city and upward social mobility to be roughly equivalent. This view of mobility and the city in the Chinese scheme of things provides a basis from which we can examine trends in recruitment and their consequences for social change for selected periods since the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644).[2] Particular emphasis will be placed on the interrelationships of urban social mobility and industrialization and on the implications of these interrelationships for political legitimacy in the Chinese People's Republic.

Following the time-honored Chinese system of evaluating occupations, the official was accorded unmatched prestige. The general citizenry, well beneath all officials, was classified into scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants—in descending order of rank—with a tiny group of declassed individuals placed far below them. The legal and customary classifications frequently failed to account for the sometimes prominant role of wealthy merchants and for the key place of the educational and examination systems in undermining the constraints placed on occupational positions. Yet, in the Ming period at least, the attempt of the wealthy to transform economic power into socio-political status through the purchase of official ranks and titles or the special promotion of their sons in preparation for the degree examinations proved to be only partially successful. On the other hand, the examination system in the Ming does appear to have provided a regular avenue to power and position. Mobility for sons of non-officials competing in the exams, irrespective of wealth, thus "resulted in a degree of fluidity comparable with that of modern 'open' societies."[3] This apparent "fluidity" blurred the class distinctions among commoners, and by the end of the Ming era, social mobility, both up and down the hierarchical ladder, seems to have been a significant fact of Chinese life.

Furthermore, official practices of routinely transferring members of the imperial bureau-

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[1] For a discussion of some of the literature on Chinese cities see Norton S. Ginsburg, "Urban Geography and 'Non-Western' Areas," in Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore: (eds.), *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 327–331.

[2] In this analysis, I have relied particularly on Wolfram Eberhard, *Social Mobility in Traditional China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962); Ping-ti Ho, "Aspects of Social Mobility in China, 1368–1911," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (1959), 330–359; Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert. M. Marsh, *The Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China, 1600–1900* (New York: Free Press, 1961); and Johanna M. Menzel (ed.), *The Chinese Civil Service: Career Open to Talent?* (Boston: Heath, 1963).

[3] Ho, "Aspects of Social Mobility," p. 336. This was apparently less true of pre-Ming bureaucracies. See Eberhard, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–27.

cracy to new localities reinforced this fluidity, and as a result of both official and non-official movement the turnover of the populations of Chinese cities in Ming times may have reached a substantial percentage.[4] Few reliable and consistent population data on urban China in pre-modern years have yet come to light, however, and we can only surmise that the relatively high degree of social mobility produced the turnover of urban residents in significant numbers. It is well known that in the Ming era the ruling class found it difficult to perpetuate itself over more than two or three generations and that disestablished families commonly returned to their ancestral village homes after the onset of irreversible declines in family fortunes. Few stayed on in the cities and entered low-status mercantile occupations, and in general the Confucian system of recruitment and placement barred former officials from merchant roles. In sum, the city as the "social setting" for the upwardly mobile was even less a center for expanding economic activity and non-conformist behavior than was the countryside.[5]

Fairly high rates of social mobility with low levels of socio-economic development appears to have been the predominant pattern for the society in pre-seventeenth century China.[6] But when the Ch'ing rulers seized power in 1644, social practice came to diverge sharply from the prevailing ideal that the poor and humble could, if qualified, attain elite status by means of competitive examinations. Seeking the services and allegiance of the existing body of officials held over from the Ming, the Ch'ing leaders established precedents by which the men in power could place potential rivals at a decided disadvantage in the competitive process. The urban bias in the selection system was also intensified.[7] Members of official circles were permitted to recommend candidates for special sittings of the examinations on certain occasions, and the deepening military and economic crisis that beset the Ch'ing government helped magnify the pressures toward the creation of informal alliances between officials and wealthy merchants and landlords. Furthermore, such alliances were stamped with semi-official approval when the practice of selling titles, ranks, and studentships was expanded, and were even further regularized in the catastrophic period of the late nineteenth century by the inauguration of the *kuan-tu shang-pan* (official supervision and merchant management) enterprises.[8] In the context of foreign incursions and the decay of political authority, these latter developments signaled the near collapse of the idealized system of mobility based on classical scholarship and impersonal competition. What remained of the traditional system of recruitment of youth into the government was dealt a further blow with the issuance of the 1905 edict abolishing the examination system.[9] At the same time, the increased emphasis on economic growth could have given higher ratings to those non-official merchant roles needed for development. Yet no means could be found to turn the eyes of educated youth away from the lure of officialdom. The Chinese also lacked ways to displace those who had already moved into key economic roles and thus to attract first-rate managerial talent on a long-term basis. The momentum of rural-urban movement appears to have continued, moreover, and thereby to have aggravated the sense of frustration among lower-class youth drawn to the cities, particularly after the collapse of the Ch'ing and the series of humiliating defeats inflicted on China by various foreign powers. It was in this mood that the conflicting doctrines of the West were received by China's urban youth.

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[4] For evidence on the turnover of households in early Japanese cities, see Robert J. Smith, "Aspects of Mobility in Pre-Industrial Japanese Cities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 (1963), 416–423. Wolfram Eberhard discusses the effect of population turnover on urban culture in the areas of South China which he studied.

[5] On the question of high rates of social mobility in traditional societies, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 62–64; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Research Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Mobility and Development," *International Social Science Journal*, 16 (1964), 35–48. Marion J. Levy discusses the "source of motivation for a flight of both talent and capital from the merchant role" in "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2 (1953), 161–197.

[6] The amount and level of economic development in the pre-Ch'ing period remains the subject of considerable controversy. Many Chinese writers and most Japanese Marxist economic historians insist that "budding capitalism" existed for centuries prior to the intensification of Western contacts.

[7] P'an Kuang-tan and Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "City and Village: The Inequality of Opportunity," in Menzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–21.

[8] The best study of these enterprises is Albert Feuerwerker, *China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). Feuerwerker and others indirectly raise the problem of the extent to which elite roles began to undergo fundamental changes in the Ch'ing in response to the pressures of industrialization. It should be emphasized that the *kuan-tu shang-pan* enterprises served highly limited purposes and did not include the treaty-port industries and businesses which originated later.

[9] I have attempted to deal with some of the problems surrounding the abolition of the examination system in my "Party Cadres in Communist China", in James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), chap. XII. See also Wolfgang Franke, *Reform and Abolition of the*

In the Ming, the Chinese system maximized mobility in the context of minimal development; immediately prior to the collapse of the Ch'ing, upward social mobility had been deliberately impeded in the effort to strengthen and industrialize the nation. When the imperial reign ended in the Revolution of 1911, the political authority necessary for successful industrialization disintegrated or devolved onto the shoulders of power-oriented satraps. In the chaos that followed, the scarce resources needed for continued industrial growth—money, talent, and motivation—withered away. The growth of modern manufacturing was slow, as one economist has noted, "not only because of political instability and lack of effective demand in the stagnant economy, but also because, by treaty limitations, tariffs on foreign goods were low."[10] By the end of the third decade of this century, China had also lost—or was rapidly losing—any semblance of generalized channels of access to status for talented and educated youth. The consequences of this situation were to determine the issues in the political competition that beset China for the next decades. Within the scope of this brief paper, I shall attempt to highlight only those aspects of the situation which appear to have been crucial in the urban outlook and policies of the Chinese Communist Party.

II. THE ALLIANCE OF CLASSES, CITIES, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF TANGSHAN

To recapitulate, as Ch'ing power fell apart, an operative coalition developed among the economic, political, and military elites. An overlapping of personnel in the several domains of what C. Wright Mills called "the higher circles" distinguished the Ch'ing and early Republican leadership from that of its predecessors. No longer was the sphere of officialdom relatively isolated. Wealth, status, and political power had become commensurate and were frequently interchangeable. The inviolate standards of bureaucratic conduct largely disappeared; nepotism and corruption flourished and were even encouraged. Guided by this new code of conduct, Chinese business and political leaders retained the city as the unchallenged center of status and power and set the tone for urban life.[11] The bits and parts of Chinese modernization, as Marion Levy put it, became concentrated in the urban pockets of North and East China, while rural China—especially in the Central and Western areas—remained abysmally backward.[12]

In the political and social chaos which per-

Traditional Chinese Examination System (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[10] Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933–1959* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 8. This generalization can be challenged on the basis of data provided in R. H. Tawney, *Land and Labour in China* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), pp. 122 and 196. His data are, however, subject to various interpretations and, on balance, he concludes that the record of factory industrialization "with some honourable exceptions, has not been good, and the question of the conditions under which it is to develop is one of the vital problems confronting China" (p. 110).

[11] P. A. Sorokin in his definitive study of mobility (*Social Mobility* [New York: Harper, 1927]) makes the point that "since the growth of cities, they have almost completely monopolized the function of social promotion of individuals. All channels of social promotion have been concentrated in the city." China does not appear to have been an exception to this rule.

[12] This echoes the classic argument made by R. H. Tawney (*op. cit.*, pp. 137–138) that from the viewpoint of development there were two Chinas. This argument has been picked up in some studies of the two competing elites. Robert C. North, for example, in his *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 63, emphasizes the rural-urban differences between the backgrounds of the leading Communists and Nationalists. He also notes the inclusion of 22 persons identified as "merchant-scholar or wealthy merchant" and "other merchants" in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committees as contrasted with only two from these categories in the Communist Political Bureaus (p. 47).

vaded the Chinese scene in the decade after the establishment of the Republic, the cities throughout the Middle Kingdom experienced in common the same concatenation of events: sporadic industrialization, low levels of mobility, high aspiration with an equally high sense of personal frustration among the youth, and humiliation by foreigners.[13] These were the social ingredients that together sparked programs of political action and laid the groundwork for the May Fourth Movement in 1919. That movement, begun in Peking as a student protest demonstration against the transfer of the Shantung peninsula to Japan by the Versailles Conference, ran its course almost exclusively in urban areas, first among the youth and thence in the workers' groups and business communities.

Furthermore, this urban bias found in the May Fourth Movement persisted in the outlook of the leadership and the policies of the two major parties which emerged in the midst of the hullabaloo. A countervailing tendency in favor of the rural population may also be traced to the writings of this period, but the urban outlook clearly predominated. While the main struggle against the warlords in the 1920's constrained the full expression of these two tendencies, after the collapse of the Kuomintang-Communist united front in 1927, the Nationalists crushed the Red forces, identified unreservedly with the urban-rural elites, and left the political advantages to be gained from an identity with the lower, and largely rural, classes to the Communist Party by default.[14] The fissure that led to this fairly clear-cut division of the Chinese revolution had long been visible, although the final outcome was far from inevitable.

In view of the slow development of that fissure, I believe that it is a mistake to overemphasize the rural bias in the early statements and experience of selected leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. According to his own admission, Mao Tse-tung, for one, did not "fully realize" the importance of the peasantry until mid-1925, or many years after his contact with Li Ta-chao, the Communist leader most conscious of China's peasantry.[15] Certainly Li had championed the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the early years; his views, however, did not comprise a rejection of the city as such but only a denunciation of the city's corruption and unhealthy conditions.[16] A month after he wrote his famous article lauding the wholesomeness of the village, Li penned a short essay for *Mei-chou p'ing-lun* (Weekly Critic) in which he analyzed the life of the working man in the North China city of Tangshan, particularly the 9,000 miners in the Kailan coal mines located there.[17] He spoke of the need for orderly and purposeful strikes, a theme on which he was to generalize several weeks later in a May Day commemorative essay.[18] On balance, Li Ta-chao as well as most other early Party leaders cannot be judged as foes of the city. As in times past, the city still held the apparent key to political power as well as their own futures.

An understanding of the importance of the city in the development of the Chinese Communist Party is essential to an adequate evaluation of the actual policies pursued by the Party, even after its visible urban apparatus had been substantially smashed in 1927.[19] In many cities, the municipal Party organization survived the suppression effort and continued to organize unions and lead strikes.[20] Given the Kuomintang's class orientation and preference for the city alone, the Chinese Communists were able to establish the only meaningful links between the city and countryside and the most comprehensive apparatus providing access to higher status for upwardly mobile peasants and workers. On the basis of these links and its rural-urban organization, the Party leadership reestablished its legitimacy. By the mid-1930's Communist writings on cadre recruitment began to carry the flavor of the classics in their emphasis on the selection and promotion of leaders of "talent and worthiness." Like the Ming, mobility in the Party did not depend on economic growth; unlike the Ming, the mobility of Communist cadres became closely bound to the war effort under Party guidance.

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[13] See Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chap. II. During the First World War, Chinese industry benefited from the sharp decreases in imports only to be disadvantaged again after the Armistice by renewed trade with the West.

[14] See Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (2nd rev. ed.; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), esp. chaps. V and IX. The details on the class support for the various parties and factions are much more complex than can be described here. For example, the need for revenues, particularly during the war against Japan, forced the Kuomintang to rely heavily on the modern and international sectors of the Chinese economy.

[15] See Maurice Meisner, "Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Chicago, 1962); and Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 7–21.

[16] Li Ta-chao, "Ch'ing-nien yü nung-ts'un" [Youth and the Village], in *Li Ta-chao hsüan-chi* [Selected Works of Li Ta-chao] (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1962), pp. 146–150.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 153–154.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 171–172; see also his longer essay on the May Day holiday the following year, *ibid.*, pp. 311–326. The most extensive treatment of Li's thought thus far in print is Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), chap. I.

[19] This discussion is based primarily on John W. Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), esp. chaps. I and VI.

Seen from the perspective of strategy and tactics, this war effort fundamentally shaped the Communist Party's outlook and operations. The leadership under Mao Tse-tung could not develop independent tactics for the city. The development of suitable operational and training procedures thereby became decisively weighted in favor of strictly rural problems and objectives.[21] And, an important ambivalence thus began to manifest itself within the Communist outlook. Thereafter that outlook came to combine a long-range urban-oriented strategy with predominantly rural-centered political tactics. Hence, in 1949 the Party reasserted its fundamental urban strategy without having relevant operational techniques at its command. As will be seen, with the rejection of the urban focus in 1960, on the other hand, it placed exclusive faith in its rural-centered tactics while lacking thereafter in the cities an appropriate set of strategic objectives.

While the rural membership of the Party clearly played the principal role and rural base areas were the main centers of operation[22]—especially after the collapse of the various urban uprisings from 1927 to 1930—the Communist Party never abandoned its explicit hope of returning to the cities, the bastions of socio-economic power in China. The urban arm of the Party had sufficient strength in some centers to establish an escape pipeline for urban intellectuals and workers wishing to flee to Yenan or other Communist areas and join the Party cause. The mass orientation of the Communists was thus not simply directed toward the peasantry. Although dangerously threatened in the cities, the Communists continued to provide a major—and in the Japanese-occupied areas the only—regularized channel to higher status for urban Chinese youth. Indeed a sufficiently large proportion of the Communist Party in the countryside was composed of "petty bourgeois" intellectuals that Party leader Liu Shao-ch'i was forced to declare in 1945: "The social origin of our Party membership does not determine the character of our Party."[23] He added that most of the urban intellectuals in the Party had studied Marxism-Leninism and Mao's revolutionary theory and had changed "their old viewpoints or styles of work."[24] The long-term emphasis, according to Liu, remained on the working class and its coordinated campaign with the peasantry in preparation "for the liberation of the cities when the moment arrives."[25] Hence as the Communists reestablished and bolstered their authority in the spirit of patriotism, urban areas continued to play an important part in their plans.

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[20] Although sample quotations from Mao Tse-tung's writings must be used with care, some indication of Mao's persistent views on the urban role after 1926 can be gained from the following examples taken from volume I of his *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), as checked against the original Chinese versions: 1) "Though not very numerous, the industrial proletariat represents China's new productive forces, is the most progressive class in modern China and has become the leading force in the revolutionary movement. We can see the important position of the industrial proletariat in the Chinese revolution from the strength it has displayed in the strikes of the last four years. . . . " (March 1926, p. 18); 2) "Yet in the last few months, both in the north and in the south, there has been a growth of organized strikes by the workers in the cities and of insurrections by the peasants in the countryside. . . . (W)hether it is possible for the people's political power in small [rural] areas to last depends on whether the nation-wide revolutionary situation continues to develop" (October 5, 1928, pp. 64, 66); 3) "The democratic revolution . . . is a long process of struggle, of struggle for leadership in which success depends on the work of the Communist Party in raising the level of political consciousness and organization both of the proletariat and of the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie" (May 7, 1937, p. 290).

[21] For a fuller development of this theme see John W. Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *World Politics*, 18 (1966), 503–524.

[22] Robert C. North states: "Near the end of 1926 at least 66 percent of Chinese Communist Party membership could be classified as proletarian. Another 22 percent were considered to be intellectuals. Only 5 percent were peasants, and 2 percent were soldiers. But by the early months of 1930, elements which could possibly be labeled working class totaled only 8 percent of the Chinese Communist Party membership, while the number of industrial workers was 'still smaller, accounting for only 2 percent' of Party membership." *Op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.

[23] Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party* [May 1945] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 18.

Because of the character of the war against Japan, the Communists gave principal emphasis to the peasantry and villages but kept alive contacts with selected cities for purposes of harrassment of the enemy and recruitment of personnel. In a major report in 1938, Mao pointed out that the Japanese-occupied cities would be conquered from China's countryside, the temporary "center of gravity" of all operations.[26] By this use of the term "center of gravity," Mao in no way implied the abandonment of the urban struggle any more than the 1948 shift of the "center" back to the cities meant that the Chinese Communists were no longer concerned with the peasantry. Mao argued for a many-sided assault on the Japanese forces, and one of the important components in the struggle was the city. His strategy in this respect may be seen in part by an examination of the Communist-led strike in the North China coal-mining and industrial city of Tangshan in 1938.[27]

In the spring of that year, 7,000 miners and workers in the Tangshan area commenced a series of strikes which, in July, culminated in a coordinated uprising under the leadership of Li Yün-ch'ang (see below). This effort formed part of a plan to divert Japanese troops at Tangshan from engaging elements of the Communist Eighth Route Army which had moved into East Hopei from the west.[28] According to Chalmers Johnson, the Communists hoped to threaten the entire East Hopei puppet-controlled region, particularly the main communication arteries and the Kailan collieries at Tangshan.[29] In support of the Red invasion, tens of thousands of peasants in the area joined by the workers from Tangshan set loose a wave of violence, and most of the work in the mines and factories temporarily ceased.[30] To this, the Japanese responded with systematic terror, beginning their notorious *san-kuang* (Japanese: *sankō-seisaku*) policy of reprisals.[31] Under this battering and despite extraordinary losses, the Communists formed the East Hopei "base area" with Tangshan as one of the principal operational centers. More than 2,000 miners permanently joined the ranks of the local guerrillas, forming the leadership core of the partisans in the area.[32]

Among the many consequences of the establishment of the East Hopei "base area" then was the promotion of an important relationship between the countryside and cities. In the vicinity of Tangshan at least, this relationship affected the Party's policies concerning recruitment and promotions. In particular, many cadres from urban areas gained positions of leadership in the guerrilla apparatus and continued to direct the work of the Party in Tangshan and other cities in coordination with that in the rural areas. Many of the posts that opened up in the course of the bloody *san-kuang* suppression drives of the Japanese came to be filled by men from Tangshan. Indeed, the leader of the base area around Tangshan, Li Yün-ch'ang,[33] had launched his Party career in the city at the age of 28. Li, born in 1908, a relative of Li Ta-chao, helped engineer the 1938 strikes in the mines and shortly thereafter became Party secretary and military commander of the local guerrilla district. He continued to rise in the Party after 1938 and in 1962 was elevated to full membership on the Party's Central Control Commission. It was the forces under Li's command that "liberated" Tangshan on December 12, 1948.

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[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–22.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[26] Mao Tse-tung, *Lun hsin chieh-tuan* [On the New Stage] (Hong Kong: Hsin min-chu ch'u-pan she, 1949), sect. III, 14.

[27] This discussion will form part of a larger work on the political development of Tanshan, in progress.

[28] *K'ang-jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang* [The General Conditions of the Liberated Areas in the Anti-Japanese War Period] (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1953), pp. 1–2, 24.

[29] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 113–115.

[30] See *Tang-shan lao-tung jih-pao* [Tangshan Labor Daily, hereafter cited as *TSLTJP*], July 2 and 5, 1951, April 6, 1958.

[31] The *san-kuang* policy was "kill all, burn all, loot all." Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–56. Contrary to Johnson, the Chinese state that the policy began in 1938, not in 1940 after the Hundred Regiments' Offensive.

[32] Israel Epstein, "The Kailan Mines . . . ," *China Reconstructs*, 12 (1963), 2–7.

[33] For Li's biography, see *TSLTJP*, July 5, 1951, and April 6, 1958; Kasumigaseki Association, *Gendai Chugoku jinmei jiten* [Biographical Dictionary of Modern China] (Tokyo: Kōnan shoin, 1957), pp. 605–606; and Ta-kung pao she (ed.), *Jen-min shou-ts'e 1963* [People's Handbook for 1963] (Peking: Ta-kung pao she, 1963), p. 137.

In the years after 1938, many cadres of worker-intellectual origins began their careers in the Party. A larger study in progress of the post-1948 Tangshan elite will show that the men who moved into positions of authority in Tangshan after the takeover had long ties with the city and had usually come from urban backgrounds. In the Japanese-occupied areas, the Communists fought a daily war for survival, and in the decisive process of leadership selection, Party leaders rather consistently appear to have given preference to those from urban China. And one of the major grievances aired by peasant cadres after 1949 was the Party's apparent reluctance to detail them to leading posts in the cities. In the earlier years of the People's Republic, however, the large and expanding need of the Party for all "men of talent" gave promise of rapid promotions to able and ambitious youth irrespective of social or geographical origins. This nation-wide expansion of the bureaucracy helped soften the blow for rural youth who had pinned their hopes on the Party for rapid advancement from obscurity to power.

Consider, for example, the career of Yen Ta-k'ai, a 24-year-old worker from East Hopei in 1938 and participant in the mining strike at Tangshan.[34] As part of the Liberation Army forces entering Tangshan in 1948, Yen, then 34, headed the all-powerful military control commission for Tangshan. In this capacity, he posted military-Party representatives in all major industrial and governmental organizations and coordinated the movements of all cadres taking over official positions. It was his job to see that, as Chou En-lai later put it, "the policy of 'the wholesale taking over' of intellectuals from the old society" was carried out and that "the vast majority of them were kept on in suitable posts, some even being given responsible positions."[35]

For the next six years Yen seemed to be everywhere in Tangshan. In addition to his military position, he held posts in the Party (deputy and second secretary), the Government Council (member and acting mayor) the All-Circles Consultative Committee, the labor union (chairman), and the Kailan mines (secretary of the Party committee). In addition to his shifting and overlapping official posts, Yen headed or held a ranking position on the main committees established by the government and Party to complete limited tasks; these included preparatory committees for major meetings and holidays, the various "resist-America, aid-Korea" committees, the committee for the construction of the workers' hospital, and committees to investigate cases concerning counterrevolutionaries, evaluate and select labor models, investigate austerity in the factories, and construct workers' dormitories. While others rose and fell, stumbled at ideological or administrative barriers, or transferred to comparable posts in other cities, Yen carried on in Tangshan until 1954. He was then promoted to the rank of vice-governor of Hopei and deputy secretary of the Hopei Provincial Party Committee. At 52, Yen Ta-k'ai symbolizes the mobile revolutionary generation. He is the prototype of Mao's ideal successor.

The men typified by Yen Ta-ka'i also symbolize the Party's achievement in restoring avenues for the recruitment and advancement of talented men in China. Superficially, the Chinese pattern of vertical social mobility in the 1948–1952 period appears to have been similar to that of the Ming era: emphasis on talent, fairly rapid turnovers of the local elites, high status for political leadership, rural-urban movement, and a bias in favor of urban intellectuals. Yet, great differences between the two patterns are also evident (such as the extensive overlapping of the elites and the existence of multiple paths to selection and promotion in the Communist period). The patterns of mobility, extraordinarily complicated by the recent accession to power of the Communist leadership, remained unclear in the reconstruction years (1949–1952) as former military cadres and soldiers moved into unfamiliar civilian jobs. Wide gaps existed between an individual's power and his prestige and between his position and style of life.[36] And the situation was confused for the additional reasons that the new status values had yet to be inculcated on a nation-wide basis and the goals of the state against which talent would be judged were still to be fully promulgated. In the revolutionary war Mao had resurrected the channels for the upward mobility of China's youth. After the "liberation" his main task, never previously accomplished in China, was to maintain a high rate of career advancement among broad sections of the population in support of programs of industrialization. The principal locus for its accomplishment, Mao stipulated, would be the city. Here would be the major contest, the main arena for the legitimation of his newly-won power.

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[34] These biographical details of Yen Ta-k'ai's life are largely drawn from *TSLTJP* for the years 1950, 1951, and 1952.

[35] Chou En-lai, *Report on the Question of Intellectuals* [January 14, 1956] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 8. In 1949–50, 2,700,000 new members joined the Party (*Shih-shih shou-ts'e* [Current Events Handbook], No. 16, 1951), and Chou suggests that many of these were intellectuals.

[36] I am particularly indebted to Ezra Vogel for his insights concerning the problem of status in the early years of the Chinese People's Republic.

III. THE NEW CENTER OF GRAVITY: MOBILITY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN URBAN CHINA

In 1948, as a prelude to this task, Mao Tse-tung set out to achieve two intermediate objectives. First, he ordered his forces to consider the city as the new center of gravity in the revolutionary struggle and his army to be turned into a working force.[37] Secondly, he sought to restore production and bring the existing socio-economic apparatus of the "newly-liberated areas" under firm Party control. Attainment of this second objective would involve, Mao said in 1949, the transformation of the consumer-cities into producer-cities. Only on this basis could "the people's political power be consolidated."[38] In setting forth the guidelines for these priority objectives, moreover, Mao made clear that no change should detract from the superlative status assigned to the Party and its cadres and that the mood and tempo of the revolution must be maintained.[39] Everything would have to undergo transformation but the Communist outlook and the need for firm Party control.

It is against these objectives and the value scheme by which they came to be interpreted that Mao's broader task of maintaining high rates of upward mobility in support of the Party's programs for industrialization must be viewed. To develop its legitimacy, the Party would have to open to the main bodies of the youth and educated an expanding number of posts leading to higher salaries and greater power. Given Mao's inflexible political values, the Party would have to redefine and rank anew all posts according to these values. In theory, at least, high status would not be determined primarily by the requirements for those talents and motivations found in industrial societies, although the industrialization of China was made a prime social goal. Nonetheless, under the pressures of the social changes initiated by the Party in its effort to modernize the country, the actual ranking of classes began to diverge from the approved pattern, seriously challenging the validity of the ideal system. It is this increasing divergence of real from ideal patterns that came to threaten the legitimacy of the Party in urban China in the late 1950's and to which the discussion now turns.

Although the limits of space do not permit a full description of the Communist method of class analysis, a brief outline of their ideal status system will help to illuminate the problems which later developed in China's cities. As Mao Tse-tung and other major Communists had viewed the matter of classes and class elites in Chinese society over the years, the following hierarchical ordering had emerged:

1. The ruling elite or "vanguard" selected according to political standards of activeness and reliability and ideological standards of Party "consciousness."
    a. Party cadres (*tang kan-pu*): the top leadership assigned to posts in the Party apparatus and ranked according to geographical level (national, regional, provincial, *hsien*, or municipal, etc.) and intra-agency assignment. Non-party cadres who are also Party members (*tang-yüan kan-pu*) rank almost on a par with this elite group. These latter cadres hold posts outside the Party apparatus.
    b. Party members: ranked according to full and probationary members with full members having longer service in senior positions—particularly if they participated in some memorable event.
    c. Young Communist League members: ranked into leading and rank-and-file elements and by political standards according to worthiness for membership in

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[37] For the basic articles on Mao's new thinking on the city, see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), IV, pp. 247–249, 269–277, 337–339, and 361–375. For an early discussion of Communist policies toward cities, see H. Arthur Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," this REVIEW, 44 (1950), 47–63.

[38] Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session . . . " [March 5, 1949], *Selected Works*, IV, pp. 363–365. This same theme has been independently picked up by some Western scholars. See, for example, Bert F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 3 (1955), 278–294.

[39] I have treated this theme of revolutionary struggle in my "Revolutionary Struggle and the Second Generation in Communist China," *The China Quarterly*, No. 21 (January–March 1965), 126–147.

the Chinese Communist Party. Members of the League are usually drawn from the Young Pioneers.

   d. Non-Party cadres: ordered along the same lines as Party cadres. These cadres hold posts in the non-Party apparatus. As noted above, those who are simultaneously Party members (*tang yüan kan-pu*)[40] or League members have higher status than those who are not Party members (*fei-tang kan-pu*). They are selected for political and technical achievements and have been the principal targets for reform in the "red and expert" campaigns.

2. The working class and its allies ("the people") selected and ranked according to combined economic (particularly degrees of ownership and "exploitation"), political, and performance criteria as follows:
   a. Workers: differentiated according to skills and activeness. Highest status in theory is given to the workers most active in production and study.
   b. Peasants: elaborately subdivided in the early years but now usually ranked into poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, middle peasants, and rich peasants, in descending order of status according to categories of exploitation and ownership of the means of production. The first two groups, now frequently combined as "poor and lower-middle peasants," are placed on a par with workers in the overall ranking, and a superior place is given to revolutionary army men and dependents of Communist martyrs.
   c. Intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie: differentiated according to educational and professional attainment and to standards of political reliability. Many intellectuals and professional technicians holding posts as cadres have sometimes raised their low rating, but most rank with or only slightly above the petty bourgeois classes from which they allegedly originated. This class came under full-scale attack in 1966 with the inauguration of the "great cultural revolution" against professionalism and the scientific-technical outlook.
   d. National bourgeoisie: scheduled to disappear but allowed to cooperate with the Communists on a controlled basis;[41] all enterprises belonging to this group were effectively nationalized in 1955–1956 with the device of "state-private joint ownership."

3. The declassed "enemies of the people" made up of assorted groups of "counterrevolutionaries" and "those social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to and try to wreck socialist construction." Most of the survivors of this group are serving (or have served) sentences in prisons or "reform through labor" camps.

Membership in any one of the above status groupings was determined on the basis of a complex set of standards which had "different meanings" in "different historical periods."[42] Much more should be said about each of these categories, but the main point to be made here is that Mao Tse-tung in the initial years of the People's Republic expected future patterns of social mobility to adhere fairly precisely to the hierarchical ideal above and that social power would increasingly become centered in the cities. Peasants could aspire to become workers (though not necessarily urban dwellers),[43] and all "people" could legitimately seek to attain ruling group status. As one moved up the ladder, political criteria for selection and advancement would carry ever greater weight. Or, as it was stated in another study,[44] the training of the general population would be based on the needs of industrialization, and thus retraining according to political values would have to take place for the young members of the ruling elite.

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[40] According to Professor A. Doak Barnett, "*tang yüan kan-pu*" applies to all Party members who are cadres not only in the government, mass organizations, military units, and communes, but also in the Party administration. Thus, this term would include the *tang kan-pu*, although I have arbitrarily separated the two groups of cadres here. *Tang yüan kan-pu* is always used together with and in contrast to the term non-Party cadres (*fei-tang kan-pu*).

[41] For a discussion of the bourgeoisie and the "united front," see Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*, pp. 23–31.

[42] Mao, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* [February 27, 1957] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), pp. 8–9.

[43] The problem of peasant movement to the cities has been a recurring one in Communist China. For the many references on the problem from 1952–1957, see John Philip Emerson, "Manpower Absorption in the Non-Agricultural Branches of the Economy of Communist China, 1953–1958," *The China Quarterly*, No. 7 (July–September 1961), 76.

[44] Lewis, "Party Cadres in Communist China," *op. cit.*

In the reconstruction period and the initial years of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), the Communists apparently succeeded in establishing within the society the essential features of their status system as described above. And, at least in Tangshan, the Party's policies for cadre recruitment and promotion brought forth the most talented youth, while progressive industrialization and the vast political reorganization and expansion created many thousands of vacancies in the city's bureaucracy. The Tangshan study in progress will also show that in these years Chinese industrialization, urbanization, education, mobility, and bureaucratization were joined together and reinforced and supported each other. The more modern areas of China as a whole were also the ones most responsive to Communist demands for larger sized collective organizations.[45] As Lipset and Bendix found in successfully modernized states, so too in China during the First Five-Year Plan social mobility was "an integral and continuing aspect of the processes of urbanization, industrialization, and bureaucratization."[46] Although the actual cause of the high rates of upward mobility may be more attributable to the unusually rapid bureaucratic expansion combined with the extreme turnover of cadres during the various reform movements, the youth and favored classes acclaimed their improved lot as evidence of the validity of Mao's class line. It was this general approbation which undergirded and broadened the legitimate authority of the Party in the early years after the Communist takeover.

Within the cities at least, this legitimacy rested on the weak foundation of dubious, if not untenable, postulates. The most significant among these was that the men and women moving into the newly created positions hailed, almost miraculously, from the "right" classes and held the "proper" political beliefs in line with their class label. Contrary to this assumption, the principal incentives which operated in that period (at least in North China cities) were technical and economic in character, and youth aspired to ascend the cadre ladder for reasons of "prestige and position," as Teng Hsiao-p'ing later stated, rather than for motives of selfless service and dedication. The operative basis of Communist legitimacy, misunderstood by the Party leaders at the time, was widespread faith in the Communist ability to expand the job market, not in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Particularly noticeable was the rapid rise of professional scientists and technicians, the urban intelligentsia placed so low on Mao's ideal scale of classes but high on the personnel lists of every factory manager, office head, and educator in China. It was only by a continuing manipulation of the categories that the Party could hold that industrialization was compatible with the socialization of the class structure along Maoist lines.

Crucial to this compatibility—and to the fate of the precarious legitimacy—was the role of the intellectual. In the discussions of the First Five-Year Plan, the Party leadership had declared that "the slightest waste of our technical forces is a loss to the national construction forces" and had denounced the practice of placing "people with specialized skills . . . in unsuitable positions for prolonged periods."[47] As a result of this judgment on the vital role of the intellectual and technical personnel, great stress fell on the choice of cadres with technical and scientific competence and high achievement motivation.[48] For a time it was merely stipulated without further investigation that intellectuals (referred to then as "mental workers") in the New China could be trusted to think and behave in the best "proletarian" fashion.

The rise in the fortunes of the urban-based intelligentsia received an official stamp of approval at the Party meeting called "to discuss the question of intellectuals" in January, 1956.[49] In his famous report to this meeting, Chou En-lai began with the assertion that the "intellectuals have become an important factor in every aspect of our national life." Their number should be expanded, he stated, and their professional skills and political consciousness improved. More importantly, the Party must forsake its separatist ("sectarian") attitude toward the intellectuals and begin to mobilize them. Chou emphatically ordered his subordinates to institute a policy of assisting the intellectuals so as "to help them to grasp the principle of integrating theory with practice, learn from advanced Soviet experience, improve their working methods, and raise their vocational levels." In contrast to the past tendency of "underestimating their contribution to our socialist cause [and] failing to recognize them as a part of the working class," the Party would now have to improve their working and living conditions and admit them in large numbers to the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, over 600,000 intellectuals entered the Party in 1956–1957, and the total number of intellectuals in 1957 (1,800,000 or 14.8 percent) surpassed the number of workers (1,740,000 or 13.7 percent) in the Party ranks.[50]

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[45] See G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part III," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 24 (1965), 363–399; and Lewis, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," *op. cit.*

[46] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, p. 280. Many other variables are also at work in the processes of change. For an excellent discussion of these in the context of industrialization, see Richard D. Lambert, *Workers, Factories, and Social Change in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[47] Li Fu-ch'un, *Report of the First Five Year Plan* . . . (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), p. 97.

[48] See Lewis, "Party Cadres in Communist China," *op. cit.*

[49] Chou En-lai, *Report on the Question of Intellectuals*, *op. cit.*

With these shifts in the real class position of the intellectual, the relative position of all other classes in China adjusted accordingly. In a short time, the stratification and mobility patterns of the society, responding to these changes (but many of which were well underway long before the Communists came to power), began to resemble stratification and mobility in the Soviet Union.[51] As had Stalin before them, the Chinese vigorously decried "equalitarianism" as a "type of petty-bourgeois outlook which encourages backwardness and hinders progress."[52] They also adopted the Marxist and Russian view of work,[53] and gave serious attention to the change in status of women[54] and improvement of educational opportunities for all youth. But the changes in the years 1952–1956 went even further in the direction of Soviet society. As in the Soviet Union, intellectuals in China entered vital managerial posts in increasing numbers, and cadre selection came to be based on educational and professional attainments rather than on political reliability and activeness. Cadres perfunctorily met the formal requirements of political study and participation and usually winked at the apolitical attitudes of the new recruits. As Mao put it in 1957: "It seems as if Marxism that was once all the rage is not so much in fashion now."[55] And to make matters worse from the Chinese Communist standpoint, old bureaucratic habits came alive again and assumed "the form of swollen conceit and self-complacency."[56] When Anastas I. Mikoyan in 1956 acclaimed China's successes in "basing itself on the experiences of the Soviet Union" and in "rallying around the Communist Party and the working class those social strata which lie between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" (that is, the intellectuals), Mao hardly felt reassured.[57]

Rather, the Party leaders resolutely determined to erase those social tendencies which had moved closest to the Soviet model. Also at the 1956 Eighth Party Congress at which Mikoyan spoke, Liu Shao-ch'i laid it down that the burgeoning bureaucracy must be "trimmed and simplified" and that the functionaries must "change such ways of work as busying themselves exclusively with holding meetings and signing documents."[58] Thus began the prolonged campaign, which is still in progress, to reduce staffs and to send cadres to the lower levels (*hsia fang*).[59] In the following spring, on the heels of Mao's address, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," the Central Committee launched a major rectification movement designed to correct the working habits ("style") of the cadres and later the intellectuals.[60] Drastic downward mobility replaced the steadily upward trend in the fortunes of the cadres and labor force so evident in the previous five years. Among the hundreds of thousands of demoted cadres, many were ordered out of the cities and assigned to lowly posts in the villages. Even formal educational programs were curtailed; for example, the number of entrants to engineering schools fell from 62,000 in 1956 to 37,200 in 1957.[61] Governed by the slogans "politics in command" and "red and expert," political merit was assigned absolute priority in the selection and promotion of all personnel. The ideal system of social stratification outlined above was reaffirmed and enforced. Apparently believing that previous planning had suffered from the conservatism of bureaucrats and technical experts, Party leaders swept away most of the planning systems and procedures associated with the First Five-Year Plan. The State Statistical Bureau and other technical agencies for the processing of vital economic data underwent a thorough reorganization and were stripped of skilled personnel.

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[50] Lewis, *Leadershp in Communist China*, pp. 108–109.

[51] See Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953), pp. 609–622.

[52] Chou En-lai, *Report on the Work of the Government* [September 23, 1954] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 27. This view of equalitarianism may be traced to Mao's "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," *Selected Works*, I, pp. 111–112, written in 1929.

[53] See particularly George Fischer, *Science and Politics: The New Sociology in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Center for International Studies, 1964), pp. 32–38.

[54] For the principal documents on Chinese Communist policies toward women in the early years, see *Fu-nü yün-tung wen-hsien* [Documents on the Women's Movement] (Hong Kong: Hsin min-chu ch'u-pan she, 1949).

[55] Mao, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, p. 43.

[56] Teng Hsiao-p'ing in *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), I, p. 183. Joseph S. Berliner describes the similar expression of bureaucratic habits in the Soviet Union in his *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), chaps. XI–XII.

[57] In *Eighth National Congress*, III, pp. 12 and 19.

[58] *Ibid.*, I, p. 75.

[59] See Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*, pp. 220–232.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 169–175.

Predictably, the intellectuals responded negatively to their loss of status and this in turn only intensified the sharpness of the Party's resolve to reverse the trends that it opposed in Chinese society.[62] Intellectuals generally found themselves reclassified as members of the bourgeoisie rather than the working class, and some fell victim to even harsher measures, including death or imprisonment.[63] And it was in this charged atmosphere throughout China that the Central Committee, probably at its Third Plenum in September–October, 1957, decided to initiate the new line of socialist construction which was to lead within the year to the "great leap forward" and the people's communes. As a result of this new line, moreover, the emphasis in recruitment shifted once again to the enrollment of peasants rather than workers in Party and cadre positions, and tens of millions were forcibly transported from urban centers to work in the countryside.[64] By mid-1960, the countryside had been restored as the "center of gravity" in the Party's thinking, and most leaders, recalling the images of the Yenan struggle, spoke principally about dramatic leaps in agriculture and about "industrialization of the whole country, industrialization of the people's communes and making agriculture into a factory."[65] Following the changes in status values, political-psychological incentives displaced economic rewards for outstanding performance, and real wages gradually fell.[66] One by one, the assaults on the previous systems of placement and cadre working habits crippled industrialization and education. Its major elements thus in jeopardy, the city lost the active spirit which had characterized it in the early days of the People's Republic and became the object of official scorn. By late 1960, the urban economy lay in a shambles and all industrial targets were revised downward.

The price tag for Mao's rigid political goals then was the drastic decline in industrialization and urban growth. In the end, he obtained neither the level of conformity nor the type of social stratification which he desired, and his policies propelled the society toward near total breakdown in some sectors.[67] And even where there was no threat of social collapse, the people at the very least became embittered and then cynical as the Communists attempted to restore the basis for industrialization in a piecemeal fashion.[68] One refugee from Tangshan, for example, reports that the incidence of thefts of food and more serious crimes in the city rose sharply in this period and that the general state of health was poor.[69] Discontent among the workers had increased, he reported, and "recently discipline and fear of the police seemed loosening" with deliberate insults made by the populace toward "the visible representatives of public authority." Where the rural population had a rather complex set of grievances, urban youth centered their criticism almost exlusively on lack of opportunity for urban placement and steady advancement. Thus the assault on cadre mobility had not only undermined industrialization but had also resulted in the breakdown of the legitimate authority of the Party.

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[61] Leo A. Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China* (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), p. 131.

[62] See Roderick MacFarquhar, *Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (New York: Praeger, 1960); Mu Fu-sheng, *The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers: The Chinese Intelligentsia Under Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1963); and Dennis J. Doolin, *Communist China: The Politics of Student Opposition* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964)

[63] Teng Hsiao-p'ing, *Report on the Rectification Campaign* [September 23, 1957] (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), esp. pp. 11–22

[64] China's urban population grew from 71,630,000 in 1952 to about 92,000,000 in 1957. Thereafter millions illegally entered the cities, raising the urban figures to over 130,000,000 in 1960. According to official sources, more than 20,000,000 of these had been sent back to their native villages by 1963.

[65] In 1960, this shift in the "center of gravity" was formalized in the line of "taking agriculture as the foundation of the national economy."

[66] For an early discussion of the "proper" incentives, see Liu Ch'eng-chieh *et al.*, "Hsien-ching sheng-ch'an-che ti hsin-li t'e-tien" [The Psychological Characteristics of Advanced Producers], *Pei-ching ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao* [Peking University Journal], No. 4 (1958), 39–49.

[67] For a discussion, see John W. Lewis, "China's Secret Military Papers: 'Continuities' and 'Revelations,'" *The China Quarterly*, No. 18 (April–June 1964), 68–78.

[68] See the article on incentives by Shih Hsiu-lin in *Jen-min jih-pao* [People's Daily], March 6, 1962.

From 1961 through 1965, moreover, the Communist leaders showed an ambivalence toward elite recruitment. They wavered on the criteria for the selection and promotion of their "successors." At times, they demanded evidence of excellence on both the political and technical sides of a candidate's record but, at other times, required excellence on one side alone.[70] In a major article on the subject of cadre recruitment in May 1964, moreover, one writer argued for a "bold" program of "choosing young but outstanding men who have undergone ideological remolding and training in practical work and placing them in suitable work posts so that they may undergo further trial and training and may mature more rapidly."[71] While appearing to face up to the need for "young and outstanding persons for responsible posts in scientific and technical work," the author also noted the danger of China's "peaceful evolution" or Soviet-type "revisionism" as caused, he held, by the incautious advancement of those who might in time betray the revolution. Such distrust of all potential cadres was echoed three months later in a tract condemning Khrushchev's Russia. It said: "All working personnel must be prevented from abusing their power and enjoying special privileges."[72] All cadres, old as well as new, must thus submit to intensive indoctrination in a "cultural revolution" and to work thanklessly in collective labor in the countryside.[73] At each stage officials have thereby qualified their calls for boldness with warnings against reliance on professional or material incentives. These warnings in the first five years of this decade resulted in the stagnation of the recruitment process and the consequent aging of the bureaucracy as major posts rotated among the long-time members of the elite.

In sum, Mao had at first succeeded brilliantly in bringing together mobility, education, and urbanization in support of industrialization. This success, however, depended on a continuous increase in the number of cadre posts. By tying mobility to industrialization, moreover, the Communists risked changes in the social structure and the elite itself, if men and women entered higher posts with "irregular" class credentials. They also made it inevitable that later efforts to alter mobility patterns would affect and disrupt industrialization and other aspects of modernization. By adhering to Mao's view of all policy in terms of a wave-like motion—moving from extremes of control and discipline to voluntarism and education—Party cadres could not leave well enough alone. Neither could the Communists sit idly by and watch the "erroneous" transformation of Chinese society and the Communist Party. But, misjudging the forces of change which they had accelerated in 1952, they lost control of the efforts to reinstate the "revolutionary" class values as a guide to aspirations and conduct six years later. As the rate of upward mobility in China rapidly declined and then reversed, the entire organization of industrialization and education was rudely shaken. Unwilling to compromise, Mao overreacted to the signs of unrest in the cities and among the intellectuals and thus helped bring about the debacle of the "three hard years."

Although it is still too early to estimate the probabilities for success of recent Communist programs for economic development, they cannot be judged in the same light as the efforts at restoration and control during the years of reconstruction more than a decade ago. The memory of failure and dashed hopes is poignant, and it will directly affect the outlook of the youth and younger cadres for many years to come. Since the Communists have continued to move urban dwellers and educated students to the countryside and have made only sporadic efforts to rehabilitate the channels of mobility to achievement-oriented youths, the prospects for industrialization in the near future do not appear bright. Mao hopes to achieve industrialization without its social concomitants or, in the words of one leader, "modernization without revolution."

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[69] Reported in *China News Analysis*, No. 382 (1961). Although this refugee is not identified as a worker from Tangshan, the description of his city in every detail fits Tangshan.

[70] Lewis, "Party Cadres in Communist China," *op. cit.*

[71] Article by Chao Han, *Jen-min jih-pao*, May 20, 1964. The author also expressed a bias favoring the use of older cadres. For a discussion of other problems of cadre recruitment, see Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China*, pp. 193–195.

[72] *On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 69.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Nothing has so dramatized Mao's rigid stand on the political aspects of mobility in China's urban development as the campaign for "cultural revolution" and the resultant purge in 1966. As part of this campaign in June, the Party abolished the prevailing system of university examinations and for at least six months postponed the enrollment in all institutions of higher learning.[74] The former system, now labeled a failure in terms of Mao's values and status system,[75] allegedly obstructed "the integration of educated young people with the workers and peasants and . . . [encouraged them] to seek advancement in their academic careers for the purpose of finding jobs in the cities after completing their studies and of enjoying a life of luxury."[76] The central purpose of the current "great proletarian cultural revolution," the Communists have explicitly said, is the determination of "whether one supports Mao's thought in command, supports politics in command, or whether one advocates moneymaking in command and the placing of professional skill in command."[77] And, according to the army's press, satisfactory achievement in work can no longer be taken as an indication of sound ideology and right thinking.[78]

Yet as the Party attempts to revive those aspects of the "great leap forward" designed to create the revolutionary man in this industrial era, it lacks the active social support of the advanced urban sectors. The urban population remains in limbo, a poor second to the countryside in the official ideology. Mao proved that he could enlist the backing of the urban society for politically-determined measures in the early years. He may now discover that the social limits on those politically-induced changes requiring urban support can be formidable indeed.[79]

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[74] For the text of the State Council notice of June 13, 1966, see *Peking Review*, June 24, 1966, p. 3.

[75] The State Council notice of June 13 states: "Bourgeois domination is still deeply rooted and the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is very acute in quite a number of universities, colleges and middle [high] schools. . . . The method of examination and enrolment for the higher educational institutions, has failed in the main, to free itself from the set pattern of the bourgeois system of examination. . . . "

[76] Peking Radio, June 18, 1966. In August a Central Committee decision labeled units in the large and medium cities as the "key points" in the movement (Peking Radio, August 8, 1966).

[77] *Jen-min jih-pao*, June 10, 1966.

[78] *Chieh-fang chün pao* [Liberation Army Daily], April 5, 1966. See also *ibid.*, April 18, May 4, and June 6, 1966; and Peking Radio, June 13, 1966.

[79] The avowed purpose of the "cultural revolution" in progress in late 1966 is to erase these social limits. Mao Tse-tung in mid-August launched the Red Guards in China's cities. Operating as "combat groups," bands of these young zealots began to invade churches, schools and shops, and with official encouragement, made "a clean sweep of the names of many places, shop signs, books, attire, customs, habits, and bad practices that represented the ideology of feudalism, capitalism and revisionism" (Chieh-fang chün pao, August 23, 1966).

DISCERNING A CAUSAL PATTERN AMONG DATA ON VOTING BEHAVIOR*

ARTHUR S. GOLDBERG
University of Rochester

I. CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS: SIMON'S MODEL

The present analysis is devoted to making an empirically based choice among alternate causal explanations. This entails making causal inferences from statistical correlations. While this might, at one time, have constituted a heresy, I believe that the procedure to be followed here will soon be a part of statistical orthodoxy.[1]

This is not the place for an extended philosophical discussion of the problem of causality. Yet I would like to make my position on the problem as clear as concise presentation will permit. My basic sympathies are with that school which argues that scientifically relevant causal explanation inheres only in our theories, i.e., that the explained event takes the shape which it does because our postulates and logic preclude any other shape on pain of being themselves incorrect.[2] However, the development of such theory, containing such postulates, is usually the product of an inspired insight on the part of one thoroughly immersed in the manifestations of the empirical phenomenon under consideration. The production and verification of such insight in a systematic and reproducible way is the goal of inductive research. Where controlled experimentation is possible, Mill's canons may apply. Where such experiments are either impossible or impracticable, statistical inference becomes necessary. It is in this situation that the present approach, based upon a model developed by Herbert Simon and others, seems justified.[3]

Simon's model is designed to capture the asymmetry in our notions of causality. When one speaks of A as a cause of B, one usually has in mind a unidirectional forcing, and not merely a covariation, or phased covariation. Thus, if one speaks of rains as a cause of floods, one expects that a variation in rainfall will be accompanied by a variation in flooding, *but* one does *not* expect that variations in flooding deriving from other causes, e.g., faulty dam construction, will be accompanied by variations in rainfall. Again, it should be noted that the concept of alternate causes is alien to deductive theory, which seeks to postulate the most inclusive principles. However, inductive inference is concerned with perceiving an ever-increasing proportion of the total set of alternate causes in order to facilitate formulation of a principle of commonality.

Simon suggests that a patterned causal ordering can and should be described as a recursive set of simultaneous equations dealing sequentially with each of the variables in the causal ordering and describing each in terms of the regression of its causal antecedents upon it. Thus if one had four variables, $x_1 \cdots x_4$, in

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* While I have incurred a great many intellectual debts in the conduct of this inquiry, I am most particularly indebted to Hayward R. Alker, Jr., at Yale University, for so generously making available to me his understanding of causal inference strategies. I also wish to thank the University of Rochester for the research fellowship which enabled me to devote the summer of 1964 to the study of causality and causal inference techniques. Of course, neither mentor nor patron is responsible for such errors as may have been perpetrated herein. For these I alone am culpable.

[1] Cf. Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, (March, 1963), 45–56; Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews, "Causal Priorities in Panel Study Data," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1964), 836–847; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), chap. VI.

[2] Cf. Robert Brown, *Explanation in Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1963), chap. XI. See also Norwood Russell Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958, chap. III; and William H. Riker, "Causes of Events," *Journal of Philosophy*, 55 (1958), 281–291.

[3] See Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), chaps. I–III; and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964), chaps. I–III. These authors, in turn, have drawn heavily upon the work of econometricians. Among basic sources are, for example, Ragnar Frisch, *Statistical Confluence Analysis by Means of Complete Regression Systems* (Oslo: Universitets Økonomiske Institutt, 1934) and T. C. Koopmans (ed.), *Statistical Inference in Dynamic Economic Models* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950).

which x_1 was considered causally independent of all of the rest, and x_4 was considered causally dependent upon all of the rest, and in which x_2 and x_3 were causally intervening, this could be described as follows:[4]

$$
\begin{aligned}
x_1 &= e_1\\
x_2 &= b_{21}x_1 + e_2\\
x_3 &= b_{31.2}x_1 + b_{32.1}x_2 + e_3\\
x_4 &= b_{41.23}x_1 + b_{42.13}x_2 + b_{43.12}x_3 + e_4
\end{aligned}
$$

The non-zero regression coefficients describe the impact of each of the causal antecedents upon a given variable; the pattern of impacts is inferable from the zero regression coefficients, and asymmetry is accomplished in that manipulation of the value of a given variable leaves unaltered the relationships among its causal antecedents, and can affect only causally subsequent variables.[5]

Since it is the case that causal impacts should appear as non-zero value regression coefficients, causal models in which any of the variables contribute directly to less than the full set of subsequent variables have implied zero value regression coefficients. Hubert Blalock points out that such regression coefficients imply zero value correlation coefficients. It thus becomes possible with the aid of partial correlation coefficients to make an empirically based decision among alternate causal models purporting to describe the causal relationships within the same set of variables. This is the technique which will be used in the present analysis.

It should be noted that there are several assumptions being made which bear substantially upon the logic of the analysis. These are: that the effects on the dependent variable of variables excluded from the model are not related to effects produced by any of the independent variables in the model; that all variables which have a substantial impact on the dependent variable and are correlated with independent variables in the model are also included in the model (i.e., the error terms are uncorrelated); that the phenomena to be explained entail no reciprocal causation.[6]

It should also be noted that there is a serious controversy among econometricians with regard to the uncorrelated error term assumption.[7] Although I do not wish to indulge in an extended discussion of the subject, it is perhaps only fair that I make my own position explicit. In general, I believe that this assumption is almost always invalid, and that science proceeds not only in spite of this invalidity, but to a large extent through efforts to cope with it. When the limit of a theory is encountered, in the form of the occurrence of a theoretically precluded phenomenon, the search is begun for some component of the error term which is correlated in the relevant sense, and in conjunction with its discovery, the substance of the theory is revised. This is but one form of the retroductive process.[8]

II. CAUSAL RELATIONS AMONG SIX VARIABLES

The present analysis is concerned with making inferences about the pattern of causal relationships among six variables: father's sociological characteristics (FSC); father's party identification (FPI); respondent's sociological characteristics (RSC); respondent's party identification (RPI); respondent's partisan attitudes (RPA); and respondent's vote for President in 1956 (RV). The assumed causal ordering is the sequence in which the variables are listed above, except when otherwise noted. In each case to be examined, the model will be presented schematically, and the variables will be numbered in accordance with their assumed causal sequence.

Variables were selected for inclusion in the analysis on the bases of their repeated occurrence in the voting literature and their availability in a reliable body of data.[9] The sociological characteristics of the respondent's father and the father's party identification were taken as indicators of the context in which the respondent underwent his early political socialization. The literature is replete with the importance of this early socialization for political behavior in general and for voting behavior in particu-

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[4] Simon, *op. cit.*, chap. I.

[5] Blalock, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–60.

[6] See *ibid.*, pp. 46–54.

[7] See, for example, Fritz C. Holte, *Economic Shock-Models* (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1962), pp. 14–17.

[8] See Hanson, *op. cit.*, chap. IV.

[9] The body of data used consisted of that generated in the 1956 election study (#417) by the Survey Research Center at The University of Michigan, and made available to me through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The exact operationalization of the variables is described in the Technical Note at the end of the article. The number of respondents in the present analysis is 645 out of the 1762 provided in the SRC survey. The 645 are those who had full information on the full set of variables. There is thus a slight overrepresentation of Republicans and upper SES respondents. This bias is slight and there appears to be no other systematic bias in the sub-sample. For more detailed discussion, see Arthur S. Goldberg, *The Intergenerational Transmission of Party Identification* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1966), Appendix B.

MODEL I. Attitude as final mediator.



Prediction Equations	Actual Values
$r_{41.23}=0$	0.017
$r_{61.2345}0$	−0.019
$r_{32.1}=0$	0.101
$r_{52.134}=0$	0.032
$r_{62\cdot1345}=0$	0.053
$r_{43.12}=0$	0.130
$r_{63.1245}=0$	−0.022
$r_{64.1235}=0$	0.365

FIG. 1

lar.[10] The respondent's sociological characteristics were taken as an indicator of the constraints placed upon him by his current social environs. This variable represents the approach taken by Berelson *et al.* in *Voting*, and thus the general sociological explanation of voting behavior.[11] The respondent's party identification was included because of its well established and substantial correlation with direction of vote in a number of major studies.[12] Finally, the respondent's partisan attitudes were included as an indicator of his perceptions of the political arena, on the basis of the argument made in *The American Voter*, and because of the high correlation of these attitudes with voting behavior in that study.[13]

III. MODEL I

As a point of departure, let us consider one version of an attitude-field theory model, that presented in *The American Voter*.[14] The authors have told us very little about what to expect in such a model, except that in pure Gestalt theory, the attitude field is the final mediator of all causes of the behavior in question. Based upon this requirement, let us consider one plausible model. In this model the attitude field is taken to be the result of two causal streams, one consisting in the sociological conditioning of childhood and adult life,[15] and the other consisting in affective conditioning to the party label.[16] This model is presented in Fig. 1.

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[10] Surveys of the literature on this point are available in Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959); and Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).

[11] See, for example, Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), chaps. IV–VII. See also Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), Part II.

[12] See, for example, Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), chap. VII. See also Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), chap. VI.

[13] *The American Voter*, chap. IV. See also Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," this REVIEW, 52 (June, 1958), 367–387.

[14] Cf. *The American Voter*, pp. 24–37.

[15] Cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *loc. cit.*

[16] Cf. Lane and Sears, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

Let us call this Model I, Attitude as Final Mediator. Fig. 1 contains a schematic of the model, the theoretical prediction equations implied by the model, and the empirical values which those equations yielded from the data in the analysis.[17]

Given the assumption of a unidirectional causal ordering, there are fifteen possible causal arrows in a six variable model.[18] In Model I there are seven arrows present. The eight missing arrows mean that the model posits no causal impact in eight of the possible fifteen causal connections. One therefore expects the regression coefficients, and therefore the correlation coefficients associated with the missing arrows to be zero. This yields the set of prediction equations consisting in the list of partial "r's" predicted to be equal to zero in Fig. 1.

While Model I may seem plausible, there are some substantial incongruities between the prediction equations and the actual values. Most notably, these incongruities derive from the omission of causal links between RPI and RV, between RSC and RPI, and between FPI and RSC. Of greatest theoretical importance is the size of $r_{64.1235}$, i.e., 0.365. While this amounts to only 13.3% of the variance, it is sufficient to give one qualms about regarding attitudes, as operationalized by *The American Voter*, as the final mediator. Clearly party identification has an impact not caught in the screen which those researchers drew across their funnel of causality.[19] The need for a link between RSC and RPI, based upon the actual value of $r_{43.12}$ being equal to 0.130 instead of zero, reflects the idea that adult sociological characteristics play a role in party identification. The fact that this role accounts for a miniscule proportion of the variance (1.7%) suggests that the adult sociological environs are supportive of earlier learned behavior, rather than the primary source of this behavior. The need for a link between FPI and RSC is suggested by the value of $r_{32.1}=0.101$. The size of this value suggests that the link is quite weak, and a more parsimonious model might well do without it. A possible explanation may be in upwardly aspirational parents adopting a party identification normally associated with higher status groups and transmitting their status aspirations to their offspring with sufficient impact to have them realized to some extent. This is, to be sure, a most tentative explanation, but then this particular linkage is also rather tentative.

IV. MODEL II

On the basis of the experience provided by Model I, a second model is proposed. In Model II party identification is taken as the final arbiter. Three arrows have been dropped: those linking FSC and RPA, RSC and RPA, and RPA and RV. The first two were dropped in a search for parsimony, and the third was dropped to implement the central idea of this particular model. Finally the lessons of Model I have been incorporated in Model II presented in Fig. 2. Note that in Model II the time sequence between RPI and RPA is the reverse of what it was in Model I. Thus the subscripts do not necessarily refer to those variables which carried the same subscripts in Model I. Comparisons between models require translation of subscript numbers, which indicate causal ordering, into variable symbols through the use of the schematic diagrams. Each set of subscripts should be used only within its own diagram.

Examination of Fig. 2 indicates two rather gross discrepancies between predicted and actual values. One of these, $r_{64.1235}=0.470$, simply invalidates the notion of party identification as final arbiter. It suggests the need for a direct causal link between RPA and RV. The other major discrepancy, $r_{42.13}=0.357$ requires a more complex interpretation. Given the causal ordering in this model, what is implied is the need for a causal link between FPI and RPA. However, if one glances back at Model I, it can be seen that the omission of the causal link between FPI and RPA produced no serious discrepancy (predicted value = 0, actual value = 0.032). It is this pair of findings which

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[17] Although the aid of a computer was enlisted for the statistical computations in the present article, the lower order partials could be calculated with a slide rule or desk calculator. The appropriate formulae are available in Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1960), pp. 333–336. For those who wish to check the computation of some of the lower order partials, the matrix of simple correlations is provided below:

	FSC	FPI	RSC	RPI	RPA	RV
FSC	1.000					
FPI	0.454	1.000				
RSC	0.808	0.420	1.000			
RPI	0.400	0.603	0.411	1.000		
RPA	0.318	0.453	0.289	0.710	1.000	
RV	0.282	0.466	0.271	0.722	0.742	1.000

[18] Assuming that reciprocal causation is not involved, there are always $n!/2(n-2)!$ possible arrows among n variables.

[19] *The American Voter*, p. 35. The relative size of this impact is a function of factors which will be dealt with later in the present analysis. See pp. 918–919, below.

MODEL II. Party identification as final mediator.



Prediction Equations	Actual Values
$r_{41.23}=0$	−0.017
$r_{51.234}=0$	0.037
$r_{61.2345}=0$	−0.019
$r_{42.13}=0$	0.357
$r_{62.1345}=0$	0.053
$r_{43.12}=0$	0.031
$r_{63.1245}=0$	−0.022
$r_{64.1235}=0$	0.470

FIG. 2

enables a choice to be made between the two causal orderings. On the basis of Simon's asymmetric model of causality, the causal link between two variables may be affected by all of the variables antecedent to the dependent variable, but *cannot* be affected by any of the variables subsequent to the dependent variable.[20] Thus, in Model I the antecedents to RPA are FSC, FPI, RSC, and RPI. In describing the impact of FPI upon RPA, it was therefore necessary to control for FSC, RSC, and RPI. However, in Model II, RPA is assumed to be antecedent to RPI. Therefore, in describing the impact of FPI upon RPA in this model, one is prohibited from including RPI as a control. Clearly, the omission of the control yields a poor fit with the data and suggests that to the extent that unidirectionality is assumed and parsimony desired, the RPI ought to be regarded as prior to RPA. Support is thus lent to the positions of Lane and Sears, Greenstein, and others who have urged the importance of the early socialization of political symbols.[21]

V. MODEL III

Reverting, then, to the causal ordering in Model I, and incorporating the lessons taught by Models I and II, a third model is proposed, that of dual mediation. The schematic, prediction equations, and findings are presented in Fig. 3. Here, in Model III, one has a model which fits the data relatively well. Its distinctive features are: it hypothesizes *both* party identification and partisan attitudes as direct causes of vote direction; it assigns a pivotal position to party identification in denying that any of the antecedents to party identification have a direct bearing on partisan attitudes or vote direction; within the framework of the model, no causes are hypothesized for partisan attitudes other than party identification. The last point, of course, suggests that the framework of the model is too restricted, since party identification in its total impact accounts for only about 50% of the variance in partisan attitudes (r = .710, see n. 17, above). This point will be elaborated upon. However, before launching into a serious critique of Model III, one ought to consider that while the model fits the data rather well, it is not a perfect fit. Since it is possible to make perfectly valid direct inferences from correlation coefficients to re-

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[20] Blalock, *Causal Inference* . . . , p. 59.

[21] Lane and Sears, *loc. cit.* Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," this REVIEW, 54 (1960), 934–943.

MODEL III. Dual mediation.



Prediction Equations	Actual Values
$r_{41.23}=0$	−0.017
$r_{51.234}=0$	0.083
$r_{61.2345}=0$	−0.019
$r_{52.134}=0$	0.032
$r_{62.1345}=0$	0.053
$r_{53.124}=0$	−0.073
$r_{63.1245}=0$	−0.022

FIG. 3

gression coefficients only where the former are actually zero, and since the inferences here have been based upon correlation coefficients slightly different from zero, a further analytic step seems warranted, i.e., calculation of standardized regression coefficients (beta weights). Based upon the causal ordering of Model III, such coefficients were generated for all of the linkages possible within that ordering. In general, the inferences made from the correlation coefficients are supported. That it, the implied zero impacts prove to be very small and statistically insignificant at the .05 level.[22] However, there is one exception: the FSC to RPA linkage, while relatively small, proved to be significant at the .05 level. Thus there is occasioned the revision presented in Model IV, in Fig. 4. Within the assumptions made with regard to unidirectional causality and causal ordering, this is the model which best fits the data, and which requires critical assessment.

VI. MODEL IV

From the viewpoint of theory, Model IV has both desirable and undesirable features. Let us first look at the happier side of this situation. Certainly the model achieves a certain amount of parsimony. Of fifteen possible causal arrows, six have been eliminated and of the remaining nine, two are clearly of secondary importance, leaving a dominant seven-arrow model. Moreover, the model is theoretically informative, both in terms of what it omits and in terms of its dominant patterns. The omission of direct causal links between sociological characteristics, both childhood (FSC) and adult (RSC), and voting behavior, as well as the omission of such a link between childhood sociological

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[22] The decision to accept or reject linkages on the basis of significance tests poses some problems. The significance test is designed to deal with the type I error (rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true). That is to say, it provides a statement of the probability that a strength of association as great as that found in the sample could have been drawn from a population in which there was in fact no relationship between the variables in question. However, in deciding to omit a link, one is concerned with the risk of a type II error (acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is false). The information desired in this case is the probability that a strength of association as weak as that in the sample could have been drawn from a population in which there was a stronger association. Unless one has an a priori expectation of the strength of association in the population, it is not possible to calculate this probability.

MODEL IV. Dual mediation, revised.



Key: The beta weights of the implied linkages appear either immediately above or immediately to the right of their representational arrows. The beta weights of the linkages represented by solid arrows prove significant at the .001 level. Those represented by broken arrows prove significant at the .05 level but not at the .01 level. None of the possible linkages which have been omitted have beta weights which are significant even at the .05 level.

FIG. 4

characteristics and adult party identification certainly justify the qualms of the authors of *The American Voter* about the sociological explanations of voting behavior.[23] However, it can also be seen, in this empirically supported model, that sociological characteristics do have a substantial *indirect* impact on voting behavior, exerted primarily through party identification. The mediating role of party identification as described in Model IV suggests that father's sociological characteristics, father's party identification, and respondent's sociological characteristics have almost no impact upon voting behavior save as they act through respondent's party identification. Therefore one expects $r_{65\cdot4} = r_{65\cdot1234}$. The actual values are: $r_{65\cdot4} = 0.472$, $r_{65\cdot1234} = 0.470$.

The fact that party identification rather than partisan attitudes proves to be the pivotal encapsulator of political socialization, substantiates the position that such socialization entails an affective relationship to symbols rather than a conscious evaluative relating of political means to ends. This position is given still further support by the absence of a direct link between childhood sociological characteristics and adult party identification; there is a relationship, but it is dependent upon mediation by paternal party identification. However, this is not to say that there is no rational calculus involved in voting. The fact that partisan attitudes have a substantial impact beyond that of party identification, suggests that such a calculus is operative, but operative against a set of predispositions dominated by party identification.[24] Thus, the model suggested by this study comports well with the data of other studies and imposes a certain order upon their findings.

Yet certain caveats are in order. One should bear in mind that the present study has dealt, to this point, only with respondents who claimed a Republican or a Democratic party identification for themselves. Those who were classified as Independents or as apolitical have been excluded. This has an important bearing upon the partial correlation between party identification and vote, controlling for partisan attitudes. In the present study, this partial correlation is 0.415, amounting to 17.2% of the variance. It has been pointed out to me by Professor Donald Stokes of the Michigan Survey Research Center that in the full sample, which, of course, includes Independents and those classed as apolitical (together amounting to 12.6% of the sample), this partial correlation drops to 0.238, thus accounting for less than 5.7% of the variance.

To one interested primarily in mapping a particular population, the figures based upon the full sample ought to be more salient. However, for one interested in the logic of the explanatory theory, both sets of figures are of interest. Taken together they suggest that the impact of party identification on voting behavior in a given population will depend upon the ratio of partisans to non-partisans in that society. In those instances in which, for whatever reasons, individuals have not developed a party identification, the impact of partisan attitudes would be substantially increased, if the logic of Model IV is correct. As the proportion of such instances in a population increased, the net impact of party identification on vote would be expected to diminish.[25] Essentially this is the obverse of the argument made in *The American Voter* about the efficacy of partisan attitudes as a guide to voting behavior.[26]

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[23] *The American Voter*, pp. 32–37.

[24] Cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–233. See also *The American Voter*, pp. 128–131; and Lane and Sears, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–82.

At this point attention is directed to certain unsatisfactory features of the model itself. While it leaves room for a rational calculus prior to the voting act, it does not permit party identification to benefit from this calculus. This prohibition derives from the requirements of the mathematical model of causality used in the analysis. A major requirement of that model, it will be recalled, was unidirectionality. Yet this is a limitation which, in the long run, must be circumvented, if theory is to be relevant to events. As this model stands, party identification is nearly immutable. There is very little if any variation over time in its antecedents, nor is there any provision for what V. O. Key calls a critical election.[27] This derives from two factors. First the model does not permit partisan attitudes to have an impact upon party identification. Second, the model does not include among its components the political events in the environment in which it is assumed to operate. The failure of partisan attitudes to feed back upon party identification would mean that even if the correlation between partisan attitudes and party identification were substantially reduced, voting behavior would be influenced, but party identification would be unaffected. Clearly the model needs revision on this point. Moreover, unless one includes an additional variable there is no source within the model for variation of partisan attitudes. Thus, the model is itself a partial description of the impact of the past upon the present, but its connection with the future rests almost entirely in the error factors of the recursive equations which define the model—a situation both undesirable and unnecessary.

Let us first consider amending the model to permit partisan attitudes to have an impact upon party identification. This could be done within a recursive set of equations by "lagging" some of the variables, as Blalock suggests.[28] This entails treating a single variable through time as a set of discrete variables, and treating two interacting variables as two sets of discrete variables. Thus in the time interval $t_0 \cdots t_n$, an interaction between X and Y could be schematized as follows: $X_{t_0} \to Y_{t_1} \to X_{t_2} \to Y_{t_3} \to X_{t_4} \cdots$. This technique, of course, requires data through time, and will not be utilized with the data of the present study, but is presented for future research purposes.

Introjection of political events into the model presents rather more difficult problems. All of the variables in the model are, in some sense, attributes or activities of the actors. Political events, on the other hand, are external to the actors and cannot be brought into the model directly. They can however, be brought in through his perceptions. Now to some extent these perceptions are measured in partisan attitudes. These attitudes are, however, assessed only immediately prior to the election itself. What would have to be done in a more dynamic and adaptive model would be to sample perceptions of political events as they arise in the political arena, probing in each case for evaluation of the party's handling of the event. The adequacy of the series of events selected would depend upon the astuteness of the analyst and could be tested by the amount of variance in partisan attitudes immediately prior to the election which is accounted for by the attitudes on the full set of events. Moreover, selected probing techniques, such as factor analysis, could be applied to draw inferences about the factors underlying shifts in partisanship over time.

A model incorporating these modifications is presented in Fig. 5 below. The model exploits the mediating roles of partisan attitudes and party identification in order to avoid reincorporation of political socialization characteristics over time. This is not to say that these are not operative. On the contrary, they form the

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[25] Note that this "net impact" refers to a population parameter, or statistic thereof, rather than to the impact of party identification on the vote of any single individual in the population. While the latter would doubtless be of interest, it would be extremely difficult to come by in non-experimental data.

[26] See *The American Voter*, pp. 139–142.

[27] V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 18 (1955), 3–18.

[28] Blalock, *Causal Inferences . . .*, pp. 53–57.

MODEL V. A proposed dynamic.



* PPE = perception of political events.

FIG. 5

background, encapsulated largely in party identification, against which partisan attitudes are formed and operate. The model represents a continual reality-testing and adjustment process. To the extent that party identification exceeds the impact of partisan attitudes, little learning is taking place. To the extent that partisan attitudes exceed and have the same directional impact as party identification, reinforcement is taking place. Finally, to the extent partisan attitudes operate in a direction opposite to party identification, that identification is being eroded. There are several other points in the proposed model that bear discussion, e.g., the requirement that partisan attitudes operate on party identification through vote (or vote intention). However, this and other excluded arrows had best wait upon the systematic analysis of data in future studies.

VII. CONCLUSION

In concluding the present analysis, it is important to bear in mind that we are as yet very far from concluding the inquiry into causality in voting behavior. First, it should be noted that the full set of independent variables accounts for only 50% of the variance in voting. This suggests, of course, that one or more important variables have been excluded from the model. In itself, this is only an indication of the need for a broader searching effort. However, there is a distinct possibility that the omitted variable(s) may be correlated with both the dependent variable and one or more of the independent variables in the present model. In such a case the regression coefficients in the model might be substantially affected, even to the extent of reducing to zero some of the now nonzero coefficients, and of reasserting causal linkages estimated as zero in the present model.[29] The present model is thus tentative, an initial approximation to be continually retested not only with the same variables in different populations at different times, but against the impact of the inclusion of new variables.

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47. See also Herman Wold and Lars Jureen, *Demand Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), pp. 37–38, and Fritz C. Holte, *loc. cit.*

TECHNICAL NOTE

The variables were operationalized from the source decks of the 1956 election study (Project 417) of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan in the following manner:

1. Father's Sociological Characteristics (FSC)

This variable consists in an index generated by running five sociological characteristics of the father against the father's party identification in order to generate an expected value of his being Republican. This value constituted the index. The variables utilized, their sources, and their categorizations are presented below:

Variable (Source Deck: Column)	Categories	(Rows)
Religion (5: 27)	Protestant Catholic Jewish	(1) (2) (3)
Class (8: 11)	Working Middle	(1, 2, 3) (4, 5, 6)
Size of community (6: 34)	Farm Town Metropolis	(1) (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8) (7, 9)
Region (6: 31–32)	South Non-South	(1 in col. 31, 4 or 5 in col. 32) (all others)
Race (6: 10)	White Negro	(1) (2)

2. Father's Party Identification (FPI)

This was established on the basis of data gathered in a later wave with the same panel, i.e., the 1958 election study, project 431. Within that study, the information was taken from Deck CO4: column 23, and the only categories used were Democrat (Row 1) and Republican (Row 2).

3. Respondent's Sociological Characteristics (RSC)

The procedure here was the same as that entailed in building the index of father's sociological characteristics, except that the variables used in the regression were characteristics of the respondent rather than of the father.

Variable (Source Deck: Column)	Categories	(Rows)
Religion (5: 27)	Protestant Catholic Jewish	(1) (2) (3)
Class (8: 10)	Working Middle	(1, 2, 3) (4, 5, 6)
Size of community (1: 17)	Farm Town Metropolis	(6, –, &) (3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 0) (1, 2, 7)
Region (1: 15)	South Non-South	(8, 9, 0) (1–7)
Race (6: 10)	White Negro	(1) (2)

4. Respondent's Party Identification (RPI)

This information was taken from Deck 4, column 9. It was dichotomized as follows: Democrat (rows 1–3), Republican (rows 5–7).

5. Respondent's Partisan Attitudes (RPA)

This variable was received directly from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan as an index, drawn from their analysis deck number 86, columns 3–9, and based upon their regression of six dimensions of partisan attitudes against reported vote in 1956.

6. Respondent's Vote

Deck 7: Column 26 Democrat (row 1), Republican (row 2)

THE GOVERNOR AND HIS LEGISLATIVE PARTY*

Sarah P. McCally
Hunter College

When the dust settles following the reapportionment upheavals, the traditional problems of legislative policy-making will remain. This process is divided between the governor and (with due respect to Nebraska) the two legislative houses, with the governor generally taking the lead. A governor represents the totality of interests within his party. No single legislator or faction represents as wide a variety of interests as the governor. The governor proposes and vetoes and normally plays an even greater legislative role in state government than the President in the national government because of the infrequent sessions, low seniority, lack of state-wide influence or prestige and inadequate staff of the legislators. The governor's legislation is geared to please his state-wide constituency and, depending largely upon his degree of control over his party, is passed, modified or rejected.

What affects the ability of the governor to control his legislative party is a question seldom asked and rarely investigated except by the harassed occupant of the executive mansion. This is surprising, since the definition of party responsibility is closely related to executive control. By common agreement, a definition of party responsibility would include the ability of the party to control nominations, to present a united front in the election and thereafter to discipline the legislators to uphold the program of the executive in order to make a good record for the next election.[1]

Those who investigate the behavior of legislative parties in the interest of party responsibility equate the latter phenomenon with party voting loyalty. The loyalty rate of legislators on party votes is not the same animal as their degree of support of administration bills. Executive request legislation has received little attention from scholars. We will set this distinction aside for the moment in order to examine the factors which have been claimed to cause party responsibility or voting loyalty, as it has been defined for research purposes. The two characteristics of inter-party conflict and intra-party cohesion in legislative situations are the major conditions for party responsibility as recently restated by Thomas A. Flinn.[2]

If inter-party conflict means that the governor's party has a reasonable chance of obtaining a working majority of the legislature, this variable has immediate surface appeal as a condition for gubernatorial control. With the resources at his disposal, a governor can forge party agreement on legislation which is vital to his program. He will be disadvantaged if his party has a permanent minority position in the legislature, for he will have to use his resources to bargain with the opposition. If he has an overwhelming percentage of seats in the legislature he may be unable to control rival factions. It is the expressed hope of proponents of reapportionment that governors with new majority parties will bring about promised reforms; but it is doubtful that the possession of a majority in a competitive legislature guarantees that the governor's program will be passed. Enough exceptions come to mind to cast suspicion on this as a controlling variable. His success in state-wide competition for the governorship may play a part in his influence over his legislative party.

Intra-party cohesion indicates unity which can be forged either by power resources or by ideological agreement. Students of legislative voting loyalty commonly assume that cohesion results from similarity of districts within a party's legislative contingent. If legislators from similar districts vote alike because they have the same interests to defend, then the most unified party would be the one in which the districts were most similar. From the governor's point of view, the most loyal legislators would come from districts which reflect the characteristics of his state-wide constituency. Yet one need not dig too far into the study of power structures to discover that they are not necessarily fed by ideological agreement. Organizational rivalries, personal ambitions or sidepayments need not follow demographic differences. Reapportionment will bring about increased suburban representation within both parties, but new demands, rather than increased cohesion, may result from suburban factions with increased legislative voting strength to use at the bargaining table.

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[1] Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, "Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System," this Review, 44 (September, 1950), Supplement.

[2] Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," this Review, 58 (March, 1964), 60.

The discussion to this point has been intended to show that satisfactory operational definitions of competition and cohesion must be formulated before these concepts can be used to test the governor's control over his legislative party. A review of the research related to these concepts may aid the quest for accuracy of definition.

I. COMPETITION AND COHESION: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

There have been several probes in the areas of party competition and cohesion and their effect on legislative voting behavior. Malcolm Jewell compared several competitive states with respect to the degree of voting loyalty with the parties, using all the roll call votes in a session.[3] His findings do not confirm the hypothesis that party competition for control of the legislature can of itself explain party voting loyalty. Furthermore, since party voting loyalty did not vary with the degree of state-wide competition for governor, this variable was also rejected as a meaningful explanation. Since neither state-wide competition nor legislative competition could explain the voting behavior he witnessed, Jewell turned to intra-party cohesion for an explanation. He advanced the proposition that there is more ideological cohesion within the parties of urban states because he discovered a higher degree of party loyalty in urban than in rural states. Jewell did not consider the strength of the state party organization as a factor in legislative voting loyalty.

It was Duane Lockard's major thesis that close party competition at the state level produces party voting loyalty in the legislature. However, the connecting link in this causal chain is party organizational strength.[4] Lockard comes closer than Jewell to affirming the party-responsibility school's two major conditions of party competition and party cohesion. Jewell and Lockard agree on the measurement of party competition either as a state-wide vote for governor or President or as competition for a legislative majority but disagree over its effect on legislative voting loyalty. Lockard claims that competition produces cohesion which in turn produces voting loyalty. Jewell finds no direct correlation between competition and loyalty although he states that a certain type of competition—urban-rural competition—produces ideological cohesion followed by voting loyalty within the parties. The two writers disagree on the measurement of cohesion, one defining it as party organizational strength, the other as ideological agreement, but both claim it influences voting loyalty.

A different research approach, which tends to reaffirm the importance of electoral competition and organizational cohesion, is that of Wahlke and his associates, who interviewed legislators in four states in an attempt to determine the influence of many outside variables affecting their roles.[5] They found that political career patterns and orientations are likely to be shaped by the degree of competition in a given system. Also, the varying degrees of a particular party's organizational strength and morale may be an important factor affecting the legislators' career patterns and orientations. The authors state that party organizational strength is probably related to degree of competition between the parties, but, as the case of California Democrats in one direction and Ohio Democrats in another direction indicated, it may also operate independently of it. Another major determinant of legislative behavior was the relative strength of the majority and minority within the legislature.

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[3] Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," this REVIEW, 49 (September, 1955), 773–791. Jewell chose eight competitive states and limited his research to sessions in which the party balance in the legislature was reasonably close, for he assumed that there would be less party voting even in strong two-party states during the years of one-sided legislative control. He discovered, however, that the three states with the highest levels of party loyalty had long records of Republican legislative control, with only a few Democratic years, while the Democrats frequently held large legislative minorities and (except in Pennsylvania) won control of the governorship. In the states with a closer balance between the parties in the legislature, a lower level of party unity was found. He used all the roll call votes in a session and paid no attention to their sponsorship.

[4] W. Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). In the then essentially non-competitive states of New Hampshire, Maine and Vermont, policy-making was primarily a function of the dominant party in the legislature. The factions within this party, both inside and outside the legislature, determined the fate of legislation. In the competitive states of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, Lockard discovered considerable discipline in both legislative parties. He used votes on which there was disagreement between the parties.

[5] John C. Wahlke *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1962).

Another area of research assumes that legislative voting behavior is a result of ideological cohesion brought about by the economic composition of the districts represented by the individual legislators. The more alike the districts are within each party, the more ideological cohesion and therefore voting agreement exists. On the other hand, the theory goes, the more diverse the districts within the party, the more disunity, because of lack of ideological agreement.[6] Thomas Flinn tested this theory of party unity based on similarity of district in the Ohio Assembly of 1949 and 1959. He concluded that differing constituencies do not give rise to intra-party voting disagreement and that policy differences between the parties are not due to differences in the composition of the legislative parties in terms of constituencies represented.[7]

This theory of constituency influence has been used with more success in explaining the deviant members of the legislative party. It cannot account for average party loyalty, but it can account for a few of the deviant cases. Duncan MacRae attempted to measure the comparative effectiveness of party power and constituency interest over the roll call voting of the individual legislator on issues chosen to reflect class differences.[8] Both Thomas R. Dye and Thomas A. Flinn give some support to the theory that constituency economic pressures affect the extremes in party loyalty.[9]

The degree of competition in a constituency measured singly or in combination with economic characteristics has been offered as an additional variable affecting the extremes in legislative voting loyalty. It is assumed that members with comfortable margins are a more loyal group than those from competitive districts because they are freed from constituency pressures and hence can vote the party line without fear of voter retribution. On the other hand, the legislators with close races will reflect the interests of their constituencies—be they for or against the party line. Thus the most deviant legislators are to be found from competitive atypical districts. The findings are not conclusive and differences exist with respect to these variables between parties, between legislative bodies and between sessions.[10]

The study of the deviant members of a state legislative party suffers from lack of justification. No one in the party-responsibility school would require a "party line" vote on all issues on which the majority of both parties are opposed. Taking all votes on which there is substantial disagreement may not be a true test of party responsibility. It does not separate the votes which the administration wants passed from those on which the administration has taken a hands-off policy. The leadership of each party tolerates deviations in party voting as long as the necessary vote is achieved.

The studies reviewed so far confirm the warning that the evidence sifted governs the results acheived. Three definitions of competition have been used: state, legislative and constituency, with conflicting results. Three definitions of intra-party cohesion have been used: structural, state-wide ideological and similar-constituency. The roll calls chosen to test the theories have ranged from the total number to those which represent party conflict to those which are of economic importance. The reason for this may be that there has not been an operational definition of party responsibility upon which researchers can agree. With respect to legislative policy-making, party responsibility can be defined as the ability of the governor to command enough votes in the legislature to pass his legislation. The major question to be asked is: What affects the ability of the governor to get his legislation passed?

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[6] David R. Derge, "Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), 1051–1065. Since this study, it has been acknowledged that party is a more important determinant than rural-urban conflict, and the subsequent studies have dealt with the presumed relationship between similarity of district and degree of ideological cohesion within the party contingent.

[7] Flinn, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[8] Duncan MacRae, "The Relationship Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in Massachusetts," this REVIEW, 46 (December, 1952), 1046–1055. MacRae maintained that those legislators who come from districts which are most typical of their parties tend to show highest party loyalty on roll calls. Those who come from districts atypical of their party tend to cross party lines more often. We do not know whether the roll calls selected by MacRae were administration-supported measures or whether deviations were sizable enough to prevent passage.

[9] Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (June, 1961), 473–481; Flinn, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–69. Both writers used all party opposition votes whether or not the issues were economic. Dye measured voting deviation and Flinn measured voting support.

[10] MacRae, *op. cit.;* Dye, *op. cit.*, p. 477; and Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (June, 1961), 460–472.

II. THE USE OF VETO VOTES TO MEASURE GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE

Because we are interested in measuring the influence of the governor in the legislative process, two traditional methods of identifying significant partisan roll calls are not appropriate. Neither Lowell's party vote nor Rice's index of likeness[11] takes into consideration the raw number of votes necessary to pass legislation. Both indices assume that partisan activity can be identified by comparing the percentage of members of each party (or group) who agree or disagree. But the passing of legislation is not purely mechanical. The proponents do not have unlimited favors to pass out to supporters. Because of this they make marginal calculations, procuring enough votes to pass their measure, but no unnecessary surplus. Most bills require for passage a majority of those voting. If the party of the sponsors of legislation has an overwhelming percentage of the legislature (80% for example), the bill needs the affirmative vote of only 63% of their party members in order to pass. If the other party is unanimous in opposition, the index of likeness would approximate 40%. This is far from complete disagreement, and those looking for roll calls which exhibit partisanship might disregard it entirely. However, a great deal of partisanship was present. Does a party which needs only 63% of its members to pass legislation and gets it show any less partisan activity than a party which needs and gets 100%?

William H. Riker developed an index of significance which *does* take into consideration the minimum votes necessary for victory on a roll call;[12] but it gives less indication of partisan activity than the previous two indices, and in fact completely obscures party. A vote of 50–50 could mean two highly disciplined parties, two widely split parties or one split majority party and a cohesive minority party.

The above three measures will have to be discarded as not appropriate for our use. They are not valid indicators of party activity except in legislatures where the party split is approximately 50–50; and they cannot distinguish between trivial and important legislation except in a mechanistic way.

We want to test the governor's influence over his party on measures which are important to him. The most satisfactory way would be to test the influence of the governor on administration bills—those bills which the governor wants passed. This would provide the best test of the party in power—the ability to get its program passed. The governor's position is clear. If the administration bills could be identified, the roll call votes on this legislation would provide a clear indication of the behavior of the parties on issues of major importance. David Truman used this type of legislation for the 81st Congress. He automatically included votes on sustaining Presidential vetoes, votes on Presidential reorganization plans, and (in the Senate) votes on the confirmation of Presidential nominations and the ratification of treaties. Other votes were included if the public record revealed an express Presidential preference concerning the precise content at stake in the vote.[13]

The identification of governor's program bills for the seven legislative sessions for each state during the period (1946–1960) proved to be too difficult. In the attempt, the Legislative Reference Bureaus of thirty-five northern states were contacted and asked to send lists of administration bills for each session. With the exception of Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wisconsin and Oregon, for which lists of administration bills for some sessions were sent, the only help came in the form of suggested procedures to be used in identifying the administration bills. In all of the states, the governor presents a program message to the legislature in which he outlines the substance of the program he wants passed for the session. This is usually translated into administration bills which are often introduced by the governor's party leaders in the house or senate or by legislators whom the governor may specify. In the states in which this is an iron-clad custom, the name of the party floor leader attached to a bill may identify it as an administration bill. This is the case in Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York and West Virginia. For the bulk of the states, however, no fool-proof procedures exist for the identification of program bills.[14]

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[11] A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of The American Historical Association for 1901*, Vol. I (Washington: American Historical Association, 1902), p. 323; and Stuart Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), pp. 209–211.

[12] William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," *Legislative Behavior*, John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959), pp. 377–384. He defined the most significant roll call as one in which (1) all members vote, and (2) the difference between the minority and the majority is the minimum possible under the voting rules.

[13] David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 327.

As a substitute for votes on administration bills, votes on vetoes were used because, as with administration bills, (1) the position of the governor is clearly stated and (2) the governor's party leaders would exert maximum influence to see that the veto was sustained. The veto calls for a vote of confidence in the governor. In most cases he uses it sparingly, more as a threat than an actuality, so that when a veto does come before the legislature, the greatest amount of party activity attends it.

One might question why a governor who had considerable influence in his legislative majority would ever allow unapproved legislation to slip through. In this regard, it must be remembered that the governor recommends for passage only a small amount of the total legislative product. If offensive legislation is called to his attention, he may threaten to veto it if passed and must do so enough to give credibility to his threats. Cases have arisen in which the governor vetoed a bill in his program because it was altered substantially in the legislative process. Furthermore, it is possible for the minority party to gain enough support to pass a bill on which the governor has taken no stand, whereupon the governor might send it back with a veto message if it is not in his conception of the "public interest."[15]

Table 1 gives the number and substance of vetoes used in the fifty-eight house sessions on which this research rests.[16] These sessions are broken down by percent of seats of the governor's party. The Democratic sessions follow a pattern we would expect. There are more vetoes when a party has a hopeless minority position than when it has 40%–70% of the legislature. There are also more vetoes when the party has an overwhelming percent of the legislature, and therefore may have less control over its own members. The Republicans, however, show the reverse of the expected. We cannot say, therefore, that the number or substance of the vetoes are related in any significant degree to the party balance in the legislature. It is interesting to note that the largest number of vetoes on taxation come from Democratic governors whose legislative parties are hopeless minorities.

After choosing veto votes as the most efficient indicators of the influence of the governor, we need a measure which will indicate the degree to which his party supported him on these issues. Rice's index of cohesion is not suitable

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[14] As a second try, all the governors from 1946–1960 were contacted and asked for lists of program bills from their personal files. In all, 101 governors were contacted and replies were received from 72. Only one governor had such a list: Governor Williams of Michigan sent his worksheet "Priority Points of Democratic Legislators and Governor Williams" for 1960. A considerable amount of strategy was admitted by some governors. Some declared the necessity of including certain items in a message as an aid to secure the enactment of legislation more seriously sought. Capital newspapers could provide the type of information needed. Usually capitol reporters either know specifically what measures are aimed at enacting part of the Governor's program or make their own evaluations in covering the legislative session.

[15] The substantive importance of these vetoes varies. It must be remembered that the governor vetoes frivolous as well as major substantive legislation. For instance, the one veto of the late Governor Stevenson which was put to a roll call vote in the Illinois Senate in 1949 was S.B. No. 93, an act to provide protection to insectivorous birds by restraining cats. (Illinois, *Journal of the Senate*, 1949, p. 541). In the following session of 1951, on the other hand, the one veto roll call was on S.B. No. 102, an act to protect against subversive activities. (Illinois, *Journal of the Senate*, 1951, pp. 1946–50). Regardless of the substance of the veto, the roll call vote puts on record the degree of party support the governor can muster. Not all veto votes are taken by roll call, but the assumption is that most votes of real controversy are recorded in this way.

[16] As an additional test of the ability of a governor to have his veto upheld against opposition, the following screening procedure was used: (1) 80% or more of the legislature must vote on the veto; and (2) There must be 10% or more of those voting in disagreement. We hoped in this way to reject low-interest, low-tension vetoes. A large percentage of these are technical vetoes. In California, for instance, this method cut 185 out of 189 roll call votes in the seven sessions studied. It seems logical that in a state where so little party voting exists, a governor's veto may be the only check on hasty and ill-advised legislation.

TABLE 1. NUMBER AND SUBSTANCE OF VETOES ACCORDING TO PERCENT OF SEATS OF THE GOVERNOR'S PARTY IN FIFTY-EIGHT HOUSE SESSIONS[a]

Percent of Seats	Class I Party Interest[b]	Class II Substantive	Class III Taxation	Class IV Procedural	Total	No. of Sessions	Average Per Session
			Democratic				
0–39.9	3	22	11	25	61	14	4.4
40–54.9	1	7	2	0	10	5	2.0
55–69.9	1	3	0	8	12	7	1.7
70–	2	3	1	0	6	2	3.0
Totals	7	35	14	33	89	28	
			Republican				
0–39.9	2	1	1	3	7	4	1.8
40–54.9	2	5	1	6	14	4	3.5
55–69.9	0	14	5	14	33	9	3.7
70–	1	25	1	10	37	13	2.8
Totals	5	45	8	33	91	30	

[a] The states and number of sessions are: Arizona (2), Calif. (1), Colorado (1), Conn. (1), Delaware (1), Idaho (2), Illinois (1), Indiana (3), Iowa (2), Kansas (3), Maine (3), Maryland (2), Mass. (6), Mich. (5), Montana (1), Nevada (1), N. H. (2), N. Y. (1), N. D. (1), Ohio (6), Oregon (2), R. I. (2), S. D. (1), Utah (1), Wisc. (6), Wyo. (1).

[b] The four categories of vetoes involved the following issues:

Class I	Party Interest.
	Elections and Reapportionment
	Appointments
	Legislative Procedure and Organization
Class II	Substantive
	Fish and Game Laws (Conservation)
	Labor
	Appropriations for other than those listed
	Veterans Affairs
	Welfare, Health, Education
	Business Regulation
Class III	Taxation
Class IV	Procedural
	Civil Service
	State Administration
	Local Administration
	Judicial and Legal

because it is not directional.[17] It does not indicate whether the majority supported or opposed the governor. It may be that the party was more cohesive in opposition to the governor than in support. In this case the index would be misleading. For instance, in the Arizona House session of 1949, the majority Democrats voted 39–8 to override the governor's veto on H.B. No. 71, which would have removed the supervision of real estate from the state.[18] The percent of cohesion is 83. (If this is converted to a scale of 0–100, the index of cohesion becomes 66.)

Index of Administration Support. What we need for our purposes is an *index of administration support* which measures the degree to which the governor's party members support him. For a single roll call, the index is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by the party members who voted for the governor by the total number of party members who voted.

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[17] Rice, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–209.

[18] Arizona, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, 1949, p. 638.

When several vetoes were used, the average index was the arithmetic mean of the indices derived for the various roll calls in the session. David Truman used this type of measure for the 81st Congress.[19] Using the example from Arizona mentioned above, the index of administration support would be 17.

Index of Administration Success. Neither the index of cohesion nor the index of administration support indicates whether the governor was successful in obtaining enough votes from his party to win. If he has an overwhelming percentage of the legislature, the number of votes necessary to win does not form a large percent of his party. An index of cohesion or administration support takes no account of the percentage of the governor's party which must support him in order to pass his legislation. For instance, in the Iowa House session of 1953, the majority Republicans had an index of cohesion of .59 and an index of administration support of .41 on a veto.[20] Neither figure would would make one suspect that the governor was in good shape, but the governor needed only 36% of his party to uphold his veto, and thus was comfortably over his margin. The *index of success* is obtained by dividing the percent of those who voted in favor of the governor by the percent of his party votes he needed in order to uphold his legislation. One-third-plus-one of those elected is the usual requirement for upholding the veto. The index of success is a ratio of percents instead of votes because when the governor's party had fewer than 34% of the seats in the legislature, it was assigned 100 as the required percentage of votes. It should be recognized that this imposes an almost hopeless requirement on the minority party. One maverick makes it impossible for the governor to make his quota. The arithmetic mean of the individual indices for success was used in order to obtain an average index for a session.

I substituted the veto votes for votes on administration bills to make it possible to use many more sessions in my analysis. I assumed that the governor would receive the same support on vetoes that he would receive on administration bills. Table 2 compares the index of support for veto votes with the same index applied to votes on administration bills for seven state sessions for which lists of program bills had been supplied by the governors or methods of identification of program bills had been related. In all cases except two, the program bills received a higher index of support than the veto bills. The two sets of support indices have a correlation of .71. The first guess might be that passing program legislation is more important to a governor than having his vetoes upheld. The second guess might be that the animosities which develop over program legislation might be ironed out by the time the vote reaches the floor, whereas a veto comes to the house directly in the form of a message from the governor, and the anger of those who voted for the measure may not have been assuaged.

If our assumption is correct that a governor does not use his limited supply of favors to obtain more votes than he needs, it is logical for him to receive a different degree of support for roll calls on vetoes for which he needs only 34% of the house than for program legislation for which he needs 50% of the house. On this basis, we would expect the index of success to be about the same for the governor for both sets of votes. The index of success was previously defined as the ratio of the percent he needed to pass (or uphold) his bills (or vetoes) to the percent he received. If the governor has the influence and resources to obtain what he needs, and if he calculates at the margins, he should be equally successful with program bills as with veto votes. Comparing the two indices of success state by state, we note that the governor was more successful with the veto than with program legislation in four sessions. In only two sessions, however, did he receive over 100% on one success index and under 100% on the other. In both cases his success was well over 90% on the other index. The index of success on vetoes can be fairly confidently used to indicate the governor's success on program legislation. The correlation between the two indices is .63. The index of success has the disadvantage of requiring 100% of any legislative party which does not have the required minimum number of seats for victory. This imposes a hard task on a hopeless minority party. Seldom is even the most cohesive party unanimous. One or two mavericks carry more negative weight in a minority or bare majority party than in a party which has votes to spare. Although the index of success would seem to be a better measure of gubernatorial influence than the index of support, it does not do as reliable a job of predicting the comparative influence of the governor on program bills and vetoes on a session-by-session basis. This may be due to the inaccuracy of measurement just mentioned.

The index of cohesion was given for comparative purposes only. Note that in Nevada 1953, in Wisconsin 1951 and in Massachusetts

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[19] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Truman used the arithmetical mean of the legislators' *individual* administration support indices as the average index for the session.

[20] Iowa, *Journal of the House of Representatives*, 1953, p. 1234. (H.B. 123, relating to exemptions for debts).

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF ROLL CALL VOTES ON PROGRAM BILLS AND VETOES WITH RESPECT TO INDICES OF ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT AND SUCCESS FOR SEVEN HOUSE SESSIONS[a]

State, Session (Party, % Seats)	Mean Index of Support	Percent of Party Needed[b]	Mean Index of Success	Mean Index of Cohesion[c]	No. of Roll Calls
Connecticut, 1955					
Democratic, 33%					
Program	94.6	100	94.6	94.6	2
Vetoes	89.4	100	89.4	89.4	2
Wisconsin, 1957					
Republican, 67%					
Program	80.5	75.9	106	83.7	8
Vetoes	68.4	50.8	135	73.1	12
Oregon, 1959					
Republican, 45%					
Program	72.2	100	72.2	80.4	18
Vetoes	74.2	100	97.5	83.2	6
Nevada, 1953					
Republican, 38%					
Program	68.7	100	68.7	81.2	7
Vetoes	55.6	97.7	56.9	69.8	3
Wisconsin, 1951					
Republican, 76%					
Program	65.6	67.5	97.2	97.2	6
Vetoes	52.3	46.2	113	52.3	1
Massachusetts, 1959					
Democratic, 60%					
Program	75.7	82.5	91.8	84.0	8
Vetoes	40.2	54.1	74.0	62.7	12
Massachusetts, 1957					
Democratic, 55%					
Program	84.9	91.0	93.3	84.9	10
Vetoes	89.7	58.7	153	89.7	1

[a] Program bills were "screened" in the same way as vetoes.

[b] States differ with respect to the percentage of votes needed to uphold vetoes. In some states, the one-third required is based on total membership; in others, on those present. In Connecticut, a majority present could uphold the veto. (As of 1965, one-third of the members are needed to uphold).

[c] This is the percent of those voting who took the majority position on roll calls. It is not converted to a scale of 0–100.

1959, the party was more cohesive in opposition to the governor than in support. When the states are compared, as they will be in the rest of this study, it is more important to know that the governor was 135% successful on a veto than that he received 68.4% of his party. In Wisconsin in 1957, the 68.4% meant that the governor was 135% successful, whereas in Nevada in 1953, the governor received 68.7% of his party on program legislation and was only 68.7% successful.

III. SOME CORRELATES OF GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE

Because there is so litte agreement as to the appropriate measures to be used for electoral competition or intra-party cohesion, several indicators of each concept were used in the initial analysis.[21] This procedure has been suggested recently by Richard F. Curtis and Elton F. Jackson.[22] The use of multiple indicators is called for when the researcher has definite theoretical concepts which he wishes to relate but for which he is unable to obtain or defend "single, unambiguous, direct, operational definitions."[23] Examining the effects of several indicators on gubernatorial influence will postpone the choices among them until the individual associations have been observed.

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[21] With respect to measuring inter-party competition see: Robert I. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength,

A survey was made of the vetoes in the entire universe of 476 legislative sessions held in thirty-four states outside the South during the period 1946–1960;[24] All the senate and house sessions (76 house sessions; 64 senate sessions) in which there were one or more veto roll calls were used in the research. The vetoes were, of course, subject to the screening procedure described in footnote 16. Altogether, 525 votes were used.[25]

Table 3 gives the results for fifty-eight house sessions which followed a gubernatorial election. It seemed reasonable to assume that a governor might have more control over legislators elected concurrently, rather than in mid-term, or on staggered terms as in many senates. The results of the product-moment correlations between the variables of competition, party structure and legislative behavior run contrary to the expectations of previous hypotheses and offer the following findings of speculative interest.

(1) State-wide electoral competition does not appear to be a major explanatory factor of legislative discipline. In only three cases do we get a correlation higher than .30 between electoral competition and legislative behavior, and two of these correlations are not in the anticipated direction. If competition produces disciplined parties, as the party-responsibility theorists

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I" *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (September, 1958), 499; V. O. Key, *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 98; Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, 48 (June, 1954), 477–485; Coleman B. Ransone, *The Office of Governor in the United States* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1956), pp. 12–94; Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Structure of Competition For Office in the American States," *Behavioral Science*, 5 (July, 1960), 197–210; and William H. Standing and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," this REVIEW, 52 (December, 1958), 1066–1077. For measures of party cohesion based on primary voting see: V. O. Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 109–118; and Joseph A. Schlesinger, *How They Became Governor* (East Lansing: Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957), p. 27.

[22] Richard F. Curtis and Elton F. Jackson, "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (September, 1962), 195–204.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[24] The eleven southern states were not included because they did not offer sufficient two-party competition to be directly comparable with the northern states. Nebraska and Minnesota were excluded because their legislatures are elected on a non-partisan basis. New Mexico did not publish a record of the legislative proceedings during this period.

[25] The following information was collected for the 140 legislative sessions and processed on an IBM 709 Computer.

I. Independent Variables.
  A. Electoral Competition
    1. The mean percent of the vote for the seven elections preceding the session won by the Governor's party.
    2. The percent of the preceding seven elections won by the Governor's party.
    3. The percent of alternation of control of office between the parties for the preceding seven elections.
    4. The Governor's percent of the pre-session vote.
    5. The Governor's percent of the post-session vote.
  B. Party Structure
    1. The Governor's percent of the total primary vote both pre-session and post-session.
    2. The Governor's "winning percentage" of the highest two primary candidates both pre-session and post-session (as in Joseph A. Schlesinger, *loc. cit.*).
    3. The Governor's percent of the highest two primary candidates both pre-session and post-session.
  C. Control of the Legislature
    1. Percent of seats held by the Governor's party.
    2. Absolute number of seats held by the Governor's party.
    3. Average percent of the seats held by the Governor's party over the previous six sessions.
II. Dependent Variables.
  A. Index of support
  B. Index of success
  C. Index of cohesion (This is based on a scale of 50–100. It is not converted to a scale of 0–100.)

TABLE 3. PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CERTAIN VARIABLES OF PARTY COMPETITION AND STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR VARIABLES OF SUPPORT, SUCCESS AND COHESION WITHIN THE GOVERNOR'S LEGISLATIVE PARTY IN FIFTY-EIGHT HOUSE SESSIONS[a]

Measures of Party Competition and Structure	Index of Support		Index of Success		Index of Cohesion	
Electoral Vote						
Mean percent of Gubernatorial vote—7 elections	−.38[b]		.15[b]		−.23[b]	
Percent of elections won by Governor's party	−.28		.26		−.25	
Percent of Alternation	−.02		−.22		−.05	
Percent of Pre-session vote	−.05		.25		−.02	
	Gov.	*Party*[c]	*Gov.*	*Party*[c]	*Gov.*	*Party*[c]
Percent of Post-session vote	.27	.06	.22	.29	.18	−.05
Over 50%	*.32	−.11	*.36	.20	.23	−.28
Under 50%	−.19	.03	−.02	.14	−.09	−.03
Primary Vote						
Before: Governor's % of total	.26		.02		.15	
Winning % of highest two	.25		.02		.16	
% of highest two	.25		.01		.17	
Incumbent	.39		−.03		.32	
Non-incumbent	.16		.13		.07	
After: Governor's % of total	.60		.49		.17	
Winning % of highest two	.46		.37		.21	
% of highest two	.61		.49		.18	
After: Candidate's % of total[c]	.54		.15		.36	
Winning % of highest two	.52		.27		.37	
% of highest two	.50		.13		.32	
Legislative Seats						
% of seats—Governor's party	−.60		.20		−.49	
Over 50%	−.45		−.05		−.36	
Under 50%	.09		.46		.10	
Absolute number of seats	−.12		.31		−.15	
Average percent six sessions	−.55		.22		−.45	

[a] These sessions are the same as those in Table 1.

[b] For all correlations higher than .30, p ≤ .05 for a two-tailed test except for those correlations asterisked. For those, p ≤ .10 for a two-tailed test. Correlations above .40 in magnitude are underlined for convenience.

[c] The vote for the post-session is the vote for the governor or for his replacement.

suggest, we should expect a negative correlation between percent of the electoral vote and amount of support and success. The mean percent of the electoral vote over the past seven elections is more highly correlated with the degree of support and success of the governor than are the other measures of competition, and in the anticipated direction. A plausible explanation is that the correlation is caused by the lack of discipline of traditional majority parties over the previous 14–28 years. This modest negative correlation may indicate that, over a long period, lack of competition will produce lack of cohesion. Competition in any single election does not appear to produce cohesion. The gubernatorial election success of the governor following the legislative session is positively correlated with his support and success in the legislature. This may be an indication of a major effort on the part of the governor to consolidate his party for a decisive win. In the fourteen-year period within which the legislative sessions fall, the gubernatorial elections became more competitive. During that period in 24 of the 32 states outside the South the election results were within 45%–55%. The eroding of the traditional majority party and the close competition which followed may have brought about the positive correlation between the legislative support and the electoral record of the governor, both indicative of his personal efforts. These correlations are not high, and do not support the theory that electoral competition produces legislative support or success due to the efforts of the governor to make a vote-getting record for the next election.

(2) Intra-party cohesion on the state level has a high positive correlation with the support and success of the governor in the legislature. The highest correlations are obtained between the governor's primary percentage after the legislative session and the degree of loyalty he receives from his legislators during the session. The high correlation between outside party cohesion and legislative loyalty would seem to support the theory that the outside party organization generates discipline in the legislative party. The *direction* of this influence needs to be explained, since the legislative discipline predates the organizational cohesion. One would expect that the primary of an *incumbent* governor held before an election in which both he and the legislature ran concurrently would correlate as highly with legislative loyalty as his primary after the session was over. This expectation is based on the assumption that the strength of the governor's faction as measured by his ability to make a strong primary showing is reflected in his ability to induce his legislative party to back him. Surprisingly, this is not true. As Table 3 shows, even with incumbents it is the post-session primary which correlates most highly with support and success.

Correlation does not indicate causation, and we ponder whether it is the legislative success which affects primary results, or whether both indicators are part of a general control exercised by the governor. The latter hypothesis makes more intuitive sense. In that case the progression of events would start with the efforts of a governor to build support within his party, both electoral as well as legislative, to help him win the next primary and election. With his supply of rewards and punishments and his own ability and effort, he forges a coalition to stand by him at primary time. The degree of his success is measured both within the legislature and by the primary results. Additional evidence can be garnered to support this interpretation of the results. The correlations between party structure and primary voting for the three remaining categories of legislative sessions included in the study are presented in Table 4. They are even higher than those previously reported for the fifty-eight house sessions. Of particular interest is the fact that the governor's success with his party increases as the election approaches. The senates and houses elected mid-way through the term of a four-year governor produce extremely high indices of success. The assumption that the governor wields his maximum influence over legislators elected concurrently with him appears to be in error. His influence grows as the time for election approaches. His strategy is oriented toward the next election, and the strength of the coalition he builds is measured both in legislative and primary support.

The governor's success in receiving the necessary votes to pass his legislation is a more personal matter than his degree of support. While the index of support has a correlation of well over .40 in most cases with the primary fortunes of the party's next candidate, the index of success was not correlated highly with the primary success of the party's candidate. Success is correlated with the strength of the individual governor, and not with the strength of the leadership faction of the party. It would appear that the strength of the leadership faction within the party has a definite relationship to legislative support, but that the personal efforts of an incumbent governor who plans to run again make the difference between support and success.

Comparison between the index of cohesion and those of support and success shows that cohesion is not as highly related to the governor's primary and election as the other variables. This is to be expected, since a party which was completely opposed to the governor would be assigned an index of 100%, as would a party which completely supported him. Cohesion does not measure the direction of loyalty within a party, but only the extent of agreement among its members.

Common sense also suggests that the percentage of seats a governor's party holds in the legislature would affect his support and success. Assuming that governors calculate at the margins and do not expend more rewards or punishments than necessary to gain support for their projects, we would expect a high negative correlation between the percentage of seats a

TABLE 4. PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY RESULTS AND SUPPORT, SUCCESS AND COHESION WITHIN THE GOVERNOR'S LEGISLATIVE PARTY FOR DESIGNATED SESSIONS

Primary Vote	Index of Support[a]	Index of Success[a]	Index of Cohesion[a]
Forty-two Senates Elected Concurrently with the Governor[b]			
Before Session:			
Governor's % of total	.23	.08	.08
Winning % of highest two	.24	.08	.12
% of highest two	.24	.08	.13
After Session:			
Governor's % of total	.71	.48	.48
Winning % of highest two	.63	.48	.55
% of highest two	.67	.45	.46
After Session:			
Candidate's % of total[e]	.40	.03	.26
Winning % of highest two	.40	.03	.28
% of highest two	.30	−.04	.19
Eighteen Houses Elected Mid-term[c]			
Before Session:			
Governor's % of total	.21	−.12	.12
Winning % of highest two	.21	−.12	.12
% of highest two	.19	−.15	.11
After Session:			
Governor's % of total	.63*	.82	.69
Winning % of highest two	.32	.70	.42
% of highest two	.64*	.71	.67
After Session:			
Candidate's % of total[e]	.39	.15	−.03
Winning % of highest two	.28	.16	.04
% of highest two	.36	.20	.05
Twenty-two Senates Elected Mid-term[d]			
Before Session:			
Governor's % of total	.08	−.20	−.13
Winning % of highest two	.24	.07	.12
% of highest two	.03	−.23	−.20
After Session:			
Governor's % of total	.69	.89	.47*
Winning % of highest two	.56*	.86	.47*
% of highest two	.72	.85	.42*
After Session:			
Candidate's % of total[e]	.51	.40	.19
Winning % of highest two	.47	.44	.17
% of highest two	.48	.41	.14

[a] Correlations above .40 in magnitude are underlined for convenience.

[b] For all correlations higher than .30, $p \leq .05$ for a two-tailed test.

[c] For all correlations higher than .50, $p \leq .05$ for a two-tailed test, except for those correlations asterisked. For those, $p \leq .10$ for a two-tailed test.

[d] For all correlations higher than .50, $p \leq .05$ for a two-tailed test except those asterisked. For those, $p \leq .10$ for a two-tailed test. All correlations between .40 and .50 have $p \leq .10$ for a two-tailed test except those asterisked. For those, $p \leq .20$ for a two-tailed test.

[e] This is the party candidate, who may be either the governor or his replacement.

governor has and the percentage of his party which supports him. This is confirmed by the statistics in Table 3. Fifty percent of the seats was used as a break-point to investigate this relationship further. Again the results show that the size of the governor's majority affects his support. If he has under 50% of the seats, there is little relationship—presumably the governor works to rally all of his party members behind him, or the deviations which do occur do not show any consistent pattern. If he has over 50%, he does not work for as many votes and the correlation is negative. This finding is important to bear in mind when comparing different parties with respect to indices of cohesion or loyalty. Legislative voting is not a "rally-'round-the-flag-boys" type of support, but a carefully calculated operation in which energy is not expended unnecessarily to force conformity among party members whose votes are not needed to pass. Part of this strategy may be a planned pattern of deviations, in which those whose constituencies or philosophies make it uncomfortable for them to support certain measures are allowed independence. As the majority hovers close to the 50% level, however, deviations are not tolerated because every vote counts.

Before we assume that this strategy is crowned with accomplishment it is necessary to consider the factor of success. Success is the ratio of the percent of the party the governor received to what he needed. We would think that the more seats the governor had to spare, the more successful he would be. This is not the case. There is a low negative relationship between the number of seats over a majority and success. Apparently an excess of seats is not in the governor's favor. A more logical break-point might fall somewhere about 55%, with extra seats an advantage until then. Thereafter, the surplus may generate rivalries within the house that the governor cannot control. This finding may modify the total strategy assumption related above. The governor may be able to handle a modest majority, but when his party has an overwhelming majority coalitions form against him which he cannot undermine by his traditional stock of rewards and punishments.

The absolute number of seats was correlated with the indices of support and success as a control over the assertion that it is the percentage of seats rather than the raw number of seats which affects the governor's support and success. The control proves this assertion to be true. The *success* of the governor is advantaged slightly by a larger numerical contingent in the legislature (the difference between .31 and .20). For instance, a governor with 36% of a 100 member legislature may have a harder time in obtaining the necessary one-third vote than a governor who has 36% of a 200 member legislature. The first governor can tolerate two defectors and the second four defectors. This advantage is not large, however, and percentage of seats remains a good indicator.

So far the legislative behavior of both parties has been grouped together. Table 5 affords a comparison between the two parties. The major reason for the differences can be laid to the larger majorities which the Republicans traditionally hold in these legislatures.[26] The mean scores for the three types of legislative competition for the 58 sessions are:

	Republicans	*Democrats*
Percent of seats of governor's party	67	46
Absolute number of seats	83	58
Average percent for six sessions	64	39

This explains why the mean index of support for the Republican Party is lower. The Republicans do not need as many votes to pass legislation. It was necessary for the Democrats to mobilize all of their party members to sustain a veto 40% of the time while the Republicans needed unanimity only 14% of the time. Thus there was no spread over 100% success to distinguish one particularly successful Democratic governor from another. The measure of success makes the Democratic party appear less loyal than the Republican, but this is an accidental and misleading byproduct of the method. We proceed with the assumption that the Democratic party would behave the same as the Republican with respect to success *given the same opportunities*.

IV. A MODEL OF GUBERNATORIAL INFLUENCE

The Linear Regression Model. So far we cannot assess the relative weights to give to the independent variables of party structure and competition in explaining their effect on gubernatorial influence. If we assume a linear model for explaining a single dependent variable such as gubernatorial legislative success as the sum of separate effects from several independent

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[26] An additional reason for the high negative correlations between the first two electoral variables and support for the Democrats is that there are high positive correlations between the electoral and house seat measures for the Democrats but not for the Republicans. Thus the variables for elections may be measuring the same phenomena as seats.

TABLE 5. PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES OF PARTY COMPETITION AND STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR VARIABLES OF SUPPORT, SUCCESS AND COHESION WITHIN THE GOVERNOR'S LEGISLATIVE PARTY IN FIFTY-EIGHT HOUSE SESSIONS BY POLITICAL PARTY[a]

Measures of Party Competition and Structure	Index of Support		Index of Success		Index of Cohesion	
	Republicans M = 62.4	Democrats M = 80.5	Republicans M = 113.9	Democrats M = 100.2	Republicans M = 77.3	Democrats M = 88.0
Electorial Vote						
Mean percent of gubernatorial vote—7 elections	−.03[b]	−.55[b]	.33[b]	−.12[b]	−.18[b]	−.18
Percent of the Elections won by Governor's party	.06	−.42	.41	−.05	−.19	−.15
Percent of Alternation	−.28	.11	−.45	.11	.06	−.20
Percent of the Pre-session vote	−.24	.11	.21	.27	−.24	.23
Percent of the Post-session vote—Governor	.31	.24	.30	.21	−.08	.24
Percent of the Post-session vote—Party[c]	−.06	−.08	.37	−.06	−.30	−.06
Primary Vote						
Before: Governor's % of total	.29	.14	.14	−.08	.26	−.11
Winning % of highest two	.34	.08	.17	−.12	.27	−.11
% of highest two	.36	.06	.16	−.13	.29	−.13
After: Governor's % of total	.59	.55	.74	.28	−.05	.13
Winning % of highest two	.51	.04	.68	−.10	−.03	.05
% of highest two	.58	.54	.68	.28	−.08	.12
After: Party candidate[c] Percent of total	.47	.59	.06	*.39	.35	.34
Winning % of highest two	.51	.48	.14	*.34	.28	.28
% of highest two	.50	.46	.12	*.33	.28	.26
Legislative Seats						
Percent of Governor's party	−.59	−.50	.22	.05	−.49	−.16
Absolute number of seats	.09	−.10	.37	.23	.09	−.16
Average percent 6 sessions	−.40	−.56	.33	−.03	−.40	−.18

[a] These sessions are the same as those in Table 1. There are 30 Republican sessions and 28 Democratic sessions.

[b] For all correlations higher than. 35, $p \leq .05$ for a two-tailed test except for those correlations asterisked. For those, $p \leq .10$ for a two-tailed test. Correlations above .40 in magnitude are underlined for convenience.

[c] The party vote for the post-session is the vote for the governor or his replacement.

variables such as primary support and percentage of seats in the legislature, multiple regression analysis helps us to estimate the size of such effects. For each individual session, the residual difference between the actual and predicted value of success can be calculated and subjected to further analysis; for the group of sessions, the squared multiple correlation coefficient indicates the percentage of gubernatorial success which can be explained by the model.[27] Coefficients in such regression models may be interpreted in either of two ways. The b-coefficient before each independent variable in a regression equation indicates the direction and amount of change in gubernatorial success associated with a unit change in only that one variable. When each of the variables has been standardized, different versions of the b-coefficients called beta-weights are appropriate. These beta-weights tell how much each independent variable contributes toward explaining success when its potential contribution has been equalized and when all the other independent variables have been held constant. Beta-weights are comparable; b-coefficients are not. The b-coefficients, on the other hand, have the advantage of concreteness. They are more likely to remain stable in different samples having unequal variances than the beta-weights.

From an analysis of the inter-correlations between independent variables correlating most highly with the dependent variables of support and success, several were chosen for the regression subject to the restriction that they not be intercorrelated at higher than .50 level themselves.[28] One exception was made in the case of the majority factor, which has a correlation of .84 with the percentage of seats a governor's party controls. This variable has potential importance because of the many advantages which accrue to a governor who has a majority. The speaker is from his party as well as the chairmen and majorities of committees. The speaker controls the membership of committees and the assignment of bills. This gives the governor, through the speaker, a control over legislation which he does not have with a minority, in which the leadership positions are in the hands of the opposite party. In order to check the supposition that the majority variable has an independent contribution to make in explaining support and success, I did not include this variable in the initial regression.

Since it is the primary record of a governor who runs again which has the highest correlation with support and success, thirty-four house sessions preceding an incumbent's election campaign were used to provide the data.[29] The regression estimates for support and success are as follows:[30]

Index of Support for the governor's party ($R = .66$ with the majority variable; $R = .66$ without the majority variable)

$$\widehat{\text{Sup}}_{.i} = \underset{(0)}{58.6} - \underset{(.03)}{.13}\ \text{G.E.}_{.i} + \underset{(.36)}{.66}\ \text{Prim.}_{.i} - \underset{(.50)}{.71}\ \text{Seats}_{i} + \underset{(.04)}{1.9}\ \text{Maj.}_{.i} \qquad \text{With the majority variable}$$

$$\widehat{\text{Sup}}_{.i} = \underset{(0)}{57.4} - \underset{(.03)}{.12}\ \text{G.E.}_{.i} + \underset{(.35)}{.65}\ \text{Prim.}_{.i} - \underset{(.47)}{.67}\ \text{Seats}_{i} \qquad \text{Without the majority variable}$$

Index of Success for the governor's party ($R = .55$ with the majority variable; $R = .47$ without the majority variable)

$$\widehat{\text{Suc}}_{.i} = \underset{(0)}{1.2} - \underset{(.09)}{.57}\ \text{G.E.}_{.i} + \underset{(.54)}{1.4}\ \text{Prim.}_{.i} - \underset{(.19)}{.38}\ \text{Seats}_{i} + \underset{(.38)}{38.2}\ \text{Maj.}_{.i} \qquad \text{With the majority variable}$$

$$\widehat{\text{Suc}}_{.i} = \underset{(0)}{23.3} - \underset{(.06)}{.37}\ \text{G.E.}_{.i} + \underset{(.53)}{1.4}\ \text{Prim.}_{.i} + \underset{(.22)}{.44}\ \text{Seats}_{i} \qquad \text{Without the majority variable}$$

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[27] A good explanation of the technique appears in Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), Chapters 17–19. For two applications see Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," this REVIEW, 52 (June, 1958), 367–387; and Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 642–657.

[28] The regression equation for explaining a governor's index of support (Sup.) was: $\widehat{\text{Sup}}_{.i} = K + b_1\ \text{G.E.}_{.i} + b_2\ \text{Prim.}_{.i} + b_3\ \text{Seats}_{i} + b_4\ \text{Maj.}_{.i}$. In this equation the i subscript may indicate any of the 34 sessions being analyzed. K is an appropriate constant; $\text{G.E.}_{.i}$ equals the governor's percent of the post-session election; $\text{Prim.}_{.i}$ equals the governor's percent of the post-session primary vote; Seats_{i} equals the percent of seats the governor's party has for the session; $\text{Maj.}_{.i}$ equals one if the governor's party has 50% or more of the House, zero if it does not. K equals zero when the explanatory variables are standardized. A similar equation was used for explaining a governor's index of success (Suc.).

[29] The states and number of sessions used are:

The coefficients and the multiple correlation coefficients serve to test succinctly a number of hypotheses and answer a number of questions about the relative contribution of electoral competition and party structure to gubernatorial support and success. We will first interpret the unstandardized b-coefficients in the explanatory models. The addition of the majority variable to the other independent variables makes an appreciable change in the value of R in the equation for success, but no change in the value of R in the equation for support. Apparently, holding a majority of seats in the house and the ability to organize its procedures barely affects the negative relationship which exists between the percentage of seats and the support of the governor. The results in Table 3 indicate that this negative relationship can be interpreted in either of two ways: (1) Legislative support is a matter of gubernatorial strategy. The governor makes marginal calculations concerning the votes needed to pass his legislation and does not try to marshall excess votes. Therefore as the proportion of seats held by the party goes up, the proportion of party votes needed to pass legislation goes down. (2) Excess seats are a liability to a governor. As the proportion of his party seats in the house rises, rivalries are generated which a governor cannot control. Therefore gubernatorial support falls as the percentage of seats rises.

Nor does the possession of a majority change the positive relationship which exists between the governor's primary showing and his support. With or without a majority of the legislature, a stronger governor gets higher support on upholding his vetoes; the weaker governor less support. This indicates that a strong governor can make use of the advantages which come to him as a result of majority control while a weak governor cannot. It may indicate that a strong governor calculates at the margins, but can counteract rivalries which develop with a large majority. The success equation clarifies many of these queries and will be considered next. The index of success controls for the "strategy" interpretation since, by definition, it is the percentage of party votes received out of the party votes needed.

The addition of the majority variable to the regression equation for success makes a noteworthy increase in the value of R. It changes the independent influence on the equation of the percentage of seats from positive to negative. Without the addition of the majority variable, it appears that the higher the percentage of seats, the more the governor is advantaged. The addition of the majority variable indicates that when the governor has a majority of the seats, however, extra seats over this majority become a disadvantage. Before the addition of the majority variable, the b-coefficient for seats indicated that the governor needs excess party seats to be successful. His success in getting the percentage of his party he needs is aided by increasing the number of seats in his party up to a certain limit. Probably a few seats over a majority are to his benefit. This explains the positive relationship which existed before the addition of the majority variable. With the addition of this variable the independent effect of the percentage of seats changed. The negative influence of seats over a majority indicates the attrition which excess seats brings to even the strongest governor. Thus the "rivalry" explanation for the negative relationship between seats and party support must account for the negative relationship between excess seats and success, since we have controlled for the "strategy" interpretation in our measure of success.

The equation for support which includes the majority factor tells us that a one percent increase in the post-primary support of the governor causes a .66% increase in his index of support. On the other hand, a one percent increase in the governor's legislative party contingent causes a .71% loss of support by the governor.

The equation for success which includes the majority factor indicates that receiving 80% in a primary vote is worth three times the advantage of having a majority in the legislature in terms of the ability to get the necessary votes to sustain a veto. In other words, possessing a majority of the legislature is not an automatic guarantee that vetoes will be upheld. It is the impact of a popular governor which contributes much more to the equation for success. A one

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Republican: R.I. (1), Maryland (1), Idaho (1), Oregon (1), Illinois (1), N.H. (1), Mass. (1), Wisconsin (3), Kansas (1), Ohio (2), and Michigan (1). Democratic: Maine (1), Ohio (3), Conn. (1), Iowa (1), Kansas (2), Michigan (4), N.Y. (1), Nevada (1), California (1), Colorado (1), Mass. (2), Montana (1) and R. I. (1). There were 16 sessions in which the governor had a minority of the legislature: (4 Republican: 12 Democratic). There were 18 sessions in which he had a majority: (10 Republican: 8 Democratic).

[30] In these equations b-coefficients are given with the independent variables; beta weights are given below them in parentheses. Beta weights are obtained by multiplying a concrete b-coefficient times the standard deviation of its independent variable and dividing by the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

percent increase in the general election support leads us to expect a little over one-half of one percent decrease in legislative success. While this looks like an influential variable, it must be remembered that the election returns rarely swing outside of the 45%–55% range, so the actual effect of this variable is minimized.

The preceding examination of the unstandardized b-coefficients in the explanatory models confirms the hypothesis that there is an appreciable difference between the effects of the same independent variables on gubernatorial support and their effects on success. In the equations for support, defined as the percentage of the governor's party which voted to support him, the influence of his strength in the outside party amounted to only half as much as it did in the equation for success, the measure of his ability to get the votes he needed. On the other hand, the influence of the percentage of seats in the legislature was twice as much in the first support equation as in the first success equation. This indicates that most governors make marginal calculations based on the votes needed to pass, but that the governors who are successful in achieving what they need are those who are also in control of the outside party.

The comparison between the variables would be on a more equitable basis if we used the beta weights. The use of beta-weights corrects for the fact that there are differences in range and variability involved in measuring the independent variables. We measure changes in the dependent variable in terms of standard deviation units for each of the other variables, a method which assures us of the same variability in each of these variables. These beta-weights can be presented by means of a bar graph. The direction in which a bar extends from the midline indicates the direction of the variable on support and success. If it extends to the left, it is exerting a negative force on the dependent variable; if it extends to the right, it is exerting a positive influence on the dependent variable. The length of the bar indicates the magnitude of a variable's force on support and success.

These beta weights are compared in Figure I, which gives the direction and degree of change in both support and success brought about by the standardized variables. From the comparison one can see that the gubernatorial election does not affect the support or success of the governor to a very great degree. The primary accounts for more positive change in the success index than any other variable and affects support to a very large degree. Success, which indicates whether or not the governor received the deciding number of votes to uphold his veto, is more closely allied with the governor's post-session primary vote than is support, which is simply his percentage of support by his own party, unrelated to whether or not he got what he needed. A comparison of the relative contribution of the percentage of seats and majority factors confirms the previous findings. The fact that a governor has a majority has very little to do with his support, which is affected in the high negative by the percentage of seats. Success, however, is much more affected by the possession of a majority than by



Fig. 1. Effect of four variables of party competition and structure on gubernatorial support and success in the legislature. (Beta weights)

the percentage of seats. This may indicate the contribution of such organizational factors as the speakership and control over committees, or it may indicate, more simply, that the governor has sufficient votes to uphold his veto if he works on it.

R and the Residuals. The multiple correlation (R) is given with each regression equation for support and success. The non-squared multiple correlation coefficient associated with the support equation is .66, which is higher than any of the single correlations between an independent variable and the dependent one. Squaring this correlation shows that about 44% of the governor's support can be explained by a linear model using the independent variables we have chosen. A multiple correlation of .55 is also "respectable" as an indication of the correlation between the actual and predicted values of success. That these multiple correlations are fairly high even when the indices we have used are rather crude is quite encouraging. As indicators of legislative support and party structure the veto votes and post-session primary results are at best approximate.

An analysis of the residual differences between actual and predicted values for the sessions reveals several reasons why the R's were not even higher. Table 6 gives the residuals for the thirty-four house sessions. The model for support was close to being correct in 24 out of the 34 sessions. The model for success is not quite as accurate, predicting within 30% of the actual success in 21 out of 34 sessions. The over- or under-predicted sessions serve to lower the correlations between the actual and predicted values.[31] There are several possible explanations for the deviant sessions. Local factors not amenable to interstate comparisons may account for some of the cases. The effects of constituency interests upon the behavior of the individual legislator have not been considered in this paper. The role perceptions of the legislator may account for deviations. Further research on the deviant cases is clearly indicated.

Strengths and Limitations of the Linear Regression Model. The linear equations which were presented represent an attempt at both economy and accuracy of prediction. They have the advantage of indicating when certain variables are only spuriously correlated with the dependent variables, although the "independent-dependent" interpretation of the regression model ignores the more complicated interdependent and nonadditive causal interrelations of the variables involved.[32] For instance, we know that the degree of success in the primary after the session has a high positive correlation with gubernatorial success in the legislature. It can hardly cause this because it comes later in point of time. We used the post-session primary to indicate the cohesion of the party structure outside the legislature. Like malaria's high positive correlation with marshes via the mosquito, there is undoubtedly a causal connection between legislative discipline and primary success. We have assumed throughout this paper that the governor provides this causal connection through his efforts to consolidate his party to win in the primary and in the election.

A Suggested Causal Model. Based on the findings we have just presented, a model of gubernatorial influence would give the most weight to the ability of the governor to form winning coalitions both within and outside the legislature. There may not be a time lag here. The two processes probably occur simultaneously. Instead of the legislative party being an independent entity, it is subject to the direction and influence of the governor's coalition within the electoral organization. The fact that the two variables of legislative party support of the governor and primary cohesion are so highly correlated indicates that the governor provides the connecting link. Correlations between legislative performance and primary results of the party candidate were not as high. Also, it was the primary *following* a session which correlated most highly with the legislative success of the governor, indicating that influence builds upon a future reward, rather than a past success.

Within most states outside the South, enough competition exists for either party to

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[31] Multiple correlation represents the zero-order correlation between the actual values obtained for the dependent variable and those values predicted from the equation. If all of the points are on a least-squares line in a scattergram, which is a geometrical interpretation of the equation, the actual and predicted values will coincide and the multiple correlation will be unity. The greater the scatter about the line, the lower the correlation between the actual and predicted values.

[32] A way of deciding between alternative models of the causal interrelationships among variables has been elaborated by Hubert M. Blalock, "Correlation and Causality: The Multivariate Case," *Social Forces*, 39 (March, 1961), 246–251. It was used by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56.

TABLE 6. ACTUAL AND PREDICTED VALUES FOR SUPPORT AND SUCCESS FOR THE THIRTY-FOUR HOUSE SESSIONS

State	Session	Governor's Party	Support			Success		
			Actual Percent	Predicted[a] Percent	Percentage[c] error	Actual Percent	Predicted[b] Percent	Percentage[c] error
Governor's Party with Less than 50% of the House Seats								
Rhode Island	1959	R	100	90.0	+11	100	90.8	+10
Maryland	1951	R	65	91.0	−29	65	90.2	−28
Ohio	1951	D	54	97.7	−45*	54	103.0	−48*
Maine	1955	D	97	100.0	−04	97	102.8	−06
Ohio	1953	D	79	99.8	−21	79	104.9	−25
Idaho	1959	R	93	81.3	+15	110	80.6	+36*
Connecticut	1955	D	89	84.4	+05	89	78.3	+14
Iowa	1957	D	87	94.2	−08	87	101.9	−15
Kansas	1957	D	98	93.1	+05	98	99.8	−02
Michigan	1949	D	95	90.4	+05	103	102.0	+01
Michigan	1951	D	98	94.0	+04	98	103.7	−05
Michigan	1953	D	100	93.2	+05	100	100.5	+00
New York	1955	D	100	81.7	+22	118	85.7	+27
Michigan	1957	D	100	76.5	+31*	112	77.6	+44*
Kansas	1959	D	100	86.9	+15	116	103.0	+13
Oregon	1959	R	78	73.7	+06	100	70.5	+42*
Governor's Party with More than 50% of the House Seats								
Illinois	1957	R	42	56.0	−03	55	40.0	+30
Nevada	1947	D	95	61.6	+54*	143	92.4	+35*
Ohio	1949	D	41	73.6	−44*	44	112.0	−61*
California	1959	D	87	73.8	+18	118	122.2	−03
Colorado	1957	D	38	77.0	−51*	62	126.5	−50*
Massachusetts	1949	D	96	82.9	+16	144	126.5	−14
Massachusetts	1957	D	90	80.1	+12	153	130.0	+18
New Hampshire	1949	R	95	59.2	+60*	166	93.7	+77*
Massachusetts	1947	R	96	78.6	+22	175	137.2	+27
Montana	1949	D	98	77.5	+26	182	131.5	+38*
Wisconsin	1957	R	68	72.9	−07	135	131.3	+03
Rhode Island	1947	D	100	60.2	+66*	142	102.9	+38*
Kansas	1955	R	18	41.5	−57*	38	68.2	−44*
Ohio	1957	R	29	47.4	−39*	45	80.3	−44*
Wisconsin	1953	R	66	66.5	−01	143	125.3	+14
Wisconsin	1951	R	52	65.0	−20	113	122.0	−07
Ohio	1947	R	36	53.0	−31*	67	113.4	−41*
Michigan	1947	R	40	53.0	−25	103	120.8	−15

[a] For each session the equation for support including the majority variable was applied.

[b] For each session the equation for success including the majority variable was applied.

[c] The formula for the percentage error is:

$$\frac{\text{actual value-predicted value}}{\text{predicted value}} \times 100.$$

* The sessions under- or over-predicted by over 30% are asterisked.



FIG. 2. Causal relationships in the model of gubernatorial influence.

consider winning the election a possibility. In Figure 2 the broken line indicates the influence of the variable of state-wide competition upon the governor because this variable is potentially strong, but cannot be used as an effective predictor of the cohesion of most of the states in the North whose election competition is within the 40%–60% range. Because either party can win, competition for the party nomination is keen. Active and potential factions exist within both parties. The governor must compete for the nomination and, in order to do so, he starts building a coalition within the party which will be large enough to assure him of an uncontested primary nomination, or at least guarantee victory in the primary election. This faction, we hypothesize, includes members of the legislature who come from areas where the governor has organization support. With his supply of resources the governor can "pay" other legislators to back him. The model does not separate the legislative from the electoral party, but considers it to be a partner in the forming of party coalitions which later battle in the primary.

Within the legislature itself, a variable which has a great deal of weight upon the success of the governor in building his faction is the size of the legislative party. If the governor has an overwhelming majority, he has trouble building a coalition large enough to pass his legislation. The excess may fall prey to rival factions who can gain a strong enough foothold to entice a deciding number of potential supporters from the governor's coalition. In so far as reapportionment is able to make it possible for either party to gain control of the legislature in a state in which the electorate is fairly evenly divided between the parties, the handicap of excess seats will be diminished. The governor will find his legislative party more manageable with his supply of limited resources.

V. CONCLUSIONS

There are several avenues of future research which lead from these findings. The only factors which have been considered are state-level factors which bear an influence on the governor's support. At best we were able to explain only 44% of the support with these factors, and the predictive value of the equation cannot be improved unless we know more about the following components of gubernatorial influence:

1. The amount and availability of economic resources such as jobs and contracts and their effect on the ability of the governor to form coalitions;
2. The personal basis of gubernatorial coalitions as a possible reason for the lack of permanence of controlling coalitions within the party;
3. The bases for permanent coalitions within a political party which can outlive any one governor; and
4. The economic and social components of a coalition and the effect on coalition building brought about by a diversity of economic interests within a party;
    a. The relationship of constituency economic interests upon the success of the governor. (Flinn discovered that members from constituencies more typical of the party supported the party position more often.[33]); and
    b. The relationship of constituency economic interests upon the failure of the governor to pass his legislation. (There is more agreement among researchers that variance in party loyalty can be related to constituency characteristics.)

The ability of the electoral party organization to influence the voting loyalty of the legislators is unquestionable. Further test borings into the resources which feed successful gubernatorial coalitions should be of interest to those who claim that a party should be able to pass its program.

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[33] Flinn, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–66.

"IMPERIALISM" IN BUREAUCRACY*

MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR.
Wayne State University

I. CONSTITUENCY, JURISDICTION, AND POWER

If an important part of the political scientist's mission is to anticipate and explain "the critical problems that generate turbulence"[1] in that part of the world which attracts his attention, then, in the study of administration, bureaucratic "imperialism"[2] must be of compelling interest. If systematic data directly assembled for the purpose are lacking, and if there are some signal problems of theory which have been little investigated,[3] there is still enough evidence from studies of other political problems[4] that it seems worthwhile to set out some trial-run ideas in the hope that they will elicit further discussion.

Bureaucractic imperialism seems pre-eminently a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency[5] as well as the jurisdiction of that agency. We are thus primarily concerned with the politics of allocation[6] and shall, except incidentally, bypass some other interesting aspects of inter-agency politics[7] such as cooperation between agencies sharing missions, competition for favorable "one-time-only" decisions which do not involve jurisdictional reallocation, or the critical problems of the "holding company" administrative organization and its internal politics.[8] For the moment, our concern with the politics of allocation leads to a focus on what would appear to be the likely behaviors of those decisionmakers who have both inclination and opportunity to look after the institutional well-being of agencies. Ad-

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[1] Albert B. Martin, *Personal Communication.*

[2] Cf., Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), pp. 134–136; and Bela Gold, *Wartime Economic Planning in Agriculture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 530–535.

[3] Cf., Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 11.

[4] Herbert Emmerick, *Essays on Federal Reorganization* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1950), Ch. 2; Irving K. Fox and Isabel Picken, *The Upstream-Downstream Controversy in the Arkansas-White-Red Basins Survey* (*ICP*, #55) (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); James Miller Leake, "Conflict over Coordination," this REVIEW, 12 (August 1918), 365–380; Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); F. F. Ridley, "French Technocracy and Comparative Government," *Political Studies*, 14 (February 1966), p. 41; Ashley L. Schiff, *Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), Ch. 5; Warner R. Schilling, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 22–24; and Herman M. Somers, *Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), particularly Ch. 1 and 2.

[5] The well-known case of Interior Secretary Ickes' effort to acquire control over the Forest Service is in point: Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days*, 1933–36 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953).

[6] Emmette S. Redford, "Perspectives for the Study of Government Regulation," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (February 1962), pp. 8–9; and Marshall Dimock, "Expanding Jurisdictions: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Conflict," in Robert K. Merton, *et al*, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), pp. 282–291.

[7] For a pertinent contribution, see William M. Evan, "Toward a Theory of Inter-Organizational Behavior," *Management Science*, 11 (August 1965), B217–230.

[8] Health, Education, and Welfare, and Housing and Urban Development are, at the federal level, particularly good examples of "holding company" organizations lacking an integrating goal or mythology.

ministrators at this level are really "administrative politicians," and the genesis of their problem is the necessity to increase power if the agency is to survive and flourish in an administrative habitat crowded with other agencies:[9] agencies embryonic or decaying, nascent, adolescent or mature.

This by no means implies that administrative politicians are pirates out for plunder. But it does imply that the most saintly idealist (if a saintly idealist ever could arise to such a high post) could not function if he abandoned the maxim of "my agency, right or wrong!" The condition of power is a favorable balance of constituencies. Constituency means any group, body or interest to which the administrative politician looks for aid and guidance, or which seeks to establish itself as so important (in his judgment) that he "had better" take account of its preferences even if he finds himself averse to those preferences. The constituency of the agency, like the legislative constituency, includes not only those with whom the politician has a stable *and friendly* relationship, but those who support his ends, those who oppose his ends, and those who wish to intervene for what he regards as "irrelevant" purposes. Moreover, the term "constituency," although only customarily applied to the external groups which make claims upon the administration, is equally applicable to subordinates, employees, and colleagues who constitute internal constituencies.

To achieve a favorable balance of constituencies, in other words, administrative politicians must discover, identify, or manufacture suitable combinations of means and ends to yield effective incentives for the constituents he desires. This is the signal importance of jurisdiction. The goods the administrative politician can deliver, and the penalties he can impose, are a function of jurisdiction. Hence, he must have the jurisdiction (or competence)[10] over those policy issues out of which he can tease the suitable combinations of constituency support.

II. STRATEGIES IN BUREAUCRATIC IMPERIALISM

It would be unreasonable to assume that the incentives of agency power always lead to imperialistic behavior.[11] Yet the evidence of such behavior occurs often enough that we can believe it is not rare or trivial. Hence, we have to reach for some greater clarity about agency strategies. By strategy we mean calculation by some "broad" or "general" set of partially explicit, partially implicit "decision rules" which provide clues to action in unforeseen—and often unforeseeable—contingencies.

Strategic patterns will naturally reflect such idosyncratic features as the disposition of the individual decisionmaker, his sense of purpose, or his sense of agency capability to perform in the area where opportunity exists. But if the basic criterion of agency strategy is power achieved through constituency organized around jurisdiction, then we suggest that the administrative politician tends to adopt the impact on *existing* constituencies as the criterion by which to respond to each potential reallocation of jurisdiction. In this regard, there are at least three major considerations which will govern strategic choice: agency disposition, available occasions for allocation issues, and modes of resolution.

Agency Disposition. Some agencies rather clearly have a greater disposition to take on new jobs than do others which might, in principle, take on the same jobs. One of the critical factors here is the nature of the internal constituency. Administrative empire-building may, of course, be little more than a self-promotion strategy for an agency head to build a reputation and move on. This is somewhat unlikely, it would seem, for administrative empire-building also requires signs of successful performance or evidence that successful performance is likely. If this is to be achieved, the internal constituents have a to make serious decision to produce: the agency and its enterprises must engage their loyalties and enthusiasm. The boss's orders won't be enough!

While the energizing mythology which sustains a disposition to take on new jobs may be found in many different kinds of agencies, it may be suggested that it is most likely in the new organization. A new organization will exist only because someone thought there was something to be "reformed," "improved," or "developed" and this is likely to carry over into the selection of personnel. But there is a vital collective incentive. In the nature of government, there is an almost inevitable mixture of missions between agencies (e.g., a labor department, a commerce department, and a development department). If the old agencies have somewhat come to terms with the mixture of missions, the new agency can vindicate itself only if it finds a substantial share which it can control by itself. This requires energetic pursuit of opportunities and, necessarily, imposes conflicts with previously existent agencies. (Witness OEO in relation to HEW, Labor, etc.) But the very novelty of the situation means that the organization will have on board people who see brilliant opportunities if only they can so extend their reach as to bring all the relevant program fragments under their own agency's control. They lack commitment to existing programs, slots, routines, and schedules and therefore have great mobility.

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[9] Norton E. Long, *The Polity* (edited by Charles Press) (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1960), Chapter 4, remains the best statement on this point; also Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political Theory," this REVIEW, 58 (March, 1964), p. 12 and note 9 at the same page.

[10] We recall that the "sphere of competence" is an essential criterion of the "administrative organ" as defined in Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1947), p. 330.

[11] Victor A. Thompson, *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950), makes this point by noting the *indisposition* of the OPA's Gasoline Eligibility Committee to grab jurisdiction.

In the first stages, at any rate, the novel organization is also likely to benefit from the interest of those external constituencies which provided support for its very creation. These constituencies will be inclined to think of all resistance from existing agencies as "old fogeyism" and, equally, will having just gone through the process of creating the agency be much on the alert for possible external threats. Defense politics since World War II would be acutely relevant, since it is *the* best (and *the* test) case of effective reorganization. The military needs of the Cold War were perceived as great enough and specific enough that the most important constituent—the President—had a vested interest in supporting reorganization. These same needs, plus the awareness of Presidential support, activated the doctrines of obedience and inhibited potential resisters.

Each time the expanding agency acquires a new constituency, that constituency co-opts[12] part of the agency's money, people, time, skill and working doctrine. If the agency then seeks to shift those resources, it may find itself constrained by the demands of the co-opting constituency which has, so to speak, now acquired a first mortgage on those resources. From this arises a disposition toward maintenance rather than basic expansion. When this process first manifests itself, the agency officials may find it regrettable, and may even console themselves that the lapse from expansion into maintenance is purely temporary. But the fact is that it is difficult to shift funds once committed, to get personnel to interest themselves in new jobs, or even to find the time. Even more, it is virtually impossible to change these commitments without offending or injuring powerful constituencies, so that "temporary" maintenance becomes "permanent" maintenance.

When maintenance-minded agencies are challenged, one common response is to attempt to prove that what it is doing is all that could be done in the area (witness the Triborough Bridge Authority contra Mayor Lindsay) or that it is doing all the new things now desired.

Perhaps the most neglected cases are those in which there is a clear agency disposition toward retrenchment or self-limitation. It is not merely that the agency adopts kid-glove tactics in order to maintain a cooperative relationship with a constituency, but that it actually denies its powers. The history of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as interpreted by the Federal Power Commission, provides one fairly clear example.[13] The FPC has several times seemed to be faced with a cleavage between the preference of the industry (little or no regulation) and the preferences of others (greater regulation). Recurrently, the Commission chose the strategy of denying (by quasi-judicial interpretation) that the Act conferred those powers which the pro-regulatory forces desired it to exercise. (The Federal Courts tended to assert exactly the contrary.)

Retrenching agencies may be forced to reorient themselves in order merely to maintain the *status quo*. This special case of reluctant running just to keep in place seems to be an interpretation one may impose upon the recent responses of the Texas Railroad Commission—an agency regulating oil and gas production[14]—to legislation establishing the Texas Water Pollution Control Board. The new statute (1961) apparently consolidates powers formerly vested in several agencies (not including the Commission).[15] Prior to this legislation, the Commission had disclaimed the power to regulate the discharge of oilfield brines (saline wastes) into water courses, although it did describe such discharges as a necessary incident to production. By this disclaimer, the Commission was freed of any responsibility to impose penalties upon the producing constituency, with which it had a long-standing and protective relationship.

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[12] Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

[13] The interpretation is my own, but the evidence is presented in Edith T. Carper, "Lobbying and the Natural Gas Bill," in Edwin A. Bock and Alan K. Campbell (eds.), *Case Studies in American Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 178–184.

[14] York Y. Willbern, "Administrative Control of Petroleum Production," in Emmette S. Redford (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1956), pp. 3–50.

[15] The statute is H.B. No. 24 of the 57th Legislature, First-Called Session, codified as Article 7621d, *Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes*. It is reprinted in: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Sub-

The Commission pursued its policy of self-limitation in a slightly different form when the new legislation first became effective. In administrative conferences to set up the Control Board machinery, Commission spokesmen agreed that the Board (1) had authority to issue or withhold permits for discharges into watercourses, (2) the Commission itself lacked such authority, and (3) "the Commission would depend upon the Board in regard to the decisions regarding quality to be maintained in the waters of the State in line with the Board's responsibility as the coordinating agency in pollution matters."[16] This administrative treaty, subsequently sanctioned by an Opinion of the Attorney General,[17] became the basis for the Board's new permit system. However, when a producing firm challenged the Board's new permit system, arguing that authority in oilfield matters lay exclusively with the Commission, the Commission intervened on the producer side, thus negating its acceptance of the earlier agreement.

How can this change-about be explained? If we accept the constituency hypothesis of this paper, the following interpretation would appear to be consistent with the facts. In the absence of a competing agency, no problem existed for the Commission, but it could hardly oppose some kind of permit system once the new statute was effective. Nor could it easily accept the controlling role for itself, in view of its previous position. If this were so, then the administrative treaty would seem a reasonable settlement. Once the Board actually began to operate, however, its course seriously disturbed the equilibrium of the Commission-producer relationship by a highly restrictive interpretation of one aspect of the problem. "Grandfather" permits were, under the statute, to be available to producers already in business, but when the Board began to operate, it actually issued "grandfather" permits to only 45 percent of the existing producers. Almost inevitably, one producer brought the law suit mentioned and the Commission's choices became much more constricted. It could sustain the original agreement, and violate the basic reciprocity owed its primary constituency, or it could join that constituency. It chose the latter course claiming, in effect, powers broader than any which it had exercised previously. It won the suit in the trial courts, but the legal issue was soon moot, for the legislature amended the law (before the appeal could be heard), making the primacy of the Commission with respect to oilfield matters unmistakable.

This shift from retrenchment indicates what we suspect is a more persistent factor. The disposition toward retrenchment would seem to depend upon the extent to which there is one critical constituency which cannot be changed or which has substantially inflexible ends. When there is at least one such, and the administrative politician does not perceive possibilities for a favorable constituency balance with diverse constituencies, he will tend to seek ways for self-limitation. This is particularly important in agencies where the internal constituency is a relatively homogeneous professional or skill group. For the agency head is more immediately jeopardized by the demoralization or silent sabotage of this internal group than by external criticism.

If the phenomenon of retrenchment is little noted in formal discussion, it is nonetheless apparent in many familiar situations. Political scientists need only consider some of their departmental problems. If, for example, there is a legal requirement that students be taught a course in "the Government of North State," a chairman is very likely to experience difficulty reconciling this with faculty desires to work in an atmosphere of academic high fashion. If the professional constituency is to be satisfied, therefore, it makes sense for a chairman to try to get rid of the requirement. In contemporary urban politics, the relationship between the police departments and the civil rights groups raises this problem. Police departments tend to be highly cohesive bodies in which the normative rules acceptable to the internal constituency are defined primarily from the inside,[18]

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committee on Natural Resources and Power, *Hearings on Water Pollution Control and Abatement* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Part 6, p. 3579 *et seq.*

[16] This recitation of the facts is based upon Board briefs filed in litigation. Since it is of considerable importance and apparently nowhere rebutted, we assume its accuracy.

[17] Opinion No. WW-1465, October 31, 1962, as reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations, *op. cit.*, pp. 3586 *et seq.*

[18] Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), pp. 285–292; William

so that the more responsive the police commissioner is to those who allege "police brutality," the more he will find himself forced to fight his internal constituency. The more responsive he is to his men, the more he must try to get an allocation of responsibility which permits him to ignore the outside. In federal administration, the recent signal example has been the Public Health Service which never wanted serious *police* power over environmental pollution—a power largely inconsistent with the developed tradition of PHS.

Occasions for Allocation Decisions. The administrative politician's strategies must go, of course, far beyond the estimate which he can make of the agency disposition to act. One of the primary considerations must be the "ecology"[19] within which action is to take place, and an important component of this ecology is the state of the competition. What are the alternatives open to those on whom he is dependent if he does not move? What are the alternatives if he does move? If he refuses to take on a new task, will he cut his own throat because some other agency will be given the task to the eventual detriment of his own agency? If his subordinates do not like the course he follows and resign, are there really places they can go, or do they have to stay with him?

Even more, however, he must consider the extent to which there is a consensus about policy or the extent to which there is uncertainty. (1) If we may agree that the ultimate limitation is some arbitrary criterion which makes some possible claims patently "ridiculous", then one critical occasion for making agency claims exists when policies are in their infancy. Doubt and confusion about policy ends lead to similar doubt and confusion about appropriate instruments. There is likely to be an almost primitive uncertainty[20] such that the decisionmaker does not "know what he wants," nor how "to make things turn out right," nor possibly even what "right" is. (2) Fluidity and confusion in a policy area, where there are some major fixed points of substance, but where connecting "threads" of policy have not been worked out so that the area is stable, also permit disputes about allocation. For who gets the job will do much to determine the eventual policy fabric. (3) The commonest situation appears to be that in which policy norms appear to be agreed upon, but in which there is dissatisfaction *superficially* directed to the forms and techniques of administration. When this occurs, the ambitious administrative politician may put forth his agency as the "natural" or "logical" candidate to do the job efficiently.

Under primitive uncertainty, maintenance may be feasible for very strong organizations, but few such are actually likely to exist. Retrenchment, on the other hand, is almost a sure receipe for disaster, for the disposition to retrench actually protects the agency only so long as the constituency which loses thereby does not secure opportunities by other channels to achieve the same ends. Primitive uncertainty gives the freest play to dispositions to expand and this is most likely to be manifest when the governmental system is yet evolving[21] or, even more, when the very basic frame of social order is unsure.[22] But this may be fundamentally akin to the problem of administrative coordination whenever policy problems are severe enough that the existing system, if continued in its dominant mode, cannot accomodate to them. Even in highly stable countries, particular administrative units, whether mature or embryonic, find these seasons of crisis and confusion favorable to attempts to satisfy their most elemental power requirements.[23]

When uncertainties depend mainly upon the

Westley, "Secrecy and the Police," *Social Forces*, 34 (March 1956), 254–257; Westley, "Violence and the Police," *American Journal of Sociology*, 59 (July 1953), 34–41; William Kephart, *Racial Factors in Urban Law Enforcement* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959); and Murray Kempton, "The Cop as Idealist: The Case of Stephen P. Kennedy," *Harper's Magazine* (March 1962), 66–71.

[19] John M. Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1947), Chapter 1; Kaufman, *op. cit.;* Long, *op. cit.* Ch. 10; Fred W. Riggs, *The Ecology of Administration* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1961); and Redford, "Perspectives for the Study of Government Regulation," *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5, all embody literary formulations of the idea of ecology in administration. Evan, *op. cit.*, has contributed a more precise statement in the notion of the "organization-set."

[20] On levels of uncertainty, see Matthew Holden, Jr., "Committee Politics under Primitive Uncertainty," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (August 1965), 236–237.

[21] Leonard D. White, *The Federalists* (New York: The Macmillan Comany, 1956), particularly Chapter 18.

[22] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Chs. 15, 16.

[23] This seems to me the conclusion supportable by Somers, *op. cit.*, on economic administration during World War II.

fluidity of policy, but where a few major points are more or less fixed, or where there is a presumption of policy consensus so that only administrative technique is overly disputable, the problem of acting on one or another agency disposition is even more complex. In these instances, retrenchment can be successfully pursued only by very strong organizations which jettison what they regard as irritating trivialities,[24] or by weak organizations which can afford only the least measure of turbulence. Organizations which do not tower over all their competitors, but which are still strong enough to be in the competition, have the problem that jettisoning any area of responsibility for which there is support opens the door for other agencies to appeal to the pertinent constituencies. This is particularly important in public as against private administration where the constituency is likely to entertain a presumption that the agency has a responsibility to look after its welfare.[25] (Imagine the fate of a Secretary of Labor who concluded that the major international unions really did not deserve his attention any more and tried to redefine "labor" to mean people largely outside the union movement.) The administrative politician thus has the complicated problem, if he really prefers to act on the retrenchment disposition, of trying to do as little as possible while not vacating the jurisdiction to possible competitors.

On the other hand, situations other than primitive uncertainty impose constraints on *explicit* self-aggrandizement because of the normative doctrine that all governmental agencies are "really" directed to a common purpose. Political ritual thus precludes, as a usual procedure, an open display of ambition or an explicit attack on the opposition. Consequently, the administrative politician is more likely to cooperate with, and sometimes to generate, surrogate or third-party claims in his own behalf, as the Texas law suit or the well-known practice of leaking criticism through a friendly newspaper or legislator. But, in any event, he is likely to appeal to the pertinent constituencies by setting up a straw man. Thus, a limited area of authority may be expanded if it can successfully be argued that "the problem is *really* not X [which is what the competitor presumably can handle] but Y [which is what the claimant can handle]."

Again, water pollution control provides an illustration beyond those equally applicable cases (e.g., defense reorganization) with which there is such common familiarity that the basic process may be missed. Pennsylvania is, for example, a state in which this issue has recently come to be of considerable political value. The main agency contestants are the Health Department and the Mines Department. The rule-making Sanitary Water Board characteristically exercises its authority through, or at the recommendation of, its "enforcement agent": the Department of Health.

Over the years, the more obvious dangers of bacterial pollution which Health has emphasized have receded, and the relevant external constituency ("the conservationists") has looked more toward ending chemical pollution, mainly associated with the drainage of toxic acids from coal mines, a matter of less importance to the sanitary engineers. Meantime, the Mines Department has had some recent successes with controlling pollution from highly visible bituminous surface (strip) mines. Legislators and newspapers have tended to praise the good faith and efficiency of the Mines Department, while viewing the Health Department with skepticism, if not hostility, for "not enforcing the law."

The Secretary of Mines did not miss the opportunity to advise the legislature that acid drainage was necessarily incident to the mining business, as repugnant to the mine firms as to anyone else, and was actually "a mine problem" and "not a water problem." Having thus established this rationale, the Secretary then proposed to remove the matter from the Sanitary Water Board into an entirely new Mine Drainage Board. The particular proposal failed, but the door was opened. The Sanitary Water Board retained its regulatory power but a Mine Drainage Research Commission was created and, in the normal course of administrative politics, one would expect future efforts to expand its jurisdiction at the expense of the Sanitary Water Board.

For all the effort to place the issue in the perspective of proper administrative techniques to do an agreed job, the opportunity to seek a reallocation existed in 1965 and not some other time precisely because there was a general mystique supporting "clean streams" and considerable dissatisfaction with existing administration.

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[24] See, for example, Leslie Goldner, "Air Pollution Control in the Metropolitan Boston Area: A Case Study in Public-Policy Formulation," in Harold Wolozin (ed.), *The Economics of Air Pollution* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.), 1966, p. 137, n. 11.

[25] In this respect, the idea that there is "ordinarily little or no limit to the amount of inaction an organization can 'undertake' [because] inaction does not absorb resources" seems in error. See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 175.

Modes of Resolution. The third consideration in the strategies of administrative politicians is that they know that issues of jurisdiction can seldom long be resolved, except in very broad terms. This is a point which appears rather obvious, yet is largely missed in existing administrative theory because the latter is largely a theory of kingship, i.e., how the executive-ruler may compel subordinates to do his will ("achieve organizational goals") and no more. If one adopts the regio-centric perspective, autonomous or contradictory agency action is pathological or, as Selznick says, "adventitious and subversive."[26] This is an important consideration in the tendency to pursue what Clawson appropriately describes as "the mirage of reorganization,"[27] of the effort to give internally consistent settlements of jurisdictional issues.

Unless one could imagine simple free enterprise in the bureaucratic system, there could be only two ways to settle questions of boundaries. One would be some form of inter-agency bargaining such as the process by which the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation merged their conflicting downstream-flood control and upstream-irrigation interests, thus forestalling deadlock among their respective Congressional supporters and obstructing effective Presidential advocacy of a "basin authority" for the Missouri basin.[28]

As a general rule, it would seem doubtful that agencies have any great ability to make such deals explicitly. Since each party aims at its own continuance, it is apparent that bargains will not be accepted unless parties consider themselves advantaged by the deals. If party *A* enters a deal, *A* must be able to protect itself against such of its followers as are disaffected, or the deal cannot stand. Similarly, *A* and *B* must be able jointly to maintain the integrity of their deal by jointly protecting themselves against third-party attack. If the effective deal depends upon the ability of each to assure the other that the deal will more likely be kept than not, the issues at stake must be issues which can have reasonably clear termination points. The division of interests in the Missouri Basin permitted this to some degree by the sheer physical nature of the two areas of activity. Most jurisdictional issues do not lend themselves to specific termination points, simply because of the continued intermixture of missions.

Moreover, differences in agency power become extremely relevant. Given the intermixture of missions, there is a variety of constituency interests often "shopping" from one agency to the next, providing ambitious agencies with incentives to break their deals and defensive agencies with much ground for uncertainty about the consequences of such broken deals. The more firmly an agency is bound to a previous deal, the less opportunity it will have to ward off new challenges or to respond to new opportunities provided by the incidence of constituency "shopping." Accordingly, the resolution of agency jurisdictional conflicts must much more often be tacit than explicit, and accordingly much more uncertain of future stability.

The limitations of bargaining must often mean some kind of central decision or arbitration by a third official party—presumably "above" the contending agencies—as to which agency shall occupy a particular jurisdiction. Litigation is the clearest form of arbitration, leading to a decision by a court which says (as in the Texas case) that "this matter lies within the jurisdiction of this agency rather than that." But most of the arbitration lies with other officials, e.g., the President, the Governor, the Congress or the legislature. Insofar as each administrative agency has, or will seek to have, its autonomous base of power, it is evident that such arbitration is not likely to have lasting effect. The resolution of jurisdictional disputes tends to become more like mediation or conciliation in which the disputes are tentatively settled, on incremental terms. In making claims before third parties, agencies may exploit all the ordinary techniques of politics. The extent to which they do so determines whether the third-party officials making the allocation decisions can or cannot be coercive in forcing settlements upon the agencies.

The point now takes on considerable practical relevance because there is a mood in American politics—appropriately symbolized by the idea of systems analysis or the more startling notion of "goals research"[29]—suitable to the idea of "modernization" or "rationalization."[30] One of its manifestations is a revival of the regio-centric notion that bureaucratic imperialism is a form of pathology to be dealt with appropriately by institutional design which eliminates the conflicts and cross-purposes.

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[26] Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, p. 11.

[27] Marion Clawson, *The Public Lands* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc. and American Forestry Association, 1965), Part 5.

[28] Henry C. Hart, *The Dark Missouri* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), Ch. 7.

[29] See the "Introduction" by Gerhard Colm in Leonard A. Lecht (ed.), *Goals, Priorities, and Dollars* (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 1–16.

[30] Cf. Paul Y. Hammond, "Foreign Policy-

Since so much of the rationalization case is based on DOD experience, we have to note how consistent that experience appears to be with the idea that success in reorganization also requires time to wear down the centers of resistance. If the MacNamara regime is the user of potent analytic tools, we also have to note that it is the legatee of each predecessor since the Forrestal period. For in each administration, Secretaries of Defense engaged in fights to extend the reach of the office—a process, which, incrementally, prepared the way to the present. The Defense experience is highly consistent with the view that reorganization which denies powerful parties' access to the internal decision process of the new organization will itself precipitate a new round of jurisdictional controversies, including new efforts to change the boundaries of the organization. Its product is reality rather than mirage if, and only if, the side being "attacked" can be deprived of alternative channels of influence or if powerful marginal constituents can be brought to the side of the "attacker." Even then, there is no guarantee that the process will stop, nor is it evident that even if, by some criteria, there are critical substantive problems to which appropriate responses are not forthcoming, does it follow that institutional reorganization is necessarily likely to produce those responses.[31]

Finally, the pressure toward reorganization involves a normative issue to which a postscript reply may be made. It would be improper for us to conclude that bureaucratic imperialism never involves irrationalities. But what we know of administration in an imperfect world suggests two considerations in terms of which bureaucratic imperialism may also have highly rational[32] effects in the policy process.

1. The administrative world in reality is a place of confusion and uncertainty, with false signals strewn about like dandelion seeds in an open meadow. Bureaucratic imperialism is a part of the process of clarification. Decision-makers need some guides to the needs, preferences, ambitions and hopes of the various and constantly changing constituencies. Competition between agencies, engendered by competition between constituencies, is a vital part of the process of clarification.

2. Since administrative agencies tend to be co-opted by particular constituencies, other constituencies whose interests are affected have difficulty entering the process as agency boundaries are stabilized and, indeed!, ossified. This is the source of pathological disinclinations to adapt to new circumstances. The idea that "higher authority" alone could either know enough of all the relevant situations or afford to make continuous readjustments of agency missions simply ignores the complex reality.[33] There must be numerous means of readjustment of missions including agency initiative. Agency initiative in a competitive political atmosphere permits the dissatisfied to "shop around" until they find somewhere in the administrative system agencies responsive to their claims.

Competition through self-aggrandizement may thus enhance the sense of reality and maintain the fluidity of choice which prevents serious error. This phenomenon may be deemed "irrational" or "pathological" if, but only if, one has assumed that there is at some point a central policy mechanism capable of articulating a single "public interest" and that those interests not so articulated ought not to be permitted avenues of realization. Those who advocate this may describe it as "rational planning," but gamblers have a more honest name: they call it stacking the deck.

III. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

Bureaucratic imperialism arises, it is argued here, from the simple fact that, whatever the

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Making and Administrative Politics," *World Politics*, 17 (July 1965), 656–671; and Charles J. Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

[31] For a case demonstration, see Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administrative Organization," *Journal of Politics*, 19 (August 1957) 461–478.

[32] For a sympathetic reconsideration by an economist-systems analyst, see Roland N. McKean, "The Unseen Hand in Government," *American Economic Review*, 60 (June 1965), 496–506; and McKean, "Limitations, Risks, and Problems," in David G. Novick (ed.), *Program Budgeting* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 295–296.

[33] The practical irrelevance of regio-centric approaches is evident when one reviews discussions of the problems of the President—indubitably the public figure most like a king. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960); and, Theodore Sorenson, *Decision-Making in the White House* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

purposes of the administrative politician, his first necessity is to maintain sufficient power for his agency. Power is organized around constituency and constituency around jurisdiction. Hence, the conflicts over the allocation of jurisdiction. Since it is obvious that not all administrative politicians move their agencies with the same frequency into efforts to claim jurisdiction, we have to look for clues to their strategies. Among the manifold considerations which may be pertinent, three seem of permanent relevance: agency disposition, occasions for allocation, and modes of resolution.

1. Agencies may have dispositions toward expansion, maintenance, or retrenchment. The disposition to expand is likely to be greatest when the agency is relatively new because the novel organization has (a) the necessity to establish a secure place for itself in relation to other agencies, (b) internal constituencies with little commitment to existing programs, slots, routines, and schedules, and (c) external constituencies still energized, from the effort to get the agency created, to support its claims against the threatening resistance of older agencies which may otherwise obstruct realization of the desirable results which people had in mind when they sponsored the new agency.

2. Dispositions toward maintenance are a function of the "first mortage" expectations which constituencies develop toward agency resources—money, people, skill, time, working doctrine—as the agency goes through the process of exploiting jurisdiction to build up support.

3. Retrenchment dispositions—dispositions actually to deny agency powers—develop when administrative politicians perceive no opportunity to create favorable constituency balances out of existing jurisdiction and when they possess some critical constituency which cannot be changed and for which the critical incentives are flexible.

4. Administrative politicians' choices of strategies are further determined by the critical occasions for decision. Dispositions toward expansion may most freely be pursued under primitive uncertainty. Under the same condition, very strong organizations may, in principle, pursue a disposition toward retrenchment because the very meaning of primitive uncertainty makes such a disposition trivial. Retrenchment, always dangerous because of the room it leaves for competing organizations, is under these conditions an invitation to organizational disaster.

5. Resolution of inter-agency jurisdictional conflict would tend to be highly problematical whether the method of resolution were bargaining or central decision (arbitration). Explicit bargaining is feasible mainly when the relevant agencies can fix physical limits to the areas of contention (e.g., the Pick-Sloan Plan). Tacit bargaining will normally be more relevant because the inter-mixture of agency missions is continual and because agencies will wish to leave open options for re-assessing their power relations by future competition for constituencies as circumstances change. The existing of constituencies "shopping around" for places to get satisfaction also constitutes the critical limit on the durability and coerciveness of central decisions.

6. The normative case for reorganization—manifest both in administrative theory as usually known and in the more common version of systems analysis—is not necessarily to be rejected, but it is at least open to doubt. For, assuming that the criteria of judgment are clear, it may also be argued that bureaucratic "imperialism" may also clarify constituency preferences and disrupt stale or archaic bureaucracies through the emergence of competitors. Moreover, it is open to doubt whether there is any specific relationship between systematic reorganization and improved substantive outputs, beyond the fact that stale and archaic routines are disrupted—a result equally accomplished by the self-aggrandizement of ambitious agencies.

Agency disposition is a more autonomous factor when there is a substantial fluidity as to policy. Agency disposition loses much of its autonomy if the policy norms are relatively strict, so that most debate focuses upon "administrative technique." The more stable the environing political situation, the greater the likelihood that dispositions toward expansion will be pursued through indirect, or surrogate, tactics rather than overtly, because of the constraints imposed by political rituals of "unity of purpose." Dispositions toward maintenance, largely a function of the saturation of resources by organizations which have previously been disposed to expand, may be acted upon under any situation, but such dispositions are likely to be abandoned in the face of challenge.

SOME EFFECTS OF INTEREST GROUP STRENGTH IN STATE POLITICS*

LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR.
University of California, Irvine

The literature on interest groups is, by and large, either heavily abstract and theoretical or highly concrete and descriptive. There are, on the one hand, several attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the study of interest groups, the major foci being either "the group basis of politics"[1] or "mass society."[2] On the other hand are numerous case-studies which describe in some detail, either for a particular policy[3] or for a particular interest group,[4] relevant political activities which lead to inferred conclusions about the impact that such groups have on the issue or issues. What we lack, and what is needed to raise the study of interest groups to the level of empirically-based generalization, are studies which collect data and generalize about interest groups using multiple units of analysis.

This observation is not meant to depreciate or undervalue the important theoretical and descriptive contributions which have been made in the examination of the role of interest groups in governmental systems. It is simply to state a fact about the literature and to plead for more systematic data collection and empirically-based generalization from which verified propositions about interest groups may emerge.

I think there are two major reasons why the literature on interest groups lacks a comparative base. First, many of the concepts which are employed in theories about interest groups are difficult to operationalize for data collection. Such concepts as "cohesion," "access," "resources," etc., represent complex phenomena and would involve a good deal of effort to apply rigorously and empirically. Take, for example, the interesting proposition that, *ceteris paribus*, "interest groups with high cohesion are more effective than interest groups with low cohesion." Clearly this is an important assertion which attempts to explain why some interest groups may have more influence than others. How such a proposition might be tested is, unfortunately, also clear. Simply take a sample of interest groups, devise measures of group cohesion and political effectiveness, collect the data on both measures, and see whether the proposition is confirmed or invalidated.

Second, it is usually very difficult and expensive to collect data on a wide variety of groups which might then be used for purposes of generalization. Such data is not generally available, and what is available is often incomplete, inaccurate, or both. Even to collect such relatively simple data as group size often presents serious problems in compiling membership lists, deciding who is a member and who isn't, perhaps identifying those who feel some allegiance to the group but who may participate in the activities of the group only minimally, and other equally knotty problems. To attempt to determine, across groups, what difference a particular independent variable (such as cohesion, group size, leadership ability, etc.) may have in the distribution of political outcomes raises formidable data problems indeed.

This paper will suggest how a comparative base for generalization about the activity of interest groups may be developed. I will attempt to answer the question: Do political systems that vary in the strength of their in-

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[1] See, for example, David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), Chapters 2 and 3; Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), Chapter 1; E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); and Harmon Zeigler, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), Chapters 1–3. There is also a voluminous journal literature discussing the pros and cons of "the group approach." See, for example, Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory: Observations on the Group Approach," this REVIEW, 54 (March, 1960), 15–33.

[2] See William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1959).

[3] See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business And Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963) for a policy case study which also develops very interesting and useful theory.

[4] See R. Joseph Monsen, Jr, and Mark W. Cannon, *The Makers of Public Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) for a number of discussions of particular interest groups and their activities.

terest groups also vary in a systematic way with regard to certain structural and output variables within their respective political systems? That is, can we explain certain differences in political systems by knowing something about the strength of interest groups within the system? The data to be employed will be for forty-eight state governments within the United States.[5] It is by now a truism to assert that states may provide a convenient laboratory to test certain propositions about politics. The number of states, the fact that they are all part of a larger political system (and hence share many things in common) while at the same time providing a certain amount of diversity make the states a useful data source in which to generalize and test political hypotheses.

THE FIRST SET OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Political scientists have long been interested in questions regarding constitutions and constitution-making. By and large the focus of attention has been on national constitutions and more particularly the Constitution of the United States. It is very difficult, however, to make generalizations about constitutions if the unit of analysis is a single document.

What will concern us here is how state constitutions differ in certain respects from one another, and how these differences might be explained. There are, of course, a large number of possible differences in state constitutions. State constitutions may vary, for example, in the kinds of governments they establish (unicameral vs. bicameral legislatures, a large number of elected executive officials vs. a large number of appointed officials, elected vs. appointed judiciaries, etc.). State constitutions may also vary in the detail in which they cover various aspects of government, and in the discretion which they give to public officials to carry out certain functions. They may also vary in the specific content which they give to questions of public policy (labor practices, regulation of utilities, transportation problems, etc.).

The differences among state constitutions which are of most interest to us here have to do with how specific and comprehensive they are, how easy or difficult they are to amend, how often proposals are made to amend the constitution, and how often the respective constitutions are in fact changed. More specifically, there are four dependent variables in which we will be primarily interested.[6]

1. *Length of Constitution.* State constitutions vary greatly in their length. We are not, however, interested in length of constitutions in and of itself but rather assume that the longer the constitution the greater the range of activity it attempts to cover and the more specific and detailed it is in its provisions. Length of constitution, then, will be used as an indirect measure of extent of coverage and specificity.

2. *Number of Amendments Proposed.* What we are interested in here is the number of official proposals which have been made to amend the respective state constitutions. The measure to be employed will control for age of constitution by taking the number of proposed changes for each state and dividing by the number of years the constitution has been operative.

3. *Number of Amendments Adopted.* This measure is similar to the previous one except that amendments actually adopted rather than simply proposed is the unit employed. Age of constitution is again appropriately controlled.

4. *Percentage of Amendments Adopted.* This is the ratio of amendments adopted to amendments proposed for each state and is expressed in a simple percentage.

Table 1 gives some indication of how the states vary on these four measures.

As can be seen from Table 1, there is a wide diversity among states with respect to these four variables. Now, assuming that constitutions are one of the mechanisms through which

TABLE 1. MEDIAN AND RANGE FOR STATES ON THE FOUR DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Median	Range
Length of Constitution (No. of words)	15,000	4,840–227,000
Number of Amendments Proposed Per Year	1.35	.31–12.63
Number of Amendments Adopted Per Year	.65	.10–9.98
Percentage of Amendments Adopted	58%	23%–94%

Source: *The Book of the States, 1964–1965* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964), p. 12.

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[5] Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.

[6] Data from *The Book of the States*, 1964–1965 (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964), pp. 12–15.

advantages and disadvantages are distributed in a political system, we would expect that differences in length of constitutions and the frequency with which they are amended would help us to understand, in some measure, how responsive states are to demands made by groups within the political system.

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The role of interest groups in political systems is an extremely important, and hotly contested, open question. At one level we can talk of the functions which most interest groups, or interest groups collectively, perform in political systems. David Truman, Robert Dahl, William Kornhauser, and V. O. Key, Jr., for example, suggest that, among other functions, interest groups:[7]

1. channel communications to decision-makers,
2. help structure alternative policy choices,
3. act as buffers between the government and the people,
4. help check demands made by others,
5. provide for functional representation,
6. compartmentalize access to decision-makers,
7. lead to a system of minorities rule,
8. provide people with an emotional outlet.

This kind of analysis helps us to understand how interest groups in general fit in with other aspects of a society and polity. What we are interested in here, however, is a somewhat different question. It would be useful to know whether variations in interest group strength make a difference with respect to structural and output variables of political systems. More specifically, do interest groups vary in strength from state to state, and if so, might this variation help to explain why certain other variables also vary?

The major question of this section, then, is how may states be classified according to strength of interest groups? The answer, "obviously," is that some measure of "strength" must be developed by which the states may be ranked. This task would, equally obviously, be an exceedingly difficult, expensive, and time-consuming enterprise.

It is possible, however, to employ a probably less valid and less reliable technique to measure interest group strength. The Committee on American Legislatures of the American Political Science Association sent questionnaires to political scientists located in the various states asking them to judge whether interest groups in their respective states were strong, moderately strong, or weak.[8] On the basis of the responses to this questionnaire the Committee then classified state interest groups into the three categories.

Judgmental measures are not unique with this study. Several psychological measures, for example, rely on this technique (rating scales of various kinds).[9] Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal piece on social requisites of democracy also relies heavily on a judgmental measure of whether countries are democratic and stable.[10] A recent comparative study of polyarchy also employs ratings on several variables.[11]

It is not that, if the authors mentioned above had their "druthers," they would choose this technique rather than another. It is simply that it has advantages in reducing crucial costs of research. The use of this type of measure certainly invites some criticisms, and where it is used it should be viewed as providing only tentative answers to the questions which it attempts to answer. It does, however, provide a useful first step until better resources become available.

On the basis of this classification of state interest group systems into strong, moderate, and weak, Harmon Zeigler, in a very useful study, relates this classification to other variables which help to show why states are likely to vary in strength of interest groups, and how such variation is related to political party structure and legislative cohesion. Zeigler finds that states with stronger interest groups are also more likely to be (1) one-party states, (2) states which have legislative parties with weak cohesion, (3) less urban, (4) less wealthy, and (5) less industrial. Table 2 presents these findings from Zeigler's study.

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[7] David B. Truman, *op. cit.;* Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); William Kornhauser, *op. cit.;* and V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1964), 5th ed.

[8] Belle Zeller (ed.), *American State Legislatures* (New York: Crowell, 1964), Chapter 12, especially Table 9, pp. 190–191.

[9] See, for examples, Claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook, *Research Methods in Social Relations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

[10] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this REVIEW, 53 (March, 1959), 69–105.

[11] Deane E. Neubauer, *On The Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in Ten Countries* (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1966).

TABLE 2. THE STRENGTH OF PRESSURE GROUPS IN VARYING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS

Social Conditions	Types of Pressure System[a]		
	Strong[b]	Moderate[c]	Weak[d]
Party Competition	(24 states)	(14 states)	(7 states)
One-party	33.3%	0%	0%
Modified One-Party	37.5%	42.8%	0%
Two-Party	29.1%	57.1%	100.0%
Cohesion of Parties in Legislature			
Weak Cohesion	75.0%	14.2%	0%
Moderate Cohesion	12.5%	35.7%	14.2%
Strong Cohesion	12.5%	50.0%	85.7%
Socio-Economic Variables			
Urban	58.6%	65.1%	73.3%
Per Capita Income	$1900	$2335	$2450
Industrialization Index	88.8	92.8	94.0

[a] Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, New Hampshire, and North Dakota are not classified or included.

[b] Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.

[c] Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.

[d] Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wyoming.

Source: Harmon Zeigler, "Interest Groups in the States," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 114.

What we will do now is to employ the Committee's classification of state interest group systems and see whether this classification helps us to explain variations among the states in the four dependent variables previously described.[12]

THEORY, HYPOTHESES, AND FINDINGS

Why would one expect strength of interest groups and certain aspects of state constitu-

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[12] A note of caution, however, should undoubtedly be entered here. The measurement of "strength" of interest groups being employed may probably best be construed to mean strength of interest groups *vis-a-vis* the state legislature. At least this is the sense in which it appears that the Committee defined strength. It is certainly the case that interest groups could vary in strength in a number of different ways. For example, size of membership, or number of groups may, under certain conditions, be appropriate measures of strength. As strength of interest groups is being used here it will be defined primarily in terms of legislative activity.

In addition, the results of this study must be interpreted cautiously since the time periods in which the independent and several of the dependent variables were measured are not coterminous. Strength of interest groups was measured by the Zeller Committee in 1954. Length of constitution and difficulty of amending the constitution (a variable to be introduced later in this paper) correspond to this time period, but the three variables having to do with amendments (number proposed, number adopted, and percentage of amendments adopted) are measured to the date when each state's current constitution was adopted. In several cases this reflects many years. It is therefore necessary, in three of the propositions, to make the assumption that strength of interest groups in states is a relatively stable phenomenon. Although there is not much evidence to support or deny the validity of this assumption, it does not appear unduly unrealistic to make it. Changes in governments, barring revolutions, are likely to take place slowly. If this is the case it does offer a certain plausibility to the assumption.

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRENGTH OF INTEREST GROUPS AND THREE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Strength of Interest Groups	Average Length of Constitution	N[1]	Average No. of Proposed Amendments per year	N[2]	Average No. of Adopted Amendments per year	N[3]
Strong	33,233	24	2.97	19	1.58	22
Moderate	17,985	14	1.14	12	.76	14
Weak	14,828	7	.68	5	.41	7

[1] Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from this and the following tables. In addition, Idaho, New Hampshire, and North Dakota were not classified by strength of interest groups.

[2] Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, and Washington are excluded for lack of data.

[3] Michigan and North Carolina are excluded for lack of data.

Sources: *The Book of the States, 1964–1965* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964), pp. 12–15, and Harmon Zeigler, "Interest Groups in the States," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 114.

tions to be related to one another, and what would be the expected relationships?

The answer to the first part of the question, the theory underlying the expected associations, is that where interest groups are stronger one manifestation of this greater strength as compared with weaker interest group systems would be a larger number of requests for, and the actual giving of special privileges and advantages. This distribution of special advantages would be predicted to show up in a political system in a number of ways. For example, we might hypothesize that in states with stronger interest groups the latter would have relatively greater success with state legislatures in receiving legal protection and encouragement for their activities. It would also not be unreasonable to suppose that states with stronger interest groups would differ with respect to the ways in which laws are administered and adjudicated. It would be interesting, for example, to observe if such states also differ in the manner in which administrative personnel are recruited and appointed and, consequently, in the decisions which are reached concerning various regulations and distributions within the political system. An investigation of part of this hypothesis will appear near the end of this paper.

We would also, however, expect there to be a relationship between strength of interest groups and state constitutions. If we assume that constitutions essentially lay out important ground rules by which the game of politics will be played, and that they may place certain restrictions or give certain dispensations to the players involved in the game, then we would expect variations in state constitutions to be intimately related to variations in other aspects of political systems. Generally, we would expect state constitutions in states which have stronger interest groups to reflect, in certain systematic ways, a greater amount of interest group activity than do the constitutions in states with weaker interest groups. More specifically, we would hypothesize the following relationships:

1. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the length of state constitutions.

This hypothesis follows in that states with stronger interest groups would be predicted to make greater efforts to achieve special advantage through constitutional provisions which refer to their activities. These efforts would result in longer and more detailed constitutions than in states with weaker interest groups. Table 3 presents data which tests this hypothesis.

As can be seen from Table 3, the twenty-four states which are classified as strong-interest-group states have constitutions which average 33,233 words in length; the fourteen states which are classified as moderate in interest group strength have constitutions which average 17,985 in length; and the seven states which are classified as weak in interest group strength have constitutions which average 14,828 in length.

2. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of proposed amendments.

If the theory we have suggested is correct, then we would expect states with strong interest groups to have more proposals for constitutional changes than states with moderately strong interest groups which, in turn, would have more proposals for changes than would states with weak interest groups. This hypothesis would reflect a greater number of attempts to gain some special constitutional status.

The data from Table 3 confirm this hypothesis. The average number of proposed amendments per year in states with strong interest groups is 2.97, in states with moderate interest groups 1.14, and in states with weak interest groups .68.

3. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of amendments which are adopted.

As with proposed amendments, we would expect stronger interest group states to have a larger number of changes in the constitution than in states with less strong interest groups.

From Table 3 we can see that the data confirm the hypothesis. Strong-interest-group states have an average of 1.58 amendments adopted per year, moderate states an average of .76, weak-interest-group states an average of .41.

Additional support for this hypothesis, and for the theory being proposed here, is the following. We would also expect states with longer constitutions to have a greater number of changes in their constitutions. This follows if we assume, as we have been doing, that longer constitutions indicate a larger range of activities provided for in the constitution, and a greater specificity and detail. The greater constitutional comprehensiveness in states with longer constitutions would also suggest a greater need to revise the constitution as economic, social, and political changes occur. Hence we would predict that the longer the constitution, the greater the number of amendments. Table 4 provides data on this point.

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF CONSTITUTION AND NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ADOPTED

Length of Constitution	Average No. of Adopted Amendments per year	N[1]
Less than 10,000 words	.27	7
10,000–19,999	.67	18
20,000–29,999	.78	12
30,000 & over	3.04	9

[1] Michigan and North Carolina are excluded for lack of data.

Source: *The Book of the States, 1964–1965* (Chicago: The Council of States Government, 1964), pp. 12–15.

As Table 4 indicates, the average number of amendments adopted per year increases as the average length of the constitution increases.

Since states with stronger interest groups tend to have longer constitutions (Table 3), and since states with longer constitutions tend to have a greater number of amendments (Table 4), hypothesis three, the stronger the interest group, the greater the number of amendments which are adopted, is directly derivable from these other hypotheses. The fact that this three-step chain of hypotheses is true at all three steps lends additional validity to the general theory being proposed here. It is also interesting to note that both strength of interest groups and length of constitution have an independent effect on the number of amendments adopted. When each is held constant the relationship with the other and number of amendments adopted is attenuated, but still present.

4. States with moderately strong interest groups will have the highest percentage of amendments adopted.

This hypothesis, although not immediately obvious, follows from the following argument. To this point our data indicate a positive relationship between strength of interest groups and both number of amendments proposed and number of amendments adopted. It is clear, however, that it is easier to propose an amendment than to get an amendment adopted. States with strong interest groups, then, would be expected to have a larger number of amendments proposed and a larger number of amendments adopted, but since it is easier to propose amendments than to have them ratified, their rate of success would not be expected to be the largest among the states.

Similarly, states with weak interest groups have the fewest number of amendments proposed and the fewest number of amendments adopted. But, again, since it is easier to propose than to adopt, weak interest group states would not have the highest rate of success. This reasoning would predict that states with moderately strong interest groups would have the highest ratio of amendments adopted to amendments proposed. Table 5 provides data on this hypothesis.

As Table 5 indicates, it is the states with moderately strong interest groups that have the highest percentage of amendments which are proposed adopted. States with strong interest groups have a ratio of adopted amendments to proposed amendments of 54.8%, states with moderate interest groups 62.8%, and states with weak interest groups 52.6%. Those states with the weakest interest groups have the low-

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF INTEREST GROUPS AND PERCENTAGE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ADOPTED

Strength of Interest Groups	Average % of Amendments Adopted	N[1]
Strong	54.8%	19
Moderate	62.8%	12
Weak	52.6%	5

[1] See footnote 3, Table 3.
Source: See Table 3.

est rate of success, but those states with the strongest interest groups do not have the highest rate of success. Indeed, their rate of success is much closer to weak interest group states than to moderately strong ones.

A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

Before accepting the above theory and hypotheses relating strength of interest groups to variations in state constitutions, it might be useful to explore a possible alternative explanation.

States also differ considerably in the extent to which it is easy or difficult to amend their constitutions. Some states, for example, require a two-thirds or three-fifths majority of the legislature and/or passage by two successive legislatures to propose and ratify constitutional amendments. All states but one also require a popular referendum after legislative action, but require differing majorities in the referendum. In addition, states also differ on whether they allow constitutional amendments to be proposed by initiative, and have different ways of calling together and proposing amendments in constitutional conventions.[13]

Given these widely varying practices in states, an index of difficulty of proposing and ratifying constitutional amendments was constructed. This index is derived from the three major ways in which the constitution may be amended and therefore reflects: (1) legislative difficulty, (2) presence or absence of the initiative, and (3) constitutional convention difficulty in proposing and ratifying constitutional amendments. One point was given to each state if a majority greater than a simple majority is required in the legislature, one point if approval by two sessions is needed, and one point if ratification by a majority vote in the election rather than a majority vote on the amendment is required. Additionally, one point is given if there are no initiative procedures in the state. With regard to constitutional conventions, one point is given if greater than a majority in the legislature is required to call a constitutional convention, one point if approval is needed by two sessions of the legislature, one point if a referendum on whether there should be a constitutional convention is necessary, one point if a majority in the election rather than a majority on the proposition is required, one point if after the constitutional convention ratification of the amendment is required (one-half point is given if no provision is in the constitution for a referendum ratifying the amendment but the legislature may determine if a referendum is necessary), and one point if ratification requires a majority in the election rather than a majority on the amendment.

This index of difficulty of amending the constitution, then, can vary from 0 to 10. The median score was 4, the range from 1 to 9. Fifteen states had scores of 3.5 or less, sixteen had scores from 4 to 5, and fifteen had scores from 5.5 to 9.

Given this wide range in difficulty in amending state constitutions, we would expect that such variation might have an impact on the number of amendments which are adopted by the states. More specifically, we would hypothesize that the greater the difficulty in amending the constitution, the fewer the number of amendments which will be adopted. Table 6 provides the data to test this hypothesis.

Table 6 only partially confirms the hypothesis. Those states with the most difficult procedures to amend the constitution do have fewer amendments adopted, but the states

TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFICULTY IN AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS ADOPTED PER YEAR

Score on Difficulty of Amending Constitution	Average No. of Adopted Amendments Per Year	N[1]
Less than 3.5	1.29	15
4–5	1.32	16
5.5–9	.66	15

[1] Michigan and North Carolina are excluded for lack of data.
Source: See Table 4.

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[13] For descriptions of the differing state systems see *The Book of the States, op. cit.*, pp. 13–15.

with the easiest procedures do not have the greatest number of amendments adopted.

This partial explanation of why states vary in the number of changes in their constitutions may be further explained, however, by variation in states in strength of interest groups. Consistent with our theory, it may be proposed that states would be expected to vary in ease or difficulty in amending their constitutions by strength of interest groups. That is, we would expect the following hypothesis to be true: the stronger the interest groups, the less the difficulty in amending the constitution. Table 7 presents data on this hypothesis.

The data from Table 7 confirm the relationship between strength of interest groups and difficulty of amending the constitution. States with strong interest groups have a difficulty score of 4.21, states with moderately strong interest groups have a score of 5.00, and states with weak interest groups have a difficulty score of 5.65. Hence we may say that even though the number of changes in the constitution is related to difficulty of amending the constitution as well as strength of interest groups, the reason why this additional explanation is at least partially true is because strength of interest groups is also related to difficulty of amending the constitution.

One further piece of data will also help to confirm the theory being proposed here. Since states with strong interest groups have longer constitutions (Table 3), and since strong interest group states also have constitutions which are easier to amend (Table 3), we would also expect there to be a relationship between length of constitution and ease of amendment. More specifically we would hypothesize the greater the length of the constitution, the less the difficulty in amending the constitution. Table 8 provides data on this hypothesis.

As can be seen from the Table, this hypothesis is for the most part confirmed. The states with the shortest constitutions have the most difficult amending procedures, and the states with the longest constitutions have the easiest amending procedures, although the two sets of states in the middle do not fall in the predicted order.

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF INTEREST GROUPS AND DIFFICULTY OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

Strength of Interest Groups	Average Difficulty of Amending the Constitution	N
Strong	4.21	24
Moderate	5.00	14
Weak	5.65	7

Sources: See footnote 3, Table 3.

TABLE 8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF CONSTITUTION AND DIFFICULTY OF AMENDING STATE CONSTITUTION

Length of Constitution	Average Difficulty of Amending the Constitution	N[1]
Less than 10,000 words	6.29	7
10,000–19,999	4.58	18
20,000–29,999	4.71	12
30,000 & over	4.11	9

[1] Michigan and North Carolina are excluded for lack of data.

Source: See Table 4.

Summing up this section, then, there is a partial relationship between the difficulty of amending the constitution and the number of changes made in the constitition. However, this relationship can be accounted for by the fact that there is also a relationship between strength of interest groups and ease of amending the constitution. The alternative explanation, then, may be rejected and the original explanation retained. Strength of interest group seems to be a major factor in explaining why states vary with regard to certain constitutional practices.

THE SECOND SET OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the previous sections our concern was with the effect of strength of interest groups on some general features of state constitutions. In this section the focus will shift slightly to a combined constitutional-legislative variable, the method of selection of state officials. States differ widely in the number of office-holders who are appointed as opposed to elected to office. We will be concerned, in the following, with an explanation of this variation.

A priori one might predict that states with stronger interest groups would be *either* more likely or less likely to have a larger number of elected as opposed to appointed officials. The major political variable in either prediction is the ability of interest groups to influence the selection of personnel. Those who would predict that interest groups will have more influence if governmental officials are appointed rather

TABLE 9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF INTEREST GROUPS AND FOUR DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Strength of Interest Groups	Average No. of State Elected Officials	Average No. of State Agencies With Elected Officials	% of Elected State Public Utility Commissions	% of Elected State Courts of Last Resort	N
Strong	19.54	9.17	50%	79%	24
Moderate	14.64	7.14	7%	57%	14
Weak	7.71	5.86	0%	43%	7

Source: *The Book of the States, 1964–1965* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964).

than elected would suggest that interest groups would prefer the politics of dealing with the governor and, in some instances, the legislature, to the uncertainties of electoral politics. If this hypothesis is combined with the already-established hypothesis that strength of interest groups is related to political outcomes then this group would predict that states with stronger interest groups would have a greater number of appointed rather than elected officials.

On the other hand one could, with equal logic, agree that interest groups do want to maintain influence over the selection of governmental personnel but that such influence can better be established if personnel are elected rather than appointed. A governor is likely to be responsive to a wide variety of state interests. In some cases he may be a member of a political party which is less responsive to the concerns of certain interest groups. Gubernatorial appointment combined with legislative confirmation would provide some check on the governor, but interest groups, on balance, might be better able to influence the selection of personnel if such persons were elected in what, for minor positions, would be relatively low turnout elections rather than take a chance with governors. Proponents of this view would deduce an opposite conclusion from that previously advanced: stronger interest group states would have a larger number of elected rather than appointed officials.

How does one choose between these competing theories? Since the logic of each produces contradictory conclusions we might test those conclusions. Although this does not produce a direct test of the competing theories it does provide an indirect test, since the conclusions drawn from each are clearly contrary to each other. Evidence on these derivative hypotheses may support one theory as opposed to the other.

The relationship between interest group strength and selection of governmental officials will be tested in four different ways. First, what is the relationship between interest group strength and the total number of state officials who are elected? Second, what is the relationship of interest group strength and the number of state agencies with elected officials? This relationship will give us some idea of the range of offices which are subject to election.

Each of these variables gives an indication of the overall elective-appointive system within and among states. But what about specific instances? Third, then, what is the relationship between strength of interest groups and the selection of state public utility commissions? Fourth, what is the relationship of strength of interest groups with the selection of judges on state courts of last resort? Table 9 provides data to test these four relationships.

From Table 9 it is clear, in each instance, that states with strong interest groups rely more heavily on election of state officials than do states with weaker interest groups. The stronger the interest groups the greater the number of elected officials, the greater the number of state agencies with elected officials, the greater the likelihood that public utility commissions will be elected, and the greater the probability that judges on state courts of last resort will be elected.

The data, then, lend support to the second of the alternative theories. States with stronger interest groups are better able to isolate governmental agencies and officials from executive or legislative influence than are states with weaker interest groups, and are more likely to have agencies of government which are independent from the governor and legislature.

One further bit of evidence lends additional support to this conclusion. Given the evidence that elections rather than appointments are related to strong interest groups, it may also be inferred that those states with strong interest groups would have shorter terms of office than those states with weaker interest groups. This would provide additional control by interest groups by making governmental officials run for office more frequently and hence be less independent from outside influence. Table 10 provides data on terms of office of judges of state courts of last resort.

The data in Table 10 confirm this hypothesis. Length of term for judges on state courts of last resort decreases as strength of interest groups increases.

TABLE 10. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF INTEREST GROUPS AND AVERAGE LENGTH OF TERM OF JUDGES ON STATE COURTS OF LAST RESORT

Strength of Interest Groups	Average Length of Term	N
Strong	7.58	24
Moderate	11.21	14
Weak	13.43	7

Source: *The Book of the States, 1964–1965* (Chicago: The Council of State Governments, 1964).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We began our discussion by suggesting that the literature on interest groups, generally speaking, lacks studies which attempt to test generalizations about interest group activity. The emphasis on theory and/or case studies we attributed to two factors: (1) difficulty in operationalizing theoretical concepts, and (2) difficulty and expense in collecting data for many interest groups or on many policies.

This study attempts to test several propositions about the relationship between strength of interest groups and variations among states with regard to structural and output variables centering on the constitution and the election of state officials. A theory was developed which explained why state governments would have such wide variations in their constitutions and the political processes surrounding them. More specifically the following hypotheses about strength of interest groups were tested and confirmed:

1. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the length of the state constitutions.
2. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of proposed amendments.
3. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of amendments which are adopted.
4. States with moderately strong interest groups will have the highest percentage of amendments adopted.
5. The stronger the interest groups, the less the difficulty in amending the constitution.
6. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of state elected officials.
7. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the number of state agencies with elected officials.
8. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the likelihood that state public utility commissions will be elected.
9. The stronger the interest groups, the greater the probability that judges on state courts of last resort will be elected.
10. The stronger the interest groups, the shorter will be the terms of office of judges on state courts of last resort.

In addition, the following subsidiary hypotheses were also tested.

11. The longer the constitution, the greater the number of amendments which are adopted.
12. The longer the constitution, the less the difficulty in amending the constitution.
13. The greater the difficulty in amending the constitution, the fewer the number of amendments which will be adopted (partially confirmed).

All of these hypotheses confirm the theory which has been proposed here. Variation in strength of interest groups does have an impact on political systems. It was expected that states with stronger interest groups would be characterized by attempts by those groups to gain special advantages. Since constitutions are one of the vehicles through which advantages and disadvantages are distributed in political systems, these attempts would have an effect on the length of the constitution, the amending procedures within states, and the number of changes which are made. Since the selection of governmental personnel is also of primary concern to interest groups, it would be expected that differences in selection procedures would also vary by interest group strength. The data presented in this paper lend credence to these suppositions.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

A political scientist must, with some data projects, give attention to the possible conflict between data analysis sophistication and general readability. In the text I have attempted to present the findings in the simplest way possible consistent with accuracy and at least minimum precision. However, there are techniques of data analysis which provide more powerful data manipulation. One of these techniques, appropriate for this analysis, is multiple regression analysis. This statistical appendix will present the findings in terms of correlation coefficients, holding some variables constant where appropriate.

Two points, however, should be made immediately. First, the results of the multiple regression analysis are entirely consistent with the findings already reported. The interpretation of the data also remains the same. Second, the entire analysis was performed in two steps, one with all of the states (in most cases this is forty-five states), and the second with the eleven former Confederate states dropped from the analysis. It has been found consistently that in many respects southern states differ from northern states. However, the propositions reported here are true whether one includes or excludes the southern states.

The correlation coefficients for the propositions listed in the summary, in the same numerical order, are as follows (correlations in parentheses exclude the southern states):

1. .36 (.34), 2. .40 (.33), 3. .30 (.25), 4. curvilinear, 5. −.30 (−.31), 6. .26 (.27), 7. .52 (.45), 8. .41 (.45), 9. .32 (.31), 10. −.43 (−.42), 11. .53 (.53), 12. −.24 (−.24), 13. −.12 (−.17) (partial relationship reported).

In addition, the relationship between interest group strength and number of constitutional amendments adopted, with length of constitution held constant is .19. Similarly, the relationship between interest group strength and number of constitutional amendments adopted, with difficulty of amending the constitution held constant is .24.

The relationship between strength of interest groups and number of state elected officials is not affected by population size.

FRENCH LOCAL POLITICS: A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF GRASS ROOTS CONSENSUS*

MARK KESSELMAN
Columbia University

The study of French politics has traditionally focused on the central issues of consensus and cleavage. Titles of representative works on French politics are revealing: *In Search of France, France Against Herself, Crisis and Compromise,* and *France Torn.*[1] A foremost scholarly concern has been to explain the high degree of political conflict in France. Numerous explanations have been suggested, ranging from France's history to her values, regional diversity, and electoral system.[2] However, in attempting to learn about French political behavior, an important source of information has been ignored. French local political patterns contrast sharply with national political patterns: the contrast is relevant to understanding the issues of consensus and cleavage in France.

There are nearly 38,000 communes in France. Each elects a municipal council, and each municipal council (except the one for Paris) elects a mayor; there are manifold opportunities to examine French local consensus. Scholars have studied certain issues in French local government, but not the question of local consensus. French electoral sociologists have examined temporal changes of local voting patterns in national elections. Beginning with André Siegfried's *Tableau politique de la France d'ouest sous la troisième république,* these studies have provided detailed information on cantonal and even communal voting behavior.[3] However, studies in electoral sociology are concerned with the result of the voting decision rather than with its causes. They do not question how local cleavages in national elections develop or are maintained. Still less do they examine local politics; their focus is primarily on municipalities' *national* voting behavior.

There have been a number of French community studies. They usually examine a variety of issues, such as voluntary associations, education, and occupational and demographic patterns. Some information about local politics and consensus can be gleaned from case studies of Auxerre, Grenoble, Magnac, Marigny, Nouville, Novis, Peyrane-Roussillon, Chanzeaux, and Vienne.[4] In these studies, however, local

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[1] Stanley Hoffmann *et al., In Search of France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Herbert Luethy, *France Against Herself* (N. Y.: Meridian Books, 1957); Philip M. Williams, *Crisis and Compromise* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964); and Jacques Fauvet, *La France déchirée* (Paris: Fayard, 1957), which might be translated as *France Torn.* (An English translation is less literal and less revealing: *The Cockpit of France* [London: Harvill, 1960].)

[2] In addition to the works cited in footnote 1, see Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), Part Four; Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (N. Y.: Basic Books, 1963), chs. 6, 8, 9; and Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* (N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1955). For two analyses that minimize the lack of consensus in France, see Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); and Philip M. Williams, "Political Compromise in France and America," *The American Scholar,* 26 (Summer 1957), pp. 273–288.

[3] For a partial bibliography of French electoral sociology, see François Goguel and Alfred Grosser, *La politique en France* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), pp. 101–02; and Alain Lancelot and Jean Ranger, "Développements récents de la recherche électorale en France," *Il Politico,* 29 (December 1964), pp. 763–787.

[4] Charles Bettelheim and Suzanne Frère, *Une ville française moyenne: Auxerre en 1950* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951); Christiane Marie, *Grenoble 1871–1965, l'évolution du comportement politique d'une grande ville en expansion* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966); Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Social-Class in a French Village," *Anthropological Quarterly,* 33 (January 1960), pp. 1–13; Roger Josserand, "Rapport d'enquête sur la commune de Marigny en Charolais" (unpublished Mémoire, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, n.d.); Lucien Bernot and René Blancard, *Nouville: Un village français* (Travaux et Mémoires de l'Institut d'Ethnologie, Vol. 57; University of Paris, 1953);

politics is not the predominant concern. Furthermore, too few communes have been studied to permit generalization about local consensus.[5]

The legal basis of French local government has been thoroughly explored. There are journals that specialize in local government and administrative law, and books that deal with the legal relations between the national and local governments.[6] However, the very term used by the French for local politics—*l'administration locale*—indicates its nonpolitical focus. Scholars usually study local government from the perspective of French administrative law. They rarely ask how local officials actually behave. Brian Chapman notes:

> Most foreign students of French affairs naturally concentrate on national politics, which is hardly the best introduction to the reality of local administration: on the other hand, many French scholars who concern themselves with political institutions are jurists by training, and are interested in legal concepts rather than political reality.[7]

French specialists also base their descriptions of French politics upon analyses of official election statistics. Yet local election statistics usually represent national totals of elections in all French communes. (The French Government publishes individual returns only for the largest cities in France.) Global totals are of little assistance in examining many issues and reliance on them may be misleading.

Many years ago, André Siegfried remarked:

> It is no wonder that a foreigner is completely at a loss when he tries to understand us, let alone judge us, for he has no opportunity of meeting the people that we consider most typical of our country.[8]

French scholars today—either through necessity or choice—seem to be at an equal loss: they have not studied the local politics of their country in great depth. The best general survey of French local government has been written by an Englishman; the best French community study by an American.[9]

In order to gain useful information about local politics, it is desirable to analyze comparable electoral data from a large number of communes. The results of such an analysis reveal important differences between national and local political patterns in France.

France is often characterized as a country with high internal conflict. It has frequently been observed that, on the national level, political and social cleavages are deeper and more numerous in France than in the United States. Ideological appeals are said to be more common in France than in America. There is greater class consciousness in France and more hostility among social groups. Even in the Fifth Republic, one finds a large number of political parties.[10]

What consequences do national cleavages in France have for local politics? One might speculate that political and social divisions in France would have one of two alternative effects on local government. Local politics might simply reflect national political patterns. Since groups are in close proximity on the municipal level, local politics might be at least as ideological and competitive as national politics. Assuming that Frenchmen are involved in local politics, one would expect many political parties to compete for local offices.

Alternatively, Frenchmen might withdraw from local politics altogether. Given the relative lack of autonomy of French local government, national political conflicts might domi-

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Henri Mendras, *Etudes de sociologie rurale: Novis et Virgin* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951); Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), *Chanzeaux, A Village in Anjou* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), and "Social Change at the Grass Roots," in Hoffmann *et al.*, *In Search of France;* and Pierre Clément and Nelly Xydias, *Vienne sur le Rhône* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955).

[5] For example, according to the reports of Pitt-Rivers, *op. cit.*, and Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*, local politics in Magnac is quite different from local politics in Peyrane. Further study would be needed to determine which village is more nearly typical of most French communes.

[6] The leading journals are *La revue administrative* and *Départements et communes;* two important books are Charles Schmitt, *Le maire de la commune rurale* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1959); and Brian Chapman, *Introduction to French Local Government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953).

[7] Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

[8] André Siegfried, *France: A Study of Nationality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 7. Also see Jean Touchard, in the preface to L'association française de science politique, *Le référendum de septembre et les élections de novembre 1958* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1960), p. xxii.

[9] Chapman, *op. cit.*, and Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*. See the reviews of these books in *Revue française de science politique*, 6 (July–September 1956), pp. 672–674; and *ibid.*, 7 (October–December 1957), pp. 951–953, respectively.

[10] See the works cited in footnotes 1–2 above.

nate popular attention. Because involvement in local government would reinforce existing conflicts, people might simply abstain from participating in local political life.

Thus, two models of French local politics may be posited. If there is high turnout for local elections, one would also expect there to be high electoral conflict. The great interest in local elections would exacerbate cleavages in the local body politic that are influential in national elections. Conversely, if there is low turnout in local elections, one would also expect a low level of electoral conflict.[11] In the alternative model, the slight interest in local elections, as evidenced by a small proportion of voter turnout, would help keep political tensions low.[12]

In order to test the two models of French local political behavior, turnout and conflict will be analyzed separately. To provide a standard of measurement, comparison will be made with the level of turnout and conflict in French national elections. However, data presented below will support neither hypothesis. A detailed statistical examination suggests an altogether different view of French local politics.

I. TURNOUT

Basing their analyses on published national totals, specialists conclude that turnout in France is generally higher in national elections than in local elections. Studying changes in French turnout through time, René Rémond concludes that turnout has been "strongly lower" in local elections than in elections for the National Assembly, "the abstention rate being at least higher and even double."[13]

Jacques Fauvet suggests, "The number of abstentions is nearly always the same, higher in local than in general elections . . . . "[14]

In a study of turnout in French elections, Jean Meynaud and Alain Lancelot find that "the proportion of abstentions is generally higher for local elections (general council and municipal) [than for legislative elections]."[15]

According to Nicholas Wahl:

> . . . Elections to the municipal councils . . . are influenced mainly by relatively nonpolitical or at least strictly local issues. This, as well as the lack of any real autonomy on the part of these assemblies, makes public interest in local government elections very slight. Non-voting is, therefore, traditionally widespread. . . .[16]

Jean Stoetzel observes that abstentions in the Fourth Republic were "relatively more frequent in the municipal elections than in the general elections."[17] And François Goguel states unequivocally:

> One of the proofs that local political life does not satisfactorily perform the educational role which theorists assign to it, is that electoral participation is nearly always weaker in local balloting than in elections to Parliament. Numerous electors are sufficiently interested in national political life to participate in the election of a deputy, but do not bother when it is a question of selecting their commune's municipal council. . . .[18]

Yet two studies of localities that examine turnout in local and national elections find results opposite to those suggested by other scholars. In these areas, turnout is higher in local elections than in national.[19] In a study of French public administration, F. Ridley and J. Blondel also observe local turnout and competition patterns to be rather high: " . . . local elections are keenly contested: a turnout of 75 per cent or 80 per cent is not unusual."[20] According to Alain Lancelot, "Many small communes vote in a massive fashion in local elections; as many people vote as in legislative elections, and even more. In cities, on the contrary, . . . abstentions are nearly always higher [in municipal elections than in legislative elections]."[21] And in 1930, Harold F. Gosnell noted that "popular participation in [French] local elections is not greatly inferior to that in parliamentary elections."[22]

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[11] The act of voting is used to measure citizen involvement because turnout can be ascertained and measured relatively easily. Of course, voting alone may demonstrate only minimal political involvement. In *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 131, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba regard voting "as a relatively passive form of participation in community life, though a form of participation it certainly is."

[12] In *Why Europe Votes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), Harold F. Gosnell found that turnout and competition vary directly in England and France. In England, " . . . the closer the contest the greater is the interest in the election": *ibid.*, p. 14. In France, "the closeness of the contest has a great deal to do with the size of the votes cast. . . . ": *ibid.*, p. 49. Studying turnout in France, Jean Meynaud and Alain Lancelot also find that abstentions "tend to diminish when the electoral outcome appears uncertain: the elector becomes more aware of the importance of his participation": *La participation des Français à la politique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), p. 18. In Swedish local elections, according to Donald R. Niemi, " . . . the presence of competing political lists was related to higher voter participation. . . . " Niemi, "Sweden's Municipal Consolidation Reforms," (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1966), p. 84.

[13] René Rémond, "Participation électorale et participation organisée," in Georges Vedel (ed.), *La dépolitisation: mythe ou réalité?* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), p. 78.

[14] Fauvet, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[15] Meynaud and Lancelot, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[16] Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System," in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam (eds.), *Patterns of Government* (2d ed.; New York: Random House, 1962), p. 357.

[17] Jean Stoetzel, "Voting Behaviour in France," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 6 (June 1955), p. 105.

[18] Goguel and Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

The contradiction can only be resolved by empirical examination. However, there has been no general study which compares the national and local voting patterns in a large number of communes. In the absence of detailed statistics, scholars have relied on national electoral totals for information about differences in national and local voting behavior.[23] Because all communes are included together in these totals, significant differences among them may be masked. For example, are comparative turnout rates similar in large and small communes? Relying on the one national constituency has limited the possibility of more refined analysis and, perhaps more important, has led scholars to reach unjustified conclusions.

A comparison of turnout in national and local elections suggests that, in France as a whole, turnout is higher in national elections. Whereas 75 per cent of all eligible French voters cast their ballots in the national elections of November 1958, only 72 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls in municipal elections held four months later.[24] Scholars have generally assumed that turnout patterns in most communes are consistent with national totals of voting turnout. Yet this conclusion does not necessarily follow.

In an analysis of turnout from a large sample of French communes, I have found that, contrary to accepted scholarly opinion, turnout in local elections is extremely high. Moreover, in most communes more Frenchmen vote in local elections than in national elections. Because the reverse is usually true for large communes, the turnout patterns of most French communes are masked by turnout patterns in larger cities.

In order to study differential turnout, competition and other factors relating to local consensus, the communes in three French departments were selected for statistical examination. The departments chosen—the Calvados, the Gironde, and the Nord—are in different regions of France and exhibit different economic, social and political characteristics.[25] There was a total of 1,978 communes in the three departments.[26] For each commune, data were collected regarding communal political behavior in local and national elections, the proportion of the municipal council that elected the mayor, and the tenure of the mayor after the 1959 municipal elections.[27]

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[19] Wylie, *Village in the Vancluse*, p. 233; and Jacques Busnicourt, "Un canton rural du Santerre," in Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras (eds.), *Les paysans et la politique* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958), p. 474.

[20] F. Ridley and J. Blondel, *Public Administration in France* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 99.

[21] Alain Lancelot, in the colloquium, "Au lendemain de l'élection présidentielle," *Revue française de science politique*, 16 (February 1966), p. 178.

[22] Gosnell, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[23] It is not easy to obtain local election returns in France. Prefectures only send the returns for large cities to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris. For electoral data in all other communes, one must consult the records at each prefecture.

[24] Turnout in the legislative elections of November 23, 1958 is noted in *L'année politique, 1958*, p. 145. This represents the percentage of valid votes cast (*exprimés*) in relation to registered voters (*inscrits*). For the 1959 municipal elections, the Ministry of the Interior estimated turnout by using all votes cast (*votants*), whether valid or not: *Le Monde*, March 17, 1959. Since the difference between these two measures of turnout is usually about 2 per cent, the Ministry's figure of 73.4 per cent was reduced by about 2 per cent to determine *exprimés*.

[25] Although sampling procedures were not used, an attempt was made to choose departments representative of varying conditions in France. However, as Jean Blondel has noted, "In the case of France, it is very difficult to state whether [a] particular *département* is typical or not: is there anything, from the point of view of social, political or economic life, which can be said to be typical of the whole of France?": "Local Government and the Ministries in a French Département," *Public Administration* (London), 37 (Spring 1959), p. 66.

[26] Electoral data were obtained from the prefectures of the three departments. Of the total of 1,978 communes in the three departments, the 95 communes in the arrondissement of Vire (Calvados) are excluded because it was impossible to get the necessary data. It was also impossible to obtain data for 73 other communes. Thus 1,810

In the 1958 national elections, average turnout for all communes in the sample—calculating each commune as a unit—was 78.3 per cent. (The national rate for all France—not averaged by commune—was 75 per cent.) In the 1959 local elections, average turnout—again calculating each commune as a unit—was 81.7 per cent. (The comparable figure for all France in the the 1959 local elections was 72 per cent.)[28] Thus, on the average, about 3 per cent more Frenchmen in the communes of the sample voted in the local elections of 1959 than in the national elections of 1958. Only 396 of the 1,810 communes studied—less than one quarter—had lower turnout rates in local elections than in national. In all fourteen arrondissements of the three departments, more communes had higher turnout rates for local elections than for national elections. Indeed, except for the arrondissements of Dunkerque and Lille, more than two-thirds of the communes in each arrondissement had higher turnout rates in local than in national elections.

A large proportion of Frenchmen in the communes of the sample turned out to elect a deputy in 1958. However, in most communes even more Frenchmen went to the polls several months later to elect a municipal council. Contrary to published reports, turnout in French communes is generally higher in local than in legislative elections.

The higher rate of turnout in local elections is also evident when departmental voting patterns are analyzed. Differences in turnout between national and local elections were compared in France's eighty-nine metropolitan departments.[29] In more than two-thirds of all departments (64 out of 89) turnout was greater in the municipal elections of 1959 than in the national elections of 1958.[30]

Average turnout was calculated for each of the cantons in the three departments of the sample by averaging turnout rates in the communes comprising the canton. In more than three-fourths of all cantons—113 of 146—average turnout was higher in the municipal elections of 1959 than in the national elections of 1958.

TABLE 1. DIFFERENTIAL PER CENT TURNOUT, BY DEPARTMENT

Department	Aggregate-Based		Average-Based	
	National (1958)	Local (1959)	National (1958)	Local (1959)
Calvados	75.4	78.1	76.4	82.2
Gironde	74.2	71.8	74.0	81.1
Nord	82.6	80.9	84.5	85.7

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communes were selected for statistical examination, nearly five per cent of all French communes.

[27] Figures are from the *premier tour* of each election. The national election of November 1958 was chosen since it was nearest in time to the most recent municipal elections—those of March 1959—at the time this study was conducted. Of course, turnout varies in successive elections for the same office. According to unpublished figures made available by the Ministry of the Interior, turnout was lower in the 1959 municipal elections than in any other municipal elections since World War II. Turnout in the 1958 legislative elections was lower than in previous legislative elections since World War II but higher than in the succeeding legislative election of 1962. Moreover, until December 1965, national elections in France meant legislative elections, which are used here for purposes of comparison. Different political patterns prevail for the French presidential elections. For example, turnout was 84.1 per cent in the *premier tour* of the December 1965 presidential elections: *L'année politique, 1965*, p. 105. Therefore, the hypotheses presented in this study should be tested further.

[28] It is significant that when the percentage of turnout in national elections is averaged by the communes in the sample, or totaled for all France and the percentage taken, the two methods of calculating turnout produce similar results. The same is not true for turnout in local elections. This suggests that the size of commune affects turnout in local elections more than in national elections, an hypothesis that will be supported by evidence presented below.

[29] Unpublished election returns were made available by the Bureau of Elections, Ministry of the Interior. Aggregate returns (i.e., those compiled by adding together all returns from all communes) were used for comparison rather than average-based figures (i.e., figures obtained by averaging the turnout percentages for all communes taken one by one).

[30] The proportion was reversed for turnout based on aggregate totals in the three departments chosen for close study. In two, turnout was higher in national elections than in local. This suggests that the finding regarding higher turnout in local elections holds elsewhere in France, where even aggregate-based turnout percentages are higher in local than in national elections.

TABLE 2. DIFFERENTIAL TURNOUT IN COMMUNES OF DIFFERENT SIZE

Average Population, 1959	Per cent Turnout	
	National (1958)	Local (1959)
Below 400	76.9	83.0
401–700	77.2	82.5
701–2,000	80.4	82.0
Over 2,000	80.4	76.5

In order to study further the relation between turnout and size of commune, communes were stratified by size into four groups, and turnout in local and national elections was compared for each group.

Table 2 reveals an important relation between size of commune and turnout. The relation is opposite in national elections compared to local elections: in national elections, turnout varies directly with size of commune; in local elections, on the other hand, turnout varies inversely with size of commune. As the size of commune increases, turnout tends to increase in national elections and decrease in local elections.[31]

The installation of modern tabulating equipment enabled the Ministry of the Interior to publish more detailed returns for the municipal elections of March 14, 1965 than for previous elections. These figures permit a replication of the comparison between turnout in large and small communes.

As suggested by some reports, interest in the 1965 local elections—as measured by voting turnout—was higher than in previous local elections.[32] Turnout for all France in 1965 was 75 per cent, compared to the turnout figure of 72 per cent in the 1959 municipal elections.[33] A comparison of turnout figures for large and small communes in the 1965 municipal elections corroborates the earlier finding. The Ministry of the Interior divided communes into those larger and smaller than 30,000, in accordance with the different electoral laws used in 1965 for the two categories of communes. There was a great difference in turnout between large cities and other communes. Whereas turnout was 67.5 per cent in large communes, it was 78.5 per cent in all other communes.[34]

Thus, analysis of French voting behavior reveals that municipal elections attract surprisingly high turnout. Contrary to general scholarly opinion, in most communes turnout is higher for local elections than for national elections.

II. *COMPETITION*

Since there is high turnout in French local elections, in accordance with the previous discussion one would expect local politics to be characterized by high conflict. High turnout in local elections presumably reflects the presence of extensive competition for municipal office. Given the generally high competition in French national elections, cleavages in a given commune's local voting behavior appear to parallel cleavages in the commune's national voting behavior.

In order to test the hypothesis that turnout follows competition, competition in local and national elections for the communes of the sample was measured and compared. Since turnout in local elections is high compared to turnout in national elections, one would expect competition to be high in local elections compared to national elections.

An index of multipartyism was used to measure competition in national and local elections.[35] The index measures the degree to which votes in a commune are distributed among competing candidates or lists. It increases as the number of candidates or lists competing increases, and as the proportions of the total vote received by candidates or lists converge. The value of the index lies in its ability to measure the closeness of the electoral outcome in multiparty systems.[36]

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[31] Turnout also appears to be affected by a regional factor independent of the size of communes. Communes in the department of the Nord have a far higher average turnout rate in both local and national elections than communes in either of the other two departments. See Table 1, above.

[32] Edmond Taylor, "French Politics at the Municipal Level," *The Reporter*, April 8, 1965, p. 32; and François Goguel, "Les élections municipales des 14 et 21 mars 1965: la signification de la consultation," *Revue française de science politique*, 15 (October 1965), p. 912.

[33] *L'année politique, 1965*, p. 20.

[34] In the 1959 municipal elections, average turnout for the 8 communes of the sample over 30,000 was 72.5 per cent, as compared with 81.8 per cent average turnout for all communes in the sample under 30,000. The comparison with the Ministry's figures is limited, however, because turnout was calculated differently in the two cases. In the research reported here, turnout for small and large communes was determined by averaging the turnout *rate* for all communes in each of the two groups. The Ministry of the Interior determined the turnout rate by adding together *those voting* in communes over 30,000, and dividing this figure by the total number of registered voters in the communes of that size. The Ministry calculated turnout for communes under 30,000 in a similar fashion.

[35] The formula for the index of multipartyism

For each commune in the sample, an index of multipartyism was constructed to measure the commune's voting behavior in the 1958 legislative election and in the 1959 municipal election. Voting patterns in the tiny commune of Campigny (Calvados) illustrate the index of multipartyism. In the local elections of 1959, 75 of Campigny's 94 registered voters went to the polls. The commune split its vote between two lists, one of which received an average of 46 votes, the other an average of 13 votes.[37] Isolated candidates received an average of 3 votes.[38] Campigny's index of multipartyism in the 1959 local elections was 1.70.

In the national elections of 1958, Campigny split its vote more evenly and among a larger number of candidates. Seventy of the 96 voters registered in 1958 cast valid ballots in the legislative elections that year. Two candidates for deputy each received 30 votes, a third candidate received 6 votes and the fourth candidate received the remaining 4 votes. Campigny's index of multipartyism for this election was 3.01.

The voters of Campigny were thus more divided about their choice of a deputy to the National Assembly than they were about the selection of their municipal council. The commune distributed its votes more widely in national elections than in local elections. Moreover, the proportions of votes cast for candidates for deputy were more similar to each other than were the proportions of votes for competing lists in local elections. Campigny's voting behavior does not conform to the predicted pattern.

Yet, contrary to expectation, Campigny's voting patterns resembled those in most French communes. Judging from the communes of the sample, competition for local office is generally low in France. A comparison of competition in national and local elections reveals that competition is much less widespread in local elections than in national. In virtually every commune, there is far greater fractionalization of the vote for national elections than for local elections.

The mean index of multipartyism for the 1958 national election for all communes in the sample is 3.37, as compared to a mean index of 1.64 for the 1959 local elections. In only two of the 146 cantons in the sample was average competition higher in local than in national elections. Competition was greater for local than national elections in only 85 of the 1,810 communes studied. Rather than competition being greater in local elections, as the figures on turnout might suggest, it is significantly lower than in national elections.

Despite the greater competition in French national elections compared to local elections, turnout is generally higher for local elections. It would seem, therefore, that local elections attract greater interest than national elections. Yet, for any given election, one would still expect to find a direct relation between competition and turnout. In order to test the hy-

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was suggested by Duncan MacRae, Jr. It is:

$$I = \text{antilog}_e \left\{ - \sum_{i}^{k} p_i \log_e p_i \right\}$$

where: k = number of candidates or lists; p_i = proportion of vote for ith list; $\Sigma_i p_i = 1$. Lists or candidates receiving less than 5 per cent of the vote were eliminated from calculation of the index. The index has also been used in the social sciences by Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares and Amelia Maria Carvalho de Noronha, "Urbanização e Dispersão Eleitorae," *Revista de Direito Público e Ciencia Politica*, 3 (July–Dec. 1960), pp. 258–70.

[36] The index does not measure conflict or competition but rather the convergence of votes among competing parties. Competition and conflict are dependent on electoral laws and other factors in addition to the distribution of votes among candidates. However, since the closeness of the election is an important part of competition, the terms "competition" and "conflict" will be used below to refer to the index of multipartyism.

[37] The total of the averages for the lists does not equal the total number voting. For the municipal elections of March 1959, voters in communes under 120,000 were not required to vote for an entire list and could delete or substitute names if they wished. Therefore, different candidates on a list might not receive the same number of votes. In communes under 2,500, arrangements were even more flexible. For the calculations here, the number of votes on a given list was determined by averaging the votes received by the candidate with most votes on the list, and the candidate with fewest votes on the list.

[38] Since the average of 3 votes was less than 5 per cent of the total cast, the 3 votes were eliminated from calculation of the index.

TABLE 3. RELATION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND TURNOUT, LOCAL ELECTIONS (1959)

Level	Index of Competition	Per cent Turnout
High	3.45	79.7
Low	1.00	80.2

pothesis that, for any given election, turnout and competition vary directly, the 1959 local elections were selected. The turnout rate in the 50 communes of the sample with the highest competition was compared with the turnout rate in the 50 communes with lowest competition. The results are shown in Table 3.

Table 3 shows an inverse relation between competition and turnout in local elections. This surprising finding was corroborated by multiple regression analysis, which showed turnout to be fairly significant in explaining competition. Once again, there was a negative correlation between turnout and competition in local elections. As turnout increases, competition decreases. The expected relation between turnout and competition is not confirmed by these data.[39]

Since turnout also decreases as size of commune increases, might size of commune affect the extent of competition in French elections? Size of commune proves to have a different effect on the extent of competition in national as compared to local elections. In the sample as a whole, competition in local elections was rather highly associated with the size of commune: +.35. Thus, as size of commune increases, there is a tendency toward greater competition in local elections.[40] By contrast, the correlation of the size of commune with degree of competition in national elections is a mere +.03. In national elections, the degree of cleavages within a commune does not appear to be significantly influenced by the commune's size. National elections tend to divide small communes only slightly less than they divide large communes. In local elections, size of commune plays a far more important role: cleavages in local elections appear to become much less sharp as the size of commune diminishes. Small towns are far less divided by local elections than are large cities.

The effect of size can be seen more clearly when the fifty largest communes in the sample are compared with the fifty smallest communes.

TABLE 4. DIFFERENTIAL COMPETITION IN LARGE AND SMALL COMMUNES

Registered voters	Competition	
	National (1958)	Local (1959)
High: 32,511	3.79	3.07
Low: 70	2.61	1.55

Comparing communes of different size, there is less spread between competition in national elections than competition in local elections. In national elections, the index of multipartyism for small communes is more than two-thirds of that for large communes. Regarding the choice of a deputy to the National Assembly, small towns are nearly as divided as large cities. In local elections, on the other hand, the index of multipartyism for small communes is one-half that for large cities. Regarding the choice of local governmental leaders, small towns are far more united than large cities.

The proportion of municipal councillors elected on the first ballot is another measure of community conflict, since a candidate must receive an absolute majority to be elected on the first ballot. Once again, conflict in local elections appears more restrained in small communes than in large. In the fifty largest communes, an average of 25.3 per cent of the municipal council was elected on the first ballot.[41] Far greater agreement prevailed in the fifty smallest communes, where an average of 87.8 per cent of the municipal council was elected on the first ballot.

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[39] The relation between turnout and competition in the 1958 national election was less clear. Turnout and competition were inversely related for the 50 communes in the sample with highest competition and the 50 communes with lowest competition. However, multiple regression analysis showed the turnout rate to be relatively unimportant in explaining competition in the 1958 national elections.

[40] Response to a French public opinion poll furnishes additional evidence that national and local cleavages are quite distinct and that they more nearly coincide as the size of commune increases. French voters were asked, "In choosing among candidates in municipal elections, are you concerned to know their attitudes toward General de Gaulle's policy?" Far more of those questioned replied "no" than "yes." In rural communes, three-fourths of the respondents were not concerned about local candidates' attitudes toward de Gaulle's policies. The proportion of respondents who were concerned was higher in big cities: Jeanne Piret, "L'opinion publique au début de l'année 1965," *Revue française de science politique*, 15 (June 1965), p. 536.

Regardless of size, then, French communes are quite divided by national elections, although small communes are somewhat less divided than large communes. Moreover, in most French communes, competition is higher in national than in local elections. In large communes, competition is fairly high for local office and cleavages in national elections are only moderately higher than in local elections. In small communes there is a greater disparity in competition. National elections divide small communes nearly as much as they divide large communes, whereas local elections divide small communes far less than large communes. Thus, national and local cleavages more nearly coincide in large communes than in small communes.

However, there is little direct relation between cleavages in French national and local elections. The lack of relation is evident when one isolates the fifty communes in the sample where competition was highest in the 1959 local elections, and the fifty communes where competition was lowest. Although competition in local elections was much higher in one group of communes than it was in the other, competition for national elections in one group was practically the same as in the other.

TABLE 5. NATIONAL CLEAVAGES IN COMMUNES OF HIGH AND LOW CLEAVAGE, MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, 1959

Competition, Local (1959)	National (1958)
High: 3.46	3.75
Low: 1.00	3.31

An even more striking result occurs when two groups of communes are isolated according to high and low competition in the 1958 national elections. Comparing these two groups, there is a slightly *inverse* relation between competition in national and local elections.[42]

TABLE 6. LOCAL CLEAVAGES IN COMMUNES OF HIGH AND LOW CLEAVAGE, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1958

Competition, National (1958)	*Local (1959)*
High: 5.53	1.60
Low: 1.53	1.81

The foregoing statistical analysis partially corroborates the dissensual nature of French national politics described by other observers using different methods. Furthermore, unlike the United States, national electoral turnout and cleavages in France are nearly as great in small towns as in large cities.[43] However, statistical analysis reveals a marked contrast between political patterns in local and national elections that has not been adequately noted in the scholarly literature on French politics: local elections nearly invariably produce less conflict than national elections. This is particularly true in small communes but it was also found to be characteristic of some of the largest cities in France.

III. TENURE OF MAYOR

Figures on mayoral tenure further demonstrate the extent of communal consensus on local issues. Low turnover in local office is a corollary of low competition for local office. A French mayor is elected by his commune's municipal council. Therefore, figures on mayoral stability in office indicate relative contentment within the municipal council and are probably a good measure of local consensus.

Most mayors of the communes in the sample held office for long periods. The average tenure was calculated for all mayors in the sample after the 1959 municipal elections. Thus, mayors were included who were elected for the first time in 1959 as well as incumbents re-elected to another term in office. The average tenure of the mayors in the sample was 9.6 years. Put another way, the average mayor elected in 1959 had already been elected either once or twice before.[44] And the typical mayor could now confidently look forward to adding *another* six years to his nine years of service as mayor before the next municipal elections.[45]

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[41] The communes of Bordeaux and Lille, which were larger than 120,000, and consequently elected their municipal councils by proportional representation, are excluded from this calculation.

[42] While size of commune helps explain competition in local elections, it does not nullify the previous finding that turnout is negatively related to competition. In a multiple regression analysis, both turnout and size of commune independently affect local electoral competition and, in fact, turnout plays a far more important role than size of commune.

[43] Cf. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), Chs. 13 and 15. The question is examined intensively in a forthcoming study of French politics and society by Duncan MacRae, Jr.

Nor was a man elected mayor without having first served an apprenticeship as municipal councillor. The mayors in the sample were municipal councillors an average of 6.4 years (over one term) before they were elected chief executives of their communes.

There was some variation in mayoral tenure according to size of commune. Mayors from both the largest and smallest communes in the sample generally held office longer than other mayors in the sample. The average term of mayors from the fifty largest communes was 12.2 years. Mayors of tiny communes were especially secure: those from the fifty smallest communes held office for an average of 20.8 years!

One might have expected the change in regime from the Fourth to Fifth Republics to affect patterns of local officeholding. Yet mayoral turnover was low, despite important changes occurring in national politics and the great change in the political system itself.

It is instructive in this regard to compare the turnover rate of mayors and deputies. In the 1956 legislative elections, the last general elections held in the Fourth Republic, 62 per cent of the incumbent deputies—336 of 544 deputies—were re-elected to the National Assembly.[46] The proportion of incumbent deputies who were re-elected dropped sharply in the first elections held after the advent of the Fifth Republic. In the legislative elections of 1958, most incumbents were beaten: only 23 per cent—131 of 537 deputies—secured re-election.[47]

Municipal elections occurred only four months later and, since the previous municipal elections had been held well before the end of the Fourth Republic, one might have expected the rate of turnover to be comparably high among mayors as among deputies. In fact, however, there was a remarkable stability among local officeholders. Turnover among mayors between the local elections of 1953 and 1959 was markedly lower than it was among deputies between the legislative elections of 1956 and 1958. Even more striking, a significantly larger proportion of mayors remained in office between 1953 and 1959 than did deputies between the two Fourth Republic elections of 1951 and 1956. Only one-fourth of all mayors—444 of 1,810—were elected for the first time in 1959. Most mayors were initially elected during the Fourth Republic and reelected in 1959.[48] Thus, the stability of tenure among French mayors is particularly noteworthy when contrasted with the much shorter tenure of French deputies.[49]

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of French national political patterns, an examination of local politics in France raises as many questions as it answers. French communes exhibit a degree of consensus on local matters that does not prevail with regard to national political issues. In most French communes, especially small ones, there is significantly less competition in local elections than in national. French mayors remain in office far longer than French deputies. How, then, does the typical mayor achieve electoral dominance for long periods, particularly in face of the sharp cleavages dividing his commune in national elections?[50]

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[44] The French mayor is elected for a six-year term.

[45] There was also great stability in the municipal elections of March 1965. See Goguel, *loc. cit.;* and Philip M. Williams, "Party, Presidency and Parish Pump in France," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 18 (Summer 1965), pp. 257–265.

[46] Mattei Dogan, "Les candidats et les élus," in Maurice Duverger, François Goguel, and Jean Touchard (eds.), *Les élections du 2 janvier 1956* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1957), p. 446; and Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies, 1870–1958," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-makers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 57–90.

[47] *L'année politique, 1958*, p. 146. One reason was that the size of the National Assembly was reduced. For a study examining the defeat of Fourth Republic politicians in Fifth Republic elections, see Mattei Dogan, "Le personnel politique et la personnalité charismatique," *Revue française de sociologie*, 6 (July–September 1965), pp. 305–324.

[48] Moreover, the higher attrition rate took place in a shorter time. Whereas the previous elections for mayor took place six years earlier, those for deputy occurred only two years before.

[49] "Many Gaullists who swept to the Assembly in a wave of protest in 1958 were surprised to see the 'man of the System' they had expelled from Parliament comfortably returned to his mayoral chair six months later": Williams, *Crisis and Compromise*, pp. 331–332.

[50] The issues raised here are explored at greater length in Mark Kesselman, *The Politics of Local Consensus in France* (New York: Knopf, forthcoming).

Our analysis corroborates what Georges Lavau has noted: citizens "may not vote in the same manner in local elections, national elections, referendums, etc."[51] French communes are more united when they choose their local governments than when they choose representatives to the National Assembly. The contrast is relevant to the study of comparative politics. Does a comparable contrast exist elsewhere to the contrast between French national and local political patterns? Do political patterns in other countries also vary according to differing political levels?

French local governments have been dismissed as unimportant because of their relative lack of autonomy. Yet citizen interest—as measured by voting turnout—is high. The high turnout rate for local elections in most French communes is particularly striking juxtaposed with the relative lack of conflict in these elections.

Political scientists generally assume that turnout varies in response to the closeness of an election. Yet study of French local elections suggests there is no necessary link between electoral turnout and competition. Given the low competition in local elections, why is turnout high? Why, in fact, is particularly low competition in local elections associated with particularly high turnout? Moreover, while the size of the political unit helps to explain the turnout rate, size does not influence turnout in a constant fashion. In French national elections, turnout increases as the size of commune increases. Why is the pattern reversed in local elections, where turnout diminishes as the size of commune increases?

French local politics is significantly different in character from national politics. Further study of French consensus at the local level could help illuminate this hitherto neglected aspect of French political behavior.

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[51] Georges Lavau, "Les aspects socio-culturels de la dépolitisation," in Vedel, *op. cit.*, p. 197. François Goguel and André Philip have also noted that French local elections differ from national elections, Goguel, *loc. cit.*, p. 917; Philip, in Léo Hamon (ed.), *Les nouveaux comportements de la classe ouvrière* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 128.

NATURAL DISASTERS AS A POLITICAL VARIABLE: THE EFFECT OF A HURRICANE ON AN URBAN ELECTION*

F. GLENN ABNEY AND LARRY B. HILL
Tulane University

Political scientists usually assume that physical environment helps determine political behavior. They would not, for example, expect a homogeneous political culture in a country sharply divided by mountains. Also, extreme variations in physical environment, such as droughts and floods, have been traditionally considered bad omens for governments. However, very little[1] empirical research has been done on the relationship between natural disasters and attitudes toward government for three reasons. First, political activity seems more determined by social environment than physical. Also, since the individual is influenced by a greater number of social factors than physical factors, the former are more accessible for study and comparison. Finally, it is especially difficult to examine the effect of natural disasters, for they are rather uncommon and unpredictable. This research gap is unfortunate, since such catastrophes place great stress upon the social framework and thus test the adaptive capabilities of the political system.[2]

Writers in other disciplines, who have provided clues for filling this gap, have adopted two positions concerning the impact of disasters on governments. One argues that a natural disaster is an extremely important variable:

> Symptoms of aggression become highly visible among a population that is recovering from a disaster. . . . The readiness to give vent to angry resentment, and heated condemnation, particularly of local officials, is perhaps the most widely noted manifestation.[3]

Another study agrees, but says this resentment is concentrated among lower class people hostile toward the middle class organizations which operate after a disaster.[4] The other position finds no evidence of "widespread or intense hostile feelings"[5] unless an official has been "grossly negligent" or strongly disliked. These positions agree that a disaster may influence a political system, but dispute the amount of hostility and the extent it is directed toward civic officials.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of a natural disaster upon an election. The argument set forth is that the effect of a natural disaster depends upon two sets of factors: the political and material capabilities of the government to react to the disaster, and the pertinent aspects of the political culture. The latter include (1) the extent to which the responsibility of preparing for and dealing with a disaster is specific and understood, (2) the citizens' previous perceptions of government and the degree to which they change their perceptions, and (3) the extent to which a natural disaster is considered a legitimate political variable.

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[1] See John D. Barnhart, "Rainfall and the Populist Party in Nebraska," this REVIEW, 19 (August, 1925), pp. 527–540, for a discussion of the effect of drought on the election of 1890. See also Herman Walker, Jr., and Peter L. Hansen, "Local Government and Rainfall: The Problem of Local Government in the Northern Great Plains," this REVIEW, 40 (December, 1946), pp. 1113–1123, for a description of the problems encountered in transplanting local governmental institutions from the humid and densely populated East to an area of extremely variable rainfall and thus sparse population.

[2] For an extensive review of the available literature dealing with the psychological and sociological aspects of disasters, see Jeanette Rayner, "Annotated Bibliography on Disaster Research," *Human Organization*, 16 (Summer, 1957), pp. 30–40. See also George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman (eds.), *Man and Society in Disaster* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), for a summary of much of the literature concerning disasters.

[3] Irving L. Janis, "Problems of Theory in the Analysis of Stress Behavior," *The Journal of Social Issues*, 10 (1954), p. 19.

[4] Cited from Edward Gross, William H. Form, and Charles Loomis, "The Persistence and Emergence of Social and Cultural Systems in Disasters," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (April, 1956), p. 183. They have summarized the findings of Roy Clifford, "Informal Group Actions in the Rio Grande Flood," *First Report to the National Research Council*, Committee on Disaster Research, 1955.

[5] See Charles E. Fritz, "Disasters Compared in Six American Communities," *Human Organization*, 16 (Summer, 1957), p. 9. See Also Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams, "The Human Being in Disasters: A Research Perspective," *The Annals*, 39 (January, 1957), p. 49.

I. RESEARCH CONTEXT

This study examines a situation that provided an excellent opportunity to assess the political effect of a catastrophe. Hurricane Betsy struck southeastern Louisiana on September 9, 1965, bringing flood waters, destruction, and death. It was a particularly favorable opportunity not only because of its severity but also because it occurred at the beginning of the mayoral campaign in New Orleans, and there was a definite question as to the adequacy of the city's hurricane preparation. James Fitzmorris, the opposition candidate, blamed the incumbent mayor, Victor Schiro, for the city's allegedly inadequate preparation for and response to the hurricane and made it a major campaign issue.[6] Unfortunately for the mayor, his own words could be quoted against him, for only ten months before, he had publicly endorsed efforts to reallocate public funds from levee construction, which might have prevented considerable flooding, to municipal purposes.[7]

Within this potentially hostile context, Mayor Schiro had two valuable assets—his political ingenuity and his substantial material resources. In the administration of the large rescue and relief operation, which was liberally financed and supplied by the federal and state governments, the mayor used his political acumen at every possible occasion. The results of his flight to Washington for meetings with the President and Congressional leaders about special legislation and appropriations to help the area's problems were widely reported and anxiously awaited by New Orleans residents. Television newscasts showed the mayor working in the heart of the disaster area with his shirt sleeves rolled up. In his handbills and street-corner speeches Schiro attempted to project the image of "a man of action," which was his campaign slogan. Hence, with reference to the capability factors of the argument, the city administration was able to prevent the stresses caused by the disaster from endangering seriously the status quo in the political system. That is, the mayor's political skill and material resources helped him to win the election, for they enabled him to capitalize upon the disaster and thereby to temper the possibly adverse effect of the hurricane on the election.

II. METHODOLOGY

To measure the influence of the hurricane on the outcome of the election, the city was divided into two universes: the "wet" section where people had the traumatic experience of being flooded out of their homes, and the "dry" universe. A twofold approach was planned for measuring differences in attitudes in the two areas. In the first approach electoral data from the 1962 mayoral contest, in which Schiro had been elected, were compared with those of the 1965 election to see if the hurricane had had any effect. The expected result was that because of the disaster the flooded area would turn against the mayor and give him fewer votes in 1965 than it had in 1962. Such a drop would not be expected in the dry area. Moreover, if a drop were found in both areas, it would be greater in the wet section; or if Schiro's percentage of the votes cast increased in both areas, the increase would be smaller in the wet area. The second approach sought a description and an explanation of the political attitudes of the two universes through interviews. If the interviews were to be conducted before the November election, there was neither the time nor the money to sample the entire city. Thus, the universes were limited to three small dry precincts and two larger wet precincts.

In selecting both universes, the objective was to find wholly flooded or completely dry precincts which had similar socio-economic backgrounds and which cast a similar high percentage of their votes for Schiro[8] in 1962. With the aid of Civil Defense and after a tour of the city, 32 of New Orleans' 397 precincts were considered genuinely "wet." In these areas water had forced people to evacuate, had come into their homes, and had covered their cars. For additional information, we also examined electoral data from the city's huge ninth ward, which included most of the 32 wet precincts as well as precincts where just the streets were covered by water. It is bounded by the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain and is crossed by the two major canals which flooded the area. The sampling was done at random on the basis of housing units, as defined by the United States Census Bureau. The interviewers were instructed to question whoever came to the door (as long as it was an adult resident of the household). Since this study was designed as an exploratory effort, the sampling method was considered sufficient.

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[6] See, for example, *The New Orleans Times Picayune*, September 22, 1965.

[7] *The New Orleans Times Picayune*, October 21, 1964.

[8] Politics in New Orleans centers around two major factions within the Democratic party. These factions are often ill-defined and are shaped around personalities. For this reason it is preferable to talk in terms of the candidates' names rather than in terms of parties.

Data from the 1960 United States Census indicate that the three dry precincts were quite similar in background. Their average median family income was $4,700 and only 27% of their workers held white collar positions. The precincts were approximately 95% white in racial make-up, and they cast 86% of their vote for Schiro in 1962. The two wet precincts were also basically alike and were similar to the dry precincts. However, they enjoyed a slightly higher economic status than the dry precincts. Their average median family income was $5,100, and 31% of the workers held white collar positions. Again only a few Negroes were present.

III. RESULTS OF COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL DATA

If the thesis holds that natural disasters are potent factors influencing changes in political attitudes, the resulting consequences should be observable in the differential voting behavior of the wet and dry universes. Table 1 indicates that, contrary to expectation, voting for Schiro in 1965 did not reflect a significantly larger defection in the wet area than in the dry area. That is, flooding did not have a discernible effect upon voting patterns. However, in the entire city Schiro's percentage fell from 56.5% to a little over 50% of the votes cast and a recount was threatened. In the dry area his decrease was 6.0%; in the wet, it was 6.6%. No significance can be attributed to such a small difference. The decrease of the Schiro vote in the generally wet ninth ward is 8.6%; this 2.6% difference is again not significant.

Another variable examined in Table 1 is the voting pattern of the five Negro precincts (those with a Negro population over 80%) in the wet area and the pattern of voting in the dry Negro precincts. Although the wet Negro precincts were among the hardest hit, Schiro's vote increased in them by 26.5% from its 1962 level. In dry Negro precincts his increase was 27.8%. Both increases can be explained by the fact that Schiro appealed for the Negro vote in 1965, reversing his 1962 approach. In the two wet precincts surveyed Schiro's percentage of the total vote fell by 14.8% but in the three dry precincts surveyed the amount of decrease was an even greater 30.7%. The data do not explain why the Schiro vote in these five surveyed precincts decreased so much more than in the other areas mentioned in Table 1.[9] Nor do they explain the difference between the votes of our wet and dry samples, although one of the explanatory factors may be the already mentioned slightly higher socio-economic status of our wet universe Factors outside the scope of our survey must account for these differences. In summary, though Schiro generally did slightly worse in the wet area, the evidence

TABLE 1. DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR SCHIRO IN 1962 AND 1965

Area	Election	% of Votes Received by Schiro	Increase or Decrease in % of Votes
City-wide	1962	56.5	−6.1
	1965	50.4	
365 Dry Precincts	1962	56.9	−6.0
	1965	50.9	
32 Flooded Precincts	1962	54.4	−6.6
	1965	47.8	
Ward 9	1962	57.2	−8.6
	1965	48.6	
Dry Negro Precincts	1962	13.8	+27.8
	1965	41.6	
Flooded Negro Precincts	1962	7.6	+26.5
	1965	34.1	
Dry Precincts Surveyed	1962	86.0	−30.7
	1965	55.3	
Wet Precincts Surveyed	1962	76.2	−14.8
	1965	61.4	

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[9] A possible explanation for these results is that the Schiro campaign in 1965, unlike that in 1962, was not based on racist appeals. In 1962 Schiro received less than 15% of the Negro vote; but in 1965 some of the Negro leaders supported Schiro, and he got approximately 40% of the vote from Negro precincts, which seems to indicate how short political memories can be. Schiro, by actively soliciting Negro votes, apparently won the enmity of at least some of the white lower economic group (which tends to be more segregationist), such as that found in our surveyed areas.

from the electoral patterns in the mayoral contest does not indicate that the attitudes resulting from the hurricane were an important variable.[10]

IV. INTERVIEW RESULTS

Our survey results corroborate the evidence from the electoral data which indicates that Betsy was not a decisive factor in voting decisions. The data in Table 2 (parts E, F, G, and H) below indicate that while the mayor was mentioned more frequently than any other official or agency except television, he was not in any instance mentioned by more than 30% of either universe in response to any question calling for either praise or blame. However, though the number of respondents who praised or criticized the mayor's role in either hurricane warning or administering relief and rescue operations was not overwhelming, it was large enough to have a decisive impact on the result of the election if these evaluations represented changes of opinion in the voters' candidate selection process.

When the interviewees were asked if the hurricane had influenced their choice for mayor (see Table 3 below), the results indicated that the hurricane had neither hurt nor aided either candidate. Less than 15% of each sample felt the hurricane had influenced their voting decisions. Of those who claimed that the hurricane had influenced their voting, no more intended to vote for Fitzmorris than Schiro. In the flooded area one-half of those influenced by Betsy gave their support to Fitzmorris, and the other half intended to vote for Schiro. In the dry area Schiro did slightly better than Fitzmorris, but the difference between the two was not significant. Hence, both the fact that so few voters either criticized or praised Schiro and the fact that even the 15% who were influenced were equally divided between the candidates serve to confirm the electoral data in the

TABLE 2. COMPARISON BETWEEN ATTITUDES OF THE DRY AND WET UNIVERSES*

	Flooded Area (N = 92)	Dry Area (N = 99)
A. Severity of damage personally suffered		
Severe	59%	10%
Moderate	20	33
Minor	21	57
B. Rating of New Orleans' hurricane protection		
Poor	64%	28%
Adequate	9	28
Good	9	23
No opinion	18	21
C. Who holds responsibility for preparing the city for hurricane		
Mayor	22%	43%
City Government	15	12
Federal Government	10	10
Civil Defense	13	15
Army Corps of Engineers	8	1
Levee Board	9	11
No opinion	31	17
D. Was the city adequately warned about the flooding?		
Yes	52%	78%
No	41	16
No opinion	7	6
E. Who is to blame for failure to warn the city? (Percentage is of those saying that the city was inadequately warned.)		
	(N = 38)	(N = 16)
Mayor	26%	12%
City Government	7	6
No one to blame	20	0
No opinion	28	70
F. Who should be praised for warning the city? (Percentage is of those saying that the city was adequately warned.)		
	(N = 47)	(N = 78)
Mayor	24%	17%
Television	39	43
No Opinion	22	16
G. Which organizations and officials should be praised for their work in connection with the hurricane?		
Mayor	10%	7%
Red Cross	21	24
All or everyone	26	19
H. Which organizations and officials should be criticized for their actions in connection with the hurricane?		
Mayor	7%	3%
No one	63	66

* Except for A, B, and D, the questions were open-ended and often stimulated more than one response per person. Therefore, those percentages do not total 100%. In the table under each question (other than A, B, and D) are listed the mayor and the agencies receiving the highest number of responses. Questions in the table are abbreviated forms of questions used in the survey.

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[10] Though it is not within the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the partisan history of New Orleans and electoral divisions within the 1965 election, the evidence available suggests that the divisions in 1965 followed, though not as closely as in the past, the historical divisions within the city. Since at least the 1940's, New Orleans partisanship can be defined in terms of two city-wide factions, the de Lesseps Morrison following and the Regular Democratic Association. The bulk of the support of the latter comes from precincts with a high percentage of whites, a low percentage of white collar workers, and low median family incomes. The Morrison faction has drawn its support from precincts with high Negro populations and from white precincts with high median family incomes and a high percentage of white collar workers. Though the pattern held in 1965, for the first time it was considerably weakened. However, the hurricane does not seem to explain the deviation.

conclusion that Betsy did not significantly affect the mayoral election.

At this point the obvious question is why was Schiro's candidacy not seriously damaged by the disaster? Part H of Table 2 might be used to suggest that few of Betsy's victims had hostile feelings, since a majority of the respondents felt no one should be criticized in connection with the hurricane; but explanations for this failure to criticize will be advanced below. Also, the answers to other questions suggest that hostility was prevalent.

First, the flooded voters were quite conscious that they had suffered more severe damage than others (Table 2, part A).[11] Additionally, nearly two-thirds of the wet sample described hurricane protection as poor (Table 2, part B), and many of them used more explicit language to express their hostility. Furthermore, they often complained that the city had been inadequately warned about the hurricane (Table 2, part D). The fact that respondents in the dry area rated their damage as less severe and less frequently criticized the city's hurricane protection and warning indicates a lower level of hostility. However, in both areas some people specifically praised the mayor for all facets of his work. Since generalized hostility was prevalent in the wet area, why was this hostility so poorly focused upon the mayor that even there some victims praised him? Schiro's political ingenuity and the availability of substantive aid have been suggested as one reason why the hurricane had little impact upon the election. In addition, several aspects of the political culture seem to account for this lack of effect.

First, the displacement of anger depends on one's perception of the source of irritation. In New Orleans the source was not clear, for respondents in both areas had difficulty deciding whom was charged with the responsibility for the city's hurricane protection (Table 2, part C). Our interviewers were repeatedly told "I don't know who was supposed to build better levees; some say the mayor or the federal government." In spite of the lack of a clear delineation of authority, the mayor was the most frequently mentioned, especially by those in the dry area. Even for an expert, the location of the responsibility for hurricane and flood protection, which is shared by a plethora of federal, state, and local agencies, is most difficult.[12] This amorphous situation helped the mayor to escape identification with the disaster and to avoid having it known as "Schiro's flood." This avoidance was probably necessary for his re-election. Except for television, in no case did more than one-third of the victims praise or blame the mayor or any other official or agency for their warning or for their work in connection with the hurricane, because, as noted, they were unable to focus responsibility (Table 2, parts E, F, G, and H). This aspect of the political culture, which was listed in the argument, did seem to influence the effect of the hurricane on the New Orleans election.

Second, the willingness of victims to blame government officials for disaster depends on their previous perceptions of those officials and the extent to which they alter those perceptions. Although a society may consider its governmental offices as positions of high esteem, as corrupt sinecures, or as anything between these extremes, previous evidence indicates that Americans generally hold consistently positive attitudes toward their elected officials.[13] If this is the case in New Orleans (remarks of the interviewees tended to confirm this assumption), it may explain why the hurricane victims were reluctant to focus their hostility upon the incumbent mayor by repudiating him at the polls. It may also be a second explanation, in addition to the ambiguous allocation of responsibility, why most respondents did not criticize Schiro (Table II, part E and H). For our respondents to have viewed the mayor as partially responsible for a disaster would have been inconsistent with their previous attitude toward the mayor's

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[11] Though Hurricane Betsy and the resulting flooding are logically separable, our respondents viewed the hurricane-flood experience as a unified whole and did not differentiate between them in their replies.

[12] Among the governmental agencies involved in flood control are the Army Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of Public Works, and the Orleans Levee Board (a special district government with taxing authority set up for overseeing the levees). Since their jurisdictions often overlap, their relationships are quite complicated. For example, the mayor is an ex-officio member of the Levee Board which has numerous ties with the city government. For an account of this complex allocation of powers see L. Vaughn Howard and Robert S. Friedman, *Government in Metropolitan New Orleans* (Tulane Studies in Political Science, VI, New Orleans: Tulane University, 1959), pp. 63, 67.

[13] See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), Chapter 4. See also Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," this REVIEW, 54 (December, 1960), pp. 934–943.

TABLE 3. ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF THE HURRICANE ON VOTING DECISIONS IN THE WET AND DRY UNIVERSES

Did the hurricane influence respondents' voting decisions?

	Flooded (N = 92)	Dry (N = 99)
Yes—to Fitzmorris	7%	2%
Yes—to Schiro	7	5
No	79	84
No opinion	7	9
	100%	100%

office as a protector of public safety.[14] Therefore, they found it easier to evaluate the mayor's actions as positive or neutral and to displace their hostility elsewhere.

In the same manner that citizens are consistent in their cultural attitudes toward an office, so they usually maintain consistency in their opinions of the actions of a particular official. Table 3 indicates that few New Orleanians altered their opinions as a result of the hurricane; that is, the views of both Schiro supporters and Fitzmorris supporters remained unchanged.[15] Before the hurricane the Schiro backers had felt their candidate was competent, and this attitude led them to view positively his actions during the hurricane. Therefore, since these voters had a consistently good opinion of the mayor's office and since they did not change their opinions about Schiro's activities, they could not displace their hostility upon the mayor. Consequently, their tendency to avoid dissonance affected the outcome of the election.

Finally, the extent to which hostility in the environment is reflected in the political system depends upon what the political culture defines as political. While few reported that the hurricane had been a major factor in their voting choice, the expectation, especially in the flooded area, was widespread that "others" would be so influenced (Table 4, part A). In the dry area, almost as many thought the hurricane would benefit Fitzmorris as would benefit Schiro (Table 4, part B). On the contrary, those in the wet area agreed by more than two-to-one that the hurricane would hurt Schiro (Table 4, part B); these people felt the generalized hostility in their area and thought "others" would vent it on Schiro.

Many respondents expressed indignation that other voters would be influenced in their voting decisions by the hurricane. Underlying this attitude was the prevailing assumption that the hurricane was not a legitimate political

TABLE 4. ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE INFLUENCE OF THE HURRICANE ON THE VOTING DECISIONS OF OTHERS

	Flooded Area (N = 92)	Dry Area (N = 99)
A. Has the hurricane influenced the outcome of the mayoral election?		
Yes	47%	36%
No	38	46
No opinion	15	18
	100%	100%
B. Has the hurricane benefitted Fitzmorris or Schiro? (Percentage is of those answering "yes" to question A.)	(N = 43)	(N = 36)
Fitzmorris	54%	40%
Schiro	22	42
No opinion	24	18
	100%	100%

Though our data is somewhat inconclusive, it suggests a reinforcement tendency. This was also apparent in the remarks of many of the respondents. Schiro's proponents would say, "During the hurricane he has again proven to me that he's the man for the job." Alternatively, Fitzmorris backers were equally certain that "this proves what I have always known—that Schiro is no good."

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[14] For a discussion of the individual's constant striving for consistency in his opinions see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957).

[15] When the computer cards for each universe were divided into Schiro and Fitzmorris supporters, the logical result appeared: Schiro supporters were more likely to rate the city's hurricane protection and flood warning higher and to praise the mayor more often than Fitzmorris adherents, who criticized more freely. None of the flooded Fitzmorris supporters praised the mayor, and none of the Schiro followers in either area criticized him. In this immediate aspect of political culture, various voting studies have supported this theory of cognitive dissonance. For example, Berelson, *et al.*, reported a striving for consistency in perceptions of Truman as President and of his policy position on the Taft-Hartley Act in the 1948 campaign. See Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 215–233.

issue. Those who thought the hurricane would be influential in the election usually said: "Yes, it will affect the election, but it shouldn't. They should run on their records." Furthermore, many criticized Fitzmorris for capitalizing on "Poor Vic's" misfortune: "I'm down on him (Fitzmorris); no one can predict a flood." For these people the injection of the hurricane issue into the election was a subversion of the democratic process.

Probably at the root of this indignation toward Fitzmorris was the conviction that Hurricane Betsy and the attendant flooding were the action of an inscrutable God. To blame mortal politicians for their deficiencies in hurricane protection was largely futile and seemed irreverent to many. Respondents frequently reminded our interviewers that the disaster was an "act of God." The prevalence of this attitude helps to explain the very high proportion of respondents in both wet and dry areas (Table 2, part H) who criticized no one for their actions in connection with the hurricane.[16] Both sides felt effective hurricane preparation was not within man's province. They did not suggest that the hurricane was retribution; for them God is simply unpredictable.[17] The fact that New Orleanians did not consider Hurricane Betsy a legitimate political issue is the third negative factor relative to the second section of the argument.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The fact that political scientists have neglected the political implications of sudden changes in the physical environment does not mean that such events are politically unimportant. Instead, it reflects the technical and logistical problems encountered in these studies and a lack of awareness on the part of political scientists that such research could reveal important political phenomena. Practical politicians have long realized that natural disasters create a crisis in a political system and test whether a government's output capabilities can accommodate the resulting strain or will fail, causing one regime to replace another. These crises are significant political happenings which deserve comparative empirical inquiry by students of political behavior.

This exploratory study demonstrated that the political repercussions of a natural disaster are not automatically detrimental to the government in power. Instead, the political reaction may depend upon the government's capacity to neutralize the resulting stresses on the political system and upon certain relevant aspects of the political culture. Mayor Schiro's capable administration of the recovery operation, his skillful handling of his public image, and his hard work enabled him to retain his adherents and perhaps win a few Fitzmorris supporters. One former Fitzmorris follower enthusiastically reported that she had been rescued from her rooftop by the mayor in a U. S. Army "Duck." Few criticized Schiro in connection with the hurricane (Table 2, part H), even some who thought he was at fault at first, told the interviewers he had redeemed himself through much good work.[18] Less adroit politicians or those lacking the necessary material resources or unwilling to use them,[19] might face defeat at the polls or revolt in the streets.

The first pertinent aspect of the political culture which tended to negate the effect of Betsy on the election was the unfocused responsibility for the preparation and relief of the disaster. This was illustrated by the fact that the citizens were unable to concentrate their dissatisfaction upon the mayor. In an instance in which a candidate were held clearly accountable, for example, if it were proven that the use of inferior cement had caused a dam to burst, swift retaliation could be expected from the voters.

Second, since New Orleanians consistently hold favorable attitudes toward the office of mayor, Schiro had a measure of political leeway under the strain of the hurricane and was assured of a minimum level of support.[20] In a society which held negative attitudes toward its government officers, the fact that the latter both prepared for and responded adequately to a disaster might be obscured by the citizens' tendency to view all government officials as incompetent.

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[16] Of course, criticizing no one was also a means of avoiding any danger of becoming publicly committed in a political controversy.

[17] This finding contrasts with the observations of Martha Wolferstein who reports a tendency among disaster victims to view their losses as a punishment for their sins. See *Disaster: A Psychological Essay* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 201–221.

[18] Supporting this observation, Lewis M. Killian notes, "When formal leaders fail to function in a leadership capacity in early stages they still tend to reassert their prestige in later stages." See "Some Accomplishments and Some Needs in Disaster Study," *The Journal of Social Issues*, 10 (1954), pp. 66–72. See also Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams who report that officials can minimize blame assessment if they are politically sensitive to their dangerous position. "The Human Being in Disasters," p. 43.

[19] John P. Spiegel found such alienation in a case in which officials refused to take advantage of all the disaster relief funds available. See "The English Flood of 1963," *Human Organization*, 16 (Summer, 1957), p. 5.

Finally, Hurricane Betsy was not considered a legitimate political issue but rather an act of an inscrutable God. This interpretation was at least partially due to the large proportion of religiously oriented individuals, predominantly Catholic, in the area studied. Further comparative research would indicate the extent to which this is a general principle for such disasters.[21] Perhaps in India a famine would be regarded as the work of Fate and not as the responsibility of politicians.

Hopefully, further research will examine the argument to find the extent to which reactive capabilities and pertinent aspects of the political system determine the political consequences of natural disasters in other situations.

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[20] David Easton maintains that in most political systems the government has built up a storehouse of "reserve support" which can act as a buffer to partially insulate the government against sudden reverses. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9 (April, 1957), pp. 396–397.

[21] The research of David M. Schneider in a primitive society indicates that the interpretation of the causes of a natural disaster is a cultural variable. In discussing the "meaning" of a typhoon on the island of Yap, he concludes, "A typhoon is, therefore, a punishment meted out to the people by some chief whom they have neglected to heed." "Typhoons on Yap," *Human Organization*, 16 (Summer, 1957), p. 12.

AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD TO MEASURE THE TENDENCY TO EQUIBALANCE IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM

J. A. LAPONCE
The University of British Columbia

Politics is both game and warfare: game when it seeks to keep uncertain the outcome of a competition and to keep the opponent not only alive but eager to play; warfare when it seeks to destroy or permanently weaken the enemy.[1] Depending upon the issues over which it is fought, politics will be more or less game, more or less warfare. A given society may keep its politics in a state of game unless certain issues, social status or religious freedom for example, be at stake. Conversely, a society may be unable to remove its politics from a state of warfare unless some game-like issues, such as the election of a leader, be introduced.

In order to measure the power of specific political issues to modify the game-warfare content of a political system, we should first be able to determine the tendency of that system when it operates in a political near-vacuum. In the absence of publicly known issues over which to divide themselves, we should ask, would members of a given group or society tend to fight or to play, assuming that they had only this choice?

A state of total political vacuum is, of course, no more than an ideal which cannot and need not be obtained empirically. We cannot prevent subjects from smuggling into a laboratory experiment their personal political concerns, for example the perception of a hierarchy of status and authority within which they will react. But if we cannot control for private political issues, we can, at least, ensure that they do not become public, that they not be shared.

The experiments described in this paper suggest a simple way of creating a situation of political near-vacuum into which issues can be injected and controlled. Measuring the game-warfare blend of a political system by the method I suggest presupposes only that the participants are used to delegating authority through elections. I propose to describe a political system by the speed with which its participants, when in competition, move either away from or toward equibalance.

Among equilibriums, equibalance describes a situation where the elements in balance have equal weight. For example $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}]$ would not, but $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}]$ would satisfy the definition. The tendency to equibalance should thus be distinguished from the tendency to restore equilibrium, since the latter need not be equilibrium by equal weight; it should be distinguished also from the more general tendency to rescue the underdog since in addition to indicating the direction of change it specifies how the benefits are shared when there is more than one potential beneficiary.

The search for social mechanisms tending either to restore or destroy equibalance between competitors does not require that we make any assumption of similarity between the motives of the participants and the effects of the system. Whenever we observe a tendency to restore equibalance we shall describe it as a game tendency; whenever we observe the tendency of a system to eliminate a weak opponent we shall describe it as warfare tendency, irrespective of the intentions and expectations of those producing these effects. Let us note, however, that since "democratic politics"[2] has in common with games the characteristic that participation in it is voluntary, it should, like games, tend to produce equality between competing forces if we assume that each actor a) is free to change camps, b) wants to insure his opponents' continued participation in the sustem and their support for its rules,[3] and c) wants, as far as (b) allows, to maximize his own power to determine the outcome.

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[1] For an analysis of politics in terms of fights and games and for an application of game theory to the understanding of both types of conflicts see A. Rapoport, *Fights, Games and Debates* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

[2] By "democratic" I mean a system of government based on the right of all participants to form, leave and join groups of their choice for the purpose of selecting or deciding.

[3] Mechanisms or situations other than equibalance can prevent rifts in society: for example, a supra-party consensus or overlaps within and between the political or other social systems. For an analysis of the role of overlap and consensus see Talcott Parsons, "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System" in E. Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). While the tendency to equibalance seeks to obtain or return to a specific equilibrium, consensus and overlap, on the contrary, give room for disequilibriums at various points of the political system.

THE USE OF A VOTING TEST TO MEASURE THE GAME-WARFARE CONTENT OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM

The first two experiments I shall describe were designed primarily to establish the soundness of our research instrument. We wanted to ensure that it was neither too sensitive nor too insensitive; that it could bring the groups studied as close as needed to the ideal point of political vacuum and, at will, remove them from it.

Experiment I, Jones vs. Smith: a multiballot contest. Five first-year psychology classes of about 200 students each, meeting in the same classroom at different hours of the day and taught by different instructors, were asked to participate in the following voting experiment.

1. *Procedures.* Step one: the student was asked to mark a ballot on which only two names appeared, one under the other, Smith and Jones. He was told that he would have occasion to vote more than once for the same two candidates, that at one stage his class might or might not be given some information about Jones and Smith. The experiment was presented as a study in communication; the participants were thus led to think that some classes might be asked to communicate while others were not. In fact, in all groups the students were asked to maintain secrecy of choice. To inhibit communication between students, the instructors lectured between each of the successive votes.

Step two: after the first ballots had been collected and counted, a fake result was announced, giving 69% to the top candidate, Smith, and 31% to Jones. These faked results were written on the board. The class was then asked to vote again.

Step three: after the second ballot had been collected, a third ballot was distributed and this time the candidates were identified in four of the five classes either by sex, age, religion, or ethnic group, viz:

Class II	*Class III*	*Class IV*	*Class V*
Smith (54 yrs. old)	Mr. Smith	Smith (Protestant)	Smith (English Canadian)
Jones (36 yrs. old)	Mrs. Jones	Jones (Catholic)	Jones (French Canadian)

In each of these classes the students were asked to indicate, as far as they could tell, how they would have voted on the second ballot if they had then been given the information now at their disposal.

Step four: after the third ballots had been counted, another faked result was announced, 89% for Smith and 11% for Jones. The respondents voted again.

Step five: after the fourth ballots had been collected, the students were asked to fill out a questionnaire giving the history of their votes, the reasons for their either changing or not changing, and the usual demographic information on sex, year of university, field of study, ethnic origin, religious affiliation and political party preference.

2. *Hypotheses.* Hypothesis I: on the second ballot, that is, after the 69-31 unbalance has been announced, the five classes will all react the same way. Hypothesis II: after an issue other than unbalance has been injected into the experiment, the pattern of vote transfers will be altered and the various classes will cease to react the same way since they will then react to different issues.

The first hypothesis sought to establish that our measuring test was not so sensitive as to register the different moods of our various classes, moods created by the personality of the instructor, the time of day or the hazards of student registration into one section rather than another. The second sought to ensure that the instrument was not so insensitive as not to record changes when different issues were introduced.

3. *Findings.* Both hypotheses are substantiated by our findings.

(a) The changes between the first and second votes vary only between 8% and 12.5% (see Table 1). The spread is even smaller, if instead of comparing the changers to the non-changers, we compare only those who change to the underdog and those who stay with the top candidate: trends to the underdog are 15%, 11%, 13%, 15% and 16% respectively (see Table 2). This similarity in reaction between classes is not, however, due to randomness in the answers of those who change their preferred candidate on the second ballot. In three of the five groups the differences between the bandwagon and the underdog movements are statistically significant; and they are near significance in the other two groups (see Table 3).

(b) The second hypothesis is also substantiated. We find that the introduction of an issue alters the trends observed previously and that differences appear between classes as a

TABLE 1. PERCENT OF CHANGERS AND NON-CHANGERS BETWEEN THE 1ST AND THE 2ND BALLOTS, EXPERIMENT I

	Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV	Class V
Changers	10	8.5	10	8	12.5
Non-changers	90	92.5	90	92	87.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(240)	(213)	(243)	(200)	(222)

TABLE 2. PERCENT OF CHANGERS TO THE UNDERDOG BETWEEN THE 1ST AND THE 2ND BALLOTS, EXPERIMENT I

	Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV	Class V
Changers	15	13	15	11	16
Non-changers	85	87	85	89	84
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(122)	(118)	(123)	(102)	(127)

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF CHANGERS BETWEEN THE 2ND AND THE 3RD BALLOTS, EXPERIMENT I

	Control group	Class II (Age)[a]	Class III (Sex)[a]	Class IV (Ethnic)[a]	Class V (Religion)[a]
Changers[b]	10	34.5	36	28.5	34.5
Non-changers	90	65.5	64	71.5	65.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(240)	(216)	(248)	(202)	(222)

[a] Issue introduced in that particular class after the 3rd ballot.

[b] On the null hypothesis that each issue-class taken separately does not differ from the control group, the values of the X^2 are in all groups significant at the .001 level. If each class is set against all the others combined (control group included) the values of the X^2 are significant at the .05 level except in Class IV. If each issue-class is set against all others combined at the exclusion of the control group, the values of the X^2 cease to be significant at the .05 level.

function of the issue to which they were subjected. The control group, which was asked to vote a third time in function of an increased unbalance of 89%–11%, shows again a dominance of the underdog over the bandwagon effect; the other classes, where the characteristic assumed to be most attractive had been associated with the top candidate, shows a reversal of previous trends from underdog to bandwagon (see Table 4). Furthermore, differences appear between classes. Both in its total percentage of changers and its percentage of changers to the underdog, the class in which the candidates were given an ethnic origin deviates from the classes where the candidates were identified by either sex, age or religion (see Table 5).

4. *Replication.* Variations of this voting experiment were conducted at the University of British Columbia among students of political science and students of sociology, and at the University of Washington in Seattle among political science students. Use was also made of a similar voting test among Grade 11 and Grade 6 pupils. Since these experiments will be described later in this paper, it will suffice to say that they confirmed the observations obtained from experiment I on the usefulness of the voting test to measure the game-warfare content of a political system.

Experiment II, Jones vs. Brown: a two-ballot contest. Since it was expected that among social science students the perception of an unbalance between candidates would produce a movement to rescue the underdog, we tested the hypothesis that the magnitude of this movement was related to the size of the unbalance. Again the experiment was devised to establish the sensitiveness of the instrument of research. The experiment was conducted as follows:

1. *Procedures.* Six groups of students (5 classes in political science and one in sociology) were subjected separately to a voting test pre-

TABLE 3. PERCENT OF CHANGERS TO THE UNDERDOG AND TO THE TOP CANDIDATE, EXPERIMENT I

	Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV	Class V
Percent changing to underdog	15 (N-122)	13 (N-118)	15 (N-123)	11 (N-102)	16 (N-127)
Percent changing to top candidate[a]	5 (N-118)	4 (N-95)	5 (N-120)	5 (N-98)	9 (N-95)
Value of Chi-square (df[1])[b]	7.0	5.4	5.8	2.8	2.3
	>	>	>		

> = Significant at .05 level.

[a] 100% = those who were in a position to make such a change after the first ballot.

[b] On the null hypothesis that the transfers to the underdog were proportionately equal to the transfers to the top candidate.

TABLE 5. PERCENT OF CHANGERS TO THE UNDERDOG BETWEEN THE 2ND AND THE 3RD BALLOTS, EXPERIMENT I

	Class II (age)[a]	Class III (sex)[a]	Class IV (ethnic)[a]	Class V (religion)[a]
Changers to underdog	14	15	7	12
Non-changers[b]	86	85	93	88
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N[b]	(109)	(113)	(96)	(115)
Value of Chi-square (df^1)[c]	0.6	0.9	2.4	0.01

[a] Issue introduced in that particular class after the 3rd ballot.

[b] Includes only those who could have changed to underdog.

[c] On the null hypothesis that each group did not differ from the other three combined. If the control group, where the % of transfers to the underdog was 14% were to be included, the X^2 values would be slightly higher (2.6 in class IV).

sented to them as an illustration of a two-ballot system.

On the first ballot the student was asked to vote for either of two candidates, Brown and Jones. While the instructor continued to lecture, the ballots were collected and counted. A faked result was then announced to the class. The results announced were:

	In percentage		
	Brown	Jones	Spoiled
Class 1–2nd year Political Science	49	47	4
2–3rd year Political Science	51	49	
3–2nd year Political Science	69	31	
4–2nd year Political Science	79	21	
5–2nd year Political Science	89	11	
6–3rd year Sociology	91	9	

A second ballot was then held. The instructor said that the purpose of the second ballot was to favor a more rational choice by giving the elector the information he lacked on the first ballot: the opinion of the community. The students were asked to imagine themselves in a political situation in which Brown and Jones would have been competing for votes, but no specific scenery was set for the competition in terms of either federal, local or student politics. After the second ballots had been collected, the respondents were asked to record the history of their Brown vs Jones votes, to give their reasons for having or not having changed between first and second ballots, and finally to indicate their own political preferences among Canadian parties as well as the degree of their attachment to their preferred party.

2. *Findings*. Of 296 students, 91 per cent repeated their original choice; only 30 students changed their votes in the second ballot; 3 transferred from the least to the most preferred candidate; 27 transferred to the underdog. The highest percentage of transfers observed in any one class was only 18 per cent. As in a typically satisfied society only a small minority of people are at a given time likely to change remembered previous positions on a particular problem.[4]

TABLE 6. TRANSFER BETWEEN CANDIDATES

Majority announced in %	1st Count[a] (Actual N)	2nd Count (Actual N)	Transfers from Brown to Jones N	Transfers from Jones to Brown N
49–47 and 4 spoiled	36–17	35–18	1	0
51–49	41–25	38–28	5	2
69–31	22–12	19–15	3	0
79–21	19–26	16–29	3	0
89–11	35–19	25–29	10	0
96–4	26–17	22–20	5	1

[a] Note that in 5 out of 6 cases Brown, the candidate whose name appeared first on the ballot, obtains more votes than Jones—voting for Jones on the 1st ballot may have been in an unknown proportion, a choice for the underdog.

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[4] If the previous position is not remembered, random choices may produce a high level of apparent change. Our experiments were not affected by the failure of respondents to recollect previous positions, failure which often renders difficult the interpretation of answers to panel surveys of a cross section of the population. On this point see in particular Philip E. Converse "The nature of belief systems in Mass Publics" in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964); and Converse "Nouvelles dimensions de la signification des réponses dans les sondages sur les opinions politiques" *Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales*, 16 (No. 1, 1964), pp. 21–38. The fact that all our successive votes took place within one hour and that the



x = leading candidate's % points over the majority.
y = % of the top candidate's supporters transferring to the underdog.

FIG. 1. The underdog effect.

In the 49–47% situation the transfers between Brown and Jones are small and are not, statistically-speaking, significantly different. Only 2.7% of the top candidate's supporters go to the underdog, and 5.8% of the underdog's supporters travel in the opposite direction. These small transfers tend to compensate one another, and hazard determines the winner.

When, on the first ballot, one candidate is over the majority, the bandwagon effect practically disappears. Only 1 of 28 changes favors the top candidate. In all cases the effect of the transfers is to redress the balance. The transfers to the underdog increase as the top candidate's lead increases in a way which clearly suggests a linear regression line, the slope of which is given by the equation $Y = .29X + 10.3$, where Y is the percentage of transfers from the top to the last candidate, and x the leading candidate's number of percentage points over the majority (see Fig. 1). The choice of the x intervals is, of course, somewhat arbitrary; but the use of other reasonable intervals (the difference between the percentage of votes given to each candidate for example would suggest the same observation: that of a linear correlation between X and Y.

We shall come back to the implications of these substantive findings. Suffice to say here that these two experiments satisfied us that the voting test used could register and measure adequately changes produced either by the increase in the unbalance between candidates or by the identification of the candidates with specific groups or issues.

II. APPLICATIONS

In all the following experiments, as in the previous two, the candidates were given real

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candidates had been given real names provided reasonable assurance that changers were actually aware that they were switching from one candidate to another.


1
Transfer observed in % (a)
2
Hypothetical standing in % after observed transfers (b)
3
Hypothetical standing in % if transfers at random (c)
A
34
19%
4.8%
10.2%
33
31
5.5%
B
C
6.8%
A
30
38.9
29.1
B
C
A
33.6
32.9
31.3
B
C

FIG. 2. Transfers in a situation of near equality.

[a] Anticipating that the transfers would be heaviest from the candidate coming third and that the candidates appearing first on a ballot would get the most votes, the ranking of the candidates in announcing the faked results was the reverse of that on the printed ballot. The reason for this inversion was to obtain as many cases of transfers as possible in order to analyze their demographic characteristics. Contrary to expectations, as will be seen, the heaviest transfers were not from the last candidate. In order to avoid confusion in the reading of the graph, the candidate with the highest "announced" percentage of votes is systematically called A, that with the second highest is B, the last is C. The boxed figures indicate the faked percentage announced after the first ballot.

[b] The percentage boxed was obtained after applying the actual percentage of transfers obtained from each candidate to the "announced" percentage of votes. A was assumed to have lost to B 19% of the 34% of the total vote; A was assumed to have gained from C 10.2% of 31% of the total vote, etc.

[c] The percentage boxed was obtained by assuming that each candidate had lost an equal percentage of votes and that these votes had been distributed equally among the other two candidates. Since the total percentage of changes is in this case 16%, A was assumed to have lost 8% of 34% of the total vote to B; B to have lost 8% of 33% of the total vote to A, etc.

names (Smith, Brown, Jones). To make it easier to remember who was first, second or third in the fake results announced we shall henceforth refer to the candidates simply as A, B, C.

Experiment III, a two-ballot, three-candidate contest, Brown vs. Jones vs. Smith.

1. *Hypothesis*. We assumed that in a three-candidate contest, the middle candidate B would be the winner since he would benefit from a combination of underdog and bandwagon effects. However, the experiment proved our hypothesis wrong.

2. *Experiment*. Three classes were used, each faced after the first ballot with one of three situations.

1. A situation of near equality between the three candidates: 34%—33%—31% and 2% spoiled.
2. A situation of near-equality between two of the three candidates: 45%—44%—11%.
3. A situation of dominance by only one candidate: 49%—28%—14% and 9% spoiled ballots.

3. *Findings*. (Case 1). In the situation of near-equality between the three candidates, 16% of 72 participants voted for a different candidate on the second ballot. Measured in percentage of the first ballot votes of a given candidate the exchanges were as shown in Figure 2.

If 16% of the electors of each candidate had transferred their votes randomly to the other two, the effect of such redistribution would have been to reduce the gap between the candidates (compare Fig. 2–3 to Fig. 2–1). If the vote had been repeated and the same random transfers had obtained, the candidates would have actually reached near-equality, the impossibility of obtaining complete equality being only in the rules not permitting a voter to split his vote into fractions. At the limit, 16% of the electors would have kept turning round and round to produce a change which could have been obtained by a single elector moving at random from candidate to candidate.

The pattern of changes observed in the experiment resembles that which would have resulted from random transfers. On the null hypothesis that each candidate should have lost 8% of his first votes to each of his two opponents, we find that the difference between expected and observed frequencies on the second ballot is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.10$; df $=2$; $<.8$).

(Case 2). In the second case (A = 45, B = 44, C = 11), a case of dominance by two candidates, 22% of electors changed their first votes as follows:


1) Observed transfers in %
A
45
10.5%
9.7%
5.5%
15.8%
44
19.4%
11
8.3%
B
C
2) Hypothetical standing in % after observed transfers
A
37.7
36.9
25.1
B
C
3) Hypothetical standing in % if random transfers
A
41.15
40.48
18.37
B
C

^{a} For explanation of boxed % see Fig. VIII.

FIG. 3^a. Transfers in a situation of dominance by two candidates.

On the null hypothesis of an 11% transfer from each candidate to the other two, we find the observed frequencies on the second ballot to be not significantly different from the expected ($\chi^2 = 2.06$; df 2; $>.6$). The transfers can still be explained by randomness, but there is a marked indication, confirmed by Case 3, that the underdog is favored and the top candidates penalized. Candidate A loses 26.3% of his original vote; B loses 29.9%; C loses only 13.8%. The slight dominance of the underdog effect (not registered by the χ^2 probably because of the small number of cases) tends to produce equibalance faster than would transfers made purely at random.

(Case 3). In the third case (A = 49, B = 28, C = 14, rejected = 9), a case of dominance by a single candidate so near the majority as to have appeared the likely winner, the underdog effect again tends to produce equality between candidates. 14.3% of 268 electors transferred their votes as follows:

As the previous experiment has led us to expect, the magnitude of the underdog transfers is positively related to the size of the unbalance; but contrary to our original hypothesis the combination of underdog and bandwagon effects does not result in the elimination of the third and last candidate. In the situation of political near-vacuum which characterized the experiment, the transfers operate in such a way as to maintain *all three* candidates in the race, and to bring them into a situation of equibalance. Non-random transfers tend to produce, but faster, the effects of random changes —a way of pushing at the wheel of history, of accelerating "natural" trends, without being necessarily conscious of them.[5]

Reasoning on the evolution of party politics in Anglo-Saxon countries, thought to be more typical than those of continental Europe, Duverger proposed that polarity was in the nature of things,[6] that it was a "natural" tendency for the resolution of political conflicts.


1) Observed transfers in %
A
49
11%
16.1%
1.3%
4.7%
28
4.7%
6.3%
14
B
C
2) Hypothetical Standing in % after observed transfers
A
36.7
31.5
22.4
B
C
3) Hypothetical standing in % if random transfers
A
45
28.5
17.5
B
C

^{a}for explanations see fig. 2

FIG. 4^a. Transfers in a situation of dominance by one candidate.

On the null hypothesis of 7.15% transfers from each to each candidate, we obtain a χ^2 very close to significance at the 0.5 level ($\chi^2 = 5.6$; $>.6$).

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[5] In actual situations the "deviant" behavior of those who transfer support from one candidate to another would also have the effect of bringing the candidates closer to one another not only be-

Our observations, although made at a quite different level, suggest that Duverger may have failed to account for the opposite tendencies of political systems according to whether they are in a state of game or in a state of war. Duverger observes rightly that the great factional conflicts (Armagnacs vs. Burgundians, Guelphs vs. Ghibellines, etc.) have been dualist, but such conflicts, precisely because they were great do not belong to the same category and consequently do not provide a model for the tuned-down, limited conflicts which characterise modern "depoliticized" democratic systems. If polarity seems to be in the nature of warfare politics, equibalance[7] seems to be in the nature of game-politics.

In a society where the game tendencies dominate the warfare tendencies we should observe a trend to equality not between two but among all competitors.[8] This has important implications for the design of electoral and constitutional rules. The more game-like a system becomes, the more it may need safeguards against the entry of too many competitors and the ensuing splintering of political forces. Majority systems rather than proportional representation, presidential rather than parliamentary structures—generally the devices which invite polarization may then be needed.

4. *Replication.* The third case (A=49, B=28, C=14, rejected=9) was repeated among political science students at the University of Washington in Seattle. Although the transfers away from the third candidate were somewhat higher than in the Canadian experiment, the same general trends were observable, with the dominance of the underdog over the bandwagon effects clearly marked. That the third and last candidate be not as heavily favored by transfers in the American as in the Canadian case might be due to the differences between the political cultures of our two populations, one used to a multiparty, the other to a two-party system. But precisely because of these differences in party politics, one cannot but be impressed by the fact that even in the American situation the effect of the transfers is to maintain all three competitors in the race[9] (see Fig. 5).

Experiment IV, a multiballot contest with party identification.

1. *Hypothesis.* We hypothesized that the introduction of the issue "party identification" among a group of North American students would result in the bandwagon dominating over the underdog effect, but that the latter would not disappear altogether. We expected that the magnitude of the change from under-

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cause of their obvious interest in maintaining as wide a support as possible but also because of the tendency of groups to resist trends toward the alienation of a member whose behavior is deviant. On this point see R. A. Dentler and K. T. Erickson "The Function of Deviance in Groups" *Social Problems*, 7 (Fall, 1959), pp. 98–107.

[6] See M. Duverger, *Political Parties* (London Methuen, 1965, ed.), pp. 215ff.

[7] At least equibalance between three forces, since our experiments did not include a four-or-more candidate contest.

[8] This tendency to the formation of groups of equal size differs from the movement of individuals between freely forming groups of the kind studied by James Coleman among pedestrians and playground children. See James S. Coleman and John James, "The Equilibrium Size Distribution of Freely Forming Groups" *Sociometry*, 24 (1961), pp. 36–45. Because of the very rules governing our experiments the number of candidates could not grow. But the participants could have decided to abstain, which would have been one way of forming a group of one, akin to Coleman's solitary pedestrian. However in all our experiments the abstentions were so few (around 1%) that we ignored them altogether.

[9] This tendency to change camp to rescue the underdog would seem to contradict one of the better established of small-group research findings: that individuals tend to conform to the norms of the group. See in particular S. Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 22; and T. K. Hopkins, *The Exercise of Influence in Small Groups* (Totowa: Bedminster Press, 1964), pp. 118 ff. But, since no communication took place, the supporters of a given candidate were not known to one another, and voting for Smith or Jones could hardly be considered as a rite of passage into the group of the Jones or Smith supporters. When, however, the candidates were identified, by religion for example, and the unbalance was increased, the individual voter could be said to be under the social pressure of a group norm, such as "Protestants think that the Catholic underdog should not be rescued." Even in that case it remains, however, that our groups, school children excepted, were not face-to-face groups. The tendency to restore equibalance should be expected to operate best in a situation of anonymity of the individual within social groupings lacking structure and leadership. These are the characteristics of the groups we studied, but also and increasingly so of party electorates in modern industrial societies.

Canadian (UBC) transfers


1) Observed transfers in %
2) Hypothetical standing in % after observed transfers.
A
49
11.1%
16.1%
1.3%
4.7%
4.7%
6.3%
28
B
14
C
A
36.7
31.5
B
22.4
C

American (U. of W.) transfers



Fig. 5. Transfers in a situation of dominance by one candidate.
Comparison between Canadian and American students.

dog to bandwagon would be related to the strength of the party preference.

2. *Experiment.* A group of 265 political science students at the University of Washington in Seattle were asked to vote three times in succession for one of three candidates. On the first ballot no identification of the candidates was made. Before the second ballot a fake result was announced, giving the following distribution—

A	49%
B	28%
C	14%
Spoiled	9%

After the second ballot a new faked distribution was announced and this time the candidates were identified politically as follows:

A (Independent)	45%
B (Democrat)	44%
C (Independent)	11%

3. *Findings.* The Republicans in the class, who on the second ballot had voted for the middle candidate B, being confronted with the identification of B as a Democrat, had the choice, should they want to transfer to another candidate, to support A, the top candidate, or C, the underdog. As expected, at this point in the experiment the bandwagon effect dominated but the underdog transfers were far from eliminated. Of the 45 Republicans who had voted for B on the second ballot, 25% continued to support him on the third ballot, indicating as their reason for doing so that a Democrat unlike an Independent had a known political quality. Of the 34 Republicans who transferred from the Democrat to an Independent, 68% went to the top candidate, 32% to the underdog. The weaker the allegiance to the Republican party, the greater the tendency to go to the underdog. Although the number of

cases on which this last observation is made is admittedly small, the trend is clearly marked. Among Republicans who transferred from B to an independent, 40% (N = 11) of those who said they had a strong allegiance to the party went to the underdog Independent. That proportion rose to 46.5% (N = 14) for those whose allegiance was "average" and to 66% (N = 9) for those who described their allegiance as weak.

These results are not unexpected. But they bring attention to an important type of floating voter, the underdog rescuer, whose function in the political system is in some respects akin to that of the Red Cross on the battlefield. And in politics (even when it is pure game) as in war, but for obviously different reasons, only a minority join the Red Cross.

Experiment V, a two ballot contest, Smith vs. Jones, in Elementary and High Schools.

1. *Hypothesis.* We hypothesized that the tendency to produce equibalance is related to age, that younger children, unlike their elders, would produce a bandwagon (warfare) effect.

2. *Experiment.* The test was administered to a group of 8 classes (3 grade six, 1 grade seven, and 4 grade eleven) taken equally from a Catholic school and from public schools. A two-ballot system was used. The justification for the experiment was that we wanted to test a new way of electing class representatives. After the first ballot a 70–30 unbalance was announced. As expected, the younger children tended to produce a bandwagon effect. A slight underdog dominance appeared in the higher grades. Since no statistically significant differences obtained between schools or between grades when age is controlled, the results will be presented on an aggregate basis (see Figure 6).

FIG. 6. SCHOOL CHILDREN EXPERIMENT—PATTERN OF TRANSFERS AFTER A 70–30 UNBALANCE IS ANNOUNCED



The differences observed between bandwagon and underdog effects in the lower grades are statistically significant $(\chi^2 = 8.4; > .05)$ but not those observed in the Grades 11 $(\chi^2 = 0.1; < .05)$. If we remember that all the university students tested, in whatever year of university, produced a definite underdog trend when faced with a 70–30 unbalance, our grade-11 pupils appear poised at a sort of neutral point between the warfare system of the younger grades and the game system of the university students.[10]

III. FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE UNDERDOG RESCUER

The data collected in the previous experiments, at the exclusion of school children, were used to test the hypothesis that in a situation of political near-vacuum, that is in the absence of issues other than unbalance between candidates, the underdog changers would be predominantly women and left-wingers. A separate analysis was made for the 1200 Canadian psychology students, the 400 Canadian sociology students, the 300 Canadian political science students and the 260 American political science students. In none of these groups did we find any statistically significant difference between men and women. Small as it was, the group of school children confirmed the similarity of behavior between sexes. The American sample produced no difference between Democrats and Republicans; the Canadian samples, no difference between Socialists and Liberals. In the Canadian case, however, among psychology, political science and sociology students, there is indication that the conservatives are more likely than others to respond to the underdog appeal. Our original hypothesis must thus be rejected and in the case of right wingers might have to be reversed if duplications of our experiment were to confirm our observations on Canadian Conservatives.[11]

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[10] Note also the difference between age groups in their first ballot choices. The younger children tend to vote for the candidate whose name appeared on top of the ballot. The grade eleven pupils divided their first ballot choices equally between the two candidates. No clear pattern emerged from the votes of the Canadian university students. The Seattle students showed a marked tendency to give their first ballot to the candidate listed second of three. Many indicated that their first choice was consciously made against the top candidate, simply because he was on top and thus expected to get a majority. On this point see the experiments reported by Schelling, showing that when a group of players are given some incentive to guess rightly what the majority of participants will individually decide, the culturally dominant side of an alternative is normally favored. For example: name "heads" or "tails"; if you and your partner name the same, you both win a prize. See T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 56.

IV. THE EQUILIBRIUM POINT BETWEEN WAR-FARE AND GAME

We saw that the introduction of a specific issue such as party preference may shift a political system from "game" to "warfare". But we also observed that in none of our experiments was change either total or permanent. An underdog movement, sometimes dominated, usually dominant, always appeared. That this persistence is due not entirely to random votes on the part of our subjects is best demonstrated by the last stage of the experiment with our psychology classes (Experiment I). It will be remembered that on the third ballot the candidates had been identified in one group by sex, in the second by religion (Protestant and Catholic) and in the third by ethnic origin (French Canadian and English Canadian). At that stage the unbalance was 69–31. A fourth and final vote followed, after we had first increased the fake unbalance to 89–11. In all cases the underdog effect reasserted itself on the fourth ballot. When the underdog candidate was identified as a woman, only 9.6% of men transferred to her from the top candidate; when the underdog was identified as a Catholic only 6.2% Protestants transferred to him; and when the underdog was identified as a French Canadian only 5.2% of English Canadians transferred to him. But when the unbalance was increased to 89–11, the transfers to the underdog rose respectively among the same groups to 20.5% for men, 9.6% for Protestants and 13.9% for English Canadians, as compared to an average of 14% in the control group where the candidates were not identified at all. While on the third vote the underdog transfers were dominated by the bandwagon, on the fourth ballot the underdog effect dominated again.

The fact that, younger children excepted, all our subjects produced a dominance of the underdog over the bandwagon effect, except at the time of a realignment caused by the introduction of a new issue, the fact that the underdog effect dominated before *and* after such realignments, would have brought, in all cases, the system to equibalance, had the transfers continued. The reason might lie in the game situation of the classroom experiments; it might lie also in the "North American", or "democratic" or "Christian" or "liberal" culture of which our respondents are representative. I am inclined to this second interpretation because of the differences observed between our younger and older subjects. Whatever may be its cause, the mechanism to restore equibalance is well adapted to a political system which seeks to maximize the power of the individual while maintaining equality between participants.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The various experiments with university students and school children in situations of either two or three candidate contests yielded three major observations:

(a) In a two-candidate, multiballot contest there is a positive linear relationship between the size, in percentage points, of the stronger candidate's majority and the proportion shifting to the weaker candidate on the second ballot.

(b) In a three-candidate, multiballot contest, the transfers of votes on the second ballot are such as to bring the system toward equibalance. No tendency to polarization was observed as long as the contest was kept free of issues other than the unbalance between candidates.

(c) The tendency to rescue the underdog is, among children and adolescents, related to age and seems thus to be a learned value.

The tendency of a given system toward or away from equibalance is obviously only one of many mechanisms at work even when we come close to the point of issue-vaccum; but from the analyst's point of view this is a privileged mechanism because it can be used to test the strength of opposite tendencies in the system. Whenever in a group or society the game tendency dominates in situations of near-vacuum but not in situations of conflicts over issues or individuals, there exists an invitation to identify the factors which prevent equibalance: e.g., social conflicts, inertia, wrong perception or lack of knowledge of an existing unbalance.[12] The method suggested allows not only identification of these opposite tendencies but also measurement of their strength.

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[11] Whenever in our experiments an issue was injected to produce an expected identification between the voter and the candidate, such as sex or political party, the dominant transfers became those resulting from realignment behind the candidate with whom the voter had a common characteristic. Men behind the male candidate, Protestants behind the Protestant candidate, Democrats behind the Democratic candidate, etc. At this point in the experiment however differences appeared between sexes. In the U.B.C. psychology classes (Experiment 1), after the candidates had been identified by sex, only 9% of men transferred from the top to the less preferred candidate who had been identified as a woman, while 20% of women did so. Inversely 66% of men left the woman candidate, but a surprising 42% of women also did so. The political folklore finds here confirmation to its saying that women have, as candidates, a limited appeal to their own sex.

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[12] For a study of the tendency to equibalance in the American party system see C. Sellers "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (September, 1965), pp. 16–38. For an analysis of the reasons, other than the tendency to rescue the underdog, which account for the breaking up of coalitions and alliances see William Riker, *A Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Riker notes the danger inherent in the formation of too large a coalition: the disappearance of an opponent means the weakening of the bargaining power of those who, in the winning coalition, could have threatened to change camp; too large a coalition may also mean the dilution of rewards among the winners. For practical observations as well as theoretical formulations on coalitions see also George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and M. A Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (N.Y.: Riley, 1957).

AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY FINAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY IS NECESSARY

ROBERT J. PRANGER
University of Kentucky

Hanna Pitkin's recent two-part essay in this REVIEW, "Obligation and Consent", raises a vital problem worth discussing at greater length, the question of why a final authority—a "last word"—proves necessary in political matters or at least why we seem predisposed to think in terms of a final authority even though one may not actually exist. The following remarks constitute a response to this question.

Professor Pitkin's approach is influenced by Oxford philosophy's accent on studying the role of language in moral judgments. She adds to this linguistic interest a complementary concern for "life" as well. Thus, she says, "What is ultimately needed here [on the questions of obligation and consent] is a better understanding of the role played in our language and our lives by assessments like 'he was right', 'he made a bad decision,' 'he betrayed the cause,' and the like." But who is to say, she asks? Her answer is: "each person who cares to, will say . . . . No one has the last word because there is no last word. But in order to make that clear, one would have to say a great deal more about how language functions, and why we are so persistently inclined to suppose that there must be a last word."[1] Let us first take the question, who is to say? Then we shall move to the second, connected issue, why there must be a last word. Finally, we shall explore briefly the idea that we must know more about how language functions in order to solve certain conundrums concerning obligation and consent.

I. WHO IS TO SAY?

The first question, "Who is to say?", has more than one answer. There is Pitkin's "each person who cares to". But this advances us only as far as first base, for complementary to the question of obligation is that of authority, and authority severely limits the number of persons whose "say" is official (unless one adopts the view that citizenship is an official position).[2] Since the problem of obligation concerns being obliged to obey public authority, the right of each person to care about decisions only opens the question again, it does not *answer* it. One may, for example, mutter an imprecation against somebody one feels is a traitor, but to give equal weight to this unofficial assessment and to an official judgment of treason would be inimical to stable authority as well as to justice. It is ostensibly to divide the equal right to care from the consequences of such a right in practice (which would be true anarchy, something even most "anarchists" would never condone), that the issues of obligation and authority appear in the first place. For obligation is founded on a paradox that while each may judge privately, the consequences of most such judgments do not extend very far publicly. Yet though the public judgment be not mine, I am obligated to obey it. An authority is the legitimating of some rights to care over others, and hence the allowance of some private cares to extend further in their public consequences than other private cares.

Between the equal right to care and the differential right to political authority there lies the gap of obligation, a gap filled by action and consent. Granted that each may be concerned, may judge privately, why should there be a juxtaposition of private (the right to care) and public (the right to political authority) judgments? Yet in fact—including our language—we so distinguish. Further, public authority carries added prestige over private authority, at least in parts of the world where public, political roles have been well-articulated. (Geographic and historical variables, matters of space and time, may be elementary for this discussion, since obligation and consent are basic to the development of *Western* political thought.) Why should there be public authority juxtaposed to private authority, and why should this first kind of authority be given advantage from the standpoint of individual obligation? The odds are, in less than mass revolutionary situations, that most citizens will obey legally constituted public authority most of the time, especially in *crucial matters* (e.g., draft-card burnings are much less prevalent than broken speed limits). As Charles McIlwain once noted, these are the questions central to the history of political theory *in the West*, a long dialogue in which Pitkin has also entered.[3] The answers to these basic "whys" are variegated. Let us try but one more approach, one that attempts to answer the second issue raised earlier of why men hanker for a "last word", in spite of the apparent diversity of human motives and aims.

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[1] "Obligation and Consent—II", *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), pp. 39–52, at 52.

[2] See the suggestions concerning citizenship by Joseph Tussman in his *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 105ff.

II. WHY A "LAST WORD"?

My explanation takes the form of a simple observation about the action of a small child in a special situation. A father brings home a package wrapped in colorful paper. Immediately the child jumps to the conclusion that the paper contains a toy, and is sadly disappointed upon finding otherwise. Instead of leaving matters at that, however, the child acts out his disappointment in an interesting manner: he wraps some old toys in the paper. The child now becomes overjoyed, his surrogates satisfying unfulfilled, disappointed expectations about what he considers the proper order of things. Important to note, he responds to his disappointment by reconstructing a more satisfying, orderly situation. Let us explore this event's significance for political obligation and consent.

Was the child signifying through his play that he really accepted the manifest meaning of the original event and so went about his unreal play, or that he hoped to fulfill his wishes symbolically by creating a more satisfactory situation? For political thought this question may have significance, though in political theory the lack of orderly fulfillment is acted out verbally, instead of through gestures, with substitutes in the language itself. For example, "sovereignty", as it evolves from monarch to parliament or populace, is such a key term. Thus, Locke could judge, for any number of reasons, that monarchy had failed, so he substituted the legislature as sovereign. And when the parliament was not entirely living up to expectations, the popular sovereign could be conjoined with parliamentary supremacy (Locke's own ambivalence and the 1832 Reform Bill) or could supersede entirely the representative body (Rousseau and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens). Rousseau, disappointed with contemporary society as he saw it, substituted with artificial components a new society which would conform to his own expectations for political order. From where did he derive these expectations? For Rousseau they came from his experience in imagining, craving and dreaming, as well as from his conscious manipulation of symbols. The shape and content of the old corrupt wrapping paper (society) were taken from his incorruptible (virtuous) images which, in turn, were couched in his own corruptible body and mind which needed individual reformation. His disappointed reaction to a society which did not fulfill his expectations was not despair alone (though there was that too) but reconstruction. Indeed, the reconstruction in the *Social Contract* could have been a means of escaping the pessimism found in his *Second Discourse*, the *Contract* being a kind of gigantic ideal self for Rousseau, as well as an ideal state for the rest of mankind.[4]

It is suggested here that in simple reconstructive gestures employed to satisfy unfulfilled expectations concerning proper order lies one answer for why final authority is deemed necessary. This "inarticulate intelligence", as Michael Polanyi calls it,[5] is found in children and seems inescapable throughout life. Even the anarchist Proudhon, whose response to the blight of political order was that most amorphous of panaceas, "justice", substituted for corrupt political order not disorder but a reconstruction in the form of mutualistic, contractual organization. When one examines the political thought of anyone from peasant to philosopher, one should allow for these substitutive myths functioning to order disordered experience. Contrary to St. Paul's dictum, adults do not "put away childish things" but only incorporate them into more mature linguistic responses. The ordering drive in adults may be an immature residue articulated in mature symbols at various levels of sophistication, so that protracted self-consciousness about this drive could lead to painful consequences for both individual and society. For most persons, most of the time, there is little if any consciousness about this muted intelligence. During times of extreme crisis—the present nuclear age being one such period—the fundamentals of order are probed consciously, however, as men inquire again into why there need be a last say and why consent to a political order which represents this last say proves necessary. As Lawrence Durrell notes about the effects of war in one of his novels,

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[3] In McIlwain's *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 1, he quotes from Rousseau: "if in the civil order there can be any rule of administration legitimate and sure" (*Social Contract*, Book I, Introduction).

[4] See Rousseau's Troisième lettre à Malesherbes, 26 janvier, 1762 (Hachette ed., X, 304–6), as cited in Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. by Peter Gay (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 95; Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, La Transparence et L'obstacle* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957), passim. As Starobinski warns in another place, however, the relationships between Rousseau's political theory and "les tendances les plus singulières de sa personalité," should not pretend to explain the originality of his philosophy, but only to connect the needs of personality to the needs of philosophy. "La pensée politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," in *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. by Samuel Band-Bovy *et al.*, (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1962), p. 99.

[5] *Personal Knowledge* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 77ff.

> He was not to know, however, how much worse than simple death a war could be, with its power to deaden and whip the sensibility into emptiness; he was not to foresee the dreadful post-war world which became a frantic hunt, not for values, but for the elementary feelings upon which any sense of community is founded.[6]

III. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE

The third problem relevant to the present discussion is how language functions in situations of authority and obligation. In the case of obligation and consent, it is suggested that words are important *as words* only in that they represent symbolically and artificially an order which exists nowhere in the actual daily lives of persons, but an order that creates satisfactions out of all proportion to its actuality. This means that the concepts of obligation and consent, together with their more mundane, colloquial equivalents, function to satisfy emotionally, esthetically, intellectually, and so on, without necessarily describing actual political life. Or better still, the fashioning of such substitutive myths forms part—maybe a large part—of political reality. Hence, when we say there is a "need" for order, a "need" for final authority, we are not saying that order and authority tangibly exist at all times and places, but that the needs do. These needs arise out of the experience of life, from the unfulfilled expectations for order which must be acted out to their perfection, first in gestures and later in speech, perhaps only because man shares with other animals an inarticulate intelligence as a creature who participates in etiquettes for the joy and from the habit of it.

Man, a participating, recreating animal, is a political animal. But at this level—and the small child is not far-removed from the chimpanzee in level of inarticulate intelligence—even some of the non-human animals are political. What we ascribe to the political, however, is a rich symbolism built upon advanced languages and cultures, strictly human enterprises. But what *explains* our perennial return to issues of consent, obligation and final authority may be pre-discursive, stretching back before the advent of the individual and collective civilized accretions we have today, as Rousseau once made clear. If this be true, then we may express this explanation in linguistic forms without having to analyze only the language for clues to this explanation. Language provides a screen through which such primordial experiences pass. Except in the sense that we habitually identify politics with talk and only man talks, man may not be the only political animal. Or at least man is not a political animal because he alone possesses the gift of discursive speech. I am arguing that Oxford philosophy may raise vital questions, as Professor Pitkin has demonstrated, but the ultimate answers to these questions (barring the inevitable fact that adult humans usually answer questions in linguistic forms) need not yield linguistic explanations. It satisfies me that man needs political order of some kind, but I am not sure that we have yet answered why there is this need. The simple explanation offered here is but another attempt.

IV. WHY OBEY?

Yet why should we obey public authority? Why not turn our backs on pre-discursive, inarticulate modes of intelligence? The answer to this may be put in the form of another question. Could most people afford to turn their backs, even if they wished? One obeys because of the personal repercussions of not obeying. But these repercussions may involve psychic discomforts as well as physical punishments, related to both the well-known intolerance for disobedience exhibited by public officials and to the psychological durability of given individuals. In other words, some are more capable of disobedience than others, they tolerate the ambiguities attendant upon not fulfilling their expectations through allegiance to rules of political games; that is, their capacities for independent decisions are greater. Yet is there not a threshold for *every* person, or for the vast majority of persons, beyond which unstable political expectations can lead to psychological anomalies and even mental illness?[7] Conversely, is there any guarantee that those most tolerant of ambiguity are actually the healthiest psychological specimens? Granting the interdependence of culture and personality, could it be that this threshold of tolerance for disorder is lower in nations with long traditions of obligation and consent, and hence long histories of orderly existence? Why men should feel obliged to obey public authority and why they should consent even tacitly to such obligation may be matters as much for the clinical psychologist as for the political scientist and philosopher. Or perhaps, as I have suggested elsewhere, the history of political theory has long concerned itself with such clinical questions.[8] It seems doubtful that the subjects of consent and obligation, any more than the question of power, can escape these considerations. No doubt, all three subjects, consent, obligation and power, are closely related. Though one may not be able to state why, in every circumstance, one ought to obey a law, one might be able to specify in given times and places, why persistent feelings of obligation endure, and to predict why, under given conditions, this or that person must obey.[9]

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[6] The Dark Labyrinth (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1962), p. 62.

[7] Two thought-provoking articles on the psychology of obedience among Americans have been published by Stanley Milgram. See his "Be-

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the long dialogue about obligation in the history of Western political thought may be an inescapable aspect of the connection between culture and personality. Thus, symbol and psyche continuously interact, with psychic needs dominating in most instances simply because most persons do not worry excessively about linguistic problems. But in crisis times the interaction between word and need becomes more apparent, calling our attention once again to the fact that how we express ourselves politically limits our imagination and hence our field of action. Here the political philosopher performs his vital role as the Socratic midwife of ideas. This periodic reexamination of political terms proves necessary for the survival of mankind. Cultures change, issuing new political challenges for human survival. Only by articulating these challenges and then re-opening the matter of how we shall respond to them, do we gain some measure of autonomy.

But the autonomy we gain is never complete for anyone, and remains only a potential for most. Linguistic analysis, the province of philosophers, opens again the question of obligation and consent, as the question must be explored in an age threatened by nuclear destruction, but the answer to the question comes not only from philosophy but from the behavioral, habitual dimensions of political life. As the utopians have seen, answers to political questions flow from the environment as much, if not more, than they do from individuals. To change our political point of view, therefore, we must concentrate on forces working for heteronomy in nature and society, as well as on forces tending toward autonomy in the individual. Environmental factors may largely be out of the reach of articulate, linguistic intelligence, the philosophic domain, but well within the province of inarticulate intelligence, the behavioral area. For an answer to the question, "What ought to be done in politics?"—a question at the base of political ethics—a synthesis between philosophy and behavioral science may prove invaluable.

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havioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67 (1963), pp. 371–378; and "Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority," *Human Relations*, 18 (1965), pp. 57–76.

[8] "The Clinical Approach to Organization Theory," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (August, 1965), pp. 215–234, at 220.

[9] See for example, Margaret Mead, "Public Opinion Mechanisms Among Primitive Peoples," in *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. by Daniel Katz *et al*. (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 87–94; and Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), Part Four.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Now I know how the Republicans felt in November 1964. Aghast. I know also what it is to be apathetic in a political process. Frustrated. I know, moreover, what one must be to read the REVIEW. A mathematician.

Yes, I do remember that you sent me a questionnaire some time ago asking my preference as to the type and variety of articles I would like to see in future issues of the REVIEW. I was apathetic. I didn't return the questionnaire. I relied on the good taste and vision of others who took the trouble to fill out that questionnaire and return it. Now I am frustrated. My preferences are among what was manifestly the minority of responses you did receive. I am aghast.

This outburst of passion from one apathetic, still, small voice is a plaintive cry for reason. It is a direct result of an evening spent reading the September issue. There is but one article in it—I'll not specify which one—that does not read as though written with the aid of a computer, or in some cases, actually written by a computer itself. Moreover, that computer was programmed to turn out lower-case Greek letters, mathematic symbols, and such recurrent cant words and phrases as "stochastic," "probabilistic," "cognitive dissonance," "decision-making processes," "simulation," "variance," and more.

May I make a belated suggestion? It is a suggestion, I realize now, that should have been on your questionnaire. Could future issues of the REVIEW come out in two editions? One of these could continue to be called the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. It would carry articles dealing with political science. For the other edition I offer the title *American Computer Fondlers' Review*. It would carry articles of the type represented by most of those in the September issue.

C. W. HARRINGTON

Seattle, Washington

(EDITOR'S NOTE: "Observe always that everything is the result of a change, and get used to thinking that there is nothing Nature loves so well as to change existing forms and to make new ones like them": Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*.)

TO THE EDITOR:

Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field ("Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, June, 1966) apparently wish to test the proposition that one can predict the incidence of certain forms of government (nonpartisanship, the council-manager system, at-large elections) and certain urban policies (broad civil service coverage, comprehensive planning, and large expenditures on urban renewal) by knowing the proportion of foreign stock in a city's population in 1960. Naturally, they don't think that every city that is more than half foreign stock will have all the above attributes, but they think (page 312 of their article) that "it is not untenable to assume" that there will be a "statistical association" between the proportion of foreign stock and certain institutions and policies.

We leave to the reader to decide for himself how plausible such a theory is. For ourselves, we find it rather implausible. It is hard to believe that anyone should suppose that one variable, in large cities operating under the constraints of state law and coping with diverse traditions, economies, personalities, migration patterns, party organizations, historical accidents, leaders, and issues, could be the cause of the pattern of institutions and policies of those cities. We are not surprised to learn that the theory is easily disproved.

What we cannot leave to the reader is the suggestion, advanced by Wolfinger and Field with no justification that we can find, that this theory is in fact *our* theory. It is not. It is true, as our critics point out, that some passages in *City Politics* are vaguer than they should be. But if one wishes to clarify and test our theory, surely the procedure is not to assume that no clarification is necessary, that every person of foreign stock is an "ethnic," that each ethnic shares a common "ethos," and that once those ethnics find themselves in the majority they will proceed at once to write into law their shared preference for certain institutions and policies. Wolfinger and Field state that two passages in *City Politics* suggest that we share the Wolfinger-Field interpretation of our theory but on examining the pages in question (55 and 169), we find the word "ethos" is not even mentioned and that, indeed, the two passages contain a summary, not of *our* theory, but of (in the first instance) Oliver William's typology of city governments and (in the second) Edgar Sherbenou's analysis of council-manager cities in Illinois.

We make certain assertions about *attitudes*, not institutions. Our theory suggests that certain groups, provisionally defined along lines of income and ethnicity, have conflicting views about the nature and purpose of politics; one of these sets of attitudes evaluates political action principally in terms of benefits to oneself and one's family, the other takes important account of what the person conceives to be the good of the community "as a whole."

Our theory does not assert that the attitudes in question will be translated into institutional form. What we do say is that when an issue arises the cleavage will be along the lines described. That Boston, for example, has not discarded the nonpartisan system that was foisted upon it by the Yankee-dominated legislature many years ago does not prove that the "immigrant ethos" has not prevailed in that that city at various times since; it may be that "immigrant ethos" politicians found ways of turning nonpartisanship to their advantage or that they compromised, giving it up in order to have something that they wanted even more.

Even if Wolfinger and Field thought it proper to expect our ethos theory to predict the distribution of institutions from the distribution of ethnic attributes (omitting the intervening steps of attitude formation, issue development, and policy leadership), we find it incredible that they should assume that the proper measure of "ethos" is the proportion of foreign stock in a population. This throws into one category upper-class Jews and lower-class Polish Catholics, French Canadians and English Canadians, northern urban Germans and southern rural Italians. Small wonder that the relative size of such a heterogenous group shows little or no relationship with whether a city has a nonpartisan ballot—especially since the ballot was probably adopted thirty or forty years ago and the "ethnics" are measured in 1960. (The same can be said of the residual group—the "Americans"—into which Wolfinger and Field lump Boston Yankees, Ozark mountaineers, Texas oilmen, poor Negroes, and Iowa farmers.) If we are guilty of loose writing, they are right to correct us (though in the book and article we try to distinguish among at least some of these groups); if they want to test our hypotheses, however, they ought not to make up their own and then claim they took them from us.

If Wolfinger and Field want to try to disprove our theory, rather than one of their own which they father upon us, one way to do it would be to show that when the issues in question have arisen the Anglo-Saxon Protestant upper-middle class and the "newer races" have not been on the (opposite) sides predicted. They might, for example, look at the activists who supported and opposed the measures in question. The element of ethos is easier to identify from leadership behavior than from aggregate voting data. Voting data are relevant, of course, providing that the Anglo-Saxon Protestant upper-middle-class voters can be distinguished from the "immigrant ethos" ones. But one should not expect to understand a vote taken perhaps 50 years ago by looking at the proportion of the city's population that is of foreign stock now.

An even better way of trying to disprove our theory would be to show by attitudinal research that the Anglo-Saxon Protestant upper-middle-class and the "newer races" do not in fact have the pattern of ideas and values that our theory alleges. Showing this would not prove that they did not have these ideas and values 50 years ago, of course, but it would certainly mean that present-day voting, even if it exhibits the pattern predicted by the theory, cannot be explained by it.

Unfortunately, these tests cannot be applied merely by feeding figures from the *Municipal Yearbook* and like sources into a computer. Nevertheless, we have been doing our best in various ways to disprove our theory. Our study of voting behavior on municipal public expenditures (this REVIEW, December, 1964) tested some aspects of it. (Incidentally, although Wolfinger and Field cite this article they do not come to grips with its findings.) In studies that are as yet unpublished, we have examined voting behavior on a variety of non-expenditure municipal issues. Currently we are making an attitudinal survey in two cities. Eventually, perhaps, the theory will be found wanting—although so far we have little reason to think so—but at least it will have had a fair trial.

We take it somewhat amiss that our objections to Wolfinger and Field's procedures were not put before the readers of the REVIEW along with their article. One of us (Wilson) pointed out to the authors nine months before the article appeared that the theory they were discussing was not ours. If they did not feel disposed to revise the article, they might at least have noted our objections in a footnote. Instead they blandly thank Wilson for "advice and comments," make a *pro forma* declaration (p. 311) that the "ethos theory does not refer to the actual incidence" of government forms and policies, and then go right ahead to assert (pp. 324–325) that their findings upset our theory. We find this kind of behavior in scholars very hard to understand.

JAMES Q. WILSON
EDWARD C. BANFIELD
Harvard University

To the Editor:

We found Wilson's comments on our first draft helpful and thought it polite to thank him for them, but we did not feel obliged to revise the article to reflect his views rather than ours.

There are two main points at issue: what Banfield and Wilson said in *City Politics*, and what would constitute valid procedures for verifying their propositions.

One of the "three main lines of analysis" in *City Politics* "concerns the political ethos and emphasizes the fundamental cleavage between the public-regarding, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, middle-class ethos and the private-regarding, lower-class, immigrant ethos" (p. 329). "Public-regardingness" includes preferences for the various governmental forms and policies mentioned in the first paragraph of the preceding letter. "People who are decidedly public-regarding or decidedly private-regarding on one matter tend to be so on all matters" (*ibid.*). Earlier studies reported that cities with "private-regarding" governmental institutions had larger foreign-stock populations. Banfield and Wilson cited these studies in support of their theory, apparently untroubled by doubts about their relevance. Their second thoughts on this score seem to have come only after reading our study, which found no such relationships. Unlike the studies which they cited, we did control for such factors as state laws, region, city size, and other population characteristics.

Not only did Banfield and Wilson accept these earlier findings as support for their theory, they also asserted on pages 55 and 169 that the preferences of a city's residents would be reflected in its governmental forms and policies. While we agree that both passages are "vaguer than they should be," it is difficult to find in either of them support for the present claim that they represent the thought of Williams and Sherbenou rather than that of Banfield and Wilson.

We did not attribute to Banfield and Wilson the belief that one variable is "the cause" of cities' institutions and policies, but we did read *City Politics* as saying that the prevailing ethos in a city is of some importance in this respect. The basic issue is the validity of our assumption (which also used to be Banfield and Wilson's) that there is a relationship between the attitudes of a city's residents and the nature of its institutions and policies. Banfield and Wilson's letter seems to deny that the impact of the dominant ethos can be discerned through the tangle of other independent variables. As we said, we think that if the "public-regarding" and "private-regarding" ethics are as important as Banfield and Wilson assert, their effects should be observable in the aggregate, if the data analysis includes the controls that we used. The 1960 foreign-stock population, incidentally, is a fairly accurate reflection of cities' composition over the past two generations, with the exceptions noted in our article.

We agree that the foreign-stock population includes a vast and disparate array of social types, as does the category of "old American." These two groupings are so broad as to be meaningless. We said as much in our article. But until now, Banfield and Wilson have taken the opposite position. In *City Politics* they said that the first hypothesis "that might be derived from our discussion of ethos" is "that in all social classes the proportion of voters who are decidedly public-regarding is higher among Protestants than among other ethnic groups" (p. 235). Throughout the book upper-middle-class Jews are said to be as "public-regarding" as Protestants, and there are one or two terse and casual suggestions that Polish-Americans are particularly likely to be "private-regarding." Their subsequent article extended this latter characterization to people of Czech descent. Otherwise, Banfield and Wilson have not heretofore distinguished among various kinds of ethnics or old-stock Americans. We are pleased that they have come around to our point of view.

It is also a good thing that they are now doing research to verify their theory. Their finding that voters of Polish and Czech descent tend to be opposed to municipal expenditures in Cuyahoga County and Chicago is interesting, but it is not evidence that these voters are also opposed to the city manager plan, nonpartisan elections, or any of the other alleged elements of "public-regardingness." We are also pleased that Banfield and Wilson share our belief in the need for clarifying their theory; pages 306–310 and 324–326 of our article should be of some help to them.

Raymond E. Wolfinger
John Osgood Field
Stanford University

To the Editor:

I'd like to add a long footnote to a long footnote in Jack Walker's, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," (this Review, June, 1966). In footnote 13, Walker cites Herbert McClosky's "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," as furnishing important data to support the view that it is elite consensus and the apathy of relatively "undemocratic" masses that makes contemporary "democracy" work. McClosky's conclusions are questionable at many points, but there are two issues raised by his article which are closely related to Walker's critique and which I want to comment on.

First is the question: where does the trouble come from, when and if "democracy" is not practiced, or is threatened? Despite his more general position that mass apathy is functional for democracy, McClosky points out that there are risks involved when large numbers of people do not "grasp the essential principles" of the Constitution. As examples of these risks, he cites support for Senator McCarthy, the John Birch Society and the Impeach Earl Warren campaign. Within the context of his argument, "these risks" appear to be examples of what may happen when previously apathetic, confused masses become politically involved. And yet it seems clear that the activities of dissatisfied "elite" groups have played a significant role in such causes. Can one discuss McCarthyism without noting the role of public officials and party activists in encouraging and condoning his activities! Can one discuss the Birch Society without noting sympathy it receives from elected officials, not to mention delegates at the 1964 Republican convention. (It would be fascinating to know if McClosky's data might look different if based on the 1964 rather than the 1956 conventions.) Can one deal with the Impeach Earl Warren campaign without noting the widespread attacks on the Supreme Court by prominent elected officials and political activists? These phenomena are not merely examples of *mass* support for "undemocratic" causes. The point is this: McClosky's argument tends toward an oversimplified picture of "democracy" maintained by political elites while threatened from time to time by nonpolitical masses. He fails to take into account the other side of the picture: the damage that can be done, both passively and actively, by relatively small numbers of "undemocratic" political activists.

The second point concerns McClosky's assumption that America is, in fact, a "democracy." This assumption is nowhere discussed and the failure to discuss it leads to confusion. If we simply assume "democracy" exists, then, given McClosky's data, it seems natural to conclude that this existence must be related to elite behavior, since elites seem to have the more democratic attitudes. If, on the other hand, we assume America falls seriously short of approximately democratic norms in certain areas, then we cannot be sure what conclusions to draw from McClosky's data. Perhaps the elite is responsible for these failures to achieve democracy, perhaps not. Carrying this point a step further: in an area such as social and ethnic equality where failure to approximate democratic norms is infamous, McClosky's data indicate both elite and mass public divided around the 50% mark—for and against. What does this tell us about where the responsibility for failure lies? Not very much. To create "democracy" by assumption, as McClosky does, prematurely closes crucial questions for those concerned with *concretely* relating mass and elite behavior to the degree of "democracy" achieved in particular areas. It is good that Walker, Christian Bay and others have re-opened these matters.

LEWIS LIPSITZ
University of North Carolina

TO THE EDITOR:

In his "Summary Report" (this REVIEW, 60, 354–365), Dr. Deutsch advances conclusions and prescriptions which are fraught with far-reaching implications for the foreign and national security policies of the United States. The following comments are addressed to the evidence which Dr. Deutsch adduces in support of said conclusions and prescriptions.

Although, under the rubric Evidence, Dr. Deutsch refers (p. 355) to findings derived from the analysis of the French, West German, British and American elite press; public opinion polls; surveys of arms control proposals; and a collection of "aggregative data about actual behavior," he bases his conclusions mainly and explicitly upon evidence derived from elite interviews conducted in the summer of 1964. Among the various kinds of evidence adduced, this item occupies by far the relatively largest space of the "Summary." Its salience can be easily derived by coding. Indeed, Dr. Deutsch's quantitative and literary emphasis leaves no doubt about the heavy weight he assigns to the evidence of elite interviews 1964.

According to Dr. Deutsch, these interviews were conducted with 147 French and 173 West German respondents. Although he writes (p. 358) that these interviews "are discussed at considerable length elsewhere," he does not disclose the place where this lengthy discussion can be found. He does not provide any information on the criteria for the selection of the aforementioned respondents, for the choice of season and calendar year, and the structure, if any, of the interviews. His samples seem unduly small, raising questions as to whether Dr. Deutsch's research design is well grounded in statistical and sampling techniques. The "Summary" does not furnish any answers to some formidable epistemological questions. Of these, the one about the appropriate determination of equivalences—how, for example, do the values of the French and the German elite equate with each other—is one of the most puzzling. Dr. Deutsch may have answered this question to his and everybody else's satisfaction. Yet, in order to obtain professional acceptance, Dr. Deutsch's findings, as set forth in the "Summary," would have to be supported by an explicit statement of the operations which he employed in adjusting his tabulations to cultural divergencies. There are significant differences in the formation and the value patterns, the location in the social structure and the political role of the French and the German elite respectively. Upon these, Dr. Deutsch does not dwell, leaving his solution to the most difficult problem of cross-national opinion surveys to the reader's imagination. Certainly, in the "Summary," the basis for inferring from elite survey to national attitudes is not made explicit. From the "Summary," it is impossible to ascertain whether the composition of Dr. Deutsch's samples provided for sufficient sub-samples for each identifiable relevant element in the respective national elites.

It is not clear from his wording whether Dr. Deutsch bases his Conclusions, specifically Conclusion 3 entitled "The Desire for Wider Arms Control and Disarmament" (p. 364), upon a common Franco-German elite consensus or upon some kind of congruent consensus of each nation's elite groups. In either case whatever he does conclude could become meaningful only if it were derived from the consensus of elite groups that are equivalent. Apparently unimpressed by the peculiar properties of his samples, Dr. Deutsch proceeds to infer, without further explicating such procedure, a *European* and not merely a separate or joint French and German consensus. Under Conclusion 5, entitled "The Possible European Support for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," (p. 364) Dr. Deutsch writes—his words being reproduced here without deletion in order to foreclose any "out of context" misunderstanding—as follows:

> Under these conditions of European politics, the most nearly acceptable approach to arms control and disarmament might be an international agreement limiting the possession of nuclear weapons to those five powers now possessing them: the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Communist China.
>
> These five are the governments in control of the five countries whose special importance is recognized in the United Nations Charter by giving them the status of Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council. The legal status of Communist China is currently blocked in this respect, but her acquisition of a nuclear device has been tacitly tolerated by all other nuclear powers; and an explicit or tacit nuclear modus vivendi with Communist China does not seem unacceptable to European leaders.

As will be noted, the alleged consensus of French and German elite groups—or is it a Franco-German elite consensus?—now becomes the consensus of "European leaders." Leaving aside the question as to what is meant by "European leaders," it suffices here to point out that none of the research procedures of Dr. Deutsch's study, as set forth in the "Summary," has as its stated purpose the investigation of what "European leaders," as a class, do or do not find acceptable about anything—not to speak of "an explicit or tacit modus vivendi with Communist China." I venture to presume that the set of wide-ranging conclusions advanced under #5, are based upon Dr. Deutsch's intuitive judgment. There is nothing wrong about intuitive judgments in matters of international politics, for most really important international issues are not as yet susceptible to any other kind of judgment. A conclusion intuitively arrived at and unsupported by empirical data should be clearly distinguished from the kind of insights which as elaborate a methodological apparatus as that designed by Dr. Deutsch and his associates is supposed to afford.

My uneasiness about exactly how relevant are Dr. Deutsch's conclusions to that immensely complex composite of French, German and European attitudes, elite or "mass," is not diminished by discrepancies between his findings and mine based upon hundreds of open-ended interviews accorded me, in various seasons of the last three years, by British, French, German, Italian, Greek, Dutch, Portuguese, Monagasque and other European leaders.

Particularly striking is the discrepancy between Dr. Deutsch's findings and mine on issues which he subsumes under the heading "Attitudes Toward Arms Control," sub-heading "The Lack of Popular Support for National Nuclear Deterrents and MLF Proposals" (p. 363). Be it noted that the evidence specifically adduced by Dr. Deutsch for "lack of *popular* support" (the italics are mine) consists of elite data, i.e., data obtained from interviews with the aforementioned 147 French and 173 West German respondents. How Dr. Deutsch deduces from these somewhat parsimonious samples, drawn from a far from homogeneous population, the attitudes of some 50 million Frenchmen and some 60 million Germans, this formidable and intriguing operation is not explained. Dr. Deutsch writes (p. 363) as follows:

> . . . Although clear majorities reject the main arguments in favor of a national nuclear deterrent, French respondents are exactly divided between 46 per cent who feel that such a deterrent still is worth its cost, and the same proportion who feel that it is not.
>
> There is no such division in West Germany, where the thrifty rejection of a national nuclear deterrent as not worth its cost is backed by a *landslide majority* of 95 per cent of the 163 German respondents commenting on this point. (italics added). . . .

From the subsequent discussion (p. 363) we learn that only a small minority of the French respondents who volunteered comment, favor "a multilateral force under NATO," while this proposal—presumably the aborted one for a fleet of surface vessels armed with Polaris missiles and manned by mixed crews—"divides the (German) elites exactly." According to Dr. Deutsch, a European multilateral force "would be more popular among the elites in France," whereas, in Germany, a "solid 80 per cent express their opposition." Notwithstanding these disparate proportions Dr. Deutsch holds that the "pattern of responses suggests that neither French nor German elites are pressing at this time for nuclear weapons, either national or collective. . . . "

It is upon these findings that Dr. Deutsch rests his most important conclusion as regards the desire of French, German and West European public opinion for "worldwide measures of arms control" (p. 365). This desire offers, according to the concluding sentence of the "Summary," valuable opportunities for American leadership—opportunities that "must be weighed carefully in the balance against any policy of predominant or unlimited commitments on the continent of Asia."

Now I have no idea as to the specific questions which Dr. Deutsch's interviewers put to their French and German respondents. I can only approximate some of these questions by inferences derived from his summaries of the responses; others such as those the interviewers must have asked about United States "unlimited commitments" in Asia, I desist from seeking to unravel, for the "Summary" does not refer to any relevant responses.

On the face of it, Dr. Deutsch's findings appear to be fraught with ambiguities which might well be rooted in the interviewing strategy. The following example will suffice to to show why Dr. Deutsch's findings should be viewed with caution, if not with skepticism:

"Clear majorities" in France and Germany may have rejected—and, as far as I know may still reject—the arguments in favor of a "national nuclear deterrent." In the case of France this rejection might well be prompted, as the available literature seems to indicate, by the belief of a large number of Frenchmen that the effectiveness of the "national deterrent" does not stand in any sensible relationship to the cost. In the case of Germany, such cost-effectiveness calculations are probably not being made at all, and, for good measure, are irrelevant anyway. By conventions and agreements concluded when the Federal Republic joined the West European Union and thus achieved its present sovereign status, West Germany unilaterally pledged itself not to acquire biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Educated Germans who, when asked whether they wanted to acquire nuclear weapons, will answer with an emphatic "yes," are about as hard to find as Americans who, when asked as to whether they favor violating the American Constitution, will answer in the affirmative. For this same reason, it should surprise no one that hardly any Germans now back the "project" of a "European multilateral nuclear force, independent of NATO," which "project," incidentally, has not yet been elaborated by any European government. In view of the WEU restrictions on Germany, such a force would be either a Franco-British force or, more likely, the French "force of dissuasion." It is difficult to see why any sane German should opt for such a solution which would seal his country's second-rate status, and exchange the U.S. nuclear umbrella for the minuscule French nuclear handkerchief. Furthermore, the German public's lukewarm reaction, as noted by Dr. Deutsch, to the MLF proposal, cannot be explained, as suggested by him, by a popular craving for arms control and disarmament. Rather it flows from a most comprehensible and justified skepticism towards the military worth of the proposed contrivance and the wide realization that a MLF would not give Germany any tangible share in nuclear weaponry or the making of strategic decisions. Exactly the same considerations hold for any other type of "multilateral nuclear force under NATO" *under the veto of the American President and under the provisions of WEU as now enforced.*

It would be interesting to know as to whether Dr. Deutsch's interviewers asked their respondents' views on the national or collective European or NATO possession of *defensive* nuclear weapons such as nuclear land mines and short range missiles, ground to ground and ground to air, armed with low-yield nuclear warheads. From the available literature it appears that important segments of the French and German elites do desire the possession of such weapons and would not cavil were present restrictions removed on such weapons of limited, non-aggressive purpose.

More important still, does any bare statement about European desires for possessing nuclear weapons or for being rid of them tell us all that matters about European attitudes towards nuclear and nuclear-related questions? Of course, it does not. Although a "plurality" or a "majority" of French elite respondents might "reject the main arguments for a nuclear deterrent," the great majority of all Frenchmen, elite and mass, want to keep their country in the business of nuclear and nuclear-related chemical and electronic research and development. Not being the least abnormal, they want to share in those scientific and technological advances which determine with considerable finality a country's present and future place in international economic competition and world politics. That similar, if not exactly identical aspirations motivate the British and the Germans as well as the people of any other major European industrial country, this fact can be easily ascertained from the professional literature as well as the statements of leading politicians, businessmen, scientists and the editorials of the press. Whether these aspirations can or can not be reconciled with the "Summary's" alleged "Desire for Wider Arms Control and Disarmament" or the "Possible European Support for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," is another matter. Certainly, Dr. Deutsch's findings and conclusions do not shed light upon it.

In sum, the Conclusions appended to the "Summary" are based upon inadequate evidence and are concerned with some, but by no means all the issues that need be explored in order to provide an adequate assessment of the outlook for "Arms Control in the European Political Environment." In any case, it would have been better if Dr. Deutsch had made available to the readers of this REVIEW the complete context of his findings rather than the "Summary" which lends itself to polemical exploitation rather than furthering the dissemination of empirically developed new knowledge.

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ

University of Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR:

In one respect I must take issue with Hans Morgenthau's review of my book *Power Transformed* in the June REVIEW. I nowhere suggest that "political power is evil" or that "the rational means of getting rid of political power are at hand." Such anarchistic viewpoints are wholly anathema to me. I nowhere suggest that there is a "qualitative equation of man's power over nature and man's power over man," if I understand his meaning here. On the contrary, in this and other books of mine, I emphasize the contrast between our increasing technological efficiency and our persistent political inefficiency. The contrast was never so glaringly exposed as in the age of atomic energy.

"Technological change," says Professor Morgenthau, "is in essence politically ambivalent." In essence, perhaps—but not wholly. I express the optimistic note—contrary to scholarly mores—that the nuclear bomb is a major deterrent against future world wars.

R. M. MACIVER

Palisades, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

In the September, 1966, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, I read with interest Mr. Jay Goodman's review of my recent book, *Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs.* His use at various points of such adjectives as "refreshing" and "excellent" to describe my monograph were gratifying; however, I must respond to two observations made by Mr. Goodman.

In describing Childs's model of municipal government, I employ the term "machine model," for that is the terminology of scientific management or Taylorism of which Childs's thinking is a part. Mr. Goodman reveals, I believe, his own void in this area by confusing the "machine model" of Taylorism with the "machine" of big city politicos. Informed students of urban politics, and American intellectual history, should not be confused by these terms and their completely unrelated meanings.

My major concern with Mr. Goodman's analysis is that he brushes aside empirical findings, which reveal the inconsistencies of council-manager doctrine and practice, with the apparent conclusion that since council-manager government has been "widely adopted," never mind the facts. Those of the behavioral persuasion will find that kind of attitude utterly untenable, for if facts are at odds with doctrine political *scientists* will want to know that, and they will not be deterred by sloganeering about "success." In brief, claims of "victory" for a political institution, such as council-manager government, are no substitute for empirical and scientific analyses.

JOHN P. EAST

East Carolina College

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Responsible Electorate. BY V. O. KEY, JR. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xxi, 158.)

It is a great tragedy that V. O. Key did not live to complete his brilliant contribution to American scholarship. Uniquely in his generation of political scientists, he combined a profound knowledge of the institutional structure of American politics with a sure grasp of quantitative methods and a sophisticated interest in the developing promise of "behavioral" research. As a respected elder statesman in a field largely populated by younger men, he filled a role which no one has inherited from him. His premature death was a great loss to all those concerned with a systematic understanding of political behavior.

V. O. Key left unfinished a short manuscript in which he had undertaken to use polling data from the presidential elections of 1936 through 1960 to assess the influence of "issues, events and candidates" "on the movements of voters across party lines." Milton Cummings has completed the five chapters of exposition; the concluding chapter, unfortunately, remains a bare two pages of notes on which Key apparently intended to expand. Professor Arthur Maass has written a brief forward.

Since we do not know how Key would have summarized the data with which his book deals we cannot properly assess his argument. It is clear, however, that he intended to demonstrate that "voters are not fools" and that they are indeed "moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality." There is some reason to believe that he meant this book as an antidote to what he took to be overstatements growing out of empirical revelations of ignorance and disinterest among the electorate. It is interpreted as such by Professor Maass who greets the book as "a happy event for those who are optimistic about democracy."

Is political man rational, as Professor Maass concludes from Key's data? If this statement is intended to mean that the average citizen carefully informs himself on questions of governmental policy and votes for the party or candidate who comes closest to his own ideological pattern, the answer is certainly no. The answer is still no if one considers only that minority of the electorate who move from one party slate to another from one election to the next. This has been the repeated finding of careful surveys of the national population, and the data Key presents do not challenge it.

If rational means the ability of the average citizen to respond in ways meaningful to him to the flow of political stimulation which the electorate is subjected to, then he is surely rational. However, this flow of stimulation is heavily weighted with information which bears only indirectly on questions of governmental policy. The personal style of the major figures of both parties, the vagaries of the business cycle, the headlines from Viet Nam or Mississippi, ineptitude or crookedness within the federal bureaucracy; these all contribute to the total input from which the voter's decision derives. But they do not typically involve the voter in questions of alternative policies with which the parties are clearly identified. Success, prosperity, honesty and efficiency are not partisan issues in the sense that one party favors and the other opposes them. They may, however, have a powerful impact on the electorate and on the tenure of the party which is currently in power. As Key observes, the minority party "gains votes most notably from among those groups who are disappointed by, who disapprove of, or who regard themselves as injured by, the actions of the Administration."

Policy alternatives do become identified with partisan choices in some circumstances, sometimes in a highly polarized fashion. Some of the recent contests between conventional racists and moderate integrationists in the South provide dramatic examples. There is also a persistent difference within the national electorate in the attitudes of people who identify as Democrats or Republicans regarding the proper extent of governmental intervention in the nation's social and economic affairs, a difference which disappears completely in the areas of foreign policy and civil rights. And there have been infrequent occasions in American political history (1860, 1896, 1932) when great issues have divided the nation and realigned the underlying political balance for years to come. Despite all this, American elections typically tend to reflect a competition of managements rather than a competition of ideologies. The average voter is far more readily mobilized by criticism of the way the government is being run than by an ideological description of how it ought to be run.

There persists a sentimental attachment to the idealized image of the American election as a great debate in which the contestants present contrasting programs of governmental action to an attentive audience ready to be convinced by the logic of the argument. It is certainly not an image that V. O. Key held and his data demonstrate again how unrealistic an image it is. His tables repeatedly show that the majority of the votes in a presidential election are cast by people who supported the same party in the previous election, that on the average the policy views of these people on socio-economic questions differ in ways consistent with their party's position but in every case with large proportions either having no opinion or being in conflict with their party, that on the average the marginal voters (switching and irregular voters) express attitudes which fall between the party they are moving toward and the party they are moving away from but are less consistent than those of the regular voters of either party, that these marginal voters, although sometimes expressing as much spectator interest in politics as the regular voters, are notably less involved in the outcome of the electoral decision, and that a third of the citizens do not vote at all.

The polling data which Key used in this volume, some of them going back to the early, primitive period of electoral polling, were not adequate in quality or detail to permit him to attempt a comparison of the relative importance of "issues, events and candidates" on the electoral decision. He has reminded us, however, that issues do have significance in American presidential politics even though their force is mingled with the simultaneous influence of the candidates and the ongoing events. It is also apparent from his concluding notes that he recognized the profound effect on all political perceptions and attitudes of the individual citizen's commitment to his party, the great underlying political predisposition which contributes so greatly to the impressive stability of American politics.

ANGUS CAMPBELL

The University of Michigan

The Public Interest, An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Politics. BY RICHARD E. FLATHMAN. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966. Pp. xvi, 197.)

Considering how much Hare, Hart, Rawls, Toulmin, Weldon and others who practice "ordinary language" philosophy have told us about values, I do not find a major frontier-breaking new insight in this book written in the same tradition; but Flathman does continue the culling of bushels of rotten apples of moral discourse, ending up with a stock of sound, relatively unblemished fruit.

His first summary conclusion is:

> . . . "public interest" is a general commendatory concept used in selecting and justifying public policy. It has no general, unchanging, descriptive meaning applicable to all policy decisions, but a nonarbitrary descriptive meaning can be determined for it in particular cases. This descriptive meaning is properly found through reasoned discourse which attempts to relate the anticipated effects of a policy to community values and to test that relation by formal principles. We also conclude that the concept is neither a vacuous phrase nor a verbal device useful only for propaganda purposes. It performs a function in political discourse, and it has a logic which, if taken seriously, will influence the kinds of policies adopted and rejected and the character of the political process utilized to adopt and reject those policies (p. 82).

The second half of the book is an attempt to see whether "reason," as it appears in the term "reasoned discourse" above, can carry the burden assigned to it. "Are there logical or other philosophical difficulties with the argument that reason is relevant to moral decision?" (P. 97.)

Giving reasons for moral judgments would seem to imply either a hierarchy of values or, lacking that, an infinite regress in which "justificatory discourse orbits from consideration to consideration until it returns fruitlessly to the point at which it began" (p. 157). He concedes that there is no established hierarchy of values and achieves some fresh thinking on why we might regret ever succeeding in the long-standing ambition to discover one. In a meticulous examination of what "giving reasons" consists of in the absence of a hierarchy of values, he successfully shows—again with some fresh thinking—that it amounts to more than fruitless orbiting, even though, as he says, there remains an arbitrary element in value judgments (which, he goes on to show, is much smaller and capable of more precise definition than we have thought). All this is done with skill.

To some students of the public interest, the problem of defining the public interest is posed in its most vexatious form because of the irreducible aribitary element that remains in making value judgments. They would say that the arbitary element, even if small, remains a roadblock. They might also point out that the role of reason in defining the public interest is, because of limitations of time and analytical energies, narrower in practice than the broad role that Flathman assigns to it in principle. They may consequently be disappointed in what he has to say about how to deal with irreducible conflicts in men's reasoned judgments about policy values. If I understand Flathman, his proposal is that "all interests for which public protection or support is requested be examined, first by *the individual or group* and then by an authority" (p. 52). In another formulation where he speaks of community values and the likelihood of conflict and diversity among men he says "there will have to be men with the authority to 'speak for' the community" (p. 62). Or, again: "When some decision is necessary and a number of policies satisfy the best available tests of a justifiable policy, the dilemma is resolved by the principle of authority (p. 73). Or, on how to proceed when no single decision is clearly superior, "We then turn to authority to resolve the question" (p. 166). (To avoid misunderstanding I should add that the authority itself is required to justify its decisions by "giving reasons": authority is not intended to inject a non-reasoned element into defining the public interest.) But the role of authority is not developed and remains unsatisfactory.

What might be a better answer to the question for which Flathman's answer is "authority"? He might have considered proposals to define the public interest as the outcome of certain conflict-resolving political processes. This is one of the major alternatives identified in, among other places, Wayne A. R. Leys and Charner Marquis Perry, *Philosophy and the Public Interest*, an excellently documented survey of approaches to the public interest. Or he might have taken a lead from March and Simon's distinction between analytical and political methods of resolving conflict (in their *Organizations*, p. 130). Or he might have looked into the now vast literature on the possibility of rules for aggregating individual preferences, much of which stems from Arrow's *Social Choice and Individual Values*, a literature summarized and extended in Jerome Rothenberg's *Measurement of Social Welfare*. Or, for a philosophical approach closer to his own style of thought, C. W. Churchman's *Prediction and Optimal Decision*.

I mention these illustrative possibilities—most of which would in one way or another give political processes a prominent role in defining the public interest—to indicate types of materials, analytical methods, and topics germane on a number of points to Flathman's inquiry to which I find, with one small exception, no reference in this book. The "public interest" has become a near-impossible subject for comprehensive analysis because an extraordinary variety of approaches have been taken to it and to roughly synonymous concepts. Hence I am not willing to say that Flathman should have incorporated into his work the omitted materials. Noting the omissions helps, however, to specify the confines of his study.

CHARLES E. LINDBLOM

Yale University

Dilemmas of Urban America. By ROBERT C. WEAVER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. 138. $3.50.)

Big City Politics. By EDWARD C. BANFIELD. (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. 149. $1.95.)

Who's Running This Town? Community Leadership and Social Change. By RITCHIE P. LOWRY. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Pp. 250. $5.95.)

As an administrator, an activist, and an intellectual who is on the inside of government, the pressure on the new Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to get things done is overwhelming. For this reason, possibly, Mr. Robert C. Weaver displays a sensitivity and natural resentment toward critics who take the urban renewal program to task because it may not always "renew" or because in the course of its operations, it may displace the poor, the discriminated against and the small businessman. Mr. Weaver acknowledges the limitations of urban renewal as well as the economic and psychological hardships that result from enforced relocations. He emphasizes, however, the many improvements that have taken place in recent years.

Mr. Weaver warns in his *Dilemmas of Urban America* that until there is some consensus about the basic objectives of urban renewal, there is bound to be confusion. Yet, this very confusion reflects the pluralism of our urban society.

In the quest for objectives for urban renewal, there is first and foremost the need to restore dignity to the "other America" plagued by the multiple pathologies of impoverishment, racial discrimination, crime, welfare vegetation and the loss of self-esteem. Undoubtedly the problem here is far more than inadequate housing or the need for urban renewal in a limited or confined sense. It has been observed that as long as there are slum incomes, there will be slums. Mr. Weaver echoes similar sentiments when he states that the cities will rid themselves of slums only when society solves the economic, social and psychological ills that harass man.

Still another important objective of urban renewal is the revitalization of the downtown central business district into a magic city of upper or middle class high rise apartments, skyscraper office buildings and cultural and recreational facilities combined with an industrial-trade-governmental complex. This type of development is far more dramatic than mere housing, normally will produce a higher tax and, most important of all, will be able to obtain the support of "the business and financial power structure of the city." Mr. Weaver is convinced that downtown redevelopment and the planned city are integral components of the multi-purpose urban renewal program.

Less sanguine than Mr. Weaver is Scott Greer who, in his study of *Urban Renewal and the American Cities*, concludes that the renewal program on the local level is heavily biased politically, toward those who control political power and community approval, and economically, toward those who control credit and building. Harold Kaplan's study of Newark would suggest that the urban renewal system is a relatively small and closed circle and that widespread citizen participation in slum clearance politics, far from being necessary, often proves disastrous. In still other instances of urban renewal, as in Hyde Park, the active "liberal" citizens could be coopted by their desire for a better community and by the grandiose concept of an interracial community of high standards. Mike Nichols described the Hyde Park coalition as "Whites and Blacks, shoulder to shoulder against the lower classes." That there are social costs that the poor pay for such programs as urban renewal and expressway planning seems to be undeniable, but in the long run such a price may be justified if the results are such as to "upgrade the shelter and physical environment of the poor and the discriminated against."

The dilemma of urban America is compounded by the race question. The choice generally is between having a large number of non-whites in low cost accommodations or a smaller number of non-whites in moderate or high priced integrated housing. This latter alternative implies the acceptance of a benign quota system. On the other hand, low cost public housing generally becomes exclusively non-white. Rehabilitation, too, for the most part has had the same effect as low cost housing in its perpetuation of existing racial patterns.

There are those who believe that the opportunity for improved housing and better education is more important at this stage of the Negro's development than integration. There are also those who believe that segregation is the primary cause for poor housing and inferior education. The dilemmas are great—the solutions are difficult to come by.

The Negro revolution of today provides ample evidence that the Negro in America like his counterpart in colonial Africa is demanding an effective voice in his own destiny. All of our assistance programs may be faced with the need for complete reorganization so as to accommodate the rising expectations of "participatory democracy." This has already been reflected in the advisory and neighborhood councils of the Economic Opportunity Program, although the degree of success of this participation is most questionable. Whether the poor are qualified to help set policy and even administer such programs is no more relevant than whether the African colonies were ready for independence. Possibly the cry for "Black Power" is but a manifestation of domestic nationalism.

The analogy of the American Negro and the African Negro prior to independence, also holds true regarding the similarity of their outlook toward members of their race who had accommodated to the existing social structure. Somewhere I read that the American Negro is basically a conservative on every subject but race. This was probably said by a middle class Negro about middle class Negroes. It would seem to me that the struggle of the impoverished Negroes is in some respects more of a class struggle than a race struggle—yet there is no doubt but that the additional factor of race is the explosive ingredient. There is always the danger, because of their disillusionment with Negro leaders of the immediate past, that the Negroes may succumb to the leadership of irresponsible demagogues.

One wonders whether there are lessons to be learned from big city politics in dealing not only with the Negro question but with the many dilemmas of urban America. Edward C. Banfield, author of *Political Influence* and co-author with John Q. Wilson of the teachers' prized volume *City Politics*, has edited a small compact study (*Big City Politics*) on the political systems of nine big cities based primarily on the *City Politics Reports* of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University. The latter reports were not finished treatises but systematic collections of raw and semi-interpretated data which it was hoped would provide a kind of data bank for students of comparative local government. Mr. Banfield's conclusions and generalizations are found in the introduction, which is probably the most interesting and meaningful part of the book. Although it is rather difficult as well as hazardous to arrive at generalizations about the nine cities covered in the volume, Mr. Banfield lives dangerously by doing just that.

The author declares that if Lincoln Steffens were alive today, he would not have written *The Shame of the Cities.* The big cities today are run honestly and competently and a number even have outstanding mayors. It would seem that the flight to the suburbs by the civic-minded middle class, and the inundation of the central city by the lower class Negroes and Southern whites, have not caused any deterioration in the quality of city government. On the contrary, the caliber of government has improved. As this reviewer sees it, such a phenomenon may be explained by a variety of factors such as a new public morality, career civil servants and professionals, an alert press, involved interest groups and, possibly, the limited participation and low visibility of the voter. The last observation is not intended to be cynical, but does raise the question whether today's high caliber government personnel because of background, training and orientation are not most responsive to middle class values and middle class groups. To be sure, the charismatic leader or hard-core machine leader in the polyglot central city may nevertheless still be building his own strong following among the masses so as to be able to bypass both party and so-called power structure. In the nine cities covered by Professor Banfield, however, the structure of the political systems tended to create coalitions of moderates. In Atlanta, for example, the mayor's power is said to rest on the business power structure, the good government groups and the Negro community with its large and prosperous middle class.

Conservatism in politics is another factor common to the cities. The author, Mr. Banfield, has concluded that all too frequently urban renewal programs and public work projects are for "business-serving purposes." In most of the cities covered in the book, minority and ethnic groups had little influence while business groups and newspapers were politically influential and generally conservative. Mr. Banfield makes the interesting observation that the man on the street is conservative in local affairs despite the fact that he may have a liberal outlook on state and national affairs. The working class homeowner is by and large more penurious about city expenditures than the middle class homeowner. The economic convert, like the converted atheist turned religious fanatic, may espouse stronger views than one born into a given class. Another less sophisticated and more earthy approach would simply explain the greater fiscal conservatism of the working class homeowner by a lower income which makes him extremely sensitive to the financial pinch of increased taxes.

"The remarkable ability of the cities to manage and contain conflict" is attributed by Professor Banfield principally to the electoral process whereby two candidates in a run-off election must necessarily appeal to a wide spectrum of voters. At the time the author was editing his book, there had been no major racial explosions in any large city for many years. It might well be that until just recently the ability to contain conflict and the "conservatism" discussed above went hand in hand. The mobility of immigrants, the increase in the the living standards of workers and the growth of an affluent middle class, including Negroes, may all have tended towards the establishment of a "nonpartisan" philosophic type of government with its coalition of moderates. I would suppose that mobility or the "expectation of mobility" might have been key concepts in confining conflict because the promised land beckoned. The low income Negro groups were, however, either alienated from or hostile to the social and political structure. They felt the rules were not made for or by them, did not benefit them and most significantly did not bind them. I wonder if riots on the streets might be viewed as activated alienation spurred on by civil rights concessions which only dramtized the gap between ideology and reality.

Urbanization and its ramifications are not confined to the big city. An intriguing and penetrating study of the effects of accelerated urban change upon the hybrid suburban city is dramatically portrayed in Ritchie P. Lowry's *Who's Running This Town?* As applied to Micro City, a small middle class WASP California community, the legend of grass roots democracy in a small town is effectively shattered. In place of the consensus and compromise of the pluralist world, there exist the overtones of an authoritarian community. The dissenter is the enemy and economic, political, and social sanctions bear down upon him so as to isolate and estrange him.

The community's conservative ethic for the preservation of the status quo serves as an ideological weapon for community leaders to deal with rapid social change. The cult of personality—the ability to get along with others—becomes a substitute for political issues. However, the growing gap between ideological myths and social realities results in what Mr. Lowry describes as a condition of collective schizophrenia. A private awareness of the makebelieve world by both the rank and file and the leaders leads to an increasing apathy and alienation in the local arena. Such settings have provided an ample number of converts for nationwide extremist movements.

Professor Lowry in an interesting discussion of leadership typologies refers to the emergence of a special type leader—the mediating leader. The latter plays a crucial role by providing the "group" channels through which opposing interests can interact. Thus a combination of catalyst and activated voluntary organizations become author Lowry's sociological key to the politics of consensus and compromise, and, incidentally, the hope in the future for Micro City's liberation.

Although the small city may be viewed as a microcosmic social laboratory and as such may mirror many of the basic social processes of the big city, there are still missing the countervailing forces of the urban metropolis. In the small community, politics is characterized by everyday face–to–face relationships for many of the participants and consequently results in the almost pathological avoidance of conflict. Yet the sweep of urbanization has brought diverse interests to the small city and like its large urban neighbors it must seek to provide the avenues by which such interests can compete openly in the public arena. Whether interest groups with or without a mediator leader can achieve this objective is a part of the great dilemma of urban America.

EDWARD SOFEN
University of Miami

Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal. BY J. CLARENCE DAVIES III. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 235. $6.75.)

The Politics of Zoning: The New York Experience. BY STANISLAW J. MAKIELSKI, JR. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 241. $6.00.)

These additions to the Metropolitan Politics Series of Columbia University Press complement Sayre and Kaufman's landmark treatise on New York politics, *Governing New York City*. Applying a framework originally suggested by Sayre and Kaufman and frequently referring to the parent work to gain perspective, Davies and Makielski have written case studies in depth which provide welcome supplement to the earlier analysis of New York City politics.

Davies' three cases are excellently chosen. They are rich in contrasts and span the phases of the city's urban renewal program from the steamrolling administration of Robert Moses to the emphasis on neighborhood participation developed in the early 1960's in response to criticism of earlier renewal efforts. Featured in the cast of one case is urban renewal critic Jane Jacobs, who was provided the opportunity to campaign in her own community for the ideals she had expressed in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.

Following an excellent review of the development of the city's urban renewal administration, Davies narrates his cases and then analyzes the attitude formation of neighborhood groups, the relationships between neighborhood groups in urban renewal controversies, and the strategies and resources which determine the relative influence of neighborhood groups in the urban renewal process. The author convincingly accounts for the adoption of strategies by neighborhood leaders and their relative success by examining group access to government officials and the resources determining that access.

The view that urban renewal can proceed by positing a single plan which alone will serve the public interest, and can be undertaken without assisting the residents of the renewal area, has been increasingly criticized by students of urban affairs. To some extent this criticism has been incorporated into public policy, resulting in improvements in relocation practices and a greater emphasis on rehabilitation. In his final chapter, Davies contributes to this chorus by observing that the diminishing importance of party politics in mobilizing community sentiment, and the endemic conflict among neighborhood groups over community development, makes civic planning without neighborhood representation "unfeasible and undesirable." The applicability of Davies' analysis appears to be fairly wide. In two recent surveys conducted for the new Lindsay administration, the desirability of administrative decentralization and representation of neighborhood groups in the decision-making process have been recommended for the city's urban development and poverty programs.

Davies is too modest in claiming relevance for his work. By focusing on neighborhood groups—organized real estate lobbies, shadow front organizations and tenants' associations—he has written a thoughtful study of asphalt-rooted actors in the urban political process. These elements are often inactive in renewal conflicts; when they have played a part in civic controversies, they have rarely received thorough treatment in studies of urban politics. Sayre and Kaufman's work on New York City omitted extensive consideration of the influence of the minor players in the "game." Davies' work helps to fill in the scorecard.

Makielski's historical study traces the evolution of the first comprehensive zoning law in the United States from its development and initial passage in 1916 through various attempts to rewrite zoning regulations. These culminated in the introduction of a new code in 1960. Employing data on the process of influencing zoning politics revealed in this study, the author identifies the major governmental participants in the zoning "system" as determined by formal and informal rules governing zoning practices. He then discusses the nongovernmental actors, nicely differentiating among factions within major interest groups.

In his analysis of strategies in the politics of zoning, Makielski observes that zoning politics shifted significantly in 1938, when the rules of the game were changed by centralizing zoning responsibility in a planning commission and diminishing the power of borough presidents, in whom tendencies toward localism rested. Makielski's recognition of this move toward administrative centralization and reduction of the influence of machine politicians represents the best support for his conclusion that zoning politics mirror the general politics of the city.

Makielski concludes that the zoning "system" in New York is "open," that, quoting Sayre and Kaufman, "the system can justly claim to possess openness, responsiveness, and tolerance as essential characteristics of its democracy." The author stresses this conclusion although he argues convincingly that specialized knowledge and skills, available only to trained professionals, are requisite to participation in the politics of zoning. He further maintains that conflicts are resolved through behavior which he describes as "middle class." Sanctions are leveled against individuals who violate norms of middle-class political behavior.

The author's case for pluralism in zoning politics is based upon the evidence of conflict and compromise among politicians, various factions of the real estate professions, and the civic organizations. More extensive research into noncomprehensive zoning might have provided some insight into the extent to which specialized knowledge and expertise permit groups interested in real estate development to capitalize on the non-participation in zoning politics of large segments of the population. The promise to pay "some attention" to the politics of zoning variances, tendered in the introduction to this volume, is never adequately fulfilled. Following such a path might have clarified the ways in which zoning politics in New York may be appropriately described as open and responsive.

MICHAEL LIPSKY

University of Wisconsin

Toward Fair Employment. BY PAUL H. NORGREN AND SAMUEL E. HILL with the assistance of F. RAY MARSHALL. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964. Pp. xi, 296. $8.50.)

Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination in Employment. BY MICHAEL I. SOVERN. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1966. Pp. ix, 270. $6.00.)

These volumes—welcome additions to the literature of civil rights—inevitably focus more on aspiration than on achievement. Norgren, Hill and Marshall in their study for the Industrial Relations Section of Princeton examine carefully and comprehensively the racial practices of management, unions and government as well as the operations and implications of fair employment committees and commissions. Their analyses of economic, political and legal devices utilized in the battles for and against racial equality in hiring leave the reader with the queasy realization that preachments of gradualism function too often as facades for reinforcement of the status quo. There are any number of reasons why Negroes have not had the same access to job opportunities that whites have had but most of the reasons have a common core of fear and hate. The establishment of fair employment practice commissions has generated some progress but the commissions have been hobbled to a considerable degree by low budgets and restrictive jurisdictions.

Sovern, who is professor of law at Columbia, examines from a lawyer's standpoint the background, implementation and achievements of fair employment practices legislation. He begins with a stark, statistical presentation of the status and costs of racial discrimination through the first half of 1965. He does not leave the reader in doubt as to where his own values lie: "Underlying this whole work is the premise that the law can and should be invoked against racial discrimination in employment. Our nation now seems irreversibly committed to this premise and rightly so." His discussion of the effort to inhibit racial discrimination in employment in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 combines precise legal analysis with social concern. While he applauds the intent of Title VII of the act to encourage conciliation by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, he concludes that compliance with the act's aims will be more likely to stem from enforcement actions by the Attorney General than from the Commission's "misshapen" procedures. The lack of self-starting power and of enforcement power prevents Congress' action, after more than twenty years of deliberation, from serving as more than a potential but still uncertain cure for racial discrimination in hiring.

The studies are complementary in that Sovern builds on many of the observations of Norgren, Hill and Marshall. The unique contribution of *Toward Fair Employment*, however, is its analysis of how racial discrimination can be stamped out in a comparatively brief period of time when determined and imaginative minds are put to the task. Desegregation of the federal military establishment was completed within six years after issuance of President Truman's executive order. Moreover, surveys of attitudes of white soldiers toward Negroes shows that integration has reduced earlier prejudices about race.

Despite the isolated instances of progress, the prospects for immediate total elimination of racial barriers to employment remain bleak. In considerable part this is because of the legacy of earlier discrimination. Norgren, Hill and Marshall point out: "Manifestly the nation's Negro minority cannot aspire to full occupational parity with whites until effective public measures are instituted that will assure equal educational opportunities. Even then full parity cannot be realized until a younger generation of Negroes has had time to avail itself of the full sequence of the improved opportunities." Sovern is equally concerned about the time lag in achieving equal capacities for Negroes at all levels of employment but he explicitly rejects "compensatory discrimination," that is, the selection of less than qualified Negroes to fill spots for which qualified whites are available, as a solution. "To be sure, Negroes as a group are not so well equipped for today's job market as whites," he acknowledges. But he believes that those who would use this fact as justification for favoring Negroes in employment would be guilty of the same fallacy, "stereotypy," as white supremacists who had for so long excluded Negroes from posts for which they were qualified.

Neither volume offers a solution to the qualification gap. The implied solution is patience, but the political scientist has reason to know that an era of social upheaval, supersonic speeds and a host of "instant" products hardly provides an acceptable backdrop for appeals to gradualism. Noble motives no longer substitute for deeds.

If there are no panaceas, are there not at least alternatives to passivity? Sylvia Porter pointed out recently, for example, that whereas we have developed sophisticated techniques for counting and classifying the number of workers looking for jobs, we have done nothing similar with regard to jobs that are looking for workers. Couldn't indices of jobs in quest of workers be developed and programs akin to OCS training schools or intensive language training institutes be developed so that persons with interests in undertaking certain categories of jobs could receive the technical training that would enable them to compete? Perhaps in this way industries would not have to serve as primary schools for disadvantaged populations but could be the recipients of talent development programs designed to meet their personnel needs. *Toward Fair Employment* and *Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination in Employment* provide us with the background and status of a central problem in the American political system. They offer hope in the sense that recognition and confrontation of an issue must be prerequisites to its resolution; but time keeps running out.

VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM
Northwestern University

The Law and Practice of the International Court. BY SHABTAI ROSENNE. (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1965, 2 vol. Pp. xxiii, xi, 998. Dfl. 80.)

Exegit monumentum aere perennius—to paraphrase Horace. This is a monumental work, indeed. Its author is the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office of Israel, a Member of the UN International Law Commission and an Associate of the Institute of International Law. He has represented his country in two cases before the International Court and is the author *inter alia* of *The International Court of Justice* (1957), *The Time Factor in the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice* (1960), *The World Court* (rev. ed. 1963) and numerous articles on the Court.

The work under review is not a mere integration and bringing up to date of the first two books. Because of a "thorough re-examination of all relevant materials" caused by "the Court's extraordinarily rich jurisprudence since 1957," by Dr. Rosenne's personal experience and by "the developing practices in the UN organs concerned with the Court," this is an "entirely new work." It is more than the equal to the late Judge Manley O. Hudson's classic treatise on *The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942* (1943). It does not start where Hudson leaves off but includes the practice of the League and the Permanent Court. Because of what have been termed the "succession clauses" [Articles 36(5) and 37] of the new Statute of the Court and because of the relatively few changes in the Statute, the old material, in principle, is applicable to the new Court.

The subtitle of the 1957 publication "An Essay in Political and Legal Theory" has been rightly omitted. For although Dr. Rosenne still stresses the "interplay of political and legal factors bearing upon the Court" and its function within the system of the settlement of international disputes, the former overemphasis on the political role of the "principal *judicial* organ" of the UN was misleading.

Part I deals with the Court as said "part of the machinery of diplomacy" and includes a chapter on an often overlooked aspect: the post-adjudicative phase, in which the political character of the recourse to adjudication is most evident. Part II discusses the organization of the Court (Judges, finances, property, staff). Parts III and IV analyse the jurisdiction and the practice and procedure in contentious cases, covering 375 out of 760 pages; and Part V the Court's advisory jurisdiction, practice and procedure (110 pages). The Appendices (200 pages) contain *inter alia*: the texts of the Charter, the Statute and the Rules of Court in English *and* French which is very handy; the texts of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and of the declarations accepting the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, with information on their application in concrete cases; and data on the composition of, elections to, and voting in, the Court. There are also a number of useful Indices and now also extensive bibliographical notes.

The two volumes are an exhaustive analysis of the "law and practice" of the Court and, with the appendices and footnotes, are crammed with information which other writers would parade in the text itself. There are surprising statements and omissions (such as the Brazilian decision of August 3, 1944 to be "free . . . of all obligations toward the Permanent Court" or a consideration of the special conditions of the Canadian 1939 restriction of her obligations under her 1929 declaration of acceptance, which I have pointed out elsewhere) but this is still a masterwork indispensable for the theoretician and the practitioner alike.

To complete the documentation on the Court, it would only be necessary to continue Hudson's *World Court Reports*, to bring out a new edition of von Stauffenberg's *Elĕments d'Intĕrpretation* of the Court's Statute *and* Rules and, by the Registry of the Court itself, the proposed collection of texts governing its jursidiction.

SALO ENGEL

The University of Tennessee

The Political System of Chile. BY FEDERICO G. GIL. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. ix, 323.)

It is not easy to explain why books in English about Chilean politics are as scarce as they are. Certainly Chile merits the systematic attention of students of politics. Not only is the country one of the major states of Latin America, but political events in this republic have repeatedly drawn the concerned attention of observers throughout the world. At least three times in the twentieth century—Arturo Alessandri's election to the presidency on a left-wing "Program of Rebellion" in 1920; the formation of the only Popular Front government in the Americas on the chaotic eve of World War II; and the rise of the Christian Democratic movement in our own times to challenge the Communists and other parties of the left—Chile has provided major tests of some of the most critical political problems of the general world in which the country has lived. Yet the literature in English on these tests and the political contexts in which they were conducted is difficult to find.

Federico Gil's *The Political System of Chile* thus helps to fill an obvious vacuum. The book would be welcome enough if this were its only merit. Happily, there are others. Professor Gil is an old hand in the Latin-American field. His book is workmanlike and well-documented. His judgments are moderate and well-considered. He is a modern political scientist.

It may be that the epithet "modern political scientist" still needs explanation. If so, it should be pointed out that in pre-modern times a book of this kind would concern itself with the more or less formal political history of the country and with describing the structure of government as provided for in the written constitution. Gil has chapters on these subjects, to be sure, as well as on socio-economic conditions, political parties, elections, and the current political scene. But what may well be a peculiar strength of the book, so far as its reception among political scientists is concerned, is the interesting balance or compromise struck between traditional concerns, on the one hand, and, on the other, problems in political behavior and system analysis. No doubt, this middle course has its limitations, as it restricts the analytical depth that a more rigorous theoretical commitment might have promised. In exchange, however, Gil is probably able to bring the interesting and significant case of contemporary Chilean politics to a wider audience among students of political science than might otherwise have been possible.

Current-events-minded readers will be especially interested in what Gil has to say about the Christian Democrats, the Chilean Center's left-wing party which swept Eduardo Frei into the presidency in 1964 following the first election in this century in which a single party or its candidate won an absolute majority of the votes in Chile's multi-party system. Eschewing many of the excited and sensational things journalists have said about the Christian Democrats saving Chile from Communism, Gil soberly traces the Falangist and clerical origins of the Christian Democratic movement, culminating in the program of "revolution with freedom" which the party carried to victory in 1964 and in the congressional election of the following year.

So far as the Chilean political scene is concerned, one is tempted to compare *The Political System of Chile* with the seminal pre-Christian Democratic book published in English. That was John Reese Stevenson's *The Chilean Popular Front*, which was brought out by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 1942. Stevenson's work, fraught with the hectic journalistic excitement of the struggle against the Axis, seems curiously antiquated when read today. Gil's more sober and balanced treatment of the day carried by the Christian Democrats will, no doubt, do a better job of withstanding the test of time. Yet, even when this is said, a curious paradox remains. It is that much in the political behavior, especially the voting behavior, of the people of Chile remains unexplained.

Why did the voters of Chile rally, as they did, to Alessandri in 1920, to Aguirre Cerda in 1938, and to Frei in 1964? One of the more inconsistent characteristics of many students of political science is that while they are often prepared to admit that political behavior in the United States might be complex and self-contradictory, they are somehow reluctant to recognize similar complexity and apparent inconsistency in the politics of other countries. Journalists have said many things about Chilean politics which remain untested by political scientists. One such proposition is that woman suffrage, still a relatively new phenomenon in Chile, has played a critical role in the Christian Democratic near-miracle. Another is that the Christian Democrats gave the voters of Chile what many of them had long needed—a formula for supporting social, economic, and political changes, such as land reform, without becoming involved in the Marxism of the parties of the orthodox Chilean Left. Gil has not attempted to test significant hypotheses such as these.

Thus, the breakthroughs of *The Political System of Chile* are limited and it is not an earth-shaking work. But it is a sober and solid book on an important subject, and should be read not only by Latin Americanists but also by students with more general interests in the political process.

George I. Blanksten
Northwestern University

Government and Local Power in Japan, 500 to 1700: A Study Based on Bizen Province. By John Whitney Hall. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 446. $12.50.)

Interest in Japan, as the most successful "modernizer" among Asian nations, focused at first on the Meiji era. It then became apparent that Japan entered its modernization stage with certain assets. The focus was thus enlarged to encompass the preceding Tokugawa Period, which was no longer seen as "wholly traditional" but rather as a period of preparation for the Meiji breakthrough. Professor Hall, A. Whitney Griswold Professor of History at Yale, has long been interested in Tokugawa Japan from this point of view. He plans to present us in due time with a detailed analysis of its political institutions. The present volume describes and analyzes political changes in a still earlier period. In spite of the concentration on a single region (Bizen Province), Professor Hall's interests are, as he states, "ultimately more national than local." For this reason chapters about changing authority systems on the national level alternate with chapters about the parallel changes on the local level. Thus the book serves as both an introduction to and a model for the projected larger undertaking.

Western writing on the history of pre-modern Japan has often, as Professor Hall puts it, "an exotic quality." Its attempts at explanation are sometimes simplistic, as when it articulates "an almost mechanical dialectic from the interplay of the foreign and the native in Japanese culture." More often it despairs of explanation and presents Japanese history as "bewildering" and "unique." One of the reasons for this stance is the failure to apply key variables with consistency. Professor Hall avoids this pitfall. He does not present the type of "casual analysis" which, according to Max Weber, characterizes the historian's craft, but consciously concentrates throughout on two sets of relationships, namely, "the combination of traditions and techniques by which the Japanese organize power and exercise authority" and "the connection between the holders of power and the sources of wealth, mainly land." He thus deals chiefly with matters of concern for the social scientist such as "theories of legitimacy and practices of administration, concepts of social stratification and social rights, and practices of land tenure and taxation." The study shows how previously established patterns (each originally a response to a particular set of conditions at a particular time) affected political behavior in subsequent periods. These patterns—"loading the dice," as it were, in favor of certain possible alternatives at turning points in history—provide an element of continuity to the social and political development. This is of course a much more sophisticated view than that presented by the more vulgar Japanese prewar literature with its excessive stress on tradition or by much of the later and particularly Western literature with its excessive stress on discontinuities. Thus, when Professor Hall finds that the Japanese in their move from the "familial system" of political organization to the "imperial-bureaucratic system" and to the "feudal system" never completely abandoned a patrimonial style of authority, he supports this finding not by references to a Japanese cultural "essence" but by references to the basic relationships within Japanese society.

Neither the change from one system to the other nor the retention of earlier patterns is seen as capricious. For example, the "familial system" did not give way to the "imperial-bureaucratic system" because of the imitativeness of the Japanese people or because of the infatuation of a ruler with things Chinese, but because "the kinship structure became overloaded as the society increased in complexity and specialization," thus necessitating a change in the theory and practice of government. The change was facilitated by the roughly simultaneous introduction of Buddhism, a religion unrelated to the social and political tradition. The "imperial-bureaucratic system" in turn failed when state control over rice lands and public conscription was progressively abandoned and the proprietors of land assumed duties of government and fiscal rights, thereby paving the way for a return to familial authority patterns. Feudal practices, which did not fully replace the imperial bureaucracy until the 15th and 16th centuries, were then gradually diluted by a renewed reliance on bureaucratic techniques which in turn reached a high point in Tokugawa Japan. Thus Professor Hall shows the continuous erosions and accretions of the political landscape. The reader who may have thought of pre-modern Japanese history as somewhat "flat" now sees the clear, if shifting, contours of each period. The emphasis, as this indicates, is developmental, not static.

This book is rich in data and analysis and shows a prodigious amount of scholarly labor. While Professor Hall does not attempt any cross-cultural comparisons, he clearly invites them by his use of Weberian terminology, and it can be safely predicted that his book will long be drawn upon for this purpose.

KURT STEINER

Stanford University

The Politics of Military Aviation Procurement, 1926–1934: A Study in the Political Assertion of Consensual Values. BY EDWIN H. RUTKOWSKI. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. 318. $6.50.)

In analyzing military aviation procurement policies between 1926–1934, Rutkowski proposes to add to knowledge of decision making in the American governmental system. Particular emphasis is placed on gaining, as the author states it, a better understanding "of the larger dimension of civil-military relationships in this country." (P. 4.) He has achieved his purpose with some success.

The period between the end of World War I, and the Air Corps Act of 1926, which authorized a great expansion of American air power, has been the subject of considerable historical and political analysis. This was the era of Billy Mitchell's dramatic lobbying in favor of more air power. Not so much attention has been given the less colorful but more significant years between 1926 and 1940.

A substantial part of Rutkowski's book is a history of military aviation procurement policy. As such the book usefully fills a narrative gap in the literature. But as a political scientist, Rutkowski aims much higher than synthesizing the historical record. His objective was to learn more about what he calls "the complex nature of policy determination under democratic government. For the interbellum controversy over the pattern of fulfillment of the Air Corps expansion program [authorized by Congress in 1926] demonstrated the manner in which fundamental values broadly shared in the American community found successful expression in the decisions that finally prevailed in this area of national policy." (P. 6.) Thus the period and subject under analysis potentially have something to teach us about not only the civil-military relationship, but the roles of the Executive, Congress, and interest groups in the consensus building process.

The principal historical questions of concern to Rutkowski were these: Why was the five year military aviation expansion program enacted in 1926 not fulfilled? Why was the Air Corps' long-standing procurement policy changed, at Congressional insistence, to require competitive bidding in new legislation in 1934? These may seem to be rather technical questions of no major significance to an understanding of the political process. But Rutkowski has applied to them, adapting from Harold Lasswell some basic notions about decision making, an analysis that has produced some useful findings, or at least illustrations, on how the American governmental system has worked in a specific setting. This kind of knowledge, about the past as well as the present, remains in short supply. Our introductory textbooks and what we teach beginning students of American government contain much that relates to form and myths rather than to reality about the governmental process.

Some of Rutkowski's major findings are the following. A Congressional committee chairman can, in a given setting, "cross the borderline between surveillance and actual administrative management of an executive agency." (P. 10.) In the period under survey, no "harmonious interlocking" was found between industrial and armed service interests. In the American context a military institution will come to bear "the stamp of its setting within the broader patterns of attitudes, values and interests at work in a free society." (P. 13.) In these years between the two World Wars the crucial "intelligence and appraisal functions in the decision making process were weak." (P. 237.) Because this was so, consensual values affected military aviation policy in a way that initially was less than desirable from the viewpoint of national security. Later, with better intelligence appraisals and leadership, these "broad values could be adjusted according to defense requirements in a way not considered destructive of the essentials of the society." (P. 242.)

From such generalizations, Rutkowski has not been so bold as to propound a theory of the political assertion of consensual values. His evidence is too limited, historically, and perhaps too outdated by technology to warrant a theory. Yet his study does shed valuable light on the decision process. Among others, students of politics planning doctoral dissertations based upon historical foundations could profit by noting how Rutkowski has successfully superimposed meaningful political analysis upon historical episodes.

If this study has shortcomings, they would include a failure to broaden the context of the historical record by giving more attention to such important external factors as a developing aviation technology during the period studied; to the international political setting in which the United States pursued, generally, an isolationist policy; and finally, to a more rigorous discussion of how this study may be said to bring new light to existing notions of "the group basis of politics." It is hoped that we shall hear more from the author.

Harry Howe Ransom
Vanderbilt University

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Politics and Jurisprudence. By Paul Woelfl, S. J. (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1966. Pp. vi., 310. $3.25.)

The author would probably be among the first to agree that this book has not been designed to inaugurate a new silver age of scholasticism. *Politics and Jurisprudence* is a scholarly treatise written much more on the same level as Father C. N. R. McCoy's recent volume on *The Structure of Political Thought* than such inspirational works as Jacques Maritan's *Man and the State* or Father Thomas Gilby's *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. This is not to say that Father Woelfl's product belongs to some inferior species of modern scholastic writing. Indeed, it is just this kind of mature and competent work which has often rescued contemporary scholasticism from a certain nebulousness which causes even its servants to wonder whether its wisdom is not something largely illusory. And for all its rigorous adherence to the texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas, its closely reasoned logic, and its terminological discipline, this book is not remarkably difficult to read.

In the course of twenty-six short chapters Father Woelfl attempts to present a general criticism of modern political science from the standpoint of classical political science. With overtones that are only mildly polemical he has set about this task by developing what he calls "a consistent scientific philosophy of politics not merely a hypothetical theory." (P. ii.) Constructing a definition of politics as inherently good and morally responsible human action undertaken by free and equal persons in his first four chapters, Father Woelfl then proceeds to consider various implications of politics as an art and as a science in the next major segment of his book. The common good, which he calls "the end of politics," the state, which he examines with regard to its origin and functions, church-state relations, in which the primacy of the spiritual is emphasized, the power of the state, in which the nature of political authority and its juridical organization are explored, and, finally, law as the instrument of government, in which he presents several clarifications of the scholastic theory of natural law, follow as topics which Father Woelfl investigates in developing his scientific philosophy of politics.

Much of the ground which he covers is familiar territory to most serious students of political theory, philosophy or methodology. Given the scope of this study and the author's topical approach it is necessarily somewhat picaresque and would probably be better judged according to the quality of its parts than as a whole. While it should be said that in general it is written with considerable authority and consistency, the quality of the work is not altogether even. In this reviewer's opinion most readers will consider Father Woelfl's treatment of the common good as the most substantial contribution which the author has made in this study. His lucid development of this topic is particularly valuable because of the current interest and controversy over the validity or usefulness of such concepts as the "common good," "general welfare" or "public interest." Also because he introduces several refinements to this difficult and elusive concept and goes considerably beyond such standard authorities in this area as Johannes Messner (*Social Ethics*), and Heinrich Rommen (*The State in Catholic Thought*), these chapters on the common good are doubly significant. Although the concluding four chapters on jurisprudence are barely sufficient to warrant the title which the author has chosen for his book, the last chapter contains a well reasoned examination of the relationship between natural law and positive law which it is particularly appropriate to include in a study of this nature and which should be of more than usual interest to students of public law and public policy formulation.

A thorough classical criticism of modern political science should bring the communitarian aspects of classical political philosophy to bear on political nationalism, a distinctly modern political phenomenon. It is somewhat disappointing that this issue is not even raised by the author in his consideration of the state and the origin of political authority. In his treatment of the forms of government he unmasks some of the more simplistic neo-scholastic vulgarisms in Chapter 22, but Aristotle, for good or ill, would hardly have agreed with Father Woelfl's conclusion that monarchical government is suitable only to those regions where "the citizenry labor under such political immaturity that they are incapable of providing for themselves. . . ." (P. 184.)—Robert E. Newton, *Catholic University*.

History and Futurology. By Ossip K. Flechtheim, with a Foreword by Robert Jungk. (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain Verlag, 1966. Pp. 126.)

Over twenty years ago, when teaching and writing in this country, the author of this slim but interesting volume, who is now a professor at the Free University of Berlin, coined the term "futurology" in calling for a more systematic approach to the exploration and planning of the future. By now the thing itself, if not the proposed expression, has come into its own. In addition to serial publications (such as the Paris "futuribles" or the periodical "prospective"), study centers (such as Robert Jungk's "Institut für Zukunftsforschung at Vienna), and conferences of various types probing prognostically into the future of man and society, there has been a growing number of scholars (to mention only one: Bertrand de Jouvenel) devoted to the futurological approach in their respective fields. As these references show, "futurology" as such is particularly cultivated in countries of the European Continent (and especially in France, West Germany, and Austria), while Americans, surely not inexperienced in forecasting election results or stock-market trends or uninterested in planning strategies for war and peace with all their respective models, "scenarios," and games, have simply been unaware in their prosaic way that, like Monsieur Jourdain, they already knew how to speak prose.

Flechtheim's book combines earlier and more recent (partly unpublished) writings. They are arranged in two parts, the first of which is called "History and Theodicy," the second "Futurology." They supplement each other surprisingly well. The first part deals with what one may call the metaphysical prehistory of futurology: the attempt of philosophers of history to interpret world history as—in Hegel's terms—*Gottes Gang durch die Weltgeschichte*, i.e., as a theodicy with its inevitable rationalistic, optimistic-utopian overtones, where harmony is bound to prevail in the end. In a very subtle analysis Flechtheim uncovers such common theodicean traits in Hegel, Marx, Toynbee, and others. Only the two Webers—Max and Alfred—put an end to the enchantment; according to the author, it was Alfred Weber, in particular, who first furnished more realistic concepts for a tenable overall interpretation of world-historical processes.

The second part deals with the present state of things futurological. Flechtheim shows that futurology, if not a science in the sense of a separate discipline, has become a "direction of research," a concern of almost every discipline dealing with human affairs. But this growing concern poses a number of deeper and more general problems. Flechtheim raises especially that of the self-fulfilling prophecy and its ethical implications for the futurologist who, in his capacity as "prophet," knows about this potential effect of his prognosis. Supposing that, in 1940, British futurologists had found that there remained only a one-in-a-hundred, or even a one-in-ten, chance for Britain to survive the Nazi onslaught: should they have appraised the decision-makers of this? Or should they have remained silent, this way giving history, as we know it now, a chance?

Beyond this I believe that one must raise an even more basic question: Is not the accelerating process of scientific-technological advance, which emerges each year more clearly as *the* great determinant of our world, "fatalistically inevitable" in its chief results? I.e., are we not witnessing an onrush, by now global and one-directional, where things are in the saddle and futurologists left merely to find out about details of the inevitable, such as the When of the expected tens of billions of humans filling Which of the new megalopolises, needing What by way of resources and supplies? Throughout previous history the future used to be "open." Now, as one has put it, "even the future is no longer what it used to be." Is it, then, "closed" in the sense of being predetermined by the now one-directional technological process? To assert this would be overstating the case. Only a quasi-metaphysical "technological conformism" (which is nevertheless widespread) overlooks that the technological process now sweeping the world is man-made, indeed, that it confers on man unparallelled power to plan and direct. But to make use of this power in order to prevent the undesirable effects of the process he needs a new attitude of "technological disobedience" based on a code of humanistic standards for global planning. As Flechtheim emphasizes, utopia still has a place in our approach to the future, provided it is a disenchanted, sober, unmetaphysical one. As he shows, plain de-ideologization, recently propagated, hides a conservative, even reactionary, ideology of its own. Choice is still possible. If only we admit the possibility of the "Great Reversal" of what seems to overwhelm us now, futurology might turn out to be the science of what man may become, and of planning for it.—John H. Herz, *City College of the City University of New York*.

Of Human Sovereignty. By Arthur Freud. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964. Pp. 341. $6.00.)

The assets of this book are three. First, its theme is timely, since nationalism continues to play a key role in the centrifugal movements shaking not only the Western and Communist alliances, but also the nonaligned world.

Second, the book gives a survey of nationalism in its myriad forms through time and space. Thumb-nail sketches tell of the complex activities of alleged "accessories to nationalism: the church, communism, ammunition-makers." Other forms of ethocentrism are also mentioned, e.g., Governor

Earl Long's signing a statute in 1958 requiring that blood plasma be labeled for racial origin. (P. 37.)

Third, insights in depth are provided into the author's native Vienna, where Czechs and other nationalities mixed both in conflict and cooperation. On a sadder note—one that explains something of the author's interest in nationalism—we read how he himself became infused with the ideals of Lessing and Schiller, only to have his best friend, after a quarrel, refuse to duel with him: "Du bist ein Jude und daher nicht satisfactionsfähig." (P. 23.) (The author, it should be recorded, is also against Zionism, p. 35.)

These assets, some of them only potential, are unfortunately countervailed by four serious shortcomings which result in part from the breadth of the undertaking. First, the author traces all kinds of historical phenomena to nationalism—either as its cause or its effect. Granted that virtually all political acts in modern times have "national" inputs, Freud neglects the other factors that may be present. The result is a kind of determinism which assigns to nationalism the key or even the exclusive role in producing all kinds of alleged injustices: serfdom in Russia, Tsarist imperialism in Central Asia, the "sell-out" of Eastern Europe by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1944–45; the failure of the great powers to heed popular desires for an end to nuclear testing. (Published in 1964, the book was not revised to take account of the 1963 test ban treaty and it seems oblivious of the testing moratorium 1958–1961. *Cf.* p. 19.)

Second, this over-emphasis on the devilish role of nationalism in modern times is accompanied with a series of factual errors. For example, Freud asserts that the Bolsheviks "did not aim at eliminating the national character of all the peoples," but were tolerant of the Soviet peoples who wanted to "retain their national characteristics and customs." (P. 76.) He entirely misses Stalin's approach to this problem: to organize a culture "national in form, socialist in content." Another example: he argues that there was a "complete switch" in Soviet national policy in 1957, when Moscow began to act as the protector of national ambitions so long as they were outside U.S.S.R. borders. (P. 78.) But this policy was adopted under Lenin, a point bypassed by Freud, and it reemerged at least as early as 1955. (The examples he gives for this post-1957 posture are the more puzzling, for he cites Soviet policy toward Korea, Viet Nam, and Egypt.)

Third, the book makes no allowance for what Thomas T. Hammond has called the "Janus-like face of modern nationalism," i.e., its role in the building as well as the destruction of cultural, economic, and political life. Freud also attacks democracy because it has legalized the absolute power of the nation-state. He juxtaposes ethical norms and national sovereignty, although it may be doubted whether the norms of Western civilization could have survived without some national incubus or defender.

Fourth, Freud exaggerates the dangers of the present international system and provides only a vague ideal as a substitute. "The choice is definitive," he writes, "either complete destruction of the civilized world, or world government." (P. 18.) By stressing the inevitability of Armageddon he overlooks the possibilities for peaceful evolution of the world short of a transformation of men and nations. He also neglects the deterrent role of the balance of terror, saying, "There exists among national states no law with enforceable penalties." (P. 2.)

Freud's solution to present evils is a beautiful goal, but with few roadmarks. We must choose, he argues, between "the existing vicious political system based on physical force which produces a man-made hell on earth—and the acceptance of moral and ethical political principles in a cooperating world society." (P. 333.) How do we achieve this utopia? The "ray of hope" lies in supra-national blocs. (Pp. 292*ff.*) The histories of the "United States, Soviet Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland—all clearly demonstrate the fact that integration first, then federation and, finally, the union of such states is entirely feasible. . . ." Freud does not spell out, however, just how the next steps are to be made. Austria-Hungary, of course, collapsed into competing nationalisms. The U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. have moved the world toward bipolarity but hardly to the sovereignty of man. Nor can the Swiss example be taken as a guide for the rest of the world, owing to incomparabilities of scale and uniqueness of historical development. Freud's strategy is the less convincing because of his history: the principle of Comecon, he writes—as if of an accomplished fact—is "a thorough economic coordination of the satellite countries with Soviet Russia." (P. 313.) This principle does not appear to have been an active Soviet goal in the first ten years of Comecon's history, and it seems unattainable in the 1960's.

It is hard to quarrel with the author's goal, the sovereignty of man, but its attainment will hardly be advanced by passion that produces bad history and naive politics.—Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *Boston University.*

The Changing Political Thought of John Adams. By John B. Howe, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 254. $6.50.)

Between the 1770's and the 1790's an important change took place in the political thought of John Adams. Well into the late '70's Adams seemed more than confident in the adequacy of this nation's moral resources to support its bold experiment in self-government. By the time of the '90's however, Adams was increasingly returning to the pessimistic notion of a mechanical balance in government to serve the defect of virtue in the New World. At one time he viewed the Revolution in expansively optimistic terms as confirmation of the genius of a people born in virtue and superbly qualified to lead mankind in history's search for liberty and knowledge. Later his only concern seemed to be with effecting a mechanistic solution to a problem of order occasioned by the antagonisms of selfish interests ruled by their affections. No longer then did Adams continue to distinguish between the uniqueness of America's moral condition and that incident to the generality of mankind. The major change in Adams's political thought that serves as the focus of Professor Howe's study is Adams' declining faith in the possibility that the virtue, conscience, and reason remaining to men as Americans might counterbalance the passions and selfish affections belonging to Americans as men. What particular force of circumstances might account for Adams' declining faith in the democracy and his increasing pre-occupation with the problem of social control?

The key to the important changes in Adams' thought according to the argument of the author consists of the state of the former's satisfaction with his own life situation. Adams based his faith in the success of democracy in the New World on the premise of American virtue. Virtue in Adams' own mind was coincident with the placing of public needs before private ones. The state of American virtue in the meanwhile Adams judged by reference to the quality of his own treatment at the hands of the people and in terms of the similarity between his own views and prejudices and those of the people. Thus Adams would distinguish in the Revolutionary period between "Private Mobs" and "Public Mobs" according to how consistent their own actions were with his particular policy goals. The Boston Tea Party of course was the act of a "Public Mob." Hence in the heyday of revolutionary tumult when Adams enjoyed renown and the sentiments of the people seemed akin to his own, his faith in America's ability to carry on her historic enterprise never flagged. Later however Adams would experience a growing sense of estrangement between himself and the people beginning with the frustrations of his diplomatic service in Europe and what he felt to be the indifference of the people to his own particular fate. Professor Howe skillfully attempts to show how in the post-Revolution period Adams assimilated his own observations of American experience and social change to a cyclical theory of history in a way to confirm his own belief in the decline of American virtue—a decline impressed upon his own mind by the treatment he now received at the hands of a people he earlier had so faithfully and selflessly served.

I do not mean here to be too critical of Professor Howe's work. If he seems to give little evidence of interest in critically assessing the systematic import of Adams' thinking, if he seems more concerned with learning about Adams rather than learning from him, this is how it should be. After all the author is interested in ideas as a historian and not as a political theorist. Still there is one substantive point on which one might wish to take issue with the argument that he advances. The shift in Adams' thinking may be explained perhaps as logically related not to his own life situation but to that of the nation taken as a whole. It is only natural to suppose that in the struggle *against* Europe the discontinuities between New World and Old World experience might be emphasized in the minds of the rebels. So too in the post-Revolutionary period it is only logical to assume that the new men of power and responsibility, now involved in the affairs of the world much against their will, would only find it natural to view their own situation in terms of European categories of experience. Still, this study deserves praise. It admirably integrates political biography with a history of ideas in a well researched and eminently readable essay that for many years to come will be a must on any Adams reading list.—DARRYL B. BASKIN, *Stanislaus State College.*

Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence: A Working Theory and Study in Judicial Decision-Making. BY THEODORE L. BECKER. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964. Pp. xii, 177, paper.)

This book is a sophisticated attempt by a behaviorally trained political scientist at a major *tour de force:* the exhumation and resuscitation of a body of thought laid to academic rest in the 1930's under the headstone inscription

MECHANISTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Born ? B. C.
Died 1937 A. D.

What motivated Professor Becker to essay this feat may perhaps best be gathered from arguments appearing on pages 75 and 102–103:

> All [appellate decision-makers] have been trained to think objectively in three years of rugged, heavily reinforced, professional school programs.

> Law school . . . is a dreadfully difficult and tedious process . . . in this environment . . . the legal mind is forged. Theoretically, fresh and keen minds are molded from the nonlegal thinker into the legal thinker. . . . The legal thinker (theoretically) is he who is a dispassionate seeker into the law, determined to find out whether any law is controlling in the litigation in which he is involved, and if such law is found, to abide by it. Non-lawyers

could never understand this process; this nagging belief that the law may well furnish the answer or very compelling guidelines which will dispose of the case correctly and justly.

Becker makes a double-barreled effort to substantiate his arguments. The first barrel is fired in the first 40 pages of the book. The principal target is Glendon Schubert. Schubert is criticized for too narrowly confining his search for judicial attitudes (values) to liberal or conservative votes grounded in factual situations as described in case opinions. In contrast, Danelski is praised for realistically seeking indicators of judicial attitudes in public addresses of the justices and in what records there are of the weekly Supreme Court conference. Even after granting Danelski his due, Becker still leaves the reader with the impression that the motivational concept of liberal-conservative attitude possesses limited explanatory power for understanding the behavior of judges.

The remainder of the book is shot from the second barrel. Starting from the assumption that appellate decision-making is a role that demands a peculiar kind of precedent-oriented thought process on the part of a judge, Becker cites the authority of a quasi-experiment he carried out. Students at four law schools and a control group of undergraduates were given a questionnaire which included four hypothetical cases involving statutory law questions and a separate section testing "substantive value preferences." Relevant precedents were included in each of the four cases. The students were asked to decide the cases "as you believe a good judge should decide" them. Panels of outside experts were enlisted to rate the clarity of precedent as well as the substantive value preferences of each student.

The findings: "Law students tended to decide more objectively than nonlaw students . . . and almost all of the legally trained students relied on precedent when they were being objective, while only one-half of the nonlegally trained did so, [This] justifies the statement that judicial role does seem to exist and that it is substantially a function of law-school training." (P. 130.)

Comments: (1) What this proves about Supreme Court decision-making involving *constitutional* issues where precedent counts for less is wide open to question. Becker admits to this shortcoming as part of an 11 page critique. For after all, Schubert *et al.* are basically concerned with analyzing judicial behavior in the realm of constitutional, not statutory, law. (2) In *American Political Science,* Somit and Tanenhaus reported professional esteem—measured in terms of fields where political scientists consider significant work is being done—placed public law alongside theory—the two of them "running neck and neck for last place." Becker's work, for all its imaginative conceptualization and rigorous execution, will probably alter the order of the horse race very little. It could be because Becker himself is riding (beating) a dead horse.—JAMES R. KLONOSKI, *University of Oregon.*

Father Coughlin and the New Deal. BY CHARLES J. TULL. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 292. $6.50.)

The Union Party and the National Union for Social Justice—if at all noticed—are relegated to footnotes or, even more kindly, to a brief statement in the text of most widely accepted books on parties and politics. It was encouraging, thus, to note the arrival of a treatise focused on these organizations and on their leader and prime mover, Father Charles E. Coughlin. Regrettably, though the man and the movement need and deserve analysis and serious study, this book offers little of value for the political scientist.

Father Coughlin and the New Deal is a chronological tracing of the "radio priest's" public pronouncements and activities from 1926 until 1942. This historical approach is no surprise, for the author is Assistant Professor of History at De Paul University in Chicago. What is of surprise is that the book appears in a series which focuses on "political and social non-conformists and their impact on the American scene" but offers very little analysis of Coughlin's views or of their impact on the polity.

Dr. Tull covers several topics, but there is no central thesis. One major theme traces Coughlin's economic program (based as it was upon the social-economic implications of *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*), including the priest's condemnation of "international bankers," advocacy of inflation and governmental control of money, and his establishment of the National Union for Social Justice. A second theme develops the short-lived "partnership" of Coughlin with Roosevelt from "Roosevelt or Ruin" to "Roosevelt and Ruin."

The brief sections devoted to the Union Party and the campaign of William Lemke in 1936 emphasize the performance of Coughlin in selecting and controlling the nominee rather than the significance of the Party or the platform. Tull focuses even briefer attention on the isolationist Christian Front and World War II, and on the priest's embracement of anti-communism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Anglicism. The trials and tribulations of Coughlin's organizational endeavors are highlighted, as are his attempts to mobilize public pressure on monetary and agricultural legislation, and his skepticism of democracy which led to his "fascist" program for the "corporate state."

There is no deep penetration of Coughlin's economic or political philosophy (a fault which Tull blames on the man for allowing "his words to flow faster than his ideas," as is "frequently the case with agitators"). Tull retreats from analysis time and again, except to conclude that Coughlin was sincere, though economically and politically ignorant and naive. There is no new material presented.

The prime source of the data is Father Coughlin's weekly newspaper, *Social Justice*, and his radio speeches. A second major source (too overly relied upon) is *The New York Times*. This is supplemented by slight reference to the Roosevelt Papers, historical works on the New Deal period, Catholic and popular periodicals of the time, two official biographies of Coughlin (written before 1933), and brief correspondence with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Msgr. Maurice Sheehy, and Raymond Moley. Professor Tull is, thus, unencumbered with the burdens of official cooperation by Coughlin or the Detroit Archdiocese, and unfettered by works on Lemke, Gerald Smith, Peter Townsend, or the other figures with whom Coughlin had association.

The notes in the back are plentiful, though often disconcerting and frustrating in their narrow devotion to *Social Justice* and to the broadcasts. The scholarship appears rather fragmentary, erratic, and journalistic.

The book includes a listing of the sixteen points of the National Union program, the platform of the Union Party, the Union Party vote in 1946, an index, and thirteen photographs of Coughlin in different poses.—MORRIS LEVITT, *Howard University*.

The American Dissent: A Decade of Modern Conservatism. BY JEFFREY HART. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966. Pp. 262. $4.95.)

At first sight, it would not seem necessary that a book be devoted to the ideas of *The National Review*. Most of us can be trusted to have made the acquaintance of its editor, Mr. William Buckley, and to have admired the way in which he has managed for so long to temper frivolousness by cruelty. His reputation as an Oxford debater (he nearly reduced James Baldwin to tears, but oddly still lost the debate); as a television celebrity (he skillfully elicited impoliteness from Norman Thomas); and as a political figure (his conservative defection insured the election of the most liberal of the three candidates in the recent mayorality election in New York) is a matter of wide public knowledge. His journal can be seen palely loitering in the reading rooms of all liberal colleges and universities; and liberal professors sometimes pick it up mercifully, read it dutifully, and forget it instantly. The common opinion, one supposes, is that the only mind on display in *The National Review* that counts, now that James Burnham has exchanged nihilism for panic, is that of Willmoore Kendall, a man who can speak for himself, and does it only too well and too often. But books must be written; perhaps a survey of opinion in *The National Review* can, by being inclusive, also be instructive and uncover what had hitherto escaped notice and praise.

Professor Hart's ambition is very high. By describing the content of *The National Review* in the last ten years, he thinks he will contribute to the solidification of Conservative doctrine, and by so doing, press the attack on the enemy, liberalism. His assumption is that ". . . there *is* no distinctively liberal mode of resistance [to communism], and when a liberal policy-maker does choose to resist he merely adopts the policies of his conservative opponents"; that in ". . . its universalism, its minimizing of privacy, its faith in progress, its secularism . . ." liberalism is not relevant ". . . to our real problems, to widespread anomie and alienation, to the breakdown of community, to the attenuation of moral sanctions"; and that conservatism is "most certainly" an alternative to "the revolutionary Left and to a dissolving liberalism—an alternative that is in harmony with our traditions and with the best that is in our actual civilization." While deploring his eagerness, those of us who are not conservative can still hope that Hart can put together a coherent conservatism from whatever sources he may choose. Liberal self-satisfaction is not a pretty sight, and Kendall by himself obviously cannot shake it as hard as it deserves and needs. However, as one would expect, Hart cannot get *The National Review* to serve as the foundation of a relevant (to use Hart's word) conservatism. He distills its views on a large variety of political and cultural issues, with a nimble elegance, suppressing almost all of its raucousness and inanity. But the net impression is that if this is what American conservatism amounts to, it is no wonder that it has (by its own admission) made so little headway among American intellectuals. Hart laments the ascendancy of liberalism: more precisely, welfare liberalism. Nevertheless, most liberals can, in unpartisan moments, make better points against their own creed than the ones Hart has rescued from the pages of *The National Review*.

There are two standards by which to judge any effort to formulate the conservative position. The first is its distance from Edmund Burke: the further away the better. The second is its usefulness to the Republican Party: the more useful the better. Judged by the first standard, Hart's version of *The National Review*, and Hart himself, come off rather well. Now and then there is a trace of a sigh of disappointment over the fact that the American polity cannot be written about in the language of Burke, does not lend itself to the magical process by which strength is transformed into sublimity, and injustice into tragedy. Burke sings the beauty which only scarcity arrogantly distributed makes possible; naturally his role must be small in American conservatism. Hart's quite qualified endorsement of Russell Kirk testifies to his realism. On this subject, Kendall has given the lead which other conservatives must follow. Not even when Hart defends religion (and college fraternities) does he go too far in the Burkean direction.

Judged by the second, more important standard, Hart's version of *The National Review*, and Hart himself, fall lamentably short. The fate of American conservatism is bound up with the fate of the Republican party; to some but not the same degree, the fate of the Republican party is bound up with the fate of American conservatism. The party has everything to gain from a brilliant conservatism; the trouble is that the line of *The National Review* mixes the very elements, but in an intensified form, that brought Senator Goldwater low in 1964. To the conservatives is entrusted the duty of criticizing the welfare state, but a politically successful critique cannot make wholesale attacks on those features of the welfare state that have by now passed into almost universal acceptance. It must take advantage of middle-class resentment towards enlarging the welfare state without seeming to threaten the social gains already made. Hart's chapter on the Negro is, in this regard, judicious, though illiberally so. It is only when he, and *The National Review*, desert middle-class common sense that conservatism becomes self-defeating. Even more important, the entire connection between the welfare state and the Cold War needs a great deal of exploration. Hart goes along with the conservative inflation of the issue of domestic communism —a political tactic that is futile and that keeps the Republican party in bondage to an overall bellicosity that is the greatest single obstacle to future political gains. The fact is that only by resisting the warfare state, only by resisting an activist American global foreign policy can the Republican party define itself as significantly different from the Democrats and take advantage of the deep isolationist impulses in American society. Furthermore, by resisting the warfare state, the welfare state is best resisted. The Cold War increases the collectivization of American society, leads to permanent inflation, enhances social mobility at home, and provides a justification for continuous welfare benefits for some by demanding continuous sacrifices in the form of taxes and military casualties from others. Hart is committed to the unyielding hard anti-communist position, and for that reason joins in a complicity that dooms the Republican party, and with it the conservative cause, to regular frustration.—GEORGE KATEB, *Amherst College*.

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METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

S. SIDNEY ULMER
University of Kentucky

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1. Johns Hopkins University
2. National Opinion Research Center
3. Hebrew University in Jerusalem
4. University of Notre Dame
5. University of Wisconsin
6. University of Michigan
7. Brandeis University
8. University of Washington
9. University of Illinois
10. Yale University
11. University of Manchester, England
12. University of California (Berkeley)
13. University of Sheffield, England
14. Michigan State University
15. Stanford University
16. University of Saskatchewan
17. Claremont Graduate School
18. Cornell University
19. U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California
20. Princeton University

21. Harvard University
22. University of Hawaii
23. San Diego State College
24. University of Illinois, Chicago Circle
25. Southern Methodist University
26. University of Toronto
27. New York University
28. University of Oregon
29. Ohio State University
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31. University of Pittsburgh
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34. University of Denver
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36. University of London
37. Yeshiva University
38. University of North Carolina
39. Miami University
40. University of Minnesota
41. Educational Testing Service
42. Florida State University
43. University of Texas
44. San Francisco State College

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Federal Budget Projections. By Gerhard Colm and Peter Wagner. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. 194. $2.50.); *A Capital Budget Statement for the U.S. Government.* By Maynard S. Comiez. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. 143, $6.00.)

These two excellent books are components of an outstanding series, Studies of Government Finance, being published by the Brookings Institution. The authors have not provided new theories, concepts or hypotheses to stimulate further research. Rather, they have done the important and too often ignored task of exploring with concrete, precise and detailed applications a variety of ideas which have been current in the field for several years.

As one would expect in a report supported jointly by Brookings and the National Planning Association, Colm and Wagner urge better long-range budget forecasting in Washington. However, they have gone a crucial step further: they have made estimates, not to obtain specific dollar figures as has been done in other studies, but to show the feasibility and difficulties of making such forecasts on a regular basis. To do this they tested two general models. The first assumed a continuation of programs already existing or newly proposed in the budget for fiscal year 1966. This model did not adjust for new programs to be enacted after the first year. The second model anticipated greater changes, including initiation of programs not yet supported by the administration but possessing significant responsible backing within the society. For each model the authors clearly indicated their underlying assumptions about several factors such as price levels, productivity changes and federal-state-local fiscal relations. They then made short- (next fiscal year), medium- (five year), and long- (ten year) range projections showing that useful estimates could be made despite the economic and political uncertainties entailed.

The authors give proper note to the controversy which might be generated by the publication of such estimates if they were prepared by the government itself. Colm and Wagner suggest that private research organizations should prepare these figures initially to acquaint the public with their value and limitations, thus enabling the government to enter the field at a later date without arousing as much controversy as would seem likely under current circumstances.

Maynard Comiez had the more difficult conceptual problem but he has also overcome it successfully. There is virtually no agreement in the literature as to what should comprise a federal "capital budget." Comiez has done a great service by skillfully delineating the different concepts and ideas which become embroiled in discussions of this topic. He has developed seven different models thus giving each variable a chance to show its importance in affecting the budget "balances" which emerge. Comiez has reorganized budget figures from the 1955–1963 period in accordance with these seven different definitions and has determined the budget surpluses and deficits which would have existed if each concept had been employed during those nine years. The models differ, among other matters, on the military capital outlays included, on whether all federal capital expenditures or only those shown in the administrative budget are considered and on the treatment of depreciation.

Comiez concludes that the theoretical arguments for a federal capital budget give too little weight to the differences between the objectives of business and government which render the accounting concepts of the former inapplicable to the latter. He feels the managerial and administrative advantages purported for capital budgeting can be obtained without the elaborate budgetary changes economically sophisticated definitions of a capital budget would require.

Colm and Wagner remind political scientists that relatively little of the federal budget is effectively under the control of our elected leader. Budget projections are much more sensitive to general international and domestic conditions than to program changes or initiations resulting from executive-legislative politics in Washington. For his part, Comiez casts light on one of the key political bulwarks preventing capital budgeting: that it would result in a rash of deficit financing by removing important constraints on administrative budgets. He has shown what surprisingly small differences in budget balances certain capital budgeting practices would afford.

All of the authors are to be commended for clarifying concepts and then rigorously applying them to see what they actually produce.—S. Kenneth Howard, *University of North Carolina.*

The Party That Lost Its Head: The Republican Collapse and Imperatives for Revival. By George F. Gilder and Bruce K. Chapman. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. 331. $6.95.)

This book purports to analyze the present difficulties of the Republican Party and to offer a blueprint for elevating a near-permanent minority party to majority status. The authors are progressive young Republicans who published and edited *Advance Magazine*—a short-lived but highly successful attempt to provide a journal for liberal Republicans. I share many of the biases of the authors and therefore I was fully prepared to review the book favorably. Indeed, I confess that I wanted to do so! Regretfully, however, I must report that in my opinion this book is more destructive than constructive. Able young phrase-makers have misused their talents to impugn the judgment, honesty, and motives of their peers. Virtually no Republican leader, liberal or conservative, escapes. Presumptiveness and impertinence abound. If one could see the constructive purpose in such a distorted rendering of Republican Party politics, the effort could be accepted for that reason. But, in my opinion, the authors have allowed vindictiveness to influence, perhaps even dictate, their descriptive analysis of recent party history. It is too much to ask that the reader separate revenge from fact. Much of the book reads like the "mad" letter-to-the-editor which one writes occasionally and then tosses out. Gilder and Chapman make much of the negativism of most of the Republican Party. Their constructive suggestions, however, take up only one chapter of twenty. Fully three-quarters of this book attacks, destroys, insults.

Though the book is fairly discursive, it is possible to identify several themes which hold it together. First and foremost is that Barry M. Goldwater and his right-wing strategists *conspired* to win control of the Republican Party. Most of the Goldwater people, it is asserted, were outsiders who relied on subterfuge to undermine the party. Well, frankly, I was very uncomfortable at the 1964 Convention too. I was not among friends. This was not *my* party and I still resent the Goldwater victory there. But what Gilder and Chapman call conspiracy, I call plain, old-fashioned pre-convention politics. There is nothing new about winning the nomination as the Goldwater strategists won it. In fact, until very recently that is the way it was usually done. I think it is probably a dumb way to do it these days if you want to win the general election, but I don't see anything conspiratorial about it. In fact, the Goldwater organization was announcing its progress as early as 1963. We just didn't believe what they said.

A second theme is related to the first. Goldwater was successful because of the ineptitude of the normal Republican leadership. Congressional leaders, governors, national party leaders, President Eisenhower, all stumbled about when they ought to have been working closely together. But the leadership is to be condemned for more than their ineptitude in heading off Goldwater. According to the authors, they have also failed to develop a reasonable Republican program and discouraged those who tried to do so. Surely Gilder and Chapman do not expect efficiency and unity from a minority party in America. Regrettable or not, minority party politics in this country is just not very monolithic.

The result of the Goldwater coup, and the ineptitude of the progressive leaders, is a seriously split party which is unbalanced to the right. The third theme suggests a way out. What the Republican Party needs is an ideology. Party leaders and party professionals have stressed organization and unity in the past but that emphasis will not result in majority party status for Republicans. "The prime need of progressive Republicanism today is a distinct ideological identity." (P. 249.) This "distinct" ideology should not be the "me-tooism" of most Republican liberals. It should be "conservative." Progressives should face the fact that they must be "conservatives." And what does all of that mean? The reader has every right to ask for an unraveling.

Gilder and Chapman provide "an ideology for Republicans" at the conclusion of their book. It would include a "revitalized federalism" on the domestic level—not unlike that recently outlined by President Johnson. It would include patching up several urban programs which have been poorly conceived and poorly administered. It would include reasonable approaches to the many problems related to technology. It would include reform of the draft and attention to the problems of educating large numbers of people. It would include a more dynamic role for the opposition party in foreign policy.

I find myself in almost total agreement with this excellent, if occasionally "me-too," summary statement of programs and goals for Republicans. But I reject the conclusion that this is the first statement ever issued on these subjects. The fact is that many Republican research committees and coordinating committees have issued similar statements over the past 20 years—and continue to issue them today. I do not wish to denigrate the importance of one more statement of goals but it is just one more statement. Realizing the goals is a long and complicated process—as many Republicans in positions of responsibility could inform the authors.

There is a fourth theme in this book which is much less obvious—even, I think, to the authors. Gilder and Chapman talk about *the* Republican Party as though it existed somewhere—at a specific address in a specific city—and had a "head" to lose. Decentralization is a characteristic of American political parties which is well-known—at least to most students. It causes more mischief for the minority party than the majority party but that is the result of many factors—not just the ineptitude of party leaders. What is the remedy? Apparently, according to Gilder and Chapman, to get all Republicans subscribing to an ideology and then to develop an organization strong enough to achieve the goals stated in the ideology. Goldwater tested the authors' formula in 1964. Surely one lesson of the 1964 election is that ideological "tidying up" can only result in resounding defeat.

There is no pat formula for a minority party becoming a majority party in this country. It is probably true that the Republican Party is more likely to win control of the government as a result of what the Democrats do than anything they may do. Not that many Republicans should not continue to rethink party goals and organization. They should do so and are doing so. I venture that the Republican Party right now is better prepared to govern than the Democratic Party was in 1932. I don't think, however, that bitter invective helps—whether it comes from those I happen to agree with or those I happen to disagree with. And that is why I have been less kind here than I truly intended to be, and not as unkind as I easily could have been.—CHARLES O. JONES, *University of Arizona*.

Behind Closed Doors: Politics in the Public Interest. BY EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966. Pp. 369. $6.95.)

Political memoirs are expected to perform three functions for scholars. First, they can provide insights into the personalities of the authors, who have usually been party to the making of important political decisions. Thus, memoirs can be a source of data about political elites. Second, they can provide us with information otherwise available only to those people who can pass behind the closed doors and into the rooms where major decisions are being made. As a rule, academicians generally do not get the opportunity to be behind these doors. Finally, good memoirs can serve as an external validity check on the conclusions of academic research. Frequently, political memoirs perform these functions imperfectly. They generally reflect a haphazard research design and the data they present are more likely to reflect the workings of selective retention than the fruits of systematic data collection. Mr. Costikyan has written a fascinating book which admirably performs all of these functions. Let us discuss them in order.

First, we are presented with unique and thoroughly credible views of recent political leaders in New York: the enigmatic Mayor Wagner, Carmine de Sapio, Robert Kennedy, and others. But most importantly, we get to know the new breed of middle class, intellectual, urban politicians. Costikyan himself belongs to this group. Holding an A.B. and Ll.B from Columbia, Costikyan was drawn to political activity by Adlai Stevenson's 1952 campaign, as were many of the other members of the new breed. They remained active in politics and formed the basis of New York's Reform Democratic movement. At the age of thirty-one he became the first "reformer" to be elected district leader, and Costikyan was chairman of the New York County Committee (a position that generally bears the appellation, "Tammany Boss") between 1962 and 1964. Much of the similarity stops here. Costikyan, in power, maintained a realistic view of the need for organization and leadership in politics that many of his fellow reformers lost. (Like most authors of memoirs, Costikyan seems to have superhuman powers of judgment.) By late 1964, Costikyan believed that the reform movement's ideology shifted from opposing autocratic leadership to being "against political leadership of any kind." At times, the portraits of reform leaders become so vitriolic as to make it seem that they result more from interpersonal tensions than from dispassionate observation; the view of reformers as approaching totalitarian anarchists must be taken with a grain of salt.

Nevertheless, we learn quite a bit about the intellectual amateur politicians and their impact on party structure. Unlike professional politicians, the reformers would rather embarrass the party or lose an election than sacrifice either their personal convenience or their ideological goals. They thus frustrate the party leaders' attempts at interest aggregation and endanger the efficiency of the organization in a campaign. Furthermore, Costikyan finds that their ideological fervor makes them feel less bound to "the rules of the game" than the old-line "pols."

This leads to his major thesis. Reform politics operate on the assumption that professional politicians are inherently evil. Therefore, they argue, all power should be placed in the hands of a major public officer-holder, e.g., the Mayor. But Costikyan believes that the roles of elected official and party leader are incompatible. First, both are full-time jobs, and one man simply does not have the time to do both adequately. Second, the public official/party leader cannot act as a check on the performance of elected officials because he is unwilling to deny himself renomination. As a direct consequence of this (and this is Costikyan's most damning criticism of the Wagner era), the office-holder's grasp on the party machinery is utilized to prevent the party from adequately performing its political recruitment function for fear that some bright young man will be discovered who will challenge the elected official for his job. Thus, when men like Wagner retire, their legacy to the party is a power vacuum and a surplus of mediocre aspirants for major posts. Had control of the party organization been in the hands of men concerned solely with the affairs of the party, they would have realized that the party's survival depended upon continued recruitment of highly qualified potential candidates. Costikyan's final criticism of this merger of leadership roles is that it confuses the voters, and therefore frustrates the democratic processes. Does one vote for a Mayor because he promises to democratize the party structure or because he has pursued wise policies during his tenure in office? It may be that proper performance of the Mayor's role precludes proper performance of the party leader's role, just as running the government purely on the basis of trying to maintain one party's strength is undesirable. Costikyan's solution to this dilemma is to encourage liberal intellectuals to realize the merits of party organizations and thus develop organizations which not only have integrity but are also more likely to provide solutions to the problems posed by changing urban conditions. It is hard to disagree with his persuasive arguments.

The book fulfills the second function most adequately in the excellent discussion of nomination procedures—both in convention and *in camera.* We see the development of strategies, consensus-building, cleavage-healing, misjudgment of public opinion and the costs and uses of scarce information from the vantage point that only an insider can have, but we are spared the kiss-and-tell inside-dopesterism of many memoirs. The chapters on legislative and judicial nominations should be of interest to political scientists for years to come; they add significantly to our understanding of these processes. The chapter on the settlement of the Freedom Democratic Party's challenge to the Mississippi delegation at the 1964 Democratic National Convention is thoroughly engrossing.

As I read through the book, I began to play the game of inserting academic footnotes, citing authors whose work was supported by Costikyan's narrative. The list ran from Aristotle, V. O. Key and Simmel through Dahl, Truman, Eldersveld, Cutright and Rossi, Campbell, *et al.*, and Matthews. What better support, for example, for Dahl's conception of "minorities rule" can be found than this?

> "One day in 1963, . . . when the Executive Committee selected four different candidates to run in the primary, it was necessary to put together four different majorities, each composed of different combinations of leaders; and in each case the separate stimuli that led a particular leader to each of the majorities—or two or three of them—varied candidate by candidate" (p. 312).

In sum, *Behind Closed Doors* belongs with *You're the Boss, Behind the Ballots, Jim Farley's Story* and *I'd Do It Again* on every political parties course's reading list. There are two chapters of apocryphal anecdotes which should make for great lecture material.—KENNETH S. SHERRILL, *Oberlin College.*

The Study of Urbanization. ED. BY PHILIP M. HAUSER AND LEO F. SCHNORE. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. Pp. vii, 554. $9.75.)

In 1800, after thousands of years of human history, approximately three percent of the world's population lived in cities. Since 1800, urban population has increased more than twenty-five times as fast as has rural population; now approximately one-third of mankind lives in cities. The phenomena producing and resulting from urbanization have had many impacts upon public policy, in this country and throughout the world. In recent years, and none too soon, they have begun to have similarly great impacts upon the theory and practice of the social sciences.

From 1958 to 1964 a Committee on Urbanization established by the Social Science Research Council, composed of scholars from several disciplines, explored the subject. This volume is the chief product of the Committee's labors. It is composed of fifteen papers by as many authors, grouped into a section dealing with the approaches and accomplishments of the various disciplines (history, geography, political science, sociology, and economics), a section on comparative urban study, and a section discussing selected research problems, and preceded by a panoramic overview chapter contributed by the chairman of the Committee, Philip Hauser.

The papers constitute an excellent statement and review of the present state of social science knowledge and understanding about urbanization. The summaries and criticisms of existing literature are invaluable; 103 pages of the 554 in the volume are devoted to footnotes citing items which are categorized and evaluated by the authors.

The book is not quite so satisfactory as a definition and clarification of the subject matter being studied. Not only does each discipline have its own perspective—within each of them there are numerous schools and approaches. The chief contributions seem clearly to have been made by the geographers and the sociologists. Both have supplied numerous plausible and persuasive organizing concepts, and have produced a great deal of empirical data which, more often than not, tend to suggest that the realities are more complex than the theoretical formulations which guided the researchers. In both areas, new tools and methods of marshaling quantitative data are being increasingly applied, although, as in other fields, the data and the segments of theory to which the new tools can be applied are relatively meager in relation to the logical power of the tools. History and economics have been involved in urban research much more recently, and with much smaller resources. It is noticeable that the growing profession which attempts to apply the knowledge supplied by the various sciences to the cities themselves—city planning—is not represented in the collection, nor was it represented on the Committee.

Political science is involved in the volume through the recognition by several of the contributors (particularly sociologists) of the crucial importance of government in the conditions producing and resulting from urbanization, and by a paper on "American Political Science and the Study of Urbanization," by Wallace Sayre and Nelson Polsby. Sayre and Polsby suggest that, while American political scientists preceded students from several of the other disciplines in the study of cities, they devoted most of their efforts for half a century to prescribing remedies for conditions which they deplored but about which they usually had only a superficial knowledge or understanding. Attempts to analyze and describe more deeply and more carefully the political processes of urban America are much more recent and still very limited. These analytical attempts have most often been directed at the important but still limited question—"who governs?" Political scientists have thought and studied very little about the matters implicit in the assertion of Hauser in the introductory chapter:

> Urbanization, then, has profoundly affected government. . . . It has greatly increased government interventionism, challenged traditional ideologies with respect to the role of government, modified the nature of representative government, introduced new substantive political issues, changed the character of public administration, altered central, regional, and local intergovernmental relationships, and made obsolete many local government structures.

Much of the book, particularly the central section dealing directly with cross-cultural comparisons, indicates that the generalizations and explanations which we have been using thus far in our attempts to study cities should be treated with great caution and skepticism. Most of them have been derived from relatively impressionistic observation of a limited number of situations, and they seem very shaky indeed when put to the test of careful examination of more diverse conditions. But this healthy doubt as to the reliability of existing theory lessens not at all the conviction that the phenomena producing and accompanying urbanization are of crucial relevance to a better understanding of modern human society.—YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University.*

Community Leadership: The Regional Plan Association of New York. BY FORBES B. HAYS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. 190. $6.00.)

After thirty-one years of mostly uncertain existence, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) made the remarkable discovery that the future of the New York metropolitan region would more likely be governed by the angles of politics than by those of architecture or engineering. Threatened by the prospect of a competing organization to follow up the Raymond Vernon studies (p. 122), and abjured by the Ford Foundation to "think bigger" (p. 137), RPA managed to persuade itself that the Daniel Burnham tradition of "technical" planning would have to be superseded by a vigorous program of "regional leadership."

The patrician sponsors of RPA had originally set out to press the 1929 *Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs* upon public officials in the region. By "soft sell" methods and a rigorous avoidance of "politics" (p. 13), they had sought implementation of the comprehensive system of physical works in the *Plan* and, equally, the establishment of planning agencies in the local governments of the region. From internal documentation, to which we are told the author had "unrestricted access," and from "numerous interviews with directors, staff, and others," Hays has provided an instructive account of the process by which RPA came to redefine itself in 1960.

In the New Deal years, when federal subsidies flowed for public works projects, RPA offered the local governments a ready-made program and considerable skill in drafting proposals. The result, between 1929 and 1939, was virtually full achievement of the original program. Thereafter, RPA with its goals exhausted went from strength to weakness, spending the next twenty years of "search and trial" looking for something to do (p. 137). This time of dullness was made worse by latent conflict between those who wanted to stick to the "technical" role and those more overtly "political" in bias. A shift toward demographic and economic studies, partly inspired by utility company interests in the virgin lands of Nassau and Suffolk, and foundation interest in "metropolitan community leadership" made the new departure possible.

Mixed in with many superfluous references to Selznick, March and Simon, and Truman—superfluous only because the concepts are merely cited and not used—there is much material of value to students of urbanism, or organization, and of integration. Yet it is doubtful if Hays has fulfilled the promise to say something important about "organizational dynamics" or about "the nature and prospects of the regional leadership that is gradually emerging in large metropolitan areas." (P.v.)

1. Despite references to the problem of "selection of a social base" (p. 36), there is much too little analysis of the constituency structure of RPA. Why, despite the obvious land-use implications of congestion in Harlem and the well-known phenomenon of "block busting," did RPA never take account of the racial distribution? Why, despite the obvious importance of Archdiocesan decisions about parochial-school and church location, was there so little recognition of religious relevance? In view of the importance of the Moses empire and the Port Authority, might Hays not have favored us with more details and more theory about the public works politics of New York and why RPA got along well with the Port Authority, but badly with Moses? (*Cf.* pp. 62–68 and 64–87.) Since RPA's board was studded with corporate leaders, why is there no explanation of the poverty of the organization's treasury? (*Cf.* pp. 92, 130, and 149.)

2. Hays's predictive theory of organizational development also requires clarification. (a) If, as he suggests, the organization needs a governmental structure to which to orient its work, then, does RPA as a private body in New York—where no such government is in the offing—have a better future than it has a past? (*Cf.* pp. 164–68.) And, in any event, is his theory (which would, retrospectively, require the Federal Constitution to antedate the Annapolis Convention) defensible? (b) Since RPA has flourished only when it has had federal or foundation aid, we have the Vidich-Bensman question: is the great metropolis (like the small town) itself inherently incapable of self-organization or political modernization without external incentives?

3. The role of the foundations in the private politics of the metropolis also deserves more attention. If the foundations insist on investment only in "highly organized" situations, then, does the foundation system really play an innovative role in anarchic situations where the locality simply cannot generate a high level of organization in short order?

These questions arise only because this book should have been in the category of *Union Democracy,* but is not.—MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR., *Wayne State University.*

The Dynamics of Priority Planning: A Study of Decision Making in Welfare. BY BEATRICE DINERMAN. (Los Angeles; Welfare Planning Council, 1964. Pp. 226. $4.50, paper.)

This is a report of an empirical examination of the decision making process in the Program Committee of the Los Angeles Community Chest. This is the committee which has responsibility for the allocation of Community Chest ("red feather") funds between the competing welfare agencies. This committee was used because it presumes to base its allocation decisions upon a formal priority system. An attempt was made to compare this process to that used in the budget division of the Los Angeles County Government. The attempt at comparison failed because of the fact, unrecognized in the study, that the two committees are not similarly placed in the power hierarchy of their respective settings.

The relationship between staff members of the Welfare Council and the Program Committee members on the one hand and the Budget Staff and the Board of Supervisors on the other is illuminating and sheds considerable light on the essentially political process of allocation in both the public sector and the quasi-public "voluntary" sector. In both cases the discretion of the staff is severely circumscribed by 1) the established contractual relationships and "sunk costs" 2) the limited resources, and 3) the tendency of staff and decision makers to accept traditional patterns of allocation.

The basic question to which the study is directed is: "Can rational procedures of established priorities replace unsupported value judgments, pressure group politics and unquestioned acceptance of the status quo in the establishment of a balance between needs and resources?" Secondly, does the attempt to utilize a formally established priority system actually affect the allocation pattern? The answers which this study gives are: (1) only within a very narrow range of alternatives, and (2) by and large "no."

Implicit throughout the work is evidence of a bias against lay decision-makers and the assumption that the lay members of the Planning Committee have a "watch-dog" rather than "service" attitude to guide them. These attitudes are not empirically defined. Without adequate evidence the author concludes that the priority systems were introduced because of the resentment of lay leaders of the monopoly of knowledge held by staff members and that, in effect, the system became little more than a "mental exercise" used as an additional power instrument by the staff. In other words, in a rational system designed to reduce power politics, decisions became only an additional instrument of power.

The report raises many important questions about the utilization of priority systems and how they become "corrupted" in practice; it unfortunately answers few of the questions. The book's chief value is in the description of the operation of this particular system. Miss Dinerman spends a great deal of time arguing in favor of a rational system of allocating resources, and in this section she relies heavily on the normative literature of political science. She does not give sufficient attention to the empirical literature which has identified the practical problems of implementing a rational system of priority planning. The very weakness of the evaluation points to the need for closer collaboration between academic political scientists and responsible professionals who seek to raise the level of rationality in decision making in this important sector of our society.—JOSEPH HEFFERNAN, *The University of Tennessee.*

The Political Thicket: Reapportionment and Constitutional Democracy. BY ROYCE HANSON. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966. Pp. xii, 143. $4.95.)

Reapportionment developments over the last five years have been far reaching in their constitutional and political implications. The end is still not in sight as some states continue their efforts to devise legislative apportionment and congressional districting schemes which can satisfy equal representation standards. Local governments are first beginning to feel the impact of *Reynolds* v. *Sims* although most of the implications of applying the one man-one vote requirement to the diverse kinds of local governments remain unexplored. Few issues have raised so many fundamental constitutional and political questions which have so completely preoccupied legislative, executive and judicial institutions at both the state and national levels. As an issue in the governmental process, reapportionment offers a multiplicity of fascinating research opportunities.

Royce Hanson in this book is fascinated by the interaction of "values, constitutional law, and political practice" in the recent reapportionment decisions of judicial and political institutions. He reviews state and congressional inaction on reapportionment and traces the history of the courts' treatment of the problem to their eventual entanglement with it. He carries us finally to the failures of the Dirksen Amendment proposals in Congress. Professor Hanson's first-hand exposure to the subject matter is apparent. He was a prime mover in the reapportionment effort in Maryland and an activist in the anti-Dirksen Amendment movement. His discussion of the backgrounds and the strategies of both the litigation of the sixties and the campaign against the Dirksen Amendment reflects his experience.

Since the book focuses upon reapportionment decision-making in both political and judicial arenas within the context of the American political system, Hanson devotes a chapter to the place of value systems in democratic governments. He relates the conflict of values inherent in democratic representative societies and the problems of choice confronting theorists, constitution-makers, judges and politicians. Although the discussion is far from profound, it is a tidy package for the undergraduate student or the layman who finds it difficult to comprehend the mechanics of logic, theory, and politics involved in representation decisions.

Despite Hanson's commitment to the reapportionment cause, he is rather dispassionate in the book, emphasizing the problems inherent in working out both constitutional and political solutions. He sums up by stressing representation problems which still exist despite the "reapportionment revolution." He is concerned with the implications of various districting systems and the need to devise new districting concepts for metropolitan America. He performs a service in demonstrating that "one man-one vote" conceptually does not resolve all representation issues nor guarantee effective political representation. But political leaders are not equally concerned with such shortcomings and it would be difficult, it seems, to arouse a following behind the more subtle issues of representation comparable to that which was mobilized behind "equal representation" slogans. However, the 50 states, finally stirred to confront their diverse representation problems, may still devise new and accommodating systems satisfactory to the peculiarities of their own political systems.—RALPH EISENBERG, *Universtiy of Virginia.*

Decision-Making for Defense. By Charles J. Hitch. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 82. $2.95.)

The management of the Pentagon since 1961 has exerted a phenomenal influence over American politics and civil-military relations. It has become an example which other federal agencies have been admonished to follow, and the object of conscious imitation in other national ministries of defense. The author of this book, first as a staff member of the RAND Corporation and then as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) from 1961 to 1965, was one of the principal architects of that "new Pentagon" which has captivated, fascinated, repelled and infuriated generals, admirals, congressmen, journalists and academicians.

First presented as four public lectures at the University of California, Berkeley, inaugurating the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems Science, the book is rather disappointing when one considers the formidable credentials of the author. The style is felicitous, the humor deft, the examples skillfully chosen. But it certainly lacks the depth and the rigorous analysis which characterized Mr. Hitch's writings prior to his tenure at the Defense Department. Nor does it make the reader privy to new data about any of that succession of spectacular controversies which has punctuated the McNamara era. It simply asserts that two innovations—planning-programming-budgeting and systems analysis—have enabled the Secretary of Defense, for the first time, to exercise the "direction, authority, and control" which is the first requirement for responsible and effective decision-making. It describes these innovations, and relates them to some more general observations about the historical development of the American defense establishment since the eighteenth century, and to the inordinate complexities of defense management in the present era. It also pays tribute to Mr. McNamara, recognizing that his determination to be a policy-maker, rather than an arbitrator, provided the necessary impetus to initiate such innovations and to make them work.

The fact that there is nothing really new, analytically or substantively, is undoubtedly a consequence of the limitations imposed on the author. Four public lectures encompassing a subject so broad can hardly offer much opportunity for depth and penetration. But there is probably a deeper and more compelling reason for the calm, assured and straightforward character of these lectures. Mr. Hitch is clearly convinced that the battle is over, that the problems he believed so pressing in the 1950's have been imaginatively and forthrightly faced, that the important things that needed to be done in the Pentagon have been done, and that there is now no turning back. Cost-effectiveness will continue to provoke invective, and it will continue to have its serious limitations, but it is an approach to problem-solving which is indelibly imprinted on the American defense establishment. We can hope for a more elaborate valedictory from Mr. Hitch at some future date, but it should not be surprising that, for the present, he might consider the 1965 Budget Bureau directive to executive agencies to put into practice comparable management techniques as the most forceful word that can be spoken.—Raymond H. Dawson, *University of North Carolina.*

Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs. By Gene M. Lyons and Louis Morton. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xii, 356. $7.50.)

One wit has declared that national security policy is a phrase invented by the Pentagon to steal foreign policy away from the Department of State. Does it follow that "national security affairs" is simply the modern dress in which in the century of total war the study of international relations now wraps itself? At first glance, the reader of *Schools for Strategy* might indeed think this is the case. All of his old international relations friends are in the cast of the new Lyons and Morton play. So, however, are many others, in and out of universities, affiliated research institutes, government and private research groups.

Schools for Strategy is an exact title. Data on education, research and advocacy in national security affairs are organized by producing and consuming groups rather than by leading ideas or research themes. Descriptions of what is done in the various institutions whose programs Lyons and Morton describe are accurate, discriminating and generally sympathetic. There is a minimum of direct attribution, but representatives of each institution have evidently been given a good deal of freedom to speak for themselves. The evaluation of Professor Lyons and Professor Morton is mostly implicit and always low-keyed.

This authoritative and very useful description of the overlapping communities of teaching, research and advocacy in the field of national security affairs is not perhaps so much "a study in contemporary intellectual history" (p. ix) as one in contemporary intellectual geography. The inhabitants of these overlapping communities are often not very well known to each other. Now that they can readily locate each other on the Lyons-Morton map, the level of effective communication, printed, written and oral, among all three groups should rise.

It is clear from reading *Schools for Strategy* that national security affairs is a field with neither focus nor frontiers clearly defined. If Gene Lyons and Louis Morton have erred in delimiting the frontiers of the field they have surveyed, the error has been on the generous side. I do not see how the infusion of more social science into law school curricula is relevant except as all programs for training for the public service are relevant. I would not include in the survey the pamphleteering of peace-niks or professional anti-Communists who happen to hold appointments as university professors, but I recognize that it is not easy to draw the line between advocacy and analysis, especially when the two are intertwined. Since I have no criteria of essentiality or exclusion to offer, let me only add that Lyons and Morton make it possible, by mapping such a large area, for those who follow to discuss more intelligently questions of focus and scope. Their disinterested survey also opens the way for discussion of other problems central to the future intelligent allocation of intellectual resources, for example:

(1) Is the security problem so pervasive that its impact in universities will be felt much more in the redistribution of emphasis within established disciplines than in the development of an autonomous field of inquiry? (Here the parallel with "development studies," "science affairs," and perhaps even "international affairs" is obvious. What unity there is derives from a common concern rather than from a distinctive method of analysis or an agreed paradigm for investigation.)

(2) How is one to explain the greater frequency with which relevant *innovating* intellectual responses have come from men with primary training in economics, e.g., Kenneth Boulding, Charles Hitch, Oskar Morgenstern, and Thomas Schelling, rather than in political science or military affairs?

(3) Why has productive collaboration among mixed teams of natural scientists and social scientists on problems of national security been more readily achieved outside the university than within it, e.g., at the Rand Corporation?—WILLIAM T. R. FOX, *Columbia University*.

The Petitioners: The Story of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Negro. By LOREN MILLER. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. Pp. ix, 433. $8.95.)

Loren Miller's granduncle, Bird Gee, was one of the petitioners in the *Civil Rights Cases* of 1883. He lost his suit to enforce the equal accomodations provision of the 1875 Civil Rights Act when the Supreme Court declared that law unconstitutional. Eighty-one years later, Mr. Gee would have been successful, as the 1964 Court upheld an Act virtually indistinguishable from the one he tested.

The Petitioners is a review of that long struggle in the courts to secure the civil rights of Negroes. It includes synopses of all the familiar, and many of the more obscure, cases dealing with segregation or discrimination in education, employment, housing, transportation, voting, and the administration of justice. Written by a lawyer who is now a judge of the Los Angeles Municipal Court (and a vice-president of the NAACP), the emphasis throughout is on the legal aspects of the effort, with the Supreme Court viewed as the arena of battle and the Negro depicted as the ward of the Court.

Aside from a quick look at some early cases involving the status of Negro slaves, there is nothing "new" in either the materials or the viewpoint presented in this book. Mr. Miller knows his subject well, and he has a gift for humanizing and dramatizing legal cases. The selection and organization of the materials are excellent, and while the story is told passionately, the prose is generally simple and lucid. But the author's approach is descriptive rather than analytic, and as a result his book fails to deepen understanding or to stimulate thought about either the Court or the civil rights movement.

For example, he repeatedly makes the point that the post-Civil War Court showed little concern for the effectuation of Negro rights, but he does not tell us why this was so; he insists that the justices of that Court "misread" or "misinterpreted" the Fourteenth Amendment, but he offers no explanation for this corporate error. The sublimation of concern for the Negro in that period was not, after all, confined to the Court. In the postwar era of geographic and industrial expansion, the political branches of government and the nation as a whole accepted the judiciary's position with little objection. Similarly, in developing his theme that the Negro has been the "ward of the Court," Mr. Miller barely touches on the reasons why it was the Court rather than Congress which had to take the lead in securing the rights of Negro citizens. It is a striking fact and an important commentary on the American political system that the national legislature was for so long incapable of acting on one of the nation's most serious problems. Nor does the author give sufficient weight to those changes in American society which obliquely but deeply affected the Negro's struggle for equality, particularly the different patterns of thought and action which emerged out of the Great Depression and the two World Wars.

With regard to the Supreme Court itself, Mr. Miller discusses hardly at all the changes in personnel which were occasioned by the New Deal and which opened the door to a reevaluation of the Negro's constitutional position. Certainly the later 1930's must be regarded as a turning point in civil rights history, as the "new" Court then beginning to function represented a fundamental shift in attitude—from defense of property rights to concern for human rights, from protection of state authority to expansion of national authority—which resulted in a crucial breakthrough for the Negro. To ignore the effects of personnel changes on the Court is to accept that institutional mythology which makes meaningful study of the judiciary's role in American government and politics impossible. It is also disturbing to find that a lawyer and judge should demand absolute fidelity to the Negro "cause" from every justice, and that he should consign all backsliders to the limbo of suspected racism. Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter is praised on page 281 for an opinion upholding Supreme Court review of the states' administration of criminal justice, while on page 285 he is condemned for dissenting in a similar but distinguishable case.

Finally, Mr. Miller has nothing to say about the dramatic events taking place today within the civil rights movement. His concern is only with the legal aspects of the struggle, and he excludes consideration of such vital matters as black power, black violence, and black nationalism. Like most of his generation—both white and Negro—Mr. Miller is still in the courtroom, although the action is now in the street.—ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD, *Hunter College, City University of New York.*

Bibliography of the Official Publications of Kansas, 1854–1958, Territorial and State Publications, Vol. 1. BY BESSIE E. WILDER. (Lawrence, Kan.: Governmental Research Center, University of Kansas, 1965. Pp. x, 318. $20.)

About 20,000 titles are described in the volume by the Document Librarian Emerita of the University of Kansas Library as having been issued by the various departments and other agencies of Kansas during slightly more than a hundred years. The departments, bureaus, etc., are arranged in alphabetical order. Under each is given a brief administrative history preceding the record of the publications. Since all of the items are not available in any one location, the author has given so far as possible one or more locations for each item, and with only a few exceptions has examined every one of the total. The legislative bills have not been included, although these form a necessary but sometimes rather unmanageable supplement to the legislative journals. All in all, this is an indispensable aid to the research worker as well as a monument to a devoted individual and a great credit to the foresight of the University of Kansas Government Research Center. The pattern of presentation should set a standard for the very slowly increasing number of such works for other states. Copy has been prepared for the second and final volume to cover State Institutions and Subventioned Societies. An informal supplement keeping the work continuously up to date is furnished by the Kansas State Library's semiannual *Checklist of Official Publications of the State of Kansas.*—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

America at the Polls. COMPILED AND EDITED BY RICHARD M. SCAMMON. (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965. Pp. 521. $17.50.)

This volume reports Presidential voting figures by state and county for the twelve elections during the years 1920–1964. Included in the data are total vote, Republican, Democratic and other vote, the winner's plurality, and the Republican and the Democratic percentage of the total vote and of the major party vote. The composition of the "other" vote is reported on a statewide and a national basis, as are special aspects of the electoral college and state votes. The volume differs from the *America Votes* series, which is also sponsored by the Governmental Affairs Institute, basically in that it covers a longer time span and includes figures on Presidential elections only.—W.R.K.

This U.S.A.: An Unexpected Family Portrait of 194,067,296 Americans Drawn From the Census. BY BEN J. WATTENBERG IN COLLABORATION WITH RICHARD M. SCAMMON. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965. Pp. viii, 520. $7.50.)

A popular analysis of American socio-economic life, based primarily upon 1960 census data. Interesting, but not of serious professional concern.—C.B.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1951. BY HARRY S. TRUMAN. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1965. Pp. xxxviii, 749. $6.25.)

This is the nineteenth volume in the *Public Papers* series. Similar volumes cover the Truman administration for the years 1945 through 1950, the administrations of Eisenhower and Kennedy, and the first year of the Johnson administration.—J.W.P.

Representation and Apportionment. (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1966. Pp. 94. $2.50.)

A comprehensive review of the political theory, judicial decisions, legislative actions, and political problems of reapportionment in both state legislatures and Congress current to mid-1966.—A.R.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Franklin L. Burdette
University of Maryland

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COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research. ED. BY RICHARD L. MERRITT AND STEIN ROKKAN. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 584. $12.50.)

Although it is of central concern to political science, the field of comparative politics has been ambiguously defined. What is the distinctive expertise of the specialist in comparative politics? It is no longer true, as it was a decade or two ago, that the study of comparative politics in the United States is little more than the description of "foreign" governments. The last ten years have seen the publication of notable works that involved systematic, cross-national analysis of political systems. Today the intellectual leaders in the comparative field are the macro-empirical theorists of political science, devoting much attention to the development and cross-cultural testing of theories of the political system. But unlike anthropology, the only other social science that devotes as much attention to comparative analysis, political science has almost no significant literature devoted to the methodology of comparative research.

Comparing Nations begins to fill the void. It is not concerned with the general methodological problems of comparative research, but (with a couple of exceptions) with the more specific problem of the quantitative cross-national analysis of aggregate data. The articles contained in this volume are revisions of most of the papers presented to the "International Conference on the Use of Quantitative Political, Social, and Cultural Data in Cross-National Comparison" held at Yale University in September, 1963.

The book is divided into four parts. The first deals with the general theoretical and methodological problems of the cross-national analysis of aggregate data. Part II is concerned with the aggregate data basis for cross-national comparisons and contains some illustrations of the types of analytical techniques that can be used and of the problems involved. In the third part the interesting problem of the cross-national comparison of intra-nation differences is introduced. Part IV deals with the international efforts that advance quantitative comparative analysis with as disparate topics as organizational problems and computerized data retrieval systems being discussed.

It is unrealistic to expect any symposium to contain contributions of equal merit, and thus only some of the papers deserve explicit mention. The introductory and theoretical papers of Rokkan and Deutsch are useful particularly for students in graduate seminars on the methodology of comparative research. Scheuch's analysis, extention and systematization of the statistical problem known in the literature as the "ecological fallacy," is of great value. Anyone who is undertaking the quantitative analysis of cross-national data would do well to hire a graduate student to do nothing but whisper in his ear each morning, "Remember the group and individualistic fallacies."

Since so many cross-national comparative studies concentrate on the comparison of measures of central tendency and use a single measure as the index of a given phenomenon under consideration, Part III should be read with care. Attention is drawn to the fascinating presentation of "The Eight Spains" by Linz and de Miguel. Allardt's paper is a particularly good treatment of the implications of intra-nation variation for cross-national comparative research. He clearly points out, for example, that "the same operational definition or indicator for the same theoretical concept [may] lead to erroneous results when applied within different subgroups or different areas." Comparisons are possible only if different indicators are used to measure the same variable. Fox and Miller present a good deal of data showing how differences in racial mobility can be compared cross-nationally and the Alker and Russett contribution draws attention to different indices of inequality and how they measure different aspects of the phenomenon.

In the final section of the book the chapters on political research in the United States and on various data archives are interesting (although already slightly out of date) reviews of where we are and what data archives are now available. The two discussions of computerized data retrieval systems—The General Inquirer by Scheuch and Stone and SYNTOL by Levy—are particularly useful because they present approaches to information retrieval that start conceptually from different places.

There are other worthy articles in this book that cannot be mentioned here because of lack of space.

Merritt and Rokkan are to be congratulated on putting together a much needed work. Our only wish is that symposium editors selected papers more with an eye to their readers' needs and time than to the personal feelings of potential contributors. Particularly, the reputations of potential contributors should not be taken into consideration when deciding which of the conference papers should be published in a competition. Unfortunately, this probably is a utopian criterion.—ROBERT T. HOLT, *University of Minnesota.*

Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela, BY JOHN D. MARTZ. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 443. $12.50.)

Acción Democrática of Venezuela certainly deserves a monographic study of this length and detail. In an era when most political analysts have become reconciled to undemocratic political practice in the emerging nations, and some have seen the mass mobilization movement as something of an inevitability in the process of political development, the experience of this party is something of a success story in democratic achievement.

It is hard to imagine a nation with a sorrier political heritage than that of Venezuela. Historically, this has been one of the most dictator-ridden countries of Latin America. Today, however, one can fairly cite Venezuela as an example of a working democratic system in a developing nation. A critical factor in the transformation of the Venezuelan polity has been the performance of the *Acción Democrática* party.

Martz proves to be a competent chronicler of the development of this movement. His theme is the evolution of a "modern" party, which he identifies as one characterized by the possession of a common ideology, national organization, relative permanence, an established national constituency, and a functional justification based on either actual participation in policy-making or the reasonable prospect of winning power. The achievement of such objectives by one party which is also committed to such democratic norms as the right of legitimate opposition, and definitive adherence to the electoral test of power, leads other parties in the system to adopt a more modern structure out of competitive necessity. The result, of course, makes continued political success more difficult for the first "modern" party, but is extremely propitious from the point of view of democratic political development.

Martz's approach is primarily historical and descriptive. His theoretical apparatus is most parsimonious, consisting basically of the distinction between "modern" and "traditional" political parties. He (wisely) resists the temptation to undertake once more the always invigorating task of creating a new taxonomy of Latin American parties, though he does try to locate *Acción Democrática* within existing schemes of classification. His conclusion that the party is best described as a "national revolutionary" movement will probably prove no more compelling than any of the other rubrics that have been created to identify such democratic reform movements in this region.

This book pertains to the larger tradition of monographic studies of political parties. The questions asked are the conventional ones, common currency among most students of parties. Martz stresses the broad, basic topics of party history and organization, leadership and membership, and relations with other power factors (the army, organized labor, etc.) and parties. As a conscientiously inclusive case study, this book must be counted as a contribution to the literature available for comparative study of party systems. It provides the kind of raw material that is essential for further theoretical development in this field. Unlike the more rigorously designed case experiment, which delimits its field of focus to one type of question, a case study such as this affords information and insight to researchers with a wide variety of orientations and questions.

Martz has an apparent commitment to a style which is more like that of the anthropological field report, in which observation and reporting of every potentially useful fact is stressed, than the more selective orientation toward information practiced by most political scientists. This has its advantages. Martz's book is clearly an indispensable source for anyone who would undertake research on Venezuelan politics, for it is encyclopedic in scope and comprehensive in detail. On the other hand, unless one is a close student of Venezuelan politics, this can become pretty heavy and tedious going, and one does tend to lose track of the argument in the abundance of detail. For example, Martz has a chronic tendency to list the names of all the members of committees, groups, etc. in the text of the book. While this information would be significant to one close to the movement, most political scientists will find it about as interesting to read as the begats. This material is reminiscent of histories of small town churches, where the author must be sure that no important member's name is overlooked.

A more substantive criticism is that this is largely a view from Caracas, from the top of the political system. Though Martz emphasizes the point that the formation of a truly national political movement, effectively penetrating into the previously unpoliticized mass of the Venezuelan citizenry, is one of the party's major accomplishments, the reader does not really learn *how* this was brought about. There is little information on the day-to-day techniques of organization and campaigning, on the structure of leadership at the local level, no case vignettes of the fateful encounter of local party militant and allegedly apathetic *campesino.*

Such criticisms notwithstanding, Martz's work overall is a conscientious, cautious, mature contribution. I am sure that *Acción Democrática* will want this book translated, for it is a remarkably detailed chronicle of the development of the movement. The student of Latin American politics will find it valuable for its clarification of many points concerning the political evolution of Venezuela. And the student of comparative political parties will want to add it to the work of Scott, Gil, Peterson, Snow, Kantor, and other students of Latin American parties as a source of material for cross-national theory building.—CHARLES W. ANDERSON, *University of Wisconsin.*

Brazil and Africa. BY JOSÉ HONÓRIO RODRIGUES. Translated by Richard A. Mazzara and Sam Hileman. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 382. $7.50.)

First published in Brazil in 1962, and now in its second Portuguese edition, José Rodrigues' controversial volume has found a sound translation and handsome publication in the United States. *Brazil and Africa* is one of those formative studies in Brazilian thought which through their inner conviction and vision exert an astonishing influence on both present and future generations of Brazilian intellectuals. *Brazil and Africa* belongs in the same category as Freyre's *Masters and Slaves* and Pierson's *Negroes in Brazil.*

Like Freyre and Pierson, Professor Rodrigues is fundamentally moved by a fascination for the racial formation of Brazilian society and the influence Africa has apparently had on Brazilian history and culture. It is always difficult to assess the final significance of these assertions on the importance of miscegenation in Brazil, and to the extent that Professor Rodrigues defines Brazil's role in international diplomacy in terms of his country's racial formation, *Brazil and Africa* rests on shaky grounds. But in his general argument for a new direction in Brazilian foreign policy and for a turning away from traditional American relationships, the author presents a challenging thesis.

Part I of *Brazil and Africa* is the background to the present analysis. It is a review of Afro-Brazilian relations from 1500 to 1800 wherein Professor Rodrigues attempts to gauge the contributions of African and Portuguese cultures to modern Brazil. Herein the author also attempts to define the racial democracy which grew out of miscegenation and the interaction of two alien cultures. Professor Rodrigues then devotes a hundred pages to modern relations (1800–1960) between Brazil and Africa. Half the number of pages would have served the subject as well.

Part II is a specific document on the formation and conduct of a new Brazilian foreign policy. Professor Rodrigues conceives of the South Atlantic as an emerging diplomatic area. The evolving change in world attention from East-West to North-South has introduced a new factor into Brazil's international position. The two continents of the South Atlantic, Africa and South America, have, Professor Rodrigues believes, related problems of development and strategic importance, and Brazil, perhaps the most powerful nation of the South Atlantic community, can forge a dynamic and useful role for herself. Free of any colonial association and possessing a population half-African (free, Professor Rodrigues is convinced, of any racial prejudice), Brazil is in a remarkable position both to lead and to mediate. Now has come the time for Brazil to loosen her long solidarity with America and to escape from her subservience to North American and European cultural dominance.

As far as Brazil is concerned, *Brazil and Africa* is a brilliantly argued and convincing exposition. There is a deeply personal quality to the author's estimate of his own country which sets the study above the usual scholarly achievement. It is in many ways, right or wrong, the work of a visionary. But as far as Africa is concerned—and the book is really very little about Africa—Professor Rodrigues is badly informed. The extent of his knowledge is Portuguese Africa, hardly the most typical or important area of Africa, whether past or present. In his innocence and good will Professor Rodrigues makes a number of questionable assumptions. Probably only in his condemnation of Portuguese rule in Africa would the author find general agreement in Africa with what he says. Where Professor Rodrigues has been able to see and understand the enormous complexities of Brazil, he has been obliged to view Africa in a singularly innocent way, and this is not enough. But, in spite of the title, this is not a major flaw, for the real value of *Brazil and Africa* has to do with Brazil.—JAMES DUFFY, *Brandeis University.*

Across the Tracks: Mexican-Americans in a Texas City. BY ARTHUR J. RUBEL. (Austin: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas Press, 1966. Pp. xxvii, 266. $6.50.)

This study is a general commentary on the political and economic dichotomy between English-speaking and Spanish-speaking residents of the United States-Mexican borderlands.

Using a two-year study in one town in the Texas Rio Grande Valley for his field data frame of reference, the author, an anthropologist, does not suffer from the Anglo ethnocentrism which mars the efforts of too many other social scientists to report in depth on Mexican-Americans. Rubel lived as if he were a *Mexicano*, subduing the biases of his own Anglo Saxon culture sufficiently to perceive Mexican-Americans from their own viewpoints.

Though the descriptive analysis of these border-town U. S. citizens will prove useful for students of ethnic-group political action, Rubel attempts too much; he tries to construct a wide theoretical model of political alienation of laborers living near more affluent groups. He links similarities in the composite Rio Grande Valley town of Mexiquito with the peasant village of Tzintzuntzan in central Mexico, with the town of Artiama in the highlands of Colombia, and with peasant communities of Southern Italy.

The goal of universal values of perceptions of social relations within the milieu of economic and political conflict has been sought by many social scientists. But historical differences suffice as unknown elements in any such global equations, making certain social characteristics deceptive in their seeming parallelism. The pursuit of universal threads of human behavior, however beguiling, sometimes becomes like the quest for the Holy Grail, just beyond the fingertips of the knight errants of truth.

Ignoring the relatively few pages which attempt to leap the Caribbean and the Atlantic, the corpus of this book does loom as a tribute to the objectivity, linguistic prowess, and social tact of Rubel.

He managed to capture the bickering of cliques within the League of United Latin American Citizens and the G. I. Forum, highlighting exceptions to block voting in political campaigns centering in Anglo versus Latin American candidates. The chapter dealing with an election of a city councilman, a race for mayor, and a contest for the state senate should prove of marked interest to students of borderlands politics. In these elections, Mexican-Americans voted on the basis of the personality of the candidates with little regard for issues.

Rubel relates significant data of living conditions and social ills to group frustrations. And he does so with a skill which permits humane overtones, which allows the reader to feel compassion while still retaining a scholarly overview.

This study captures the pathos of a downtrodden minority, relates it to the actual social and economic conditions of the borderlands, and yields some valid examples of political dysfunction and alienation.—Marvin Alisky, *Arizona State University*.

Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924. By George T. Yu. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 203. $6.00.)

The Republic of China, established in 1912, was the first republic in Asia. For centuries China had been ruled by despotic emperors and the Western democratic form of government was literally unknown to the Chinese people. Even after the Opium War of 1838–42, China's response to Western influence was confined primarily to the development of modern armaments and industries. The great majority of the Chinese people questioned neither the adequacy nor the merits of their age-old political institutions.

However, China's repeated defeats by foreign powers after the Opium War seriously weakened the confidence of Chinese intellectuals in the Manchu regime's ability to rule. After the failure of the reform movement led by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1898, it was clear to many progressive Chinese intellectuals that the only way to save China from foreign partition was to overthrow the Manchu regime. The result was the 1911 revolution.

The Chinese revolution of 1911 which ended the monarchical system in China was not, to be sure, the sole undertaking of Tung Meng Hui, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary organization, although it was undoubtedly the chief catalyst. In the last analysis, the 1911 revolution was the result of the internal weaknesses of the Manchu court and the external encroachments by the colonial powers. Chinese nationalism against Manchu domination, social unrests and economic difficulties were also important reasons for the success for this revolution.

The overthrow of a corrupt and inefficient regime is one thing but the establishment of a viable new republican government is entirely another. Before the revolution, Dr. Sun and many of his followers were overly optimistic about the implementation of a republic form of government in China. This attitude only led to bitter disappointment after the revolution. China's experience in attempting to practice parliamentary democracy during the early period of the republic many well be regarded as a prototype of political modernization in a traditional society and the adoption of Western political institutions in a non-Western environment. Unfortunately, when the Chinese revolutionary leaders were struggling to build their infant republic, their problems and frustrations were little understood by the West. Now, with the emergence of large numbers of new nations in Asia and Africa, the problems of political development and the future of Western democracy in these countries have attracted the attention of many Western political scientists and government leaders. Indeed, the development of valid theories of nation-building has become a critical area in the discipline of political science.

Professor George T. Yu's book, *Party Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912–1924*, is "an examination of the Chinese party movement with special emphasis upon the Kuomintang in its formative period." (P. xiii.) Yu feels that "The Kuomintang presents an excellent example of a party movement in an emerging society," (p. xiii) and his book is of importance to the student of comparative politics interested in relating the Kuomintang experience to the problems of emerging societies of the contemporary world.

The book consists of a foreward written by Professor Robert A. Scalapino and seven chapters. Yu's approach is basically historical with detailed description and analysis of the early developments of the Kuomintang from its Hsing Chung Hui days to its reorganization into the Kuomintang in 1924. The last chapter, "The Kuomintang: A Profile," is largely a recapitulation of the first six chapters which does not seem necessary.

Yu examined the evolution of the Kuomintang from a secret underground party to an open parliamentary party and finally to a revolutionary party of the Soviet type. Although Yu did not break any new ground for specialists who know the Chinese language and who are familiar with the sources used by Yu, it is the opinion of this reviewer that this book is the most comprehensive work ever published in the English language dealing with the developments of the Kuominatng during the 1912–24 period. As such, it is a significant contribution to the study of Chinese politics in the West.

The main weakness of this book seems to be Yu's lack of a general theoretical framework in his treatment of this subject. For instance, although he analyzed the changes and difficulties of the Kuomintang, his explanations were limited, in many cases, to the immediate causes. He did not give adequate interpretation of these phenomena in a larger political, economic, social and cultural context. Yu failed to relate the problems of the Kuomintang to the common problems faced by most of the developing nations. The role of the Kuomintang in the political modernization process in China was not meaningfully assessed. Nor was enough attention paid to the attitude of the rank and file partisans and the masses toward the practice of parliamentary democracy in general and party politics in particular. Dr. Sun's formulation of his "Three Principles of the People" was not analyzed in depth against the political and socio-economic conditions in pre-revolutionary China. Many other important questions remained unanswered in Yu's book, such as the role of the Chinese military forces as compared with the role of those in the new nations in Asia and Africa today in the developmental process. Mainly for these reasons, Yu's book does not contribute significantly to the study of political development in traditional societies.

In conclusion, the strength of this work is its detailed factual account of the early developments of the Kuomintang; its principal weakness is the lack of theoretical analysis of the Kuomintang experience as an example of a party movement in an emerging society. Taken as a whole, Yu's book is a welcome addition to the literature of Chinese politics.—GEORGE P. JAN, *University of South Dakota.*

The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan. ED. BY WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 753. $12.50.)

The main emphasis of this collection of studies by sixteen specialists is various aspects of Japan's economic growth. But the political context of development is also discussed, albeit somewhat less than the title would suggest, and there is interesting speculation about the relationship between politics and the economy.

Of particular interest to the non-specialist will be Sydney Crawcour's (Chapter I) and William Lockwood's (Chapter X) discussions of broad problems and patterns of economic development. Crawcour addresses himself to the problem of the responsiveness of Japan's pre-modern economy to Meiji development programs. Looking at Japan's economy in the 1860's he discovers a high potential for saving, measured in terms of ratios between national income and tax yields, and an adaptiveness to opportunities for increased production. "Modern" business attitudes are also observed, and the "comparatively" high literacy rates and opportunities for education, including business training, are seen as favorable factors in Japan's potential for growth. The substantial commercialization of agriculture and the extensive control activities of central government in marketing and production were also beneficial in Japan's responsiveness to Meiji programs.

Lockwood examines Japan's post-war "second industrial revolution." A marked rise in productivity, in which technological dynamism played a leading role, a high level of savings and investment and changes in the structure of consumption have all contributed to Japan's attainment of a phenomenal rate of growth and "upper middle rank" economic status.

The relationship between the state and the economy in post-war Japan is pictured as "sponsored capitalism" by Lockwood. Although voluntarism is preferred by business in many cases, governmental influence in economic matters is considerable. Government has strategic controls over foreign trade and capital and its role in investment, similar to that of West Germany, is akin to patterns observable in underdeveloped economies. The relationship between business and politics is intimate, with checks on preponderant influence on either side existing in observable patterns of intra-governmental dissensus and intra-business interest differences. There are, in Lockwood's terms, "creative tensions" in a context of general consensus.

Economic and social pluralism, according to Professor Lockwood, provides for greater responsibility in government, and for wider involvement in the political process. A diffusion of elites has taken place, countervailing powers have developed, and although there is still an imbalance in access to decision making centers, access is distributed more broadly than before. This fragmentation has taken place within the contours of an ongoing consensus about the nature of central institutions and directions. There is also an interdependence between economic stability and the stability of the liberal polity.

Robert Scalapino (Chapter XV) discusses the character and political orientations of the postwar Japanese labor movement. In the first phase of their development (1945–47), independent unions were established, the national federations turned increasingly to political interests and a movement to the left was observable. In 1947–50 Communist influence in the labor movement declined while labor's general involvement in politics increased. Between 1950–60, a third stage of development, labor again moved toward leftist positions, but this was followed by a shift in the direction of centralist "realism" after the fall of 1960.

Comment on propositions about relationships between economic patterns and variables is beyond the scope of competence of the political scientist. The political specialist will, however, find the various commentaries on Japanese growth of interest if he is concerned with development in its broadest implications. Some students of politics will feel uncomfortable with Professor Lockwood's discussion of responsibility and stability, since quite complex matters are dealt with very briefly—even though this may be appropriate given his general concern for economic problems. Does pluralism in fact contribute to greater accountability, or are there different patterns of responsibility appropriate to different political structures? Aren't there alternative sources for accountability other than competition? Paternalism might be one. What is the origin of the stability which is seen as central and important to both the economy and the polity? What is the basis for the consensus which is presumably so central in structuring stability in the context of pluralistic competition? These questions are important both to understanding of Japanese patterns and to more general problems of political theory.—BRADLEY M. RICHARDSON, *The Ohio State University.*

Dusk and Dawn in Village India. BY ZAHIR AHMED. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 142. $4.50.)

Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh. BY PAUL R. BRASS. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 245. $6.00.)

American Aid and India's Economic Development. BY S. CHANDRASEKHAR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 205.)

Federalism in India: A Study of Union State Relations. BY ASOK CHANDA. (New York: Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1965. Pp. 316. $7.00.)

Written by a former civil servant of the old princely state of Hyderabad who was long a District Officer, *Dawn and Dusk in Village India* pretends to be fiction, but it rings too true to be anything less than factual.

The first section of the book vividly describes villages in western Andhra Pradesh as he knew them when they were still under the rule of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The second section of the book deals with the Communist upheaval in this area in 1948, the ways in which simple peasants were forced to support Communist leaders trained elsewhere, and the destruction, terror and starvation which the Communist uprising created.

The third part of the story takes place after the Communist uprising has been crushed by the Indian army. Block Development Officers and Village Level Workers have come into being. Some slight signs of progress can be seen.

The book includes excellent sketches of a wide variety of Indian types: prince, landlord, moneylender, local leader, priest, petty clerk, peasant, artisan, Communist guerilla, employee of new India. Though most of these characters are not drawn in depth, they are well etched. Anyone who knows India will recognize them immediately. Incidentally, but poignantly, the author tells of the eclipse of the fine old Muslim culture in the city of Hyderabad and other towns, as the old Muslim aristocracy was replaced by officials of the new India.

Perceptive, well-written, and based on a lifetime of intimate contact with his area, this book deserves to become a classic.

Factionalism in an Indian State is a study of factionalism in five districts of Uttar Pradesh: Meerut, Aligarh, Kanpur, Gonda and Deoria. It shows the fluctuating nature of Congress politics in the U.P., as dissident factions make new bargains with opposition parties.

The author argues that in U.P. factionalism is not ideological or communal but personal, resulting from the intense personal rivalries between factional leaders. Each local leader tries to enlist the support of state party leaders, not vice versa. On the other hand, the intervention of party leaders at the state level tends to prevent the local leader from solidifying his position and becoming what we would call a real "boss" with lasting control.

Factional loyalty, Dr. Brass says, tends everywhere to be greater than loyalty to the party as a whole. Yet he believes that factional loyalty may serve as a stepping stone *toward* party loyalty—from a still more restricted parochial loyalty. The latter point, of course, is a prediction which cannot be supported by evidence.

This study is an important one and the book contains an abundance of detailed information about political maneuvering in the five districts studied, and about the socio-economic background. Some of the author's conclusions at the end of the book, at the end of the chapters, and scattered also throughout the text, however, bear no clear relation to the material he has gathered. For example, on page 240, he states that the Congress is weaker in the U.P. than in other states and that this is because of greater factionalism. His factual material includes nothing to lay the groundwork for such comparisons with Congress in other states.

Asok Chanda, author of *Federalism in India,* is a retired member of the Indian Civil Service who has held a long series of distinguished positions. The chief thesis of his book is that the Constitution of India contemplated that successive Finance Commissions should be the agencies to decide on the allocation of funds between the central government and the states, but that the formation of a Planning Commission, not contemplated by the Constitution, "largely defeated the intention of the Constitution and created an overlap of functions in which the views of the Planning Commission prevailed over those of the Finance Commission" (p. 196). The author, who served as Chairman of the Third Finance Commission, was clearly frustrated by this "overlap." He is also skeptical of the value of the planning procedures and states emphatically that the results have not been up to expectation.

The author covers the history of the Constitution, and examines the many provisions which give the central government in India far greater powers over the states than those held by the central government of certain other federations. To this general part of his study, however, he adds little that has not already been presented more clearly and attractively by such writers as Morris-Jones and Norman Palmer.

His preoccupation with finance reveals itself in the allocation of space: out of 295 pages, he allocates 126 to the financial provisions of the Constitution. He devotes only 35 pages to the relations between the central government and the states in regard to matters included in the Five Year Plans. He is particularly critical of the central government's programs in agriculture, education and health, which he regards as encroachments on the only powers which give the states any reason to exist. And he believes these programs take insufficient account of regional dissimilarities.

This book is essentially a statement of the Constitutional arguments against planning in which economic factors are not considered.

For some years, S. Chandrasekhar of Madras has been ready to write about anything and everything that might form a saleable book: China, infant mortality, South Indian reading habits, Indian emigration, population problems and family planning. On the subject of population, he has had the advantage of being frequently confused in the public mind with C. Chandrasekhar of Bombay, the prominent professional who is head of the Demographic Centre of Bombay.

Now S. Chandrasekhar has turned out a detailed study of *American Aid and India's Economic Development.* It contains a vast array of statistics, most of them clearly gathered from the U. S. Aid Mission in New Delhi. The book examines the allocation of American aid among various sectors of the economy: industry, agriculture, health programs, communications and transport. It also has a chapter on private aid from various American foundations, church groups and others.

Much is included that may be useful to a person needing detailed factual material about American aid. What one misses is an adequate evaluation of the impact of aid. Perhaps Mr. Chandrasekhar could not spare the time and thought for this. Perhaps there is another book, on another subject, to which he must rush on.—BEATRICE PITNEY LAMB, *30 Sutton Place, New York, N. Y. 10022.*

Retrenchment and Revival: A Study of the Contemporary British Liberal Party. BY JORGEN SCOTT RASMUSSEN. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964. Pp. x, 285. $6.50.)

This is a study of the power structure of the British Liberal Party, a party with little power and declining prospects for maintaining even the little power it presently has. It supplements the brief treatment given the Liberal Party in R. M. McKenzie's *British Political Parties,* while at the same time considering what attracts and holds men, leaders and non-leaders alike, within the ranks of a party which objectively has little prospect for success at the polls. As a study of the internal anatomy of the Liberal Party this is clearly a distinguished volume; it is less successful as an exploration of the motivations of those who have attached themselves to a "losing" cause. It should be added, however, that the deficiencies in the latter respect do not adversely reflect upon the author. Before confidence could be placed in his findings in this regard, it would have been necessary to have had substantially larger sums of money for extensive explorations of the matters involved than Rasmussen had, and he is quite explicit about the tentativeness of his conclusions regarding motivations "for political participation in seemingly hopeless causes."

The study of the anatomy of the party includes an examination of Liberal political activity from 1945 until the early 1960's, a special chapter on the relations of the Liberal Leader and the Parliamentary Party, careful treatment of the "mass party" and the professional organizations within it, and two interesting chapters on the party power structure dealing with the determination of strategy and policy. Rasmussen, in general terms, finds that the power structure of the Liberal Party fits the general pattern of the Conservative and Labour parties as described by McKenzie. This occurs despite the fact that the Liberals have had no real hope of actually acquiring control of the Government. This is a matter of some significance since McKenzie argued that the prospect of controlling the government forced certain organizational characteristics upon the major contending parties. One might expect deviant organizational characteristics to arise in a party which is not subject to such "hopes" or demands. Rasmussen is probably correct, however, in stressing that this is a third party with an unusual history. It was once one of the two great parties, and its organizational form reflects its past predominance as much as its present prospects. To this he adds that psychologically during the period under examination, the Liberals felt close to power, even though objectively they may have been far from it. He stresses the "internal climate of opinion" as a molder of the party's power structure. "This climate," he states, "determines 'the rules of the game' which apply within a party. These rules are of prime importance even when they are more recommendatory than descriptive of a party's actual power distribution, because appearing to abide by these rules—appearing legitimate—is a strength in any internal power struggle." Rasmussen's exploration of this thesis is carried out effectively in tracing clashes between the liberal leadership and the mass party which are remarkably like those which periodically have exploded in the Labour Party

The consideration of the motivations for participation in Liberal Party politics is the subject of four chapters. The conclusions reached are based upon interviews with 63 "present or former Liberal parliamentary candidates." Rasmussen is quite cognizant of the fact that his sample is small and that it does not extend to the consideration of those who vote Liberal, but otherwise do not participate in the party's affairs. Most of the interviews conducted were lengthy and seemingly at least in part open-ended. Rasmussen's comments on the responses of his interviewees, many of whom are quoted at some length, are shrewd and suggestive. There is not space in a limited review to report his findings, though it might be noted that he does not find much evidence of anomic or maladjusted needs as being major factors in Liberal attachment. The principal values of this portion of the study are, however, suggestive for future research and Rasmussen is quite conscious that he has not come close to establishing any closure in his treatment of motivations.

In general, this is an excellent volume, well-written, insightful, orderly and informative.—Byrum E. Carter, *Indiana University*.

The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939–45. By George Stein. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. 330. $7.50.)

Professor Stein's study is an important contribution to the history of Nazi Germany and the Second World War. The Waffen SS, the armed branch of the SS, started with a nucleus of members possessing the highest Nordic characteristics and ended the war as a polyglot force of nearly a half million men, most of them non-German, and including legions of people formerly designated as sub-human.

The post war apologists of the Waffen SS have tried to disassociate their organization from the regular SS and have gone as far to suggest that the multi-national Waffen SS was a forerunner of NATO and defender of the European civilization against the Asiatic hordes. Professor Stein shows quite convincingly that although some of the Waffen SS divisions, especially the elite Germanic units, were not primarily extermination squads, there was a constant exchange of personnel between the fighting units and the concentration camps. Also most of the Waffen SS units engaged in anti-partisan and police activities were nothing more than roving murder commandos. The recent publication of the diaries of some of the Waffen SS divisions by the Czechoslovak Government indicates that the author may have been even too charitable to the elite divisions. Their treatment of enemy prisoners as shown on several occasions in the West and universally on the Russian front was nothing but barbaric.

Professor Stein, apparently influenced by the Waffen SS writers, claims that Hitler decided to increase the size of the Waffen SS since they saved the day on the Russian front in the winter of 1941. Actually at this time because of its limited size the contribution of the Waffen SS was minimal. For instance, the SS Division "Totenkopf" composed only a small part of over 100,000 German troops who held out in the Demiansk pocket. Neither does the author mention the greatest defeat suffered by the Waffen SS at Prokhorovka in July of 1943 when they failed Hitler in his last attempt to salvage something from the Battle of Kursk. The Waffen SS writers obviously are reluctant to talk about this painful episode.

Although scholarly and well-documented, the style of writing in this book may disappoint those who have read Gerald Reitlinger's more readable classic study of the SS. The book however, is an excellent supplement to the Reitlinger volume. The extensive bibliography omits several books by Erich Kern and B. J. S. McDonald's study of Kurt Meyer.—MICHAEL PARRISH, *Indiana University.*

Social Change in Israel. BY JUDAH MATRAS. (Chicago: Aldine, 1965. Pp. 211. $6.95.)

The Kibbutz That Was. BY BORIS STERN. (Washington: Public Affairs, 1965. Pp. 158. $3.75.)

Social research on Israel exhibits a peculiar tendency. It sometimes seems that Israel has been written about more and understood less than many other nations. Despite a spate of descriptive and propagandistic literature the amount of solid research about Israel (that which is not merely descriptive) is still meager. For some reason Israel is often omitted from both the analyses of new nations or developing nations, and analyses of developed systems. Israel is thus often left in an intellectual limbo, at the mercy of popular novelists and sentimental tourists.

As a political and social system, Israel may indeed be difficult to classify. Nevertheless, the processes of economic development, social integration and nation-building in Israel merit more comparative attention. In the wake of independence, and in a relatively short period of time, Israel has doubled its population and has become highly polyglot. Economic growth has been rapid, though progress toward economic independence has been halting. The post-independence ethnic group immigrants are culturally widely separated from the dominant European elites. A more serious danger is that these recent arrivals occupy the lower strata of the social structure. As a result of these two trends the overriding problem has been social integration. The barriers that divide highly diverse ethnic groups imperil national identifications. A fluid social structure with extensive opportunities for mobility are essential to national integration. Education at the secondary and university levels has to be made more open if such mobility is to occur.

Judah Matras, a sociologist at the Hebrew University, has given us an excellent portrait and analysis of four important facets of Israeli social structure: population trends, social basis of electoral support, education and occupational mobility, and changes in the family structure. Matras relies on demographic data and such other available statistics to give us an assessment of mobility and change in Israel.

Social change has been a focal concern of social analysis about Israel. One of the difficulties is finding a good bench mark for the measurement of change. Some have used the pre-state period (the Yishuv) as the base for comparative assessments. Reliable empirical data are lacking for the period. As a result, a theoretical idealized configuration called "The Yishuv" has been used which has come to be construed as the reality, which it is not. Matras' careful use of data casts doubt on the reliability of the Yishuv configuration, and may thereby have liberated researchers from that type of pre-state comparison, so that Israel may now be more profitably compared cross-culturally with other nations. For the processes of political realignment, industrialization, urbanization, and differentiation that are taking place in Israel need comparative analysis.

Of particular interest to political scientists are two trends that Matras identifies. The first is the secularization of the oriental population and the distribution of their electoral support to other parties as well as the religious parties. The second trend, visible in the general population, is a shift in voter identifications away from the old political party attachments and identification of voters with new interests—economic (occupational) geographic, or ethnic. Matras presents an extremely useful ecological analysis of the voting data from the 1961 General Election to the Parliament. Thanks to his analysis we have benchmarks for voting data studies over time. Recent mergers of parties on the left and on the right in Israel attest to this recognition of the obsolescence of some old ideological issues in the face of new problems, although the character of new ideologies is not clear.

Boris Stern's book, *The Kibbutz That Was*, is a disappointing work. Stern is an economist who has conducted extensive research in Israel. He has collected much data on the economics of the kibbutzim. He does not add much when he tells us again of the problems of kibbutz threatened by an economy moving steadily toward industrialization and greater urbanization. It is widely known that the kibbutz and its ethos exemplified the dominant values in the country. Yet today the kibbutz is fighting a rear guard action against the values of technical and professional education, strident middle class consumption values, and a growing anti-socialist orientation. The problems of the kibbutz are as much attributable to its successes as to its shortcomings. Despite this isolation of the kibbutz, most kibbutzim are relatively prosperous.

The Kibbutz That Was suffers from the bias of the author against the kibbutzim of the left-wing Marxist party. This author's strong social-democratic identification does him dubious service in evaluating kibbutzim of the more left-wing Marxist political persuasion. The most useful sections are those dealing with agricultural progress and the growth of manufacturing industries.—LESTER G. SELIGMAN, *University of Oregon*.

Twelve Doors to Japan. BY JOHN W. HALL AND RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Pp. xxi, 649. $9.95.)

This collection of summary commentaries on various aspects of Japanese society, culture, politics and economics will be useful to the political scientist who wishes to introduce his students to background knowledge on Japan. Beardsley's perceptive discussion of Japanese politics is one of the best short treatments of this subject extant.—B.R.

Yugoslavia. BY PHYLLIS AUTY. (New York: Walker and Co., 1965. Pp. 251. $6.50.)

Morocco. BY NEVILL BARBOUR. (New York: Walker and Co., 1965. Pp. 239. $6.50.)

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Malaysia. BY VICTOR PURCELL. (New York: Walker and Co., 1965. Pp. 224. $6.50.)

These books in the New Nations Library are intended, apparently, to be quick historical and culturalogical introductions for prospective tourists and businessmen. Though interesting, they are hardly worth perusal by the serious scholar.—W.G.F.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

A Study of War, 2nd ed. By QUINCY WRIGHT. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. xlii, 1637. $20.00.)

This is a magnificent piece of work. The first edition of this volume (1942) will stand as a monument in its science just as the books of Freud and Keynes do in theirs. It is not quite a "general theory" in the sense of the latter works; Wright knew he was dealing with too complex a phenomenon, and with too little preceding scientific material on which to build, to produce such a theory. Instead it is an analysis of that phenomenon and its ostensible causes, with middle-level theories, exploring virtually every corner.

There has been at many universities, I suspect, nearly a generation of majors and graduate students essentially unfamiliar with this formidable tome, though they doubtless have had innumerable ideas from it filtered through other readings. It is time to correct that neglect where it exists. While a substantial quantity of original and important work on the causes of war has gone on since 1942—much of it discussed in a new commentary here—this volume is in no sense a "historical document." It is also available in an abridged version without notes and appendices, but you should buy this one.—Bruce M. Russett, *Yale University.*

Alliance Without Allies: The Mythology of Progress in Latin America. By Victor Alba. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965. Pp. vii, 244. $6.95.)

Victor Alba thinks that the Alliance for Progress is dead, killed by the oligarchies which misgovern most of Latin America, and that it is time for the United States Government to establish a new alliance which will be capable of achieving the goals set up for the now dead alliance. Professor Alba states, he does not write "to try to make the reader happy, to coddle prejudices, sooth consciences, or justify official policies." (P. vi.) Rather, he tries to describe Latin America as he sees it and to suggest what can be done to promote fundamental changes in the social organization of the Latin American republics. Originally published in 1964 in Spanish as *Parásitos, Mitos y Sordomudos,* this book is a polemic against the Latin American ruling class based on Professor Alba's twenty years of travel and study in all parts of Latin America.

Professor Alba thinks the national interest of the United States coincides with the needs of the masses in Latin America. The United States cannot allow its neighbors to drift into an alliance with the Russian or Chinese Communists. The masses in Latin America cannot continue to live on the almost sub-human level the present organization of the society offers them. Both, therefore, need to see the area transformed by land reform, industrialization, better education, democratic government and a lessening of militarism. The Alliance for Progress was intended to be a partnership in which the United States Government would help finance the structural changes so desperately needed in Latin America. But as Professor Alba points out, the oligarchy never really wanted change and convinced the United States to channel Alliance funds through governments or governmental agencies. Thus the Alliance became another aid program which the oligarchic governments used for their personal benefit and no real change came except in Venezuela where a revolutionary government was in power.

Most of this book is a description of Latin America and its oligarchy as Professor Alba has observed it during the years he lived there. He points out that most of the reality of the area is covered by myths which are assiduously propagated and believed by many, both in Latin America and the United States. Among the myths Professor Alba mentions are those that Latin America has great potential riches, that tropical zones offer infinite possibilities for development, that any problem can be solved with outside assistance, that the Latin Americans have a call to liberty, that there is a desire for progress in Latin America, that there is racial equality in the area, and that there is representative democracy in most of the Latin American countries. Another myth much believed in the United States is that there is much anti-United States feeling in the area. Actually, as Professor Alba points out, "all the Latin American dictatorships of the last thirty years have relied on the cooperation of local Communists" (p. 67). Thus the Communists helping and being helped by the Batistas, Perez Jimenezes, Somozas, Vargases and Goularts were always in a good position to attack the United States while the oligarchic governments could run to the U. S. Embassy to get more grants to help them fight "Communism." This all led many to think the United States was unpopular in Latin America when the opposite was true.

To Alba the solution is simple. The United States must end all assistance to governments and channel its aid through private organizations as well as end all assistance to the Latin American armed forces and remove the United States military missions. The United States, he thinks, has only one thing to sell, the idea of democratic capitalism. This, therefore, is what it should be selling as the utopia for Latin America to counter the status quo offered by the oligarchy and the utopia of totalitarianism offered by the Communists.

Professor Alba does not think it is money which Latin America needs, but rather, ideas and inspiration to waken and organize the almost inarticulate masses. He thinks Latin America needs no more new official agencies, or bureaucracy, technicians, experts, studies, seminars, round tables or reports. Instead, he calls for a sort of new peace corps, an alliance for progress that travels "on horseback or by bicycle," that meets "in dusty local union halls, among sacks of corn in cooperative stores, in the back rooms of drugstores, in the doorways of peasant huts" (p. 231). What Professor Alba seems to be saying is that the United States Government should try to stimulate a democratic revolution in Latin America by helping the masses to assert themselves.

This book will be of value to all scholars trying to understand Latin America. It is not extensively documented, but is well written and will prove stimulating to its readers. The policy makers in Washington ought to read it and think about its contents.—Harry Kantor, *University of Florida.*

Finland and the Great Powers: Memoirs of a Diplomat. By G. A. Gripenberg, translated by Albin T. Anderson. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 380. $5.75.)

English-language sources dealing with Finland's controversial role in the Second World War now have a major addition. Although the most important single source in Finnish political history, J. K. Paasikivi's lengthy autobiographical writings, remains untranslated, English-language editions of the memoirs of Gustaf Mannerheim and Väinö Tanner have been long available and widely used. The perspectives of soldiers and party leaders need to be supplemented by those of diplomats, however, and this gap Gripenberg has filled, at least in part. Gripenberg, an aristocratic Finn who eventually served as Finland's first Permanent Representative to the United Nations, has written a valuable and detailed account of his diplomatic experiences from 1939 to 1944. During those years he was Finnish Minister in London (until Finland broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 1941), at the Vatican (1942–1943), and in Stockholm (1943–1944). Although Gripenberg does not tell the whole truth—he explicitly acknowledges adherence to the principle *tout vrai n'est pas à dire*—there is little reason to challenge the accuracy of what he does tell.

Contrary to the translator's suggestion in a brief and inconclusive introduction, Gripenberg's account does not give a favorable picture of Finnish foreign-policy leaders and their capacity for decision-making. The translator draws from these memoirs the moral that a conception of politics as the art of the possible "is totally inadequate to describe what a small power like Finland can and must do in order to survive" (p. xiii). Gripenberg, in contrast, concludes that "principles must always give way to the hard demands of necessity" (p. 69). It was precisely in this realistic recognition of necessity that Finnish foreign policy in the years described by Gripenberg was most deficient. Eljas Erkko, Foreign Minister in 1939, was blindly optimistic that there would be neither a general European war nor a Soviet attack upon Finland. As a result, he instructed Gripenberg not to bother obtaining information on whether Finland was being discussed in great-power negotiations; no serious effort was made before the outbreak of the Winter War to purchase large quantities of military material abroad, and Finnish leaders showed little interest in putting their case before a British public inclined to be receptive to Finnish problems.

The Finnish Government compounded its difficulties by issuing infrequent, incomplete, and belated instructions to its Minister in London. Gripenberg, known for his sympathies to the Western powers, was not informed about a great many essential matters. Indeed, for all practical purposes, he was largely ignored by his superiors. Quite probably, during the Winter War the British Government knew more about events in Finland than did Gripenberg. After the Winter War, as Finland drew steadily closer to Germany, Gripenberg learned nothing of Finnish plans to participate in Operation Barbarossa. To accommodate Germany the Finnish Government broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

When Gripenberg, who did not favor the rupture with Britain, arrived home from London, the Finnish Foreign Minister expressed no interest in his impressions of British policy, and tried—without justification—to shift blame for the rupture to Marshal Mannerheim. To get rid of a potential "peace-minded" Foreign Minister, Gripenberg was named as the first Finnish Minister to the Vatican. Since the Finnish Government was not interested in a separate peace with the Soviet Union, Gripenberg had no real function in this potentially promising post. Even after he was made Finnish Minister in Stockholm, there was not much for him to do, since the Finnish leadership remained optimistic about Finland's military prospects. In June, 1944, the Finnish Foreign Minister still believed that Finland should not negotiate with the Soviet Union. Later that summer, of course, Finns who recognized that Finland had no choice but to negotiate a separate peace came to the fore. Realism, notably absent during 1939–1944, finally triumphed in Finnish foreign policy. Gripenberg, by a dry recital of the facts, has provided rich insights into the many ways in which foreign policy ought not to be made. The world was on Finland's side in 1939, but almost no one was on Finland's side in 1944. Clearly the makers of Finnish foreign policy were not so wise as Finnish soldiers were brave.—Marvin Rintala, *Boston College.*

The Communist International and its Front Organizations; A Research Guide and Checklist of Holdings in American and European Libraries. By Witold S. Sworakowski. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1965. Pp. 493. $10.00.) Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series: XXI.

A checklist of 2,300 books and pamphlets published by the Communist International and six other international Communist organizations which are held in forty-eight American and European libraries. Not a comprehensive bibliography of all publications and does not include periodical articles.—C. B.

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Richard L. Merritt and Arlene W. Saxonhouse
Yale University

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Thompson, Leonard M. *Politics in the Republic of South Africa.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. Pp. x, 230. $1.95, paper.)

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Turner, Ian, *Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900–1921.* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. xx, 272. $10.00.)

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Van Dyke, Vernon, *International Politics*, 2nd edition. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xiii, 527. $6.50.)

Vansina, Jan, *Kingdoms of the Savanna.* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 364. $6.75.)

Varma, Shanti Prasad, *Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations.* (Jullundur, India: University Publishers, 1965. Pp. ix, 342. Rs. 25.00.)

Varma, Vishwanath Prasad, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvoday*, 2nd edition. (Agra, India: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 1965. Pp. viii, 468, xii. 14 Rupees.)

Wadsworth, James J., *The Glass House: The United Nations in Action.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xiv, 224. $4.95.)

Wang, Y. C., *Chinese Intellectuals and the West: 1872–1949.* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 557. $10.00.)

Weingrod, Alex, *Israel: Group Relations in a New Society.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. vi, 82. $4.00.)

West, Francis, *The Justiciarship in England, 1066–1232.* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966, Pp. xi, 306. $10.50.)

Whitton, John B., Ed., *Propaganda and the Cold War.* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963. Pp. iv, 119. $3.50.)

Winch, Donald: *Classical Political Economy and Colonies.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 184. $5.50.)

Wint, Guy, Ed., *Asia: A Handbook.* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xiii, 856. $25.00.)

Wolff, Robert P, Moore, Barrington, Jr., and Marcuse, Herbert, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance.* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 117. $2.45.)

Young, James Sterling, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 307. $7.95.)

Young, William H., Ed., Ogg and Ray's *Introduction to American National Government.* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. ix, 755. $7.95.)

Zucker, A. E., *General De Kalb, Lafayette's Mentor.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 251. $7.00.)

NEWS AND NOTES

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association: President-elect; three Vice Presidents; Secretary; Treasurer; and eight Council members for two-year terms.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Gwendolen Carter, Northwestern University, Chairman; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; and Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1967.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

The 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association, held in New York, September 6 to 10, was one of the most successful in the Association's history. Attendance during the week was well over 4,000 and the registration for the meeting was the highest ever recorded. Under the chairmanship of Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Program Committee organized one of the best-received programs in recent years, including four plenary sessions and 72 panel discussions.

The plenary sessions were:

Wednesday, September 7: Ethics, Polity and Policy
  Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, "Evaluation of Political Systems"
  Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, "Political Science and Public Policy: Weber's Views and Their Contemporary Relevance"
  Edward A. Shils, University of Chicago, "Society and Polity"

Thursday, September 8, 3:00 P.M.: The Leviathan
  Heinz Eulau, Stanford University, "Legislators and Magistrates"
  Herbert A. Simon, Carnegie Institute of Technology, "Rulers and Bureaucrats"
  Ithiel de Sola Pool, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "The Public"

Thursday, September 8, 8:45 P.M.: Presidential Address
  Gabriel A. Almond, President of the American Political Science Association, "Political Theory and Political Science"

Friday, September 9: War and Peace
  Karl W. Deutsch, Yale University, "Nation and World"
  Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "The Formation of New States"

The recipients of research and writing awards were as follows:

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award: to *British Politics in the Collectivist Age*, by Samuel H. Beer.

The Edward S. Corwin Award: to William K. Muir, Jr., Yale University, "Law and Attitude Change."

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: to Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe."

Leonard D. White Award: no award this year.

Helen Dwight Reid Award: to William Zimmerman, Columbia University, "Soviet Perspectives in the International System, 1956–1964."

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:15 A.M., September 6, 1966, at the Statler-Hilton Hotel in New York, N. Y., with President Gabriel A. Almond presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1966, and former presidents of the Association were present: Gabriel A. Almond, William Anderson, M. Margaret Ball, Marver Bernstein, William Buchanan, Robert A. Dahl, Manning J. Dauer, James C. Davies, Alex N. Dragnich, Rupert Emerson, Heinz Eulau, Merle Fainsod, Charles D. Farris, William T. R. Fox, Samuel Hendel, Herbert Kaufman, John H. Kautsky, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Robert E. Lane, Avery Leiserson, Charles McClelland, Wallace Mendelson, Alfred G. Meyer, Clara Penniman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Laurence I. Radway, Austin Ranney, Emmette S. Redford, William H. Riker, Victor G. Rosenblum, Clinton Rossiter, Richard Snyder, Donald G. Tacheron, Joseph Tanenhaus, John Wahlke, and Kenneth Waltz.

Prior to the meeting, the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member an agenda book which included reports of the Executive Director, the Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, the Treasurer, and the Auditor, as well as an Appendix containing numerous documents on the activities of the Association in 1965–66.

The Executive Director, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, in his report to the meeting discussed particularly the acquisition on very favorable terms of an attractive new Association headquarters building at 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D. C. The Association office will move there some time during the next few months. The Council unanimously passed a motion commending the Executive Director and the Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman, for their skillful negotiations in acquiring the building.

The Executive Director also reported on a Ford Foundation grant to the Association of nearly $3 million, the largest ever received by the Association, for the continuation and expansion of several existing programs and the addition of some new ones.

The Executive Director reported that the monographs resulting from the Study of Congress, carried on under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, will be published by McGraw-Hill; and *The Job of the Congressman* by Donald Tacheron and Morris Udall, an outgrowth of the Seminar for Freshman Congressmen, will be published by Bobbs, Merrill and Company. The authors of the latter two volumes have agreed to donate their royalties to the Association.

A motion was unanimously passed authorizing the Executive Director, on behalf of the Council and the Association, to write those presenting papers at the plenary sessions, and to Representative Udall and Mr. Tacheron, Associate Director of the Association, expressing the appreciation of the Council and the Association.

Dr. Kirkpatrick spoke of Association efforts to inform the membership of federal programs and activities of interest to political scientists. He mentioned specifically summer institutes of the Office of Education; grants and programs of the National Science Foundation; hearings in the next session of Congress on the contribution of the social sciences to the solution of domestic problems; and especially a series of three bills by Congressman Fascell proposing that a Commission be created to prepare a White House Conference on the Social and Behavioral Sciences; that a White House Social Science Advisor be appointed; and that a Social Science Foundation be established. Congressman Fascell had asked for the reaction of the Association to the first of these proposals, and, after some remarks by President Almond and some discussion, a motion was unanimously passed putting the Council on record to Congressman Fascell as supporting the idea of a White House Conference on the Social and Behavioral Sciences and offering whatever cooperation it can give in its preparation.

The Treasurer, Max Kampelman, submitted the Treasurer's report indicating that the financial condition of the Association continues to be strong. He pointed out that the Association's assets of over $2.5 million reflected the expanding activities of the Association and noted that the Operating Reserve Fund has been increased and that a substantial Endowment Fund has been developed. The Council unanimously authorized the officers to express on behalf of the Council its appreciation of grants and gifts received from a number of donors. After some discussion, the budget as presented in the Treasurer's report was unanimously approved by the Council.

The new Editor of the REVIEW, Professor Austin Ranney, presented his report and thanked those who had reviewed manuscripts for their prompt and expert appraisals. He particularly noted a higher acceptance rate for manuscripts submitted to the REVIEW and outlined some alternative solutions to the resulting backlog problem.

Professor Carl Baar, a Congressional Fellow for 1965–66, then spoke briefly. He asked the Council to give attention to what he considered some defects in the Congressional Fellowship program. A motion was unanimously passed that this matter be referred to the Advisory Committee of the Congressional Fellowship program to be joined by such political scientists as the President of the Association considers appropriate and that a report be made to the Council next year.

Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool presented his report as Chairman of the Program Committee for the 1966 annual meeting. He remarked on some of the problems he had encountered in his task, especially those presented by volunteer papers. A member of the Council urged that the field of Public Law be given more emphasis in future programs than it may receive in the program of the 1967 annual meeting.

The President of the Association, Professor Gabriel A. Almond, reported on several matters that had been discussed by the Executive Committee and on which it sought the advice of the Council. He mentioned the preparation of a brochure to be issued by the Association for prospective political science majors among high school seniors and college freshmen. The Council expressed its unanimous approval of the idea, authorized the Executive Committee to send a draft to the members of the Council and other interested persons for their comments, to pre-test the brochure with some high school students and counsellors, and to proceed with publication.

The question of a code of professional ethics, which had been referred to the Executive Committee in 1965, was discussed again and a motion was unanimously adopted that the President appoint an *ad hoc* committee to report to the Executive Committee in time for it to report to the Council in September 1967 on criteria to be applied to the professional activities of political scientists.

The President informed the Council that a memorandum was being prepared for the Executive Committee on the question of what role, if any, the Association should play to foster the development of political science abroad. The problem of a proposed self-study of the profession was also discussed, but the nature of this study remains unsettled.

Finally, the President pointed out that the Association has been concerned with the teaching of political science in secondary schools. The Executive Committee will soon receive a memorandum on what is now being taught in the field of government and politics so that it can then consider what steps the Association might take in this area.

The Council adjourned at 5:15 P.M.

JOHN H. KAUTSKY, Secretary

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Gabriel A. Almond in the Georgian Room of the Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York, N. Y., at 4:45 P.M., September 7, 1966.

President Almond expressed his thanks to the officers and staff of the Association, the members of the Council and the chairmen of the various committees for their cooperation during his term of office. He mentioned as problems of concern to him during his tenure the preparation of a brochure for prospective political science majors, questions of the Association's role in relation to the teaching of political science in secondary schools, and the development of political science abroad and of a proposed self-study of the profession (all briefly referred to in the minutes of the Council meeting above).

The Chairman of the Program Committee, Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool, briefly summarized the nature of the program of the 1966 annual meeting and suggested some changes in the pattern of soliciting papers for the program of future meetings.

The Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Professor Austin Ranney, in summarizing his written report, stressed that every effort had been made to publish issues of the REVIEW on time and to give a serious evaluation to each manuscript received and make a relatively quick decision on its publication. He called attention to a higher acceptance rate of manuscripts submitted to the REVIEW and to the problem of growing backlog.

The Treasurer, commenting on his written report, available to the members, noted that the Association remained in good financial condition during the past year. The increased number of its special programs had resulted in an increase in the budget. He announced that the Association had purchased a new headquarters building, that a new Biographical Directory of the membership would be available free to members soon after January 1, 1967, and that Congressman Morris Udall, and Mr. Donald Tacheron, A.P.S.A. Associate Director, had assigned their royalties on the book prepared by them, *The Job of the Congressman*, to the Association. Mr. Kampelman stressed that the leadership of Evron Kirkpatrick had been one of the major factors in maintaining the financial success of the Association. The report of the

Treasurer was accepted by the members.

The Executive Director, Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick, pointing out that his full report was available to the members, spoke of the intellectual vitality of the Association's membership and the importance of this to the development of political science as a discipline and a profession. He mentioned state and local government internship programs and other programs supported by the Ford Foundation grant received by the Association and referred to the increasing amount of time spent by his office on federal government activities of concern to political scientists and of his hopes to keep the membership informed of them. Dr. Kirkpatrick also spoke of the excellent testimony President Almond had presented before the Harris subcommittee.

The Secretary presented his report on the meeting of the Council on September 6, 1966.

The Chairman of the Nominating Committee, Professor Bernard C. Cohen, on behalf of his Committee proposed the following officers for 1966–67, noting with deep regret the death of two of the nominees, Professors Harold Stein and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.:

President Elect: Merle Fainsod, Harvard University

Vice-Presidents: Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University), Richard Snyder (University of California, Irvine), Robert Lane (Yale University)

Secretary: Kenneth Waltz, Swarthmore College

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman

Members of the Council: (two-year terms) Herbert Kaufman (Yale University), Charles McClelland (University of Michigan), Paul Castleberry (Washington State University), Margaret Ball (Duke University), Alfred Meyer (Michigan State University), Clara Penniman (University of Wisconsin), Clinton Rossiter (Cornell University), William Buchanan (Washington and Lee University)

Professor Cohen moved adoption of the nominations. There were no other nominations and his motion was unanimously approved.

President-Elect Fainsod was invited to the platform. President Almond turned the gavel over to the incoming President, Professor Robert A. Dahl.

President Dahl declared the meeting adjourned at 6:00 P.M.

JOHN H. KAUTSKY, Secretary

The Pacific Northwest Political Science Association's 1967 conference will be on April 28–29 at the College of Idaho, Caldwell, Idaho. Ray C. Jolly of that institution is in charge of local arrangements.

At its twentieth annual business meeting in March, the New York State Political Science Association elected the following officers: president, Maynard Smith, Hobart and William Smith Colleges; vice-president, Robert E. Elder, Colgate University; secretary-treasurer, Leon S. Cohen, Graduate School of Public Affairs-State University of New York; executive council member, Marilyn Gittell, Queens College; Father James C. Finlay, Fordham University; and Walter O. Filley, Jr., State University of New York at Binghamton.

The next annual meeting will be held March 31–April 1, 1967 at the Thruway Motor Inn, Albany, New York.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants announces opportunities for advanced graduate students, faculty members, and post doctoral researchers to engage in study and research in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the academic year, 1967–68. These exchanges are made possible by the intergovernmental agreement on exchanges with the USSR and agreements with the respective educational organizations in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. These exchanges are administered for the American side by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, a multi-university American organization whose objective is to strengthen American education in all fields by supporting research in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Inter-University Committee administers three separate exchanges with the USSR: an exchange of advanced graduate students and young faculty, an exchange of post doctoral researchers, and an exchange of American teachers of Russian for a special ten-week program during the summer. The exchanges with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are open to advanced graduate students, faculty, and post doctoral researchers.

Participants are chosen in national competition through application and interview. Participants must have proficiency in the language of the receiving country commensurate with the needs of their programs. Applicants must be American citizens and with the exception of those applying for the summer exchange of language teachers which is open also to teachers of Russian in elementary and secondary schools, applicants must be affiliated with American universities or colleges.

For additional information write: Howard Mehlinger, Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants, 021 Lindley Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

A Comparative Foreign Policy Systems Program has been established by the department of political science, Wayne State University, under the direction of William D. Coplin. The Center will use man-computer and all-computer simulations, model-building and data collection. The program has begun operation under a contract with the U. S. Department of State for the experimental development of international relations simulations for the use of Foreign Service personnel. More detailed information on the various aspects of the program may be obtained from the Department of Political Science, Wayne State University, 437 Putnam, Detroit 48202.

The Ohio State University has established The Center for Atlantic Community Studies, with a program that includes interdisciplinary training, research and public education in Atlantic affairs. It expects shortly to offer support to North American and European scholars for advanced research, study and teaching. James B. Christoph is director of the Center.

Syracuse University sponsored its third annual Maxwell Institute on the United Nations, in July. The theme of the Institute was "International Organization in the Western Hemisphere." Each of six seminars featured the presentation of a paper by an expert in his field and a discussion by those attending.

The speakers were John C. Dreier, director of the Inter-American Center at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; Minerva Morales Etzioni, The Center for International Studies, El Colegio de Mexico; Gordon Connell-Smith, the University of Hull, England; William S. Barnes, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Miguel S. Wionczek, Center for Latin American Monetary Studies, Mexico City; and Michael O'Leary, Maxwell Institute.

The first issue of *Canada News Index*, covering the period of March 15–31, 1966, was published August 15, 1966. The new quarterly was devised and organized by Bernard K. Johnpoll. Future issues will be under the direction of A. R. Allen of the University of Saskatchewan. The *Index* covers Canadian news in 15 selected Canadian newspapers in each of the country's 10 provinces. Subscriptions should be addressed to *Canada News Index*, University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada.

The Cortez A. M. Ewing Foundation sponsored its first annual lecture at the University of Oklahoma, April 29, 1966. The speaker was the Hon. Carl Albert, House Majority Leader, who is a trustee of the Foundation and a former student of Professor Ewing. His topic was "The Legislative Process in Action." The address folllowed a dinner at the Oklahoma Memorial Union, attended by 500 people including members of the Oklahoma State Political Science Association, whose meeting was held in conjunction with the lecture. A copy of the lecture can be obtained by writing The Cortez A. M. Ewing Foundation, 317 Cafritz Building, Washington, D. C. 20006.

The first issue of the new *Journal of European Affairs* will be published about the first of January, 1967, according to the editor, Zoltan Michael Szaz, Seton Hall University. On the editorial board of the Journal are the following: James D. Atkinson, Georgetown University; Manuel Cardozo, Catholic University of America; Andrew Gyorgy, George Washington University; Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University; Kemal H. Karpat, New York University; Ian Karski, Georgetown University; Joseph LaPalombara, Yale University; Charles O. Lerche, American University; James Pollock, University of Michigan; Stephan Possony, Stanford University; O. Carlos Stoetzer, Fordham University; Robert Strausz-Hupe, University of Pennsylvania; Dinko A. Tomasic, University of Indiana; Jan Triska, Stanford University; and John H. Wuorinen, Columbia University emeritus. Jayne A. Davis will be assistant editor. The *Journal* will deal with recent history, politics, international relations and economics of Europe exclusive of the Soviet Union.

CURTIS AMLUND, North Dakota State University; JOHN A. BOND, North Dakota State University; FRANK J. KENDRICK, Moorhead State College; HARDING NOBLITT, Concordia College and A. B. VILLANUEVA, Moorhead State College, were members of the five man-team appointed by the mayor of Fargo to a task force on city government. They submitted their final report and their recommendations to the mayor in June.

Robert E. Agger and Joseph R. Fizman have returned to the University of Oregon after a year's research in Europe.

Michael H. Armacost was honored for distinguished teaching at Pomona College.

Donald D. Barry, Lehigh University, was the recipient of the University's Lindback award for excellence in teaching.

Francis Beer is a visiting doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

Thomas J. Bellows, West Georgia College, is on leave during 1966–67 for additional study at Yale University.

Allan W. Cameron, Bates College, served in Viet Nam during the summer of 1966 as a coordinator in AID's internship program.

Carl Q. Christol, University of Southern California, spent the fall semester teaching in the University's London graduate program. During the spring term of 1967, he will conduct research in Geneva.

Frederic N. Cleaveland has returned to his position at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill after his leave at the Brookings Institution.

Gordon B. Cleveland has returned to the University of North Carolina after a semester in Italy.

Mirian Conant, Columbia University, has been selected as a member of the Internship Program in Academic Administration of the American Council on Education for the year 1966–67.

Patrick J. Conklin has returned to the University of Missouri after a year with the Office of Career Development. United States Civil Service Commission.

Orville Cope, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, spent the summer on research in Chile.

Athern Daggett, Bowdoin College, was on leave during the second semester of 1966.

Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, will be on leave during the second term, 1966–67.

James A. Davies, University of Oregon, presented a paper at the 1966 meeting of the American Psychological Association.

Alfred Diamant, Haverford College, is on leave during 1966–67. During the fall term he was a Fulbright lecturer at the Ruhr University of Bochum, West Germany. He will conduct research in Paris during the spring semester.

Daniel Di Piazza, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater, is serving as the director of the University's Upward Bound project.

Robert H. Dix, Yale University, is on leave during 1966–67 and is conducting research in Chile.

John C. Donovan, Bowdoin College, was the American member of a three-man OECD team which examined the manpower policies of the government of the United Kingdom in London during the month of June.

Ernest A. Duff, Randolph-Macon Women's College, has been appointed a member of the Rockefeller Foundation's Special Field Staff for 1966–67. He will participate in the Foundation's University Development program at the *Universidad del Valle* in Cali, Chile.

Joseph Dunner, Yeshiva University, will serve as consultant on the Planning and Development Committee of the Freedom Studies Center of the Institute for American Strategy.

Elliott Fagerberg is a visiting post-doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

David J. Finlay and Lester G. Seligman, University of Oregon, conducted research in Ghana during the past summer.

G. James Fleming, Morgan State College, has returned from a year in Africa. He has been elected to the Council of the American Society for Public Administration and to the Baltimore Civil Service Commission.

Houston I. Flournoy, Pomona College, was on leave during the fall term and campaigned for the office of State Controller of California.

Gerald P. Flynn, St Joseph's College, has been awarded a Danforth Foundation teaching grant for 1966–67.

William J. Foltz, Yale University, is on leave of absence until the second term of 1966–67. He has been conducting research in Africa.

Murray Frost, formerly of California State College at Los Angeles, has joined the technical staff of the Defense Research Corporation of Santa Barbara.

Federico Gil, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has been elected to the Executive

Council of the Latin American Studies Association and appointed to the Foreign Area Fellowship Program Selection Committee for 1966–67. He is also directing a personnel training program for the IADB.

JOHN GILL is a visiting doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

LOUIS H. GOLD, Oberlin, will be on leave during 1966–67.

STUART GRAHAM, doctoral candidate at New York University, is senior research analyst for the Hudson River Valley Commission.

H. GAYLON GREENHILL, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater, attended the White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights," June 1–2, 1966.

DONALD HADWIGER, has returned to his duties at Iowa State University after a year spent with the USDA in Washington.

BERTIL L. HANSON, Oklahoma State University, is a Fulbright scholar at the University of Oslo during 1966–67.

RAY C. HILLAM, Brigham Young University, is in Viet Nam as a Fulbright-Hays lecturer.

EDWIN C. HOYT, University of New Mexico, is on research leave during 1966–67.

MALCOLM JEWELL, University of Kentucky, has been chosen editor for the *Midwest Journal of Political Science* for a three-year term, effective September 1, 1966.

ROBERT S. JORDON, George Washington University, has been appointed dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies of Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone. He is presently Littauer visiting professor at the College and will remain an additional year in Sierra Leone.

HWA YOL JUNG, Moravian College, is on leave during 1966–67 and is studying at Yale University.

MORTON A. KAPLAN, University of Chicago, presided over an international conference on "New Approaches to International Relations" that was held in June as part of the 75th anniversary celebrations of the University.

ROBERT W. KAUFMAN, Western Michigan University, is spending the 1966–67 year with the California State Legislature under a grant from the Michigan Center for Education in Politics.

W. MARVIN KENDRICK, Yale University, is on leave during 1966–67.

C. I. EUGENE KIM, Western Michigan University, has been awarded a grant from the American Philosophical Society and spent the fall term in Korea.

GEORGE KLEIN, Western Michigan University, spent the summer in Yugoslavia.

ALLAN KORNBERG, Duke University, has received a research grant from the National Science Foundation.

SAMUEL KRISLOV, University of Minnesota, is investigating the use of laboratories as a teaching tool in political science under a grant from the U. S. Office of Education.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, Yale University, is giving a doctoral seminar at Columbia during 1966–67.

RENE LEMARCHAND, University of Florida, was in Africa from April to September on a Fulbright-Hays award.

D. RICHARD LITTLE, Northern Illinois University, was one of three recipients of his University's teaching excellence awards.

GERHARD LOEWENBERG, Mt. Holyoke College, gave a fall term graduate course at Columbia.

J. ANTHONY LONG, University of Wyoming, is on leave of absence.

WILLIAM LUCAS is a visiting post-doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

JOHN MARCUM, Lincoln University, received a two-year Fulbright-Hays award and is spending the academic year 1966–67 in France, East Africa, Southern Africa.

JOHN D. MARTZ, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill spent April in Costa Rica conducting research. He has been awarded the John Simon Guggenheim fellowship for 1966–67 for research in Peru and Ecuador.

RICHARD L. MCANAW, Western Michigan University, is spending the 1966–67 academic year as a special aide to the governor of Missouri under a grant from the National Center for Education in Politics.

LEE C. MCDONALD, Pomona College, is directing an experimental study program on his campus.

J. Keith Melville, Brigham Young University, is on leave and is running for a seat in the U. S. House of Representatives.

Wallace Mendelson coordinated an area conference for the University of Texas on June 24 and 25. The conference was attended by political scientists from fifteen institutions in the Southwest.

Richard L. Merritt, Yale University, is on leave and is conducting research in Germany.

Linda B. Miller, Barnard College, Columbia University, spent the fall semester as a research associate at the Center for International Studies, Princeton University. She will spend the second semester as visiting professor in the American School in Switzerland.

William C. Mitchell, University of Oregon, is a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during 1966–67.

Khosrow Mostofi has returned to the University of Utah after a year's absence on a Fulbright-Hays grant.

Lowell G. Noonan is spending the 1966–67 academic year as a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Innsbruck, Austria.

Thomas Page, University of Illinois, has been on leave during the fall term. He conducted research in Illinois, Ohio and Michigan.

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, was a visiting lecturer at the NDEA Institute in History at Bucknell University July 25–29. He has been appointed a member of the Committee on the Watumull Prize of the American Historical Association. During August and Septemper he was a senior specialist at the Institute of Advanced Projects, East-West Center and from October to April, 1967 he will be a senior faculty fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies in India. For his book, *South Asia and United States Policy* he received a gold medal from the Middle States Council for the Social Studies.

Claude S. Phillips, Jr., Western Michigan University, participated in the Conference on Application of Mathematics in Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute during the summer.

James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is spending the year teaching at FLACSO University in Chile.

Herbert F. Quinn is on leave from Sir George Williams University and is conducting research under a Canada Council Senior fellowship.

Emmette S. Redford, University of Texas, spent August in Washington D. C. conducting research in the Department of Agriculture.

Peter P. Remec, Fordham University, will be on leave until September, 1967. During the past summer he attended a seminar on Chinese civilization and culture in Taiwan. He is presently senior Fulbright lecturer in international relations at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India.

William O. Reichert, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater, was on research leave during the fall term.

James M. Rhodes, Marquette University, was on leave in Germany during the summer and fall terms.

Robert Rupen has returned to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill after spending one semester at the Naval War College and another in Germany.

Robert E. Scott, University of Illinois, is on leave during 1966–67 conducting research in Peru.

Charles A. Scudder, West Georgia College, is on leave during 1966–67 for further study at the University of Georgia.

James P. Sewell. Yale University, is on leave during 1966–67 conducting research in France.

Harry H. Shapiro, Rutgers, has been named visiting professorial scholar by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, a government agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Richard F. Staar, Emory University, testified in June before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs during hearings on "the Military Threat to NATO."

James Stegenga is a visiting post-doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

Ralph A. Straetz, New York University, is on leave of absence and is serving as Executive Director of the New York State Temporary Commission on the Constitutional Convention.

Oscar Svarlien, University of Florida, has been made a knight of the Order of St. Olav by order of King Olav V of Norway. The award was conferred for distinguished research and writing in the field of international law.

Paul Tillett is a visiting post-doctoral fellow at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

George O. Totten, University of Southern California, gave a course on Japanese government at the California State College at Los Angeles during the fall term.

S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky, has been elected vice-president of the Kentucky Conference of Political Scientists for 1966–67 and to the Executive Council of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research for a two-year term, 1966–68.

V. Stanley Vardys, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, is on leave in Europe during 1966–67 on a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies.

Richard A. Watson has resumed his duties at the University of Missouri following a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavorial Sciences.

Daniel Wit, Northern Illinois University, is spending 1966–67 at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague as a Fulbright lecturer.

Francis D. Wormuth has returned to the University of Utah after a year's absence on a Fulbright-Hays grant

STAFF CHANGES

New Appointments

Robert Agranoff, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

Joseph Allman, acting assistant professor, University of Oregon; formerly of Michigan State University.

Phillip S. Althoff, instructor, Western Michigan University.

Edward L. Angus, assistant professor, Memphis State University.

Thomas J. Anton, associate professor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle; formerly of University of Illinois at Urbana.

Alan Arian, assistant professor, Tel Aviv University, Israel; formerly of Western Reserve University.

H. Lowell Ashman, instructor, Brigham Young University.

James Attaway, instructor, The Citadel.

William W. Axline, assistant professor, The Ohio State University.

John H. Badgley, joint appointment as associate professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the Washington Foreign Policy Research Center, January 1967.

Benjamin R. Barber, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania.

A. K. Basu, assistant professor, University of Southern California; formerly of University of Oklahoma.

Lawrence W. Beer, assistant professor, University of Colorado, formerly of the University of Washington.

Lucy Behrman, lecturer, University of Pennsylvania.

Suzanne D. Berger, instructor, Harvard University.

Constantinos L. Beros, assistant professor, University of Colorado; formerly of Sonoma State College.

Wallace W. Berry, lecturer, San Jose State College.

Ruth A. Bevan, lecturer, Yeshiva University.

Seweryn Bialer, assistant professor, Columbia University.

Jefferson M. Bishop, instructor, Texas College of Arts and Industries.

L. Vaughn Blankenship, associate professor, State University of New York at Buffalo, formerly of University of California.

Benjamin Bock, associate professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of U. S. State Department.

Bernard L. Bray, instructor, Bradley University.

WILLIAM E. BRIGMAN, assistant professor, Florida State University.

HENRY P. BRUBAKER, instructor, University of Vermont.

PHILIP M. BURGESS, assistant professor, The Ohio State University.

JOHN H. BURNETT, assistant professor, Texas Technological College; formerly of Georgia Tech.

LARRY CALDWELL, instructor, Wellesley, winter and spring terms, 1966–67.

LOGAN B. CAMPBELL, instructor, Brigham Young University.

YI-CHUN CHANG, assistant professor, University of Delaware; formerly of U. S. Department of Defense.

YUNG PING CHEN, associate professor, Eastern Illinois University; formerly of University of Wisconsin/Platteville.

CLEO CHERRYHOLMES, assistant professor, Michigan State University.

TOM IN TEAK CHUNG, assistant professor, University of Alabama; formerly of Vanderbilt University.

MICHAEL CODY, JR., instructor, University of Arkansas.

JOHN COLLINS, instructor, Michigan State University.

WILLIAM J. CROTTY, assistant professor, Northwestern University.

KENNETH A. DAHLBERG, assistant professor, Western Michigan University.

WILLIAM T. DALY, assistant professor, University of Missouri/Kansas City.

SUZANNE DUVALL, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater.

JOHN L. EBERHARDT, Instructor, University of Nevada.

SMART A. EKPO, assistant professor, Lincoln University (Penna.)

JOHN ELLSWORTH, associate professor, Southern Illinois University; formerly of California State College/Hayward.

ALONA E. EVANS, Elizabeth Kimball Kendall professor, Wellesley College.

JOHN R. FAUST, associate professor, Eastern Illinois University; formerly of Illinois Wesleyan College.

WILLIAM FEENEY, instructor, Southern Illinois University.

ROOSEVELT FERGUSON, instructor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

GLENN W. FISHER, professor, University of Illinois.

TROWBRIDGE H. FORD, assistant professor, University of Maine.

DONALD FOUTS, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

RICHARD FREDLUND, instructor, Southern Illinois University.

ANTHONY FUSARO, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

GARY D. GLENN, assistant professor, Northern Illinois University.

HAROLD GORDON, assistant professor, Colorado State University; formerly of University of Colorado.

BARRY GREENBERG, instructor, Michigan State University.

THOMAS H. GREENE, assistant professor, Michigan State University; formerly of Bucknell University.

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

DAVID H. GRUBBS, associate professor, Middle Tennessee State University; formerly director of The Tennessee State Planning Commission.

EDWARD W. GUDE, instructor, Northwestern University.

HAROLD GUETZKOW, Gordon Scott Fulcher Chair of Decision Making, Northwestern University.

SAMI HAJJAR, instructor, University of Wyoming.

LELAND E. HALL, instructor, Northern Illinois University.

RICHARD HALVERSON, instructor, Bloomfield College.

ROGER P. HAMBURG, associate professor, Marquette University.

YUNG C. HAN, assistant professor, Florida State University.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, assistant professor, Oberlin.

Edwin L. Harper, lecturer, Rutgers.

Paul Harper, instructor, Hofstra University.

Jonathan Harris, assistant professor, University of Pittsburgh.

Kenneth Harris, assistant professor, Wayne State University; formerly of University of Kansas.

James E. Hart, instructor, Duke University.

Frederick H. Hartmann, Chester W. Nimitz Professor of International Relations, Naval War College; formerly of University of Florida.

Martin J. Hauser, assistant professor, Florida State University.

Afak Haydar, assistant professor, Illinois State University, 1966–67.

Anne Renoulf Headley, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

James Heaphey, associate professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, State University of New York-Albany; formerly of University of Pittsburgh.

Martin O. Heisler, lecturer, University of Maryland.

Victor Hjelm, assistant professor, Southern Methodist University; formerly of University of Colorado.

Roy D. Hofheinz, instructor, Harvard University.

Jerry P. Holland, instructor, West Georgia College.

Charles D. Hounshell, professor, Tulane University; formerly of Emory University.

James C. Hsiung, lecturer, Rutgers.

Francis Hutchins, instructor, Harvard University.

Alan C. Isaak, assistant professor, Western Michigan University.

Michael L. Israel, instructor, Rutgers.

Francis W. Johnstone, instructor, Brigham Young University.

Josef Kalvoda, associate professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of University of San Diego.

Clifford Kaufman, assistant professor, University of Pennsylvania.

Natalie J. Kaufman, assistant professor, Rutgers.

Eldon G. Kenworthy, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Yale University.

Frederic Kirk, Jr., assistant professor, University of Vermont.

Robert L. Kline, instructor, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater.

Joel Larus, associate professor, New York University; formerly of Brandeis University.

Thomas C. Laughlin, assistant professor, University of Mississippi; formerly of Florida State University.

Thomas P. Lauth, instructor, Hofstra University.

Keith Legg, instructor, University of Florida.

Robert G. Leh, associate professor, Illinois Wesleyan University.

Alan Leonhard, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of Southwest Missouri State College.

Lawrence Littwin, assistant professor, University of New Mexico.

Milton G. Lodge, assistant professor, University of Iowa.

Hugh G. MacNiven, professor, University of Oklahoma; formerly of the University of Pittsburgh.

James M. Malloy, instructor, University of Pittsburgh.

Rodolfo Martinez, instructor, Brigham Young University.

Earleen M. McCarrick, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

Robert J. McShea, assistant professor, Columbia.

Ruth McVey, lecturer, Cornell University, 1966–67.

Robert Melson, assistant professor, Michigan State University.

Louis S. Meyer, assistant professor, University of Wyoming.

Lester W. Milbrath, professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Northwestern University.

Abraham Miller, University of Illinois.

Robert Miller, instructor, Duke.

Norman Miller, assistant professor, Michigan State University.

Lawrence B. Mohr, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

Robert Mollan, assistant professor, Utah State University.

James F. Morrison, assistant professor, University of Florida.

David Mozingo, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Rand Corporation.

William D. Muller, assistant professor, Texas Technological College.

Roald Y. Mykkeltvedt, assistant professor, West Georgia College.

Charles G. Nelson, associate professor, University of Missouri.

James Nelson, associate professor, Northern Illinois University; formerly of University of Vermont.

Dale A. Neuman, assistant professor, University of Missouri/Kansas City.

Mark Neuwell, associate professor, University of New Mexico.

William A. Nighswonger, assistant professor, Sonoma State College; formerly of American University.

John K. C. Oh, assistant professor, Marquette University.

Nicholas G. Onuf, assistant professor, Georgetown University.

John N. Paden, assistant professor, Northwestern University.

Richard Payne, assistant professor, The Citadel.

Samuel J. Pernacciaro, instructor, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater.

David J. Peterson, assistant professor, State University of New York/Binghamton.

Joseph C. Pilegge, assistant professor, University of Alabama.

Joseph P. Pisciotte, instructor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

Orville Poland, associate professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, State University of New York-Albany; formerly of University of California-Berkeley.

David E. Powell, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

Robert V. Presthus, professor, University of Oregon; formerly of Cornell.

Francine Rabinovitz, assistant professor, University of Florida.

Gene E. Rainey, assistant professor, The Ohio State University.

Joseph Rajbansee, assistant professor, Florida State University.

Nimrod Raphaeli, lecturer, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Harold V. Rhodes, assistant professor, University of New Mexico.

Thomas B. Ripy, Jr., assistant professor, Memphis State University; formerly of Eastern Kentucky State College.

Arthur Rovine, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Columbia University.

Ernest E. Rossi, assistant professor, Western Michigan University.

Robert L. Rothweiler, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater.

Margaret Rountree, instructor, State University of New York/Buffalo.

Mark A. Roy, assistant professor, Marywood College.

Gerry R. Sack, assistant professor, University of Rhode Island; formerly of Ball State Teachers College.

Kenneth Sherrill, instructor, Oberlin, 1966–67.

Stephen Sloan, assistant professor, University of Oklahoma.

Brian Smith, S. J., instructor, Fordham University.

Stephen N. Smith, assistant professor, Steven F. Austin College; formerly of University of Kansas.

Ronald M. Sommer, assistant professor, Texas College of Arts and Industries.

James A. Stegenga, assistant professor, The Ohio State University.

Barry Nathan Stein, assistant professor, Winona State College.

LARRY N. STERN, assistant professor, Florida State University.

JIMMIE W. STEVENS, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

HUGH M. STEVENSON, instructor, Western Michigan University.

RUSSELL STRANGE, associate professor, Eastern Illinois University; formerly of the University of Illinois.

MARVIN SURKIN, instructor, Moravian College.

ZOLTAN M. SZAZ, associate professor, Seton Hall University.

ELLIOT TENOFSKY, instructor, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater.

JOHN D. THOMAS, associate professor, University of Alabama; formerly of Alabama College.

WALTER TOXEY, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of the University of Texas.

KURT K. TWERASER, instructor, University of Arkansas.

PAUL W. VAN DER VEUR, professor, Northern Illinois University; formerly of the Australian National University.

JOHN PRESTON WARD, assistant professor, Grand Valley State College.

ROBERT WESSEL, assistant professor, Iowa State University.

MARSHALL H. WHITHED, instructor, Northern Illinois University.

H. THOMAS WILSON, lecturer, Rutgers.

HENRY J. WISE, instructor, West Georgia College.

RONALD J. YALEM, associate professor, University of Alabama; formerly of the University of Southern California.

M. GEORGE ZANINOVICH, assistant professor, University of Oregon.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, professor, New York University; formerly of the University of South Carolina.

VICTOR ZITTA, associate professor, University of Maryland.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS

DAVID W. ADAMANY, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater: instructor, University of Wisconsin, summer, 1966.

SHLOMO AVINERI, Herbrew University, Jerusalem: lecturer, Yale University, 1966–67.

JOHN C. BOLLENS, UCLA: professor, University of Colorado, summer, 1966.

H. PETER CH'EN, lecturer, University of Pennsylvania, 1966–67.

ALBERTO CIRIA, University of Buenos Aires; assistant professor, University of North Carolina, 1966–67.

HUGH M. CLOKIE, University of California/Berkeley: professor, University of Virginia, 1966–67.

E. LEWIS B. CURTIS, professor, Hiram College, 1965–66, and Birmingham-Southern College, 1966–67.

LEWIS A. DEXTER, professor, Michigan State University, spring, 1967.

JOHN C. DONOVAN, Bowdoin College: professor, Columbia University, summer, 1966.

JOHN FERGUSON, professor, Fels Institute of Local and State Government, 1966–67.

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, Rand Corporation: lecturer, Stanford University, winter, 1967.

FRED I. GREENSTEIN, Wesleyan University: professor, Yale University, fall, 1966.

DOUGLAS HODGKIN, lecturer, Bates College.

JAMES T. JONES, lecturer, University of Illinois, summer, 1966.

EDWARD LITT, University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee: associate professor, University of California/Berkeley, 1966–67.

NOAH LUCATZ, Hebrew University in Jerusalem: lecturer, Glasgow University, Scotland, 1966–67.

KIT G. MACHADO, University of California/Berkeley: assistant professor, University of Missouri.

ROY C. MACRIDIS, Brandeis University: professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, spring. 1967.

ROBERT MEAGHER, Columbia University School of Law: lecturer, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, fall, 1966.

Andrew Milnor, Boston University: assistant professor, Cornell University, 1966–67.

Peter Nettl, professor, University of Pennsylvania, spring, 1967.

Nelson Polsby, Wesleyan University: lecturer, Yale University, second term, 1966–67.

Uri Ra'anan, professor, M.I.T. and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1966–67.

Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University: professor, M.I.T., 1966–67.

Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, Italy: professor, Yale University, 1966–67.

Charles P. Schleicher, University of Oregon: professor, Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi.

John Scott, associate professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, fall, 1966.

Robert Sharlet, University of Missouri: assistant professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, fall, 1966.

Garold W. Thumm, Bates College: professor, National War College, 1966–67.

Morris Watnick, Wayne State University: associate professor, SUNY at Binghamton, 1966–67.

Joseph Wilkinson, associate professor, Northern Illinois University, 1966–67.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

Totten J. Anderson, associate dean of the Division of Social Sciences and Communications of the College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, University of Southern California.

Hoyt B. Ballard, associate professor and chairman, Texas College of Arts and Industries; formerly of Oregon State University.

Charles Beall, associate professor and chairman, University of Denver; formerly of Eastern Illinois University.

George Blanksten, chairman, Northwestern University.

Ardath W. Burks, director, International Education, Rutgers.

James A. Clark, assistant to the president, University of Maine.

Dorothy I. Cline, acting director, Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico.

Edwin L. Cobb, assistant professor and chairman, Austin Peay State College; formerly of Texas A and M University.

Robert J. Duman, acquisitions librarian, San Jose State College.

Paul C. Dunham, research assistant, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Maine.

Joseph Dunner, chairman, Yeshiva University.

Alice L. Ebel, head, Illinois State University.

Mario Einaudi, director, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.

Neil F. Garvey, acting chairman, February, 1966–August, 1966, University of Illinois.

Harvey Glickman, chairman and director of African Studies, Haverford College.

Morton Gorden, associate professor and research associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.

Lyman Jay Gould, chairman, University of Vermont.

Samuel K. Gove, professor and acting director, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois.

Lynwood M. Holland, professor and head, Texas Technological College, January, 1967; formerly of Emory University.

Charles B. Judah, acting chairman, University of New Mexico.

Fred Krinsky, chairman, University of Southern California.

Martin Lichterman, professor of history and dean, Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Union College; formerly director, New England Board of Higher Education.

Irvine W. Marsters, Jr., career development specialist, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Maine.

John D. Martz, assistant director, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of North Carolina.

Eugene A. Mawhinney, acting head, University of Maine.

Timothy D. Mead, acting chairman, Moravian College, 1966–67.

Edwin B. Morrell, chairman, Brigham Young University.

EDWARD MUTH, associate professor and director, African Center, Lincoln University; formerly of the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

JOSEPH F. NEWMAN, assistant professor and research associate, Institute of Government Research, Florida State University.

CHARLES PRESS, chairman, Michigan State University.

JESSE W. REEDER, coordinator, International Relations program, Brigham Young University.

JOHN B. RICHARD, acting chairman, University of Wyoming.

CHESTER B. ROGERS, assistant professor and director, *Institute of Public Affairs, Western* Michigan University.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, chairman, Graduate International Relations program, University of Pennsylvania.

ROYAL D. SLOAN, JR., associate professor and assistant director, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service; formerly of the University of Nebraska.

FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL, associate dean, School of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri.

RICHARD F. STAAR, chairman, Emory University.

MATTHEW C. STEWART, associate director, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

LEO C. STINE, associate dean, Graduate School, Western Michigan University.

VICTOR A. THOMPSON, professor and head, University of Illinois.

MAURICE K. TOWNSEND, professor and dean of Academic Affairs, Stanislaus State College: formerly of Moorhead State College.

GEORGE M. WALKER, JR., lecturer and research associate, Institute of Public Health, University of Michigan.

EARLE WALLACE, acting dean, Graduate School, University of North Carolina.

ELLSWORTH E. WEAVER, acting chairman, University of Utah.

DAVID W. WELBORN, acting head, Northern Illinois University, 1966–67.

ROBERT L. WEST, professor and coordinator, International Development Studies, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; formerly of the Rockefeller Foundation.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

CHADWICK F. ALGER, Northwestern University: professor.

HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., Yale University: associate professor.

SALVATORE ARCILESI, The Citadel: associate professor.

JAMES D. ATKINSON, Georgetown University: professor.

TWILEY W. BARKER, JR., University of Chicago at Chicago Circle: professor.

DONALD D. BARRY, Lehigh University: associate professor.

JOHN BATCHELDER, University of Iowa: assistant professor.

CARL BECK, University of Pittsburgh: professor.

THEODORE L. BECKER, University of Hawaii: associate professor.

GOBERDHAN BHAGAT, University of Mississippi: associate professor.

JOHN C. BUECHNER, University of Colorado: associate professor.

ROBERT S. CAHILL, University of Hawaii: associate professor.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN, University of Pittsburgh: professor.

EDWARD F. COOKE, University of Pittsburgh: professor.

RICHARD W. COTTAM, University of Pittsburgh; professor.

RICHARD DEKMEJIAN, SUNY at Binghamton: assistant professor.

MARTHA A. DERTHICK, Harvard University: assistant professor.

P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOS, Northern Illinois University: professor.

ROBERT DOVE, Iowa State University: assistant professor.

JOHN G. ERIKSEN, University of Oklahoma; professor.

DONALD L. FAIRCHILD, The Citadel: associate professor.

LEE W. FARNSWORTH, Brigham Young University: associate professor.

VICTOR C. FERKISS, Georgetown University: professor.

HARRY J. FRIEDHAM, University of Hawaii: professor.

ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN, The University of Michigan; professor.

MORTON J. FRISCH, Northern Illinois University: professor.

STANLEY T. GABIS, University of Missouri: professor.

FREDERICK GAREAU, Florida State University: associate professor.

LYMAN JAY GOULD: University of Vermont: professor.

RICHARD B. GRAY, Florida State University: professor.

ANDREW HACKER, Cornell University: professor.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON, Lincoln University (Penna.): professor.

ROYCE HANSEN, American University: professor.

GUY B. HATHORN, University of Maryland: associate professor.

ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, University of Florida: professor.

RAY C. HILLAM, Brigham Young University: associate professor.

JERRY HOUGH, University of Illinois: associate professor.

EDWIN C. HOYT, University of New Mexico: professor.

HELEN INGRAM, University of New Mexico: assistant professor.

KENNETH JANDA, Northwestern University: associate professor.

ARTHUR L. KALLEBERG, University of Missouri: associate professor.

HENRY S. KARIEL, University of Hawaii: professor.

C. I. EUGENE KIM, Western Michigan University: associate professor.

RICHARD H. KOSAKI, University of Hawaii: professor.

CHARLES KUNSMAN, JR., San Jose State College: associate professor.

H. R. MAHOOD, Memphis State University: associate professor.

JOHN D. MARTZ, University of North Carolina: associate professor.

WILLIAM T. MCCRAW, San Jose State College: assistant professor.

O. RUTH MCQUOWN, University of Florida: associate professor.

LOUIS C. MIDGLEY, Brigham Young University: associate professor.

LINDA B. MILLER, Barnard College/Columbia University: assistant professor.

DAVID W. MINAR, Northwestern University: professor.

GLENN G. MORGAN, San Jose State College: professor.

EDWIN B. MORRELL, Brigham Young University: associate professor.

JOSEPH S. NYE, Harvard University: assistant professor.

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, Georgetown University: professor.

NATHANIEL S. PRESTON, American University: professor.

QUENTIN L. QUADE, Marquette University: associate professor.

WILLIAM O. REICHERT, Wisconsin State University/Whitewater: professor.

FAUNEIL J. RINN, San Jose State College: associate professor.

WILLIAM A. RITCHIE, Western Michigan University: associate professor.

JOHN H. ROMANI, University of Michigan: associate dean, School of Public Health.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, University of Pennsylvania: professor.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT, Yale University: associate professor.

ANDREW M. SCOTT, University of North Carolina: professor.

ROBERT D. SMITH, Western Michigan University: assistant professor.

RICHARD G. SMOLKA, American University: associate professor.

Peter Snow, University of Iowa: associate professor.

Richard C. Spencer, Coe College: professor emeritus, after 18 years at Coe.

Douglas St. Angelo, Florida State University: associate professor.

Sidney G. Tarrow, Yale University: assistant professor.

M. Ladd Thomas, Northern Illinois University: professor.

Lois E. Torrence, American University: professor.

Tang Tsou, University of Chicago, professor.

Karl von Vorys, University of Pennsylvania: associate professor.

Richard A. Watson, University of Missouri: professor.

David M. Welborn, Northern Illinois University: associate professor.

James P. Young, State University of New York/Binghamton: associate professor and chairman.

RETIREMENTS AND RESIGNATIONS

Roma Sawyer Cheek, Duke University, retired at the close of the 1965–66 academic year.

Edward F. Dow has retired as head of the department of history and government after serving 34 years in that capacity at the University of Maine.

Stanley Kelley, Jr. has resigned as chairman at Princeton University and will devote full time again to teaching and research.

Karl N. Snow resigned from Brigham Young University to become Legislative Analyst with the Utah State Legislature.

Gilbert Y. Steiner, director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, has resigned his position to join the Brookings Institution in Washington, D. C.

Stephen B. Sweeney will retire after 30 years as director of the Fels Institute of Local and State Government. He will become director emeritus as of July 1, 1967, and Samuel S. Fels Research Professor of Governmental Administration until he retires in 1970.

Irwin Stewart, former president of the University of West Virginia (1946–58) and professor of political science at the University since 1958, will retire from active duty at the end of the 1966–67 academic year.

IN MEMORIAM

Edgar S. Furniss Jr. On August 17, 1966 death prematurely claimed Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Mershon Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University.

Professor Furniss was 48 years of age. He was born in Iowa in 1918; he received his Bachelor's degree from Yale in 1940 and his Ph.D. from that University in 1947. He served in the Department of State from 1944 to 1946; and in 1947 he joined the Department of Politics at Princeton University where he rose to the rank of Prefessor. In 1963 he came to Ohio State as Mershon Professor of Political Science and in that same year became first Director of the Mershon Social Science Program in National Security Studies, a post he filled with vigor and enthusiasm that spread as contagion to all those with whom he associated.

That he took special delight in his post as creator and builder of the Mershon Social Science Program there is no doubt. In contributing to the volume commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of his graduating class at Yale, he wrote the following:

"At turning points in my life, I received crucial advice from two Yale Professors. Professor Nicholas Spykman . . . advised me to go to Berkeley for one year . . . Professor Aronld Wolfers later advised me to quit Yale for Washington and get some practical experience in how the government worked. The third bit of advice we (my wife and I) gave ourselves. After sixteen . . . years in Tigertown . . . we told ourselves to accept the chance to enlarge our horizons, participate in building worthwhile enterprises and moved to Columbus, Ohio. I have never regretted following all three advices."

To say that his friends and colleagues at Ohio State joined him in never regretting his having followed that last advice would be an understatement that Edgar Furniss would have liked. The stronger, straightforward truth is that we delighted in his company. We admired the energy and the imagination that he poured into his Directorship of the Mershon program. We respected the scholarship that he brought to his teaching. And we appreciated the concern for improving the Department of Political Science in which he was a strong and active member. He was a vigorous and moving force at this University and it is diminished by his death.

Each of us who knew Edgar Furniss will remember him in his own way. Each will enjoy recalling those characteristics of personality—the pleasant idiosyncrasies—that give to each man his special stamp and character. Most will remember that Edgar Furniss was impatient with needless delay. He was punctilious in keeping appointments and he expected others to be the same. He was restless in the audience of windy speeches and his own remarks at collegial meetings were pithy and to the point. And yet, for all his concern for conserving time and energy—as his colleagues and students will testify—he was open and generous with his time, his patience, and his counsel when the larger purpose being served was scholarship and scholarly improvement.

Sometimes, it is possible to capture the measure of the man by recalling the aphorisms he applied in his daily dealings. Scholarship to serve the world of practical affairs, and practical compromise in scholarly affairs were goals that influenced his dealings. And many who knew him will remember his continuing search for these goals through the comment he often made: "The best of both worlds."

Candor and honesty were characteristic of Edgar Furniss. In faulting others for failure in these respects, his strongest criticism was often contained in the comment: "He didn't come clean." Imagination and boldness of enterprise were other qualities that Edgar Furniss valued and many will have heard him set down the timid proposal and the half-way measure with the remark: "Little steps for little feet."

But in remembering Edgar Furniss it is most fitting that we speak of the Mershon program which occupied so great a portion of his recent hopes and dreams. There is no doubt that he saw the Mershon program—and his part in that program—as making a significant contribution to American national security, and through that security, a contribution to the cause of world peace and international understanding. Characteristically, he was occupied until the very last with plans for extending that program, and for adding new achievements to old.

His colleagues at Ohio State and elsewhere are joined by alumni of the Mershon program in lamenting the death of an accomplished scholar, stopped part way in the realization of his professional concerns.—LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON.

PAUL MYRON ANTHONY LINEBARGER, Professor of Asiatic Politics in the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, died on August 6, 1966, in Baltimore.

Born in Milwaukee on July 11, 1913, Paul Linebarger became one of the most traveled and versatile of political scientists. Like his father, Paul M. W. Linebarger, long political adviser to Sun Yat-sen, he became a specialist in Chinese politics and, more broadly, in Asian history and affairs. From boyhood he spoke Chinese and German, and throughout his productive life he thought and wrote fluently in three languages. Educated in China and Germany before receiving his baccalaureate degree from George Washington University in 1933, he later completed both the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at Johns Hopkins, the latter at the age of 22. He was a postgraduate student at other universities: Oxford, American, Chicago, and Michigan. In 1955 he earned a certificate from the Washington School of Psychiatry. Later he studied Spanish and Latin American culture at the University Interamericana, Mexico, and received there an honorary degree, Litt.D., in 1964; in 1965 he was awarded an honorary D.C.L. by the National Chengchi University at Taipei. He was also decorated by the National Government of China.

Professionally Paul Linebarger established four careers: as academician, public servant, soldier, and prolific writer.

As a teacher of international affairs Paul Linebarger dealt in ideas, with unusual powers of perceptive generalization laced with strikingly vivid illustration. He inspired high standards of communication across many cultures and instilled intense loyalty among students. His teaching began at Harvard and centered long at Duke and in Washington at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins. In 1959 he was acting dean of that school. He served also as visiting professor at Pennsylvania and at the Australian National University; in addition he taught frequently at the Baltimore campus of Hopkins.

As public servant, early experience came in the staffs of legal advisers to the National Government of China. Thereafter for a third of a century he held assignments as consultant and official in agencies of the United States or as counselor to American diplomats. In World War II he was commissioned second lieutenant in the U. S. Army and advanced to major in the general staff; he was a colonel in the Reserve at the time of his death.

It was as a writer that Paul Linebarger found total continuity in varied experience. He could be a master of phrase or imagery in prose or poetry. As academician he is best known for five of his books: *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, 1936; *Government in Republican China*, 1938; *The China of Chiang Kai-shek*, 1941; *Psychological Warfare*, 1948 (translated into many languages); and *Far Eastern Gocernments and Politics* (senior author), 1954. He was a liberal in domestic politics and in international programs but staunchly opposed to any regime in which communism, or totalitarianism in any form, might subvert liberty. He strove to write with realism, behavioral as well as institutional, about the advancement of human dignity. In fiction he wrote under pseudonyms: in recent years as Felix C. Forrest, romance; as Carmichael Smith, adventure and suspense; as Cordwainer Smith, tales of interplanetary science. His wife, Dr. Genevieve Collins Linebarger, educated in international politics at Duke, Hopkins, and Maryland, was his literary partner and critic for the last sixteen years of his life.

Paul Linebarger had a hand in many books or projects beyond his own. He lent his wisdom and enthusiasm to all who came his way. He had been president of the American Peace Society and for years gave careful attention to its journal, *World Affairs*. He wrote and spoke with speed but advised with patience. He was a genius with words and in the power of uplifting friendship.—Franklin L. Burdette

William Whatley Pierson, Kenan Professor of Political Science Emeritus, died at his home in Mount Olive, North Carolina, on April 23. He was 76 years old. A native of Brundidge, Alabama, he earned his A.B. and M.A. degrees at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. at Columbia University in 1916. He came to Chapel Hill the same year.

His distinguished 40-year career at the University of North Carolina included his service as the first chairman of the department of political science, dean of the Graduate School, and interim Chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. He had a major impact on the department, the University and on higher education. The *Chapel Hill Weekly* wrote of him:

> "Whatley Pierson advocated and practiced quality instruction and training. As Dean for over a quarter of a century, he was a leader in Graduate School Development in the University, and his insistence on high standards of achievement helped to make the University of North Carolina respected in the nation and at the pinnacle of stature in the South. When accounts of Southern graduate school emergence are told, the University of of North Carolina is in the picture. In large measure that is because of the dedication and imaginative management of Dean Pierson."

While all this is true, we shall remember Dean Pierson primarily as a teacher of political theory and Latin American government. As such, he contributed mightily to the education of most readers of this journal.—The Department of Political Science, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

John Charles Withey, assistant professor of political science and international relations at Whittier College, died on July 26, 1966 at the age of 52 in Whittier, California. He attended Yale University, Columbia Law School and the Graduate School of the University of California at Los Angeles. He served from 1940 to 1945 in the United States Army, rising in rank from private to captain. From 1948 to July 1962 he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.

His service at Whittier College began in February, 1965. He proved to be a versatile, effective and dedicated teacher.

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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